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Financial development and economic growth in Rwanda

( Télécharger le fichier original )
par Deogratias MR. DUSHIMUMUKIZA
University of Mauritius - Masters Degree in Economics 2010
  

précédent sommaire

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2.3 Co nclusio

The chapter examined three theoretical views about the link between economic growth and financial development: the one stating that the financial sector development leads to economic growth, another putting economic growth ahead of financial development and lastly the view which does not support the importance of financial development on economic growth. On the empirical side, a strong positive role of financial development on economic growth has been found mostly in developed countries, and a weak or absence of link in developing countries. In some cases, the demand leading hypothesis has not been supported. In the next chapter we present the Rwandan financial sector.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

CHAPTER 3

OVERVIEW OF THE RWANDAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 3.0 Introduction

This chapter narrows the financial development issue to Rwandan case and highlights the weaknesses as well as the strength of the Rwandan financial system. To situate the level of financial development in macroeconomic perspective, a brief review of Rwandan economy is first presented. The chapter finishes with a comparison of the financial sector in Rwanda with those of other country members of East African region where Rwanda and Burundi were admitted in 2008.

3.1. Overview over the Rwandan economy

Rwanda is a small landlocked country in Central-East Africa, with 26,338 square kilometers. Its GDP per capita was $ 62.95 in 1970 with a population of 3.7 million, eight years after its independence from Belgium in 1962. The country is hampered by mountainous terrain and distance from the sea.

Rwanda is among most densely populated countries in Africa. In 2009, Rwanda was ranked 29th among densely countries in 239 countries with density of 379 people per square kilometer, far ahead of the African average of 34 people per square kilometer. In 2009, the population was 9.998 million, growing at 2.8 %, compared to African average of 1.66 %, thus putting increasing pressure on agriculture land and environment (United Nations Population Division, 2008).

Rwanda's economy is essentially rural; nearly 81% of the population lives in rural areas (United Nations Statistic Division, 2009) and derives its livelihood from subsistence agriculture, cultivating coffee and tea for export with rudiment methods. Besides agriculture, there is exploitation of scarce natural resources in some regions like cassiterite, wolframite, and methane recently discovered in Lake Kivu.

Rwandan economy has been improving since 2000 with an increasing growth
rate especially for the last four years, when the country maintained an average

growth rate vis-à- vis many African countries over the period 2005-2008. In fact, the growth rate was 7.2 % in 2005, 7.3% in 2006, 7.9 % and 11.2 % in 2007 and 2008 respectively accumulating into an average growth rate of 8.4 % above the African average rate of 5.82% during this period. In addition, the country became the third, after Angola and Ethiopia (IMF, 2009). Moreover, Rwanda has made considerable efforts in improving living conditions of her population. Poverty has fallen by 3%, from 60% of the population living under the poverty line in 2000/2001 to 56.9% in 2006 but leaving 37.9% still extremely poor (IFAD website). However, Rwanda's development indicators are still below the African and East African averages, as indicated by the table below:

Table1: Trends i n average of per capita GDP

Indicator

Country

1970=

1980

1981=

1990

1991=

2000

2000=

2008

Overall average

Per capita GDP (in US$)

Rwanda

147.4

323.5

268.2

276.6

250

 

489.21

768.9

733.9

1029.8

734.59

 

232.45

313.9

278.8

346.76

288.69

Growth rate of GDP (%)

Rwanda

5.54

2

3.2

7.13

4.36

 

3.08

3.26

3.17

5.27

3.55

 

3.87

2.14

2.82

5.83

3.5

Share of Gross capital formation in GDP (in %)

Rwanda

14.45

18.71

13.35

17.27

15.84

 

29.80

26.07

20.05

24.26

25.32

 

22.29

17.77

16.26

19.15

18.94

 

Source: Author's calculations from data provided by United Nations Statistics Division, CIA World Fact books and World Development indicators Database.

As the table indicates, for the period 1981-1990 Rwanda reached the highest average per capita GDP with $323.5 compared to the average of $276.6 during the recent period ranging from 2000-2008. In addition, it is only in this period where its per capita GDP and the share of Gross capital formation in GDP was

above East African average. This was mainly due to political stability and favorable weather that prevailed during that time which made agricultural sector to contribute a lot in GDP.

The period 1990-2000 was marked by war of four years (1990-1994), the genocide of 1994 in which more than one million lost their lives and insecurity which affected the north (1996-1998). This explains the decrease in above indicators. Despite this situation, the growth rate of GDP exceeded African and East African average, as the country was trying to recover. Although the recent period was marked by the highest per capita GDP in 2008 with $ 458.49, but the period was characterized by a low per capita GDP in the period ranging from 2001-2003, a figure less than $200.

It is worth to say that it is in 2008 where the country recovered and passed over the level of per capita GDP reached before the genocide, that of 1988 with $360.87. The per capita GDP has been declining as from 1989, one year before the beginning of the war of 1990, up to 1994 from $360.87 in 1988 to $207.43 in 1994. Since 1995, the economic growth started to recover and currently, though the per capita GDP is still low, but Rwanda is among top performing in Africa with the growth rate currently above both African and East African average.

Many reasons explain the poverty of the country: being a landlocked country, on this it added the bad governance which has characterized the country since its independence, war, genocide and insecurity, lack of natural resources, little skilled human capital, as per year 2005, less than 1% of the population had a tertiary education, and a low level of investment.

3.2 The Rwandan financial sector

We analyse the financial sector by looking at the banking sector, MFIs, insurance companies and financial markets. We begin by mentioning that the Rwandan financial sector can be traced back from the creation of the Central Bank, National Bank of Rwanda and issue of the local currency, Rwandan Franc (RWF) in April 1964.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

3.2.1 Banking sector

The development of the financial sector before the genocide of 1994 was slow. At the time, only 3 commercial banks and 2 specialized banks operated with a total of less than 20 branches in the country, and one microfinance (UBPR) with around 146 branches. The war and the genocide affected heavily the banking sector: The genocide itself resulted in closure of the Central bank for 4 months. The former government left the country in 1994 for the DRC, after committing the genocide, with two-thirds of the national monetary base in addition to US $7 million in cash which was taken from the UBPR (Alson et al, 2001). Consequently, it took two years for this bank to reopen, in 1996. Moreover, almost both physical and human capital of all banks were destroyed during the genocide.

The post genocide period was marked by increase in number of banks, where in 2002 there were 6 commercial banks with 28 branches, 2 specialized banks and 1 union of financial institutions (UBPR) with 148 branches (NBR, 2004). In 2007, commercial banks operated only 38 branches, making only 7 % of all branches of financial institutions and by the end of 2008, 8 commercial banks, 2 specialized banks and 1 Microfinance bank were operating.

However, there was a lack of competition as three banks (BCR, BK and ECOBANK) held 66% market share before the licensing of UBPR as commercial bank in 2008. This situation has led to high interest rate spreads (8.6% in 2005), a modest 16% per annum growth in deposits over the past 5 years, and lending primarily to a core group of about 50 relatively large customers concentrated in Kigali and a few sectors (Murgatroyd et al, 2007).

The penetration of banking sector is very low, and worse in rural areas. The survey conducted by FinMark Trust in 2008 showed that in general, only 14 percent of the active population use banks, 7% use MFIs, 26% are informally served and 52% are financially excluded. In rural areas, less than 6 percent of the population hold savings account in a formal finance institution. Indeed, penetration of domestic credit to the private sector is underperforming, with 11

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

percent of GDP, compared to 18 percent of GDP for peer countries (NBR, 2008).

Several reasons explain the underdevelopment of financial services. The weak culture of savings among the people is due to low level of per capita income in the country. In fact, in 2009 Rwanda was ranked 21st poorest of the least developed countries in the world and 56.9 percent of its population lives on less than US$0.45 equivalent a day, the poverty threshold in Rwanda (IMF, 2009).

Secondly, a high spread between the deposit rate (around 7%) and a lending rate (around 16%) does not provide an incentive to the public to save. Many bank accounts are used as a payment mechanism for employees. It is important to note that due to relative higher penetration of UBPR, it has been upgraded to commercial bank in 2008 and became BPR S.A, and that KCB, a new regional bank from Kenya has been licensed.

3.2.2 Microfi na nce institutions

Microfinance initiatives mushroomed from 2002, primarily as a response to the weak involvement of the traditional banks in small and micro enterprises, and rural areas. Sixty-three microfinance institutions were licensed in 2006 (Habyalimana, 2007).

In 2009, the microfinance sub-sector consisted of around 125 MFIs including 111 COOPECS (Kantengwa, 2009). In June 2006, NBR estimated that MFIs represented 24.18% of the total financing of the economy with RWF 59bn (equivalent of $100 million) out of RWF 244bn of credit of the financial institutions and 25% of savings mobilization. The mobilized savings amounted to RWF 65bn (equivalent to around $.110 million) out of RWF 259bn. Informal finance is so popular that 73 % of total population reported using informal loans in 2005 (Habyalimana, 2007).

