Memoire Online - The UN security council reforms: myth or reality? an african analysis

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: MYTH OR
REALITY? AN AFRICAN ANALYSIS

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Masters of Science in International
Relations Degree

Supervisor: Professor HASU H. PATEL
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

The United Nations Security Council Peacekeeping efforts in Africa and its Weaknesses 16

The African Contribution Towards International Peace and Security under Articles 52 and 53 of

Chapter 4: The Possibility of Adopting the African Union Proposal or Otherwise 35

Je dédié ce travail à mes parents qui ont contribué d'une façon extraordinaire à mes études.
A toute la famille de JOSEPH BARASA, je dis: Danke Schon.

With humble and sincere heart, I dedicate this work to all those who persistently fight for a
better, safer world, which the poor, and powerless dream of daily for all humanity.

I would like to express my most sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor Professor Hasu H. Patel.

«A mediocre teacher tells. The good teacher explains. The superior teacher demonstrates. The great teacher inspires» [William Arthur Ward 1954].

Your advice has been a life-lesson and a source of challenge to me, and invaluable information you provided, helped me to complete this study. I am grateful for having benefited from your unparalleled understanding of global politics. I owe this work to you.

May unreserved appreciation goes to Dr Gideon Zhou who is behind all my success and completion of my studies.

Many thanks to Professor Walter Kamba, who persistently gave me various ways of arguing throughout this study. I have been privileged to have the benefit of his intellectual vigour and valuable advice. My Sincere gratitude goes to Dr. Jabulani Nyamwenda and Ms Mumba of the United Nations Information centre, Research Section [Harare], Mr Simon Badza and Wing Commander [RTD] Mafongoya, for your guidance, patience, understanding and insightful assistance in the conceptualisation of this work.

My deep and sincere appreciation goes to Bartheze and Maman Jihad, Sr.Takaza of Inter-Regional Meeting of Bishops of Southern Africa [IMBISA], Dr. Frank Ndayahoze, Bangamwabo François of the University of Galway, Juvenal Baraga, Bizimana Télésphore, Ngendahimana Alain and Owen Shumba for your unwavering material, moral and financial support throughout my studies.

My heartfelt thanks also goes to Dr Thomas of Katholischer Akademischer Auslander-Dienst, without your assistance, this work might not have been completed.

The encouragement and support I received from colleagues deserve my unreserved thanks. While it is impossible to mention them all, my admiration and gratitude goes to Fortune G, Heather Chingono, Heather Koga, Ndudzo, Richard M, Lui, Againmore Chakandinakira, Sithole Mandela, Justin and Brian. Thank you guys for all the light moments we shared and the constructive advice we exchanged pricelessly.

To all those I did not individually mention, especially those from the Great Lakes region
currently studying at University of Zimbabwe, I thank you all for your support and
encouragement, GOD BLESS.

Tables, Diagrams and Figures
Table 4.1	46
Diagram 4.1	...38
Figure 4.1	45
Annex
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, Changes composition	.55

«It took World War II to `reform' the League of Nations into the United Nations - and it has often looked as if it might take World War III to reform the United Nations».

Abstract

«Anybody who really wants to abolish war must resolutely declare himself in favor of his own country's resigning a portion of its sovereignty in favor of international institutions.» Albert Einstein [1934]

The United Nations [U.N] was founded at the end of World War II [WWII] by the victorious world powers and China. The founders had high hopes that it would act to prevent conflicts between nations and make future wars unthinkable, by fostering an ideal of collective security. When the U.N was established, the core responsibility for maintaining international peace and security was entrusted to the United Nations Security Council [UNSC]. This organ is made up of Russia, France, United States [U.S], China and the United Kingdom [UK] as permanent members with veto power. This concentration of power to the exclusion of all other U.N member states has made the active pursuit of a universal and greater common good by the U.N, and particularly the UNSC virtually impossible. In addition, since its establishment, the UNSC did not fully discharge its mandate as enshrined in the U.N Charter. Furthermore, the UNSC composition does not reflect the dramatic political and economic changes that have occurred in the international community in the last sixty years, but rather represents the 1945 global balance of power. Therefore, in order to command worldwide respect and effectively address the challenges of the 21^st century, it has become necessary that the UNSC expands its membership in the permanent and non-permanent categories, with inclusion of both developing and developed countries, so as to enhance its representativeness, effectiveness and credibility, especially from the global South. It is under this paradigm that several countries have offered epigrammatic blue print for a democratic and empowered UNSC. This study considers major criticisms addressed to the UNSC and discusses different versions of the reform proposed by various states, paying particular emphasis on the AU proposed blueprint. It also assesses the realism and practicality of the AU proposal currently on the table. Finally, it reflects on the effect that the reform would have on the legitimacy of the UNSC and its role in maintaining global peace and security.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