However, Microfinance institutions are inexperienced, characterised by management with poor corporate governance, weak information systems, important losses caused by poor internal organisation and a mismanagement of their loan portfolio (Kantengwa, 2009). All these weaknesses culminated into

the failure of nine microfinance institutions in 2006 with total deposits of more than $5.3 million, leading to a general panic (NBR, 2007). To include rural population in the financial system, UMURENGE SACCOs was introduced in the end of 2008, a saving scheme to be operating in each of 421 sectors.

3.2.3 Insurance and pension funds

This sector comprises 5 classic insurance companies (SONARWA, SORAS, COGEAR, CORAR and Phoenix of Rwanda Assurance Company) and six insurance brokers. In 2006, only about 3% of the active population held insurance policy. In addition, there are three public medical insurance companies: RAMA, MMI and Mutuelle de Santé and one private company, AAR Health Services, licensed in 2008. The relatively well performing RAMA and MMI serve only 5% of the population (NISR, 2008).

The pension sector is assured by one Public Pension fund (SSFR) and 10 Growing Private Pension funds. The SSFR covers only 7.5% of active population and on overall less than 8% of the active population is under pension schemes (NBR, 2009).

3.2.4 Financial markets

In January 2008, Rwanda established a capital market with the creation of an Over-The-Counter market operated and regulated by a Capital Market Advisory Council (CMAC). However, its market capitalisation is still very low as only $ 360, 000 has been traded in 15 transactions (the average of $24,000 in each transaction) and newspapers frequently reported that the OTC has been silent due to lack of transactions recorded. The main reason is the poverty of Rwandan citizen which does not allow the culture of saving where even those who earn monthly salary are able to spend it for survival only. With regard to market participants, Rwandan OTC has 7 members divided into three categories: Stockbrokers, Dealers and Sponsors (CMAC website).

3.2.5 Financial liberalization i n Rwanda

Before the financial liberalization, tools of monetary policy were mainly credit
rationing, directed credit and interest rate controls. The financial deregulation

was characterized by legal reforms affecting the nature of central bank supervision and new tools of monetary policy were introduced like regal reserve requirements and discount rate, alongside the abolition of interest rate ceilings, directed credit and credit rationing as well.

The process of financial liberalization started in March 1995 by the liberalization of exchange rate and interest rate in 1996. In the same year, banking structure was opened to foreign investment and entry requirements for MFIs were relaxed. However, despite abolition of controls on interest rates, the rigidity in the later is still observed, fluctuating around 16% for lending and 7% for deposit rates of interest, due to oligopolistic nature of the banking system.

The period 2004-2006 was characterized by take over of nonperforming banks due to poor corporate governance. BACAR and BCDI were taken over by FINABANK and ECOBANK respectively, and the government sold its majority of share in BCR. In 2006, the spread of MFIs nationwide came as another step in financial liberalization, following the failure of commercial banks to deliver in rural areas. However, as prophesized by Diaz-Alejandro (1985), the end of 2006 and 2007 turned the financial sector in crisis as consequence of unmonitored regularization, after which the central bank started exerting basic controls on financial institutions through micro finance law and regulation adopted in 2008, and strengthened by creation of MFI association created in 2007.

3.2.6 Monetary policy i n Rwanda

Monetary policy is a responsibility of the NBR and is a part of the annual economic program aiming at implementing the medium-term program referred to as EDPRS. Like all central banks, NBR uses open market operations, reserve requirements (fixed at 8% before 2009 and reduced to 5% from 2009), and discount rate (which fluctuates between 7.5 % and 8%). With its basic objective of price and foreign exchange stability, its development can be regarded in two periods: the period of financial regulation, from 1964 to 1995 and after liberalization in 1995.

Before 1995, the country was in fixed exchange rate regime. From 1970 to 1990, the foreign exchange rate was 1$ for nearly 82 RWF. However, the war period 1990-1994 saw many devaluations, especially that of 1991 with 51.5 % and that of 1994 of 91.64% and by the end of 1994, the exchange rate stood at 1$ for 220 RWF (DUSHIMUMUKIZA, 2006).

The period of flexible exchange rate was characterized by volatility in exchange rate. As evidence, in January 2003, the average exchange rate stood at 511.2168 RWF for 1$, but by end of the year, the exchange rate was at 574.83RWF for 1$. The depreciation rate stood at 11.6% from one year to another. If we compare the average exchange rate of 2002 and 2008, the index is 115.2 in six years, from the exchange rate of 475.32 FRW for 1$ in 2002 to 547.61 FRW for 1$ in 2008 (NBR, annual report, 2008). Indeed, this exchange rate can be compared to 220 RWF for 1$ in 1994.

Regarding price stability, again the rampant inflation characterized the after liberalization period, as compared to the period before where the price stability was observed. Evidence from Kigali (the Capital city) in 2003 shows that the CPI for all products in constant terms of 1982 was 559.32 compared to the CPI of 408.93 and in 1996 (NBR, annual report of 2003). The inflation rate is fluctuating around 7.5%

For money supply, there was an upward trend in money supply to the level where its growth rate was above that of GDP. For instance, in 2007, increase in money supply was 31.25% against 13% of nominal GDP. Indeed, in some years, the money supply experiences an over expansion, especially during election periods like 2003 and 2008.

For payment system monetization, SIMTEL was introduced in 2005 aiming at speeding up the level of financial innovation, which is very low, as in 2008 the value of transactions using bank cards was 0.59 percent of the non cash payment instruments (dominated by cheques) and cash payment represented 98% of the payment system (NBR, 2009). Introduction of Real Time Gross Settlement and an Automated Clearing House were few among mechanisms of such modernization.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

3.3 Comparison of financial development within EAC

The discussion omits comparison based on the number of financial institutions as the countries are not equally sized and formal financial markets since Rwanda and Burundi do not have them while Kenya launched its stock market (Nairobi Stock Exchange) in 1954 and those of Tanzania and Uganda are operational since 1998. We rather use some ratios regarded as proxies of the level of financial development.

The need for this comparison lies in the sense that the macroeconomic policies of these countries are tied together, hence it pays for Rwanda to know its status quo in this community of countries. Three indicators are used: Liquid liabilities as % of GDP, claims on private sector to GDP ratio and domestic credit to GDP ratio. Data which are sources of the figures are presented in appendices.

3.3.1 Ratio of Liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP

Rwanda and Uganda are the last and their M3/GDP ratio are far below the average of the AEC (21.98 % of GDP) with Kenya leading at 39.77% compared to 15.35% of Rwanda, as shown by the chart below:

45

40

25

20

50

35

30

15

10

0

5

Rwanda Burundi Uganda Tanzania Kenya

Figure 1: Evolution i n ration of liquid liabilities i n EAC

On overall, Kenya comes first followed by Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. We noted that in 2005, worldwide ranking of these countries were: Kenya 94th, Tanzania 113rd, Burundi 118th, Rwanda 131st and Uganda 132nd out of 173 countries, with weighted average of 58%.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

3.3.2 Claims o n private sector to GDP ratio

This indictor was suggested by some researchers as the best measurement of the level of financial depth as discussed in chapter two. The figure below indicates the level of financial depth in East African Countries had been this indicator used.

35

30

25

20

15

10

0

5

Rwanda Burundi Uganda Tanzania Kenya

Figure 2: Evolution i n average of claims o n private sector to GDP i n EAC

Kenya is still leading followed by Burundi whereas other countries are almost at the same level, which is very low below the average of 14.75%. Rwanda is the fourth with 7.05% while Uganda is the last in the group with 6.11%. Based on this indicator, we can say that Kenya enjoys a financial deepening four times that of Rwanda. However, Rwanda has been improving but at a slow rate compared to Burundi which made a significant improvement. This ratio for Burundi was more than three times that of Uganda and more than double that of Rwanda in recent period, while 30 years ago the difference between these countries was slightly small (less than 3%).

3.3.3 Domestic credit to GDP ratio

As the next figure shows, Burundi has been improving considerably from the last in row during the period 1970-1975 (with 9.45 %) to the 2nd position (with 36.62%) for last two consecutive periods, from 1995 to 2005. Surprisingly, this indicator declined considerably in Rwanda's post genocide where it moved from 17.51% as the average for the war period of 1990-1995 to 11.54% for the last period 2001-2005 while the country was supposed to be putting enough effort in the credit to private sector to speed up the economic growth.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

45.00

40.00

50.00

35.00

30.00

25.00

20.00

15.00

10.00

0.00

5.00

Rwanda Burundi Uganda Tanzania Kenya

Figure 3: Evolution i n average ratio of domestic credit to GDP i n EAC

This ratio for Rwanda was below the EAC average throughout the period. Moreover, there is an increasing gap between Rwanda, the last in group, and Kenya, the first, from 11.46% over the period 1970-1975 to 27.97%. This is one among reasons that explain the gap in the level of economic development among these countries. Uganda and Tanzania too have the low ratio. Though several reasons can explain why Rwanda is lagging behind in financial development, civil war, insecurity and poor governance are paramount factors to the explanation. However, a detailed analysis is needed to explain why Tanzania and Uganda are not performing well in some areas while they enjoyed a relative stability, contrary to Burundi which was in war since 1993 up to 2005 and performed well.

3.4 Co nclusio

Rwandan economy has been growing during post genocide period but still the economy is at the lower level when compared to other countries. Indeed, the financial development is still low and below the average of the East African countries. When considering some indicators of the financial development over the period 1970-2005, Rwanda is almost the last within five countries though Uganda and Tanzania too are not performing well. This observation brings to mind the empirical question of the extent to which the level of financial development in Rwanda is linked with the level of economic growth. Therefore the following chapter presents the methodology followed to conduct this study.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

4.0 I ntroductio

This chapter presents the methods and techniques, the model, estimation techniques and types of data used in this study in investigating the causality among the proxies of financial development and economic growth.

4.1 Meaning and rationale of the model used

The use of VAR was motivated by its ability to capture the dynamic interaction of financial sector development and economic growth. A VAR is a direct generalization of the univariate AR(p) model to the case of a vector of variables and is used to express the dynamic correlations between the variables and hence is considered as an alternative to large-scale simultaneous equations structural models (Brooks, 2008).

It allows treating each variable as endogenous thus avoiding restrictions, judged incredible by Sims (1980), imposed by univariate AR, by specifying some variables as being exogenous. This model was chosen because the changes in indicators of financial development are possibly correlated with the disturbance term in the equation of economic growth. This is because an unobserved factor that influences growth of GDP may very well influence indicators of financial development, making them endogenous. Further more, this study joins other studies on the matter which used the VAR frame work, namely: Hassan and Jung-Suk (2007); Teame (2002); Sakutukwa (2008) and others.

4.2 Model specification and rationale of variables

In a VAR model, all variables have equations linking the change in that variable to its own current and past values and the current and past values of all the variables in the model, as it describes the dynamic evolution of a number of variables from their common history (Verbeek, 2004). The model is expressed

in a matrix form as:Yt = B + Elic_i AtYt_i + Et with:

V, = ( GRATES DEPTHBANKPRIVATESOPHT )

Yt : It is a 5×1 column vector of 5 variables including proxy measures of the financial development, B is a 5×1 column vector of constants, At and Yt_i are

5×5 matrices of coefficients and lagged variables respectively, i is the lag length

to be determined by AIC criteria and et is a 5×1 column vector of error terms. Variables included in the models are:

GRATE = Growth rate of Real per capita GDP, following the works of Sinha and Macri (2001) and Kesseven et al (2007);

DEPTH = Claims on Private sector to GDP ratio considered as proxy of financial deepening, following the works of Karima and Holden (2001), Firdu and Struthers (2003) and Zhang et al (2007);

BANK = Domestic credit by deposit money bank and other banking institutions divided by total domestic credit;

PRIVATE = Claims on the non-financial private sector to gross domestic credit; SOPHT = Ratio of broad money to narrow money (M2/M1) as proxy of financial sophistication, following the work of Sakutukwa (2008).

BANK and PRIVATE are inspired by the work of Levine and King (1993). Unlike to them, we have included the domestic credit for other banking institutions in BANK to mitigate the drawbacks of this indicator as commercial banks are not the only financial institutions to provide valuable financial functions. However, there is still a weakness in these proxies in Rwanda because data used on assets of financial institutions do not include the UBPR which play an important role in Rwandan financial sector.

4.3. Model estimatio

4.3.1 Statio narity and coi ntegratio

Due to spurious regression resulting from nonstationary series in the regressions, we have conducted the tests for stationarity, using ADF to check whether the residual series are white noise. The tests for cointegration have been conducted to determine the form of the VAR to be estimated. In fact, trend stationary variables are estimated by OLS, if the variables contain stochastic trends and cointegrated, a VECM is used and finally if the variables are not stationary and not cointegrated, the model is estimated after the stochastic

trends have been removed by taking first differences of the data. All tests were run within Eviews 6.

4.3.2 Granger causality tests

To determine which sets of variables have a significant effects on each dependent variable, causality tests have been conducted by restricting the coefficient of the lags of a particular variable to zero (Wooldridge, 1990). The objective is to find out if changes in one variable do affect changes in another variable and vice versa. If this is the case, as explained by Brooks (2008), a sets of lags of the included variable should be significant and it would be said that there is a bi-directional causality, otherwise it should be said that some included variables are exogenous or no causality exists at all between variables had been all lags insignificant.

4.3.3. Variance decomposition and Impulse response

The ambiguity in interpreting individual coefficients in VAR model (Gujarati, 2004) motivated us to use the variance decomposition and impulse response function which trace out the response of the dependent variable in the VAR model to shocks in the error term for several periods in the future, keeping constant all other variables dated t and before.

4.4. The data source and measurement

The five considered time series are ratios we have computed from data provided by the IFS Yearbooks. The database includes 42 annual observations from 1964 to 2005. Unlikely to previous studies which used natural logarithm of the series, we did not find any graphical relationship, as advised by Gujarati (2004), which motivates a priori transformation of the data to log-log model.

4.5 Co nclusio

This chapter has presented the methodology that has been used in this study. The next chapter presents and analyses the results of econometric estimation. The main objective of the chapter is the hypothesis testing.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

CHAPTER 5

MODEL ESTIMATION AND FINDINGS

5.0 I ntroductio

So far we have presented the literature both on theoretical and empirical side on the causality between economic growth and financial development. It is now time to turn to the empirical testing of this relationship for Rwandan economy. This chapter presents the results obtained from econometric testing and discusses the meaning and reason behind the figures.

5.1 Test for statio narity

The footstep of this analysis is to determine whether the series are stationary or not. The ADF was used to test for stationarity of these series as it provides a superior test to DF, especially in case the residuals of the regression could be serially correlated. The lag length has been automatically selected by AIC from nine proposed lags and all three possibilities have been tested: neither intercept nor trend, intercept but no trend and both intercept and trend. In all cases, results were found similar irrespective of the model used.

Here we present the results from the general model including intercept with

trend, as depicted by: AYt=f3i + f32t + SYt_i + al El:=i AYt_p + Et.

In addition, we have tested for the presence of trend in series, with the model:

Yt =cx +f3t + Et. The presence or the absence of the trend will be used for

subsequent tests. The table below presents the results: Table 2: ADF Test Statistics i n levels

Variable

t= statistics

Critical values at

Lag length

Decision at 5%

 

5%

 

Presence of trend

GRATE

-3.59

-4.20

-3.52

1

Stationary

No

DEPTH

-6.11

-2.62

-1.94

0

Stationary

Yes

 

Variable

t= statistics

Critical values at

Lag length

Decision at 5%

 

5%

 

Presence of trend

SOPHT

-3.36

-4.21

-3.52

2

Not stationary

Yes

BANK

-2.96

-4.19

-3.52

0

Not stationary

Yes

PRIVATE

-2.25

-4.21

-3.55

3

Stationary

Yes

 

The hypotheses tested are:

Ho: S = 0, the series are not stationary, )62 = 0, there is no trend

Ho: S * 0, the series are stationary, )62 * 0, there is a trend

After taking first differences of SOPHT and BANK, the series were found to be stationary at 1%, as the table below depicts:

Table 3: ADF Test Statistics with first difference

Variables

t=

Critical values at

Lag length

Decision

 

Statistic

1%

5%

selected

 

D(SOPHT)

-6.019

-4.205

-3.526

0

Stationary at 1%

D(BANK)

-6.759

-4.211

-3.529

1

Stationary at 1%

 

The above results conclude that GRATE, DEPTH and PRIVATE are I(0) while SOPHT and BANK are I(1). Therefore, VAR in levels cannot be applied.

5.2 Test for coi ntegratio

In econometric literature, it is not clear whether cointegration should be applied to only series integrated of the same order. Though Verbeck (2004) noted that the concept of cointegration can be applied to (nonstationary) integrated time series only and Dickey et al, quoted by Gujarati (2004), stipulated that Cointegration deals with the relationship among a group of variables, where (unconditionally) each has a unit root, however Brooks (2004) stressed that it is also possible to combine levels and first differenced terms in a VECM. The later therefore illustrates that cointegration can exist among variables not integrated of the same order.