After World War II [WW II] the United Nations [U.N] was set up to end all wars, enhance respect for international law and promote human rights and peoples' well-being. The U.N was established as an association of nations which accepted the values of civilized life and agreed to co-operate together for the good of all. According to Christian Tomuschart [2002:45], the U.N was founded, as it is enshrined in the Charter, «To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war». This is the most important function of the U.N and, to a considerable extent, the criterion by which it is judged by the peoples it is at the service of.

As stipulated in its Charter, the principal function of the U.N is to maintain international peace and security. Other roles include international cooperation, coordinating social, economic and cultural covenants as well as international conventions and other humanitarian problems, notably, in areas of promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. The U.N mainly comprises of the Security Council [UNSC], General Assembly [UNGA], the Secretariat and specialized agencies. As Sydney D. Bailey [2001:40] argues, «The United Nations General Assembly consists of all the small and large, greedy and generous, allied and neutral, democratic and tyrannical, arrogant and diffident member states of the United Nations». When the U.N was established, the core responsibility for maintaining international peace and security was entrusted to the UNSC. This organ is made up of five veto power wielding permanent member countries [The United States [U.S], Russia, France, the United Kingdom [UK] and China] requiring it to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N.

According to John T. Rourke [1995:363], «In the U.N Security Council any of the permanent members can, by its single vote, veto a policy statement or action favoured by the other 14 members. Between 1946 and 1990, the veto was cast 246 times, with each of the members using its special prerogative to protect its interests.» The use of veto by permanent members has led to some questioning whether or not the UNSC can still be the custodian of international

peace and security. As John Young [2003:56] puts it, the UNSC «operates, by and large, according to the golden rule - those who have the gold make the rules».

Since the establishment of the U.N, global politics has been facing major systematic challenges. Throughout this period, the UNSC did not fully live up to peoples' expectations as a guarantor of international peace and security. The incessant calls for reform result from the fact that the UNSC today still reflects the global power structure of 1945, though its non-veto membership was expanded from eleven to fifteen in 1965. The four WWII victors and China have held on to their privileged status. They are permanent and can veto any UNSC decision that affects their respective interests. Considering the current geopolitical context, it is no longer possible to conceive of and implement an international peace and security which is restricted to the maintenance of order stricto sensu. Hence, in a bid to adjust the UNSC to new global governance and geo-political realities, consistent calls for reform have become louder.

The quest for reform of the UNSC has been an integral part of the life of the U.N since its earliest days. Since its establishment in 1945, the organization has experienced an array of proposals, some of which have been adopted and implemented, and others have remained to gather dust. Considering the role of veto power in the management of international politics and the preservation of the veto wielding states' interests, the study examines the possibility of amending Article 108 of the U.N Charter and allocating two permanent seats with veto power to Africa. The researcher assesses the picture of the future world political behaviour, prospects and challenges the expanded UNSC is likely to face in the next generations.

This study examines how the unilateralist approach to global challenges exercised by veto- wielding countries militates against the objectives of the U.N Charter. The study analyses the extent to which this unilateralist approach has polarised and paralysed the current global political landscape, as claimed by Third World Countries, mostly African. The research also projects the prospects and challenges of a reformed UNSC in maintaining international peace and security. The study also assesses whether or not new permanent members, if granted veto powers, will result in the UNSC achieving its core responsibility.

This study may assist decision-makers in Governments, international organizations and members of international community on how these reforms will affect their activities in areas of foreign policy and diplomacy. Arguing from an idealist perspective which advocates unity of purpose in the U.N, cooperation between states, poor and rich, that international peace and security may be achieved, this study examines the practical possibility of this idealist's view and assesses whether or not having more permanent member states with veto power, would result in less tragedies at a high scale. The researcher also examines whether or not the inclusion of new permanent veto-wielding members will result in powerful states being limited in taking a unilateral military action without the express endorsement of the UNSC. The study further assesses whether or not any other state or combination of states will consider taking unilateral actions in their own interests such as the controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003 as Adekeye Adebayo [2005:17] notes, «when the world's most powerful state, the U.S, discovered it had power without legitimacy, while the U.N rediscovered it had legitimacy without power».