Heij et al (2004) developed the mathematical proof of this view where they asserted that a cointegration relationship exists between stationary and nonstationary variables. If their mathematical proof is put in simple terms, there are three possibilities in VAR with many variables: If m: the number of variables, r= rank of the matrix of coefficients and also the number of cointegration relations, therefore:

· If all variables are stationary, r=m and all roots lie outside the unit cycle

· If all variables are not stationary, r=0, there are m unit roots or m stochastic trends.

· If some variables are stationary and others not stationary, r= 0<r<m, there are m-r unit roots, the polynomial have m-r common stochastic trends and there are r cointegrating relations.

As some variables are stationary and others not, Johansen cointegration test has been used to determine whether there exists a long-run relationship between these variables. This test was preferred to Engle-Granger approach because in case of five variables we may have more than one cointegrating relationship (Brooks, 2004).

a) Johansen coi ntegratio n test

Johansen trace test was used on the number of cointegrating relations with null hypothesis of no cointegration between series against the alternative hypothesis of existence of cointegration between the series. All variables enter the cointegration analysis in levels. This table depicts cointegrating vectors for each model with 4 lags.

Table 4: Number of coi ntegrati ng relations by model, at 5% level*

Data Trend:

None

None

Linear

Linear

Quadratic

Test Type

No Intercept

Intercept

Intercept

Intercept

Intercept

 

No Trend

No Trend

No Trend

Trend

Trend

Trace

2

3

3

4

3

Max-Eig

0

1

3

4

3

*Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)

All five possibilities about the nature of deterministic trend assumption suggest
that the series are cointegrated. At least there is one cointegrating factor except
the Max-Eig method with neither intercept nor trend in data, which is unlikely to

be the case. The subsequent step is to determine whether an intercept or trend or both are included in the cointegrating relationship and to present the results of the selected model. The analysis of the nature of trend conducted showed that all variables except GRATE have significant intercept and trend. After estimating the selected model of both intercept and trend with 3 lags selected by AIC, the results were as follows:

Table 5: Unrestricted Coi ntegrati ng Rank Test (Trace)

Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Trace
Statistic

0.05
Critical Value

Prob.**

None *

0.890720

137.1029

88.80380

0.0000

At most 1

0.517635

55.19081

63.87610

0.2162

At most 2

0.306696

28.21578

42.91525

0.6091

At most 3

0.251814

14.66319

25.87211

0.6026

At most 4

0.100754

3.929364

12.51798

0.7523

Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

The statistic of 137.1 considerably exceeds the critical value (of 88.8) and so the null of no cointegrating vectors is rejected. But the 2nd row shows that the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector can not be rejected as trace statistic of 55.19 is less than critical value of 63.9. Therefore, there exists one cointegrating relation which means that the rank of the matrix (r) is one.

The results from trace test were the same if maximum eigenvalue test was considered. As there is one cointegrating vector, this allows us to estimate a VECM, in line with advice of Brooks (2004) of not using models in differences when cointegration is present, as this flows away important information and have no long-run solution.

5.3 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)

The lag length was chosen based on AIC, which was consistent with LR and HQ. Noting that as data are annual observations, a maximum of 4 lags is reasonable, as suggested by Brooks (2004) based on the frequency of the observation and AIC picked 3 lags. The estimated output is presented in the appendix, but the table below presents the significant lags at 5% level.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Table 6: Significant Vector Error Correction Estimates

Variable

Significant lags at 5% and their coefficients i n I l

D(GRATE)

CointEq1

[-2.03]

D(GRATE(-1)) [0.63]

D(GRATE(-2)) [0.25)

D(DEPTH(-1)) [0.69]

D(DEPTH(-2)) [0.86]

D(DEPTH(-3)) [0.96]

D(Bank(-1)) [0.4]

 

D(DEPTH)

CointEq1

[-1.16]

D(DEPHT(-1)) [0.69]

D(DEPTH(-2)) [-0.79]

D(DEPTH(-3)) [-0.49]

D(SOPHT(-1) [1.01]

 
 
 

D(SOPHT)

CointEq1

[-0.72]

D(PRIVATE(-2)) [-0.7]

 
 

D(BANK)

D(Bank(-1))

[-0.51]

D(PRIVATE(-1)) [1.11]

D(PRIVATE(-2)) [-1.26]

D(PRIVATE(-3)) [0.95]

D(PRIVATE)

D(PRIVATE(-1)) [0.62]

D(PRIVATE(-2)) [-0.52]

D(PRIVATE(-3)) [0.48]

 

The Error correction term showing the long-run equilibrium is estimated as:

CointEgl = GRATEt_i -- 0.057 SOPHTt_i + 0.0019 /31t -- 0.0019 /30

+ 0.332DEPHTt_1 -- 0.114 PRIVATEt_i + 0.298BANKt_1

In all equations, the cointegrating equation has a negative sign as expected and significant in three out of five equations. We note from the table above that in many equations of the VECM, the coefficients of lags of other variables are not significant, especially for PRIVATE which is determined solely by its own lags, SOPHT is explained by one lag from PRIVATE whereas for DEPTH only its own lags and 1 lag of SOPHT are significant.

The cointegration is strongly significant for GRATE, DEPTH and SOPHT. However, as noted by Brooks (2004), evaluation of the significance of variables in a VECM is based on the joint tests on all of the lags of a variable in the equation rather than individual coefficient estimates. Therefore we proceed to F test as indicated in the table below:

Table 7: F=statistics for VECM

Variables

D(GRATE)

D(DEPTH)

D(SOPHT)

D(Bank)

D(Private)

R2

0.97

0.67

0.67

0.62

0.55

Adj R2

0.95

0.41

0.41

0.33

0.19

F-stat

45.41

2.59

2.60

2.12

1.54

Critical values of F-statistic are taken from F-statistic table provided by Gujarati
(2004) and are 3.09; 2.2 and 1.84 for 1%; 5% and 10% respectively. The VECM

shows that for GRATE the null hypothesis being all coefficients are simultaneously zero is rejected at 1%, for DEPTH and SOPHT the null hypothesis is rejected at 5%, for BANK it is rejected at 10% and for PRIVATE the null hypothesis can not be definitely rejected.

The results suggest that there exist: a long-run relationship between growth rate of real per capita GDP and proxies of financial development, a long-run relationship between financial depth, rate of growth of real per capita GDP and other included measures of financial development and the same applies to financial sophistication. The F-test denies any long-run relationship between the ratio of credit to private sector to total domestic credit with GDP, and other measures of financial development and for the ratio of credit allocated by banks to total domestic credit when 5% level is considered.

5.4 The E ngle=Gra nger test

The test is meant to detect any short-term relationship between the variables and it is applied to test whether the changes in one variable can cause changes in another variable and vice-versa. As there is a long-run relationship between variables, the error correction term will be included in the Granger causality test for estimating a short-run relationship. It is worth noting that Granger causality test should be applied to stationary series (Sinha and Macri, 2001). Therefore, we have applied this test with differences in non-stationary series. When estimated the VAR model with differences in nonstationary variables to come up with lag length, the AIC and HQ criteria gave out 5 lags. The model to be estimated is:

M'at =0(0-Foci ~ 78 ~ ~~ ~ 98 ~

8 8 ~~ where Ya and Yb are

~~~ ~~~

variables on which causality test is being applied. The hypotheses to be tested are:

Ho: âi=0, Yb does not Granger causes Ya

H1: âi ?0, Yb does Granger causes Ya

The results for Granger causality are presented in table below:

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Table 8: Marginal significance levels associated with joint F=test

Dependent variable

Lags of variables

Significant lags

GRATE

DEPTH

DSOPHT

DBANK

PRIVATE

GRATE

0

9.8E-13

0.01503

0.60738

0.16923

DEPTH and SOPHT

DEPTH

0.99980

0

0.12400

0.99071

0.61635

None

DSOPT

0.00777

0.00338

0

0.54904

0.28578

GRATE and DEPTH

DBANK

0.99662

0.08847

0.73048

0

0.03597

PRIVATE

PRIVATE

0.25647

0.29164

0.38541

0.82127

0

None

The table above gives the probability values at 5% for the null hypothesis that all the lags of a given variable are jointly insignificant in a given equation. The second row after the headings shows that all the lags of DEPTH and DSOPHT are jointly significant in explaining the changes of GRATE (values less than 0.05). Indeed, both lags of GRATE and DEPTH jointly explain the changes in DSOPHT. Moreover, a part from the lags of PRIVATE which jointly explain DBANK, there is as well no causality between DEPTH and other variables as applied for PRIVATE.

The Engle-Granger causality suggests that in short-term, there is unidirectional causality from financial deepening to growth rate of real per capita GDP and bidirectional feedback between financial sophistication and growth rate of real per capita GDP. But other proxies of financial development do not seem to have affected economic growth, or being affected by economic growth.

5.5 Impulse responses and variance decompositions

The Granger Causality solves the problem of existence or not of variables with significant lags in the model but will not indicate whether there is a positive or a negative relationship between variables or how long the effects will take place. Fortunately, this information is given by Variance decomposition and Impulse responses.

5.5.1 Variance decompositio

Gebhard and Wolters (2007) define variance decompositions as a determinant
of how much the s-step-ahead forecast error variance of a given variable is

explained by innovations to each explanatory variable for s = 1, 2, etc. The estimated variance decompositions are as follows:

Table 9: Variance decomposition of GRATE

Period

S.E.

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.110866

100.0000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

2

0.124707

82.69667

8.579287

3.272943

3.121836

2.329268

3

0.147683

68.46577

21.21998

2.911180

3.706309

3.696768

4

0.161082

63.06704

22.01977

5.362547

4.577584

4.973060

5

0.230705

30.74644

56.71985

2.944156

5.417225

4.172328

6

0.264102

25.86977

48.00195

11.86883

10.10530

4.154157

7

0.279128

27.88629

45.35033

11.21903

9.305821

6.238536

8

0.297045

24.98740

40.23873

20.10273

9.132219

5.538915

9

0.299774

25.47580

39.51314

20.12288

9.053579

5.834607

10

0.311132

25.82532

38.50044

21.06230

8.824819

5.787122

The data shows that in period 1, changes in Growth rate of GDP are due to its own shocks at 100%. However as time passes, the effects of shocks of other proxies of financial development to GDP increase significantly, especially financial depth shocks, which increase from 0 in period 1 to 56% in fifth period and represent more than 45% of all shocks on GDP from period 5-7 and nearly 40% above period 8. For Financial sophistication, although its shocks to GDP are low up to fifth period, they become important in the long-run, as they account from 10% - 20% of the whole shocks in GDP growth rate.

In long-run, BANK and PRIVATE exert some influence on Growth rate of GDP as they account for around 9% and 6 % respectively after the seventh period. This leads to a considerable decrease of responsiveness of growth rate of GDP to its own shocks from the range of 20% to 30 % after the fifth period.

Table 10: Variance decomposition of DEPTH

Period

S.E.

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.166228

6.593561

93.40644

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

2

0.177693

5.794367

81.81403

10.71161

1.676598

0.003399

3

0.181328

6.251779

78.93336

11.59888

3.148914

0.067069

4

0.196067

5.909571

67.51985

21.31578

3.279901

1.974900

5

0.200638

5.771625

64.94746

20.47421

6.396104

2.410596

6

0.203363

5.642555

63.22212

20.70156

7.800917

2.632850

7

0.204559

5.698593

62.48965

20.49198

8.642176

2.677599

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Period S.E. GRATE DEPTH SOPHT BANK PRIVATE

8

0.206029

5.618773

61.74162

20.20135

9.476386

2.961867

9

0.206866

5.583026

61.38685

20.08648

9.998728

2.944921

10

0.209391

5.449760

61.67798

19.73869

10.25844

2.875138

From the first period, the shocks in GDP growth rate account for 6.59% of the shocks in DEPTH and no other variable exerts a shock on financial depth. However, as from the fourth period, the financial sophistication exerts a relatively higher significant influence on DEPTH than other variables, around 20%. Shocks in rate of GDP account still for around 5% and 2.8% for PRIVATE. It is noted that the impact of BANK shocks as well increase in the long-run, from 0% to 10.25% from the first period onwards.

Table 11: Variance decomposition of SOPHT

Period

S.E.

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.074312

26.69308

0.003523

73.30339

0.000000

0.000000

2

0.092146

18.38277

0.672448

74.86819

6.069340

0.007246

3

0.133858

9.698140

11.79599

67.75000

7.847544

2.908331

4

0.170257

6.012045

23.10979

54.15415

12.49342

4.230598

5

0.220413

3.774206

39.20184

37.55349

15.89273

3.577740

6

0.240093

3.239503

40.45313

31.95285

20.92763

3.426890

7

0.258410

2.844621

43.07799

28.56225

21.77780

3.737332

8

0.271110

2.841146

44.52708

26.18426

22.98927

3.458246

9

0.279182

2.780299

45.79558

24.69353

23.46618

3.264411

10

0.284385

2.707705

46.31954

23.86455

23.96186

3.146348

From the above table, the shocks in growth rate of GDP account for 26.69% in explaining changes in financial sophistication whereas its own shocks account for 73%, as other variables do not influence SOPHT in the first period. However, this order changes over time as financial depth takes over growth rate of GDP in explaining changes in financial sophistication. In fact, starting from the third period, shocks in financial depth lead to variability in financial sophistication by 11.7% compared to 9.6% of growth rate in GDP where still its own shocks account for more than 60%.

The influence of financial depth increases considerably up to 40% in sixth period and the own shocks decline to 31.95%, coupled with an increase in influence of BANK with 20.92% and a decrease in influence of GDP rate from 26.69% to 3.23% and remained at this level. The impact of PRIVATE shocks

remains low close to 3.5% whereas that of shocks from financial depth account for 40% to 45% in long-run, leaving the own shocks between 30% to 23% and BANK shocks around 23%.

Table 12: Variance decomposition of BANK

Period

S.E.

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.108855

0.758292

7.481317

2.693772

89.06662

0.000000

2

0.134533

2.800047

9.892457

3.375928

70.39165

13.53991

3

0.157558

3.654779

15.77366

3.449549

66.83704

10.28497

4

0.179687

4.319090

21.15028

5.165073

61.43189

7.933671

5

0.210744

5.307566

19.52585

10.44650

54.85325

9.866828

6

0.238217

5.969085

17.27681

17.65179

48.14008

10.96223

7

0.252272

6.237416

17.76269

20.31924

45.59069

10.08995

8

0.269294

6.611854

17.00039

23.16878

43.29296

9.926012

9

0.288331

6.654749

15.18331

25.94057

40.74650

11.47487

10

0.301548

6.780441

14.72203

27.67418

39.01775

11.80560

The part of changes to BANK due to its own shocks declines sharply from 89% in the first period to around 40% in long-run. In the short-run, shocks from DEPTH have a largest impact on BANK, varying from 7% to 21% whereas in long-run, shocks from SOPHT outweigh DEPTH shocks in explaining changes in BANK. Financial deepening and sophistication continue to exert a significant influence on the ratio of sources of credit (BANK), contributing to 40% of BANK shocks in the long-run (from the fifth period). Whereas, the shocks from growth rate of GDP and PRIVATE account for nearly 6% and 10% respectively.

Table 13: Variance decomposition of PRIVATE

Period

S.E.

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.058234

3.888004

8.796400

31.81067

0.011581

55.49335

2

0.113552

7.271370

4.966717

42.35623

0.397619

45.00806

3

0.147942

7.691150

8.030448

46.93222

1.178470

36.16772

4

0.185169

7.908759

8.726697

52.17925

0.932194

30.25310

5

0.228011

8.044798

8.260887

54.36709

0.645529

28.68169

6

0.267550

7.654312

6.582612

58.03725

0.605966

27.11986

7

0.295786