Few aspects of U.N reform have attracted as much political interest and academic attention as the projected reform of the UNSC. Since January 1994, UNSC reform has been tabled in the UNGA without any progress. As Robert J. Art [2002:38] argues, «In September 2000, Heads of State attending the Millennium Summit called for the rapid reform and enlargement of the SC making it more representative, effective and legitimate in the eyes of everyone in the world». The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, was appointed in 2000 by the U.N Secretary General, Kofi Annan. As John Shiva [2004:30] notes, «The Panel presented two models of expansion of the UNSC which involved a distribution of seats between four major areas: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and America». Nevertheless, while the expansion of the UNSC's membership pointed in the right direction, the veto power, which is critical, remained unchallenged in the report. Commentators from the Great Powers argue that the veto is crucial to the operations of the U.N: «It keeps the big players in the game and there is no game without them» [Berlie Macknara, 1986:40]. The U.N reform, in the sense of changing the organization so that its capacities to fulfill the goals of its Charter are strengthened, has been a continuing matter of concern and the object of serious research. According to Salmon C. Trevor [2000:81], «The U.N's failure to fully understand and doctrinally adjust to the new

circumstances surrounding global politics brought the world body to the point of outright strategic failure». As Nicholas Hopkinson [1998:50] has put it: «The world balance of power has changed dramatically in the years since the United Nations was established but the composition of the Security Council has not». Hence the need for reform has persistently been suggested.

Over the years, a variety of proposals to amend the structure of the UNSC, to bring it more into line with the current geopolitical realities, have been proposed. However, the veto power aspect has become a stumbling bloc, as the five permanent members have been ever ready to quash any attempt that may lead to the amendment of Article 108 of the U.N Charter. As John T. Rourke [1995:363] argues, «The continuing importance of the veto in practice, its value as a symbol of big power status, and the difficulty of amending the Charter mean that the veto authority is likely to continue without major revision despite arguments that its existence is in the hands of an unrepresentative few countries and is undermining the legitimacy of the UNSC». Advocating the overhaul of the U.N, John Galtung [2000:98] observes that,

Abolishing the Security Council, revising the contribution structure, significantly reducing the level of the United Nations salaries, the dewaldheimization of the United Nations system, greatly reducing the power and authority of the executive heads, and moving the United Nations headquarters out of New York will make this international body more efficient and reliable.

The special status enjoyed by the Permanent five [P-5] of the UNSC has become a simmering issue in the U.N. As John Rourke [2002:169] argues, «The most common argument against the arrangement is that the existing membership has never been fully realistic and is becoming less so as time goes by». Many global and regional powers that do not have the veto power have been pressing for changes in the UNSC structure. In the same vein, less powerful countries have jumped on the bandwagon. This can be illustrated by the Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga who once called on the UNSC «to become more representative and more responsible to the general membership of the United Nations» [John Rourke, 2002:169]. The Sri Lankan President's sentiments were echoed by Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa who emphasised that «The Security Council can no longer be retained like the sanctuary of the hollies with only the original members acting as high priests, deciding on issues for the rest of the world who cannot be admitted» [John Rourke, 2002:169]. In his report [March 2005], titled

`In Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for All», the U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan, stated that, «No overhaul of the U.N would be complete without reform of the Security Council». Dissatisfaction with the UNSC has spawned many plans to revise it. However, any change in the membership of the UNSC requires an amendment to Article 108 of the U.N Charter which needs the consent of all the permanent veto-wielding members. As such, it is highly unlikely that any formal changes concerning membership of the permanent members or their veto power will materialize.