7.572517

6.240606

59.76170

0.888040

25.53714

8

0.325691

7.389561

5.409754

61.44629

0.957495

24.79690

9

0.352531

7.122818

4.661823

61.92543

1.102570

25.18736

10

0.376020

6.932724

4.193691

62.39958

1.343631

25.13037

Compared to other variables mentioned above, PRIVATE own shocks are
relatively small (55.5%) in the first period, and the shocks decline sharply to a

quarter in long-run. Shocks from Financial sophistication have a strong influence on PRIVATE and account for more than a half of total shocks from the fourth period onwards. Shocks from BANK are insignificants as they do not account for 2% and shocks from growth rate of GDP and DEPTH together account for nearly 10% of total PRIVATE shocks.

5.5.2 Impulse response models

Gebhard and Wolters (2007) define impulse responses as the measure of the effect of a unit shock of the variable i at time t on the variable j in later periods. So for each variable from each equation separately, a unit shock is applied to the error term and the effects upon the VAR system over time are noted. Details of impulse responses are presented in appendices and their summarized results are:

o Positive shocks of DEPTH and BANK to GDP growth rate but negative shocks from SOPHT and PRIVATE.

o Positive shocks on DEPTH from GDP growth rate, financial sophistication and BANK in short-run. Moreover, SOPHT and BANK have positive shocks on DEPTH in long-run and negative PRIVATE shocks on DEPTH.

o Positive shocks on financial sophistication from BANK and growth rate of GDP in short-run and negative shocks from growth rate of GDP, DEPTH and PRIVATE in long-run.

o Positive shocks on BANK from PRIVATE and negative shocks from growth rate of GDP and financial sophistication.

o Negative shocks on PRIVATE from all variables.

In the results above, the ordering was GRATE, DEPTH, SOPHT, BANK, and PRIVATE. Unfortunately, the main drawback of Variance decomposition and Impulse responses is that if the variable order is altered the results will change too. For independent results from variable order, a priori knowledge about the order is required, but not easy in most interdependent financial time series data.

5.6 Discussion of findings

The tests revealed a long-run relationship between the Growth rate of real per
capita GDP and 4 proxies of financial development. Precisely, financial

deepening and financial sophistication were revealed to be associated to this rate of GDP in the long-run. This implies that as the economy allocates more credit to the private sector, as new financial instruments are introduced in Rwandan financial system, with time, then the level of economic growth will be affected. The causality test, Variance decomposition and impulse responses show that financial deepening influences positively economic growth. But no bidirectional causality detected from growth rate of GDP to financial deepening.

These results confirm the importance of the level of financial depth for Rwandan economic growth, unlikely to the conclusion of some researchers who used panel data analysis and affirmed the irrelevance of the level of financial deepening on economic growth for Sub-Saharan Africa and poor countries in general, as noted by Hassan and Jung-Suk (2007) and Michael and Giovanni (2001). Our results do agree with the conclusions of Zhang et al (2007) in China, Demetriades and Luintel (1996) in India and Sakutukwa (2008) in Zimbabwe.

The causality test and variance decomposition showed a bi-directional influence between the level of financial sophistication and economic growth. Surprisingly, impulse responses show that this relationship is negative and a mere interpretation may conclude that financial sophistication aggravates economic growth. But there can be an intuitive explanation of this situation: «the true measurement of the financial sophistication in Rwanda». The used growth rate of real per capita GDP excludes effects of inflation and the increase in the ratio of M2 to M1 used as proxy of financial sophistication could imply increase in money supply due to inflationary pressure rather than financial innovation.

This is the case for Rwanda where post genocide economy was characterized by high rate of inflation and volatility in exchange rate. Despite the increase in the quasi-money which resulted in the increase of the ratio of M2 to M1, there was no E-banking in Rwanda up to 2005, no remarkable new financial instruments and ATM cards were recent in few banks, in major towns only.

No link was found between economic growth and allocation of credit. Were the
relationships to be established by Granger causality, the impulse responses

show that the relationship would be negative. The absence or a negative relationship between the growth rate of real per capita GDP and PRIVATE, and between PRIVATE and DEPTH can be explained by the allocation of credit. Credit devoted to agricultural sector which employs more than 80% of the population was less than 1.5% of total credit to private sector while the manufacturing, trade, restaurants and hotels received more than 60% of the total credit, while these sectors employ less than 5% of the population and contributed to only 17.4% in GDP in 2005.

Moreover, some loans were given to no profitable projects and non credit worthy customers as indicated by the high level of defaulters which led to bank crisis in former BACAR, BICDI and many MFIs. These findings of negative relationship between credit allocation and economic growth conquer with findings of Karima and Holden (2001), in a panel of 30 developing countries.

5.7 Co nclusio

The study finds a strong positive causality from financial deepening to economic growth and a negative bi-directional feedback between economic growth and financial sophistication, in the short-run, and a long-run relationship between economic growth and proxies of financial development.

The lack of short-run relationship between economic growth and the credit allocation, from the source (commercial bank versus central bank) to the users (private sector versus public sector) has been confirmed, while in the long-run, variance decompositions and impulse responses showed a minor relationship between economic growth rate and credit allocation. The found negative link between level of economic growth and financial sophistication is explained by the lack of accuracy of measurement of financial sophistication in Rwanda. The next chapter will therefore put forward the general conclusions and recommendations of the study.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 I ntroductio

This study intended to examine the bi-directional influence between financial development and economic growth in Rwanda from 1964 to 2005. Chapter one presented the existing problem which was the rationale of our study alongside the objectives, research hypotheses among others. Chapter two reviewed the literature on the subject both on theoretical and empirical ground. In chapter three, a comparative analysis of the level of financial development within East African countries has been carried out and revealed a weak level of financial development in Rwanda. The results indicate that Rwanda either takes the fourth or the last position among five countries.

In chapter four, we have explained the methodology followed, focused on a VAR with five variables, namely: the indicator of financial deepening, financial sophistication and other two indicators of the credit allocation, and the growth rate of real per capita GDP was used as proxy of economic growth. The fifth chapter has been devoted to econometric testing. This chapter summarizes the results of the study and gives recommendations as well as areas for further studies.

6.1 Summary of findings

The empirical results demonstrated both a short and a long-run relationship between both financial depth and sophistication and economic growth. For financial deepening, the causality runs from financial deepening to economic growth and for financial sophistication, the causality is bi-directional but negative. As some studies have concluded, we have not found any evidence of the link between credit allocation and economic growth and even if the relationship was to be significant, it would be negative. This is explained by the pattern of the credit to private sector which has become increasingly skewed to service sector with less employment and loan defaulters rather than to agriculture and businesses for productive investments.

All in all, we found that the level of financial development matters most for Rwandan economy, contrary to the irrelevance of the financial development on economic growth in cross-sectional analysis for developing countries confirmed by previous studies. The reason being that their analysis does not take into consideration country's unique characteristics or the results are biased by the presence of outliers in their regression, due to size inequalities of countries within a region.