The world's political behaviour is dictated by the struggle for self-centered national interests. It has long been argued that world politics is characterized above all by egotistical states operating in an anarchical environment. David Forsythe [1989:30] argues that, «From the celebrated works of Hans J. Morgenthau to the much-praised restatements by David Franklin and Hedley Bull, commentators have stressed the power drive of nation-states operating without higher authority». In these classical treatments emphasis has been placed as David Forsythe [1989:40] argues, «on the independence of states, on their drive to maximize power as both ends and means, and even on the morality of normally evil action when done in pursuit of national interests». In this study, which examines power dynamics, competition, and unilateral exercise of power within the UNSC, realist and idealist theories of international relations were examined. These theories were chosen because they do help a great deal in understanding the current anarchical power struggle-ridden international system. As Bruce Russett [2001:25] observes, realist philosophy postulates that «international politics is a continuous struggle for power among nations and these nations always seek to dominate each other in the conduct of their own affairs».

This assertion finds expression in the UNSC structure and its permanent members' résistance to proposed reforms. Since the foundation of the U.N, there have been some insurmountable obstacles that have prevented Charter amendment to Article 108 of the U.N, which requires the affirmative concurrence of the five permanent members of the UNSC. Practically, this means that none of the five will approve anything that removes them from the UNSC or takes away their veto power privileges. In the history of the U.N, much more has been achieved by changes

in practice, rather than Charter revision. Thus, one may observe that any reform will have to maintain the status quo.

More recently, there has been renewed attention to the subject of cooperation in world politics, whether through emphasis on regimes or on other forms of collaboration. According to David Forsythe [1989:30], «Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, Ken Oye, Robert Axelrod, and others have sought to modify Morgenthau's `realist' school of thought by emphasizing the possibilities if not the extent of cooperation under anarchy and trying to clarify the dynamics of that cooperation.» Arguing from the idealist paradigm, Bruce Russett [2001:25] contends that, «states' behavior over each other can be modified and states act in harmony rather than always in conflict with each other». In some cases as David Forsythe [1989:31] argues, «Focus on international regimes has been blended with the use of game theory to analyze the start, duration, and decline of international cooperation». In these analyses emphasis is especially placed on development of a long-term view of interests, and restriction of the number of actors involved in the quest for agreement.

As Paul Hightower [1999:40] argues, «A number of states have been satisfied to share power rather than constantly strive to maximize it; others have reduced unilateral power in the interests of order and friendly relations». Thus, as David Forsythe [1989:31] notes, «The U.S entered a new treaty arrangement with Panama to provide for the security of the important waterway, even though the U.S appeared to be giving up prerogatives». He adds that, «Under this doctrine, it has been demonstrated that less can mean more; less assertions of unilateral advantage may mean more maximization of national interests». It is this mix of cooperation and anarchy which constitutes the environment in which the UNSC and the entire U.N system exist.

It is this recognition of cooperation rather than struggling for self-centered national interests, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are witnessing a transition from the classical Westphalian world order to a world order where regions and their organizations such as the European Union [EU], the African Union [AU]...next to states are playing a central role in global governance. As David Forsythe [1989:31 argues, «Processes of regional integration are indeed increasingly affecting and even shaping international relations». However, it is poignant to note that we are not entering the era of post-Westphalian world order in which nations are

disappearing or becoming irrelevant, on the contrary nation-states remain important for identity and local governance.

For the UNSC decisions to command worldwide respect and advance international political progress as well as international law, restore the entire U.N legitimacy and credibility, granting veto power to new permanent members remains the sole option.

The bulk of this study is confined to the analysis of library materials. Reference was made to various articles on international law and international politics. Legal instruments such as International Covenants, Declarations, Charters and the International Court of Justice's decisions were examined. The researcher analysed several resolutions adopted by the UNSC and the UNGA. The internet was used to supply relevant information on the subject matter. The proposal presented to the 60^th UNGA Heads of State Summit by AU on U.N reform was analysed. Where necessary, tables, diagrams and figures were used. It is reiterated that all media information public and private were used with caution to avoid politically persuaded opinion and in some instances patriotism which clouds the relevant issues for the discussion. Data is presented in a discussive and narrative format.

CHAPTER 2

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Introduction

The UNSC is the most powerful organ of the U.N. It is the U.N principal body for multilateral co-operation. As enshrined in the U.N Charter Article 1[1], the principal purpose of the U.N is to maintain international peace and security. The UNSC is, under this Charter provision, the custodian of this principal purpose among the family of nations. As Sydney D. Bailey [1989: 46] argues, «The Security Council is in theory very powerful. All members of the U.N have agreed that the Council has the `primary responsibility' for maintaining peace and acts on their behalf, and all have undertaken to accept and carryout its decisions». The UNSC enjoys a unique authority under international law. Its decisions stand largely unchallenged by the World Court or the UNGA. Its resolutions [unlike those of the UNGA] are binding on U.N member states and, though they are not always adopted, they outline what is acceptable conduct in international community.