The first and fourth hypotheses were partly confirmed while the second and third could not be confirmed. The study has attained its objectives and recommendations for further strengthening both Rwandan financial sector and Rwandan economy in general have been suggested.

6.2 Policy recommendations

Based on the results of the study, it is urgent that Rwandan government takes the financial sector as a pillar of economic growth which can replace non performing industrial sector and agriculture. The emphasis put on it can allow Rwanda to be the net exporter of financial services within East African Community and Commonwealth where Rwanda was admitted recently, as we do not have any comparative advantage in remaining sectors.

The emphasis should be put on the level of financial intermediation through increase in the credit allocated to private sector. It is however important to note that the allocation of the credit should be changed from private consumption and services to agriculture and other investment projects like construction sector. Additionally, credit allocation should be based on the profitability of the investment rather than personal considerations or values.

More so, Rwandan government should accelerate financial innovations which are currently very low, by making compulsory: distribution of ATM cards by banks upon bank account opening; and the use of credit cards as a means of payment in strong legalized supermarkets and shops, as a first step in the introduction of card-based system of payment.

BPR S.A has provided evidence that bank branch proximity is a key factor in bank profitability. It is therefore, recommended that other commercial banks in Rwanda should open at least one branch in each district. Due to the absence of positive impact of financial innovations on economic growth explained by inflationary pressures and exchange rate depreciation, the Government of Rwanda should put more efforts on price and exchange rate stability.

The introduction of OTC market was a good step for financial development. However, a lot need to be done regarding empowering the saving capacity of Rwandans, by policy measures enhancing an equal distribution of income, poverty eradication and the fight against rampant unemployment. We believe these factors to have been the reasons for the absence of transactions on OTC market rather than lack of public awareness as reported by newspapers.

For employed population, the government of Rwanda should ensure that the salary is enough to cover the subsistence needs so that saving is possible. This can be done through the minimum wage legislation since a larger group of employed people earn even what is not enough for family expenses. In such conditions, any policy aimed at saving mobilization would futile.

We can not claim that the study has explored all areas of the problem. For instance, we have not used the level of stock market development in our econometric analysis due to lack of data as the existing OTC started in 2008.

6.3 Areas for further research

Studies need to be conducted to determine best proxies of financial development in Rwanda, especially for financial innovations, as the used ratio of M2 to M1 may reflect the increase in classical saving functions rather than diversification of financial instruments and use of modern technology in the financial sector. Indeed, a cross-sectional study in EAC would be interesting, to assess how developed financial systems are and how they are relevant to economic growth.

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

REFERENCES

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3. Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2006), «Financing Patterns around the World: Are Small Firms Different?", World Bank mimeo.

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10. Demetriades, P.O and Luintel, K.B (1996), «Financial Development, Economic Growth and Banking Sector Controls: Evidence from India", The Economic Journal, The Journal of the Royal Economic Society, pp. 359- 374.

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Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Comparison of financial development i n EAC Table A.1: Average ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP i n EAC

Period

Rwanda

Burundi

Uganda

Tanzania

Kenya

1970-1975

14.07

11.24

21.08

 

31.05

1976-1980

13.94

14.13

17.48

 

38.04

1981-1985

12.79

17.69

11.43

 

38.97

1986-1990

16.03

17.57

11.11

18.59

42.69

1991-1995

16.49

19.31

10.75

23.41

50.05

1995-2000

15.63

19.82

14.72

20.00

39.45

2001-2005

18.77

25.80

19.67

23.48

39.87

Overall average

15.35

17.75417

15.345

21.68

39.77

Rank

4

3

5

2

1

The regional average is 21.98

For Tanzania, data are available as from 1988.

Source: Author's calculation from data provided by World Development Indicators database

Table A.2: Average ratio of claims o n private sector to GDP i n EAC

Period

Rwanda

Burundi

Uganda

Tanzania

Kenya

1970=1975

3.39

5.82

8.98

 

19.11

1976=1980

5.00

7.46

8.93

 

25.66

1981=1985

6.45

10.65

4.65

 

30.16

1986=1990

8.19

11.21

3.24

9.85

30.82

1991=1995

7.08

16.98

4.06

10.19

32.32

1995=2000

8.60

19.28

5.72

4.05

26.97

2001=2005

11.41

25.73

6.62

7.52

25.83

Overall average

7.06

25.73

6.11

7.68

27.18

The regional average is 14.75

For Tanzania, data are available as from 1988.

Source: Author's calculation from data provided by World Development Indicators database

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Table A.3: Average domestic credit to GDP ratio i n EAC

Period

Rwanda

Burundi

Uganda

Tanzania

Kenya

1970-1975

12.39

9.45

13.32

 

23.85

1976-1980

5.27

12.09

25.36

 

34.98

1981-1985

7.39

23.96

19.06

 

47.01

1986-1990

14.15

24.61

25.10

28.21

49.64

1991-1995

17.51

20.89

12.69

28.38

50.91

1995-2000

12.36

27.52

8.01

13.07

40.38

2001-2005

11.54

36.62

11.81

10.11

39.51

Overall average

11.54

21.81

16.48

19.02

40.42

Source: Author's calculation from data provided by World Development Indicators database

Appendix B: Granger causality test

Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Date: 12/15/09 Time: 21:35 Sample: 1964 2005

Lags: 5

Null Hypothesis:

Obs

F-Statistic

Probability

DEPTH does not Granger Cause GRATE

36

55.5580

9.8E-13

GRATE does not Granger Cause DEPTH

 

0.02080

0.99980

DSOPHT does not Granger Cause GRATE

36

3.52734

0.01503

GRATE does not Granger Cause DSOPHT

 

4.06239

0.00777

DBANK does not Granger Cause GRATE

36

0.73037

0.60738

GRATE does not Granger Cause DBANK

 

0.06634

0.99662

PRIVATE does not Granger Cause GRATE

36

1.70944

0.16923

GRATE does not Granger Cause PRIVATE

 

1.40536

0.25647

DSOPHT does not Granger Cause DEPTH

36

1.93549

0.12400

DEPTH does not Granger Cause DSOPHT

 

4.77110

0.00338

DBANK does not Granger Cause DEPTH

36

0.10249

0.99071

DEPTH does not Granger Cause DBANK

 

2.18163

0.08847

PRIVATE does not Granger Cause DEPTH

37

0.71712

0.61635

DEPTH does not Granger Cause PRIVATE

 

1.30701

0.29164

DBANK does not Granger Cause DSOPHT

36

0.81696

0.54904

DSOPHT does not Granger Cause DBANK

 

0.55867

0.73048

PRIVATE does not Granger Cause DSOPHT

36

1.32527

0.28578

DSOPHT does not Granger Cause PRIVATE

 

1.09960

0.38541

PRIVATE does not Granger Cause DBANK

36

2.85052

0.03597

DBANK does not Granger Cause PRIVATE

 

0.43293

0.82127

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Appendix C: Vector Error Correction Estimates, model 4 i n Eviews

Vector Error Correction Estimates

Date: 12/15/09 Time: 20:04

Sample (adjusted): 1969 2005

Included observations: 37 after adjustments Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]

Cointegrating Eq:

CointEq1

 
 
 
 

GRATE(-1)

1.000000

 
 
 
 

DEPTH(-1)

0.332100

 
 
 
 
 

(0.11144)

 
 
 
 
 

[ 2.98006]

 
 
 
 

SOPHT(-1)

-0.057857

 
 
 
 
 

(0.05848)

 
 
 
 
 

[-0.98942]

 
 
 
 

BANK(-1)

0.298156

 
 
 
 
 

(0.08532)

 
 
 
 
 

[ 3.49472]

 
 
 
 

PRIVATE(-1)

-0.114378

 
 
 
 
 

(0.06522)

 
 
 
 
 

[-1.75373]

 
 
 
 

@TREND(64)

0.001995

 
 
 
 
 

(0.00120)

 
 
 
 
 

[ 1.66116]

 
 
 
 

C

-0.109284

 
 
 
 

Error Correction:

D(GRATE)

D(DEPTH)

D(SOPHT)

D(BANK)

D(PRIVATE)

CointEq1

-2.032065

-1.163989

-0.720578

-0.251856

-0.157054

 

(0.22472)

(0.56523)

(0.28767)

(0.39386)

(0.22592)

 

[-9.04258]

[-2.05932]

[-2.50489]

[-0.63946]

[-0.69519]

D(GRATE(-1))

0.635997

0.512173

0.247474

-0.009307

0.047996

 

(0.18428)

(0.46352)

(0.23590)

(0.32299)

(0.18527)

 

[ 3.45116]

[ 1.10496]

[ 1.04904]

[-0.02882]

[ 0.25906]

D(GRATE(-2))

0.251038

0.263218

0.130006

0.132536

0.092150

 

(0.10913)

(0.27450)

(0.13970)

(0.19127)

(0.10971)

 

[ 2.30028]

[ 0.95890]

[ 0.93058]

[ 0.69292]

[ 0.83991]

D(GRATE(-3))

0.087797

-0.105592

-0.016569

-0.043783

-0.023816

 

(0.07554)

(0.19001)

(0.09670)

(0.13240)

(0.07594)

 

[ 1.16222]

[-0.55573]

[-0.17134]

[-0.33069]

[-0.31360]

D(DEPTH(-1))

0.695429

-0.758239

0.215837

0.068061

0.104795

 

(0.08377)

(0.21071)

(0.10724)

(0.14683)

(0.08422)

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

[ 8.30121] [-3.59845] [ 2.01265] [ 0.46355] [ 1.24430]

D(DEPTH(-2)) 0.866526 -0.790565 -0.013760 -0.157924 -0.021024

(0.09146) (0.23004) (0.11708) (0.16029) (0.09194)

[ 9.47464] [-3.43667] [-0.11753] [-0.98523] [-0.22866]

D(DEPTH(-3)) 0.963663 -0.491379 0.112484 0.041585 0.061428

(0.08089) (0.20346) (0.10355) (0.14177) (0.08132)

[ 11.9130] [-2.41509] [ 1.08628] [ 0.29332] [ 0.75537]

D(SOPHT(-1)) -0.090012 1.010779 0.171212 0.449488 -0.118463

(0.17793) (0.44754) (0.22777) (0.31185) (0.17888)

[-0.50588] [ 2.25852] [ 0.75168] [ 1.44136] [-0.66225]

D(SOPHT(-2)) 0.431769 0.540692 0.505270 0.034316 -0.012187

(0.23061) (0.58004) (0.29520) (0.40417) (0.23184)

[ 1.87230] [ 0.93217] [ 1.71159] [ 0.08490] [-0.05257]

D(SOPHT(-3)) 0.437132 1.215253 0.181885 -0.170377 -0.015982

(0.24017) (0.60408) (0.30744) (0.42093) (0.24145)

[ 1.82010] [ 2.01173] [ 0.59161] [-0.40476] [-0.06619]

D(BANK(-1)) 0.408020 -0.117947 0.304158 -0.517110 -0.034987

(0.12039) (0.30282) (0.15412) (0.21101) (0.12103)

[ 3.38905] [-0.38950] [ 1.97355] [-2.45067] [-0.28907]

D(BANK(-2)) 0.188578 -0.139547 0.219934 -0.160104 0.000816

(0.13695) (0.34446) (0.17531) (0.24002) (0.13768)

[ 1.37701] [-0.40512] [ 1.25456] [-0.66704] [ 0.00593]

D(BANK(-3)) 0.071952 0.000327 0.039480 -0.148662 0.020364

(0.11299) (0.28420) (0.14464) (0.19803) (0.11359)

[ 0.63680] [ 0.00115] [ 0.27296] [-0.75071] [ 0.17927]

D(PRIVATE(-1)) -0.165391 0.078972 0.292223 1.119834 0.627575

(0.22021) (0.55388) (0.28189) (0.38595) (0.22138)

[-0.75106] [ 0.14258] [ 1.03664] [ 2.90150] [ 2.83481]

D(PRIVATE(-2)) 0.118144 0.578400 -0.701639 -1.260416 -0.528714

(0.26649) (0.67028) (0.34113) (0.46706) (0.26790)

[ 0.44334] [ 0.86293] [-2.05680] [-2.69864] [-1.97352]

D(PRIVATE(-3)) -0.370708 -0.594595 0.504420 0.953775 0.488117

(0.23649) (0.59482) (0.30273) (0.41448) (0.23775)

[-1.56756] [-0.99962] [ 1.66624] [ 2.30115] [ 2.05311]

C -0.037309 -0.056214 -0.008053 0.001519 0.010289

(0.01270) (0.03194) (0.01625) (0.02225) (0.01277)

[-2.93824] [-1.76007] [-0.49541] [ 0.06827] [ 0.80600]

R-squared 0.973212 0.675205 0.675713 0.629321 0.553143

Adj. R-squared 0.951782 0.415368 0.416283 0.332778 0.195658

Sum sq. resids 0.075749 0.479224 0.124129 0.232683 0.076558

S.E. equation 0.061542 0.154794 0.078781 0.107862 0.061870

F-statistic 45.41337 2.598578 2.604607 2.122192 1.547317

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Log likelihood 62.03727

27.90961

52.90027

41.27567

61.84092

Akaike AIC -2.434447

-0.589708

-1.940555

-1.312199

-2.423834

Schwarz SC -1.694296

0.150443

-1.200404

-0.572047

-1.683682

Mean dependent -0.010551

0.003519

0.021542

0.013534

0.015225

S.D. dependent 0.280267

0.202448

0.103115

0.132048

0.068986

Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)

7.67E-12

 
 
 

Determinant resid covariance

3.54E-13

 
 
 

Log likelihood

267.8841

 
 
 

Akaike information criterion

-9.561301

 
 
 

Schwarz criterion

-5.599313

 
 
 

Appendix D: Impulse responses Table D.1: Response of GRATE

Period

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.110866

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

2

0.023867

0.036527

-0.022561

0.022034

-0.019033

3

0.045515

0.057392

-0.011222

0.017968

-0.021072

4

0.037837

0.032946

-0.027505

0.019478

-0.022002

5

-0.000736

-0.156447

-0.013251

0.041177

-0.030501

6

0.040981

0.057379

-0.081924

0.064538

-0.026016

7

0.060685

0.043036

0.021506

0.014210

-0.044306

8

0.017915

0.013092

-0.094851

0.028416

-0.005168

9

0.029084

-0.001842

-0.018589

0.008837

-0.018867

10

0.045891

0.041967

-0.048016

0.020167

-0.018944

Table D.2: Response of DEPTH

Period

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.042684

0.160654

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

2

0.002765

0.004773

0.058156

-0.023008

0.001036

3

-0.015034

-0.010982

-0.020773

0.022494

0.004580

4

0.014703

0.001705

0.066186

0.015017

-0.027150

5

0.007187

0.013749

0.006914

0.036248

-0.014533

6

-0.003185

0.001136

0.017871

0.025522

-0.010883

7

-0.007141

0.001467

-0.003656

0.019751

-0.005619

8

-0.000708

0.007714

0.000523

0.020156

-0.011697

9

-0.002032

0.007852

-0.004548

0.016009

-0.001729

10

0.000490

0.027798

-0.007655

0.014797

-0.000593

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Table D.3: Response of SOPHT

Period

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

0.038394

-0.000441

0.063624

0.000000

0.000000

2

0.009317

-0.007543

0.048052

0.022701

-0.000784

3

0.013298

-0.045349

0.076042

0.029846

-0.022814

4

0.002239

-0.067715

0.059652

0.047068

-0.026556

5

-0.009531

-0.111113

0.050461

0.064027

-0.022623

6

-0.005816

-0.065377

0.013228

0.065899

-0.015404

7

-0.005667

-0.073800

0.025564

0.049785

-0.022808

8

-0.013739

-0.062946

-0.013155

0.048529

-0.006798

9

-0.008875

-0.054465

0.001052

0.037321

-0.001589

10

-0.004777

-0.042031

-0.007326

0.033000

-0.000490

Table D.4: Response of BANK

Period

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

-0.009479

-0.029774

-0.017866

0.102732

0.000000

2

-0.020419

-0.030066

-0.017083

0.046759

0.049504

3

-0.020012

-0.046101

-0.015663

0.062062

-0.010128

4

-0.022073

-0.053973

-0.028484

0.056945

0.002892

5

-0.031028

-0.042932

-0.054515

0.067285

0.042668

6

-0.032095

-0.033648

-0.073330

0.054373

0.042879

7

-0.024130

-0.038732

-0.053985

0.041184

0.014162

8

-0.028729

-0.032004

-0.062213

0.048800

0.027874

9

-0.027158

-0.017147

-0.069020

0.049787

0.048387

10

-0.025162

-0.027646

-0.059990

0.040059

0.034574

Table E.5: Response of PRIVATE

Period

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1

-0.011483

-0.017272

-0.032845

-0.000627

0.043381

2

-0.028385

-0.018496

-0.066202

-0.007133

0.062621

3

-0.027309

-0.033425

-0.069358

-0.014376

0.045964

4

-0.032068

-0.035136

-0.087287

-0.007855

0.049569

5

-0.038349

-0.036091

-0.101852

-0.003997

0.067366

6

-0.036011

-0.020427

-0.115238

-0.009908

0.067096

7

-0.033852

-0.027347

-0.103637

-0.018525

0.054122

8

-0.034832

-0.016688

-0.113550

-0.015450

0.062935

9

-0.031838

-0.007433

-0.108540

-0.018831

0.070705

10

-0.030825

-0.011657

-0.106150

-0.023011

0.065037

Cholesky Ordering: GRATE DEPTH SOPHT BANK PRIVATE

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Rwanda

Appendix E: Data used i n regressio

Year

GRATE

DEPTH

SOPHT

BANK

PRIVATE

1964

NA

0.003567

1.129139

0.475836

0.113383

1965

0.048485

0.004227

1.130658

0.341787

0.099034

1966

-0.037486

0.010537

1.164228

0.345649

0.177340

1967

0.055563

0.009915

1.163735

0.351485

0.165488

1968

0.146935

0.008540

1.159847

0.294774

0.137405

1969

0.070565

0.009846

1.161644

0.339016

0.155382

1970

0.076776

0.014748

1.186143

0.488350

0.259087

1971

-0.019097

0.019318

1.181634

0.497815

0.268026

1972

0.005437

0.015964

1.179762

0.425915

0.189329

1973

-0.067799

0.026595

1.130154

0.428836

0.257070

1974

0.017362

0.040935

1.247668

0.546795

0.357663

1975

-0.000595

0.039905

1.236495

0.642054

0.364344

1976

-0.003619

0.041519

1.234960

0.587458

0.452704

1977

0.034499

0.062877

1.261730

0.734113

0.666864

1978

-0.005994

0.067189

1.247740

0.750870

0.702281

1979

0.052668

0.053429

1.251533

0.299719

0.696933

1980

-0.074406

0.066907

1.266090

0.799979

0.768805

1981

-0.011330

0.072512

1.357483

0.820133

0.778868

1982

0.001500

0.070229

1.411169

0.774293

0.646393

1983

0.021422

0.068853

1.467646

0.640206

0.548492

1984

-0.064912

0.076254

1.490819

0.765571

0.590796

1985

0.013082

0.089206

1.593986

0.807424

0.649958

1986

0.023334

0.092167

1.535018

0.788841

0.616279

1987

-0.034698

0.091950

1.649092

0.734884

0.537472

1988

-0.019368

0.105786

1.717816

0.794134

0.542378

1989

-0.019548

0.113606

1.880272

0.733037

0.539081

1990

-0.000318

0.956633

1.891606

0.579472

0.407243

1991

0.065505

0.085020

1.853128

0.501527

0.384436

1992

0.133531

0.094628

1.669966

0.461350

0.337314

1993

0.005033

0.074622

1.547183

0.423396

0.344361

1994

-1.001928

0.117063

1.290698

0.416386

0.334644

1995

0.263302

0.095467

1.550642

0.515350

0.446272

1996

0.092791

0.075440

1.507496

0.508075

0.434577

1997

0.046666

0.088340

1.585262

0.558837

0.503790

1998

-0.013474

0.095899

1.654591

0.592536

0.527153

1999

-0.029921

0.102427

1.668137

0.587264

0.523328

2000

-0.001148

0.108580

1.808461

0.648908

0.595793

2001

0.012502

0.110456

1.992687

0.662939

0.613780

2002

0.058323

0.111606

2.031944

0.702052

0.598948

2003

-0.008825

0.117874

2.005127

0.726781

0.624340

2004

0.028703

0.123611

2.146887

0.768688

0.652522

2005

-0.243463

0.138750

1.956892

0.795546

0.700732

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