The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the U.N. It is the best known of the three Councils of the U.N. This Council consists of fifteen members. Five of these are permanent members [The U.S, Russia [successor of the USSR], UK, China and France], each with the right of veto on most kinds of substantive decisions [Franz Cede, 1999:49]. The UNSC, which originally had eleven members, became a 15-member body on 1 January 1966, with the additional states chosen from the U.N newly admitted nations in accordance with amendments which came into effect on 31 August 1965 to Article 23 of the U.N Charter [Robert Canton, 1986:165]. One may observe that this was in keeping with the spirit of universality, the idea that the U.N shall accept all nations who agree to abide by its Charter provisions. The members are chosen by regional groups and confirmed by the UNGA. These ten elected members, known in Charter language as `non-permanent members,' are selected according to a distribution formula from each of the world's major regions and are distributed according to both Charter principles and non-Charter agreements and rules. As Franz Cede [1999:35] argues, «five seats are attributed to the Afro-Asian group, two for the Latino-American, two for the Western European and others

and one for the Eastern European group». The term is for two years, with half of the number elected by the UNGA [Art. 23] each year. As Article 23[2] stipulates «a retiring member shall not be immediately re-elected». The principal officer of the UNSC is the President who, rather than being elected, is appointed monthly, in rotation, according to alphabetical order. This rule gives each UNSC member [permanent and non-permanent] a chance to hold the Presidency.

In order to ensure prompt effectiveness of the UN, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

The UNSC, its powers and functions is by far the most extensively regulated field within the U.N Charter. As enshrined in the Charter, these powers and functions are embedded in Chapter V [Art. 24-32, general provisions], Chapter VI [Art.33-38, peaceful settlement of disputes], Chapter VII [Art. 39-51, measures with respect to threats to the peace, breach of the peace and acts of aggression], in Chapter VIII [Art. 52-54, regional arrangements] and Art.83 [functions of the UNSC in the trusteeship system]. It is assumed that by virtue of having been assigned the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the UNSC, no other body within the family of states and no state has comparable authority and functions. Thus, in order to discharge these functions, the U.N Charter assigned thereto a number of political functions and powers, which are considered as extraordinarily far-reaching, given the traditional résistance of states to transfer parts of their sovereignty to an intergovernmental authority.

The U.N Charter confers authority to the UNSC and various methods of resolving the disputes. As John Weimer [2000:40] notes, «Chapter VI of the U.N Charter provides for peaceful settlement of disputes which includes such methods as mediation, arbitration, conciliation or judicial settlement». Chapter VI, Article 33 stipulates that, «The UNSC may also ask countries to negotiate between themselves or may recommend terms of settlement». Other frequently used methods are for the UNSC to appoint a fact-finding mission or a commission of enquiry, or as John Wallace [2002:32] argues, «to ask the U.N Secretary-General to extend his good

offices». In a diplomatic parlance, the UNSC would craft what is nowadays commonly called `road map' for the resolution of the disputes. As Peter Bacher [1994:45] notes, «actions adopted by the UNSC in terms of Chapter VI of the U.N Charter, dealing with the specific settlement of disputes, are purely recommendatory, they do not bear significant force». Nevertheless, their political consideration remains vital. This is because constant disregard of these recommendations might constitute arbitrariness, impropriety or even illegality. In addition, decisions adopted under Chapter VI of the Charter can influence situations as they express the opinion of the international community. However, when these recommendations fail to soothe the conflict and there is a concomitant threat to international peace and security, the UNSC invokes its power under Chapter VII.

According to Michael Akehurst [1982:174], «under Chapter VII, once the UNSC has resolved that a particular dispute or situation involves a threat to the peace or action of aggression, the way is open to take further measures». Such measures may however be preceded by provisional action taken to prevent the aggravation of the situation. This action provided for by Article 40 of the Charter, is without prejudice to the rights or claims of the parties, and is intended as a provisional measure to stabilize crisis situation. The call for the withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] on 31 August 1998, calls for ceasefires in Middle East in 1969 and 1973 are few examples of action taken by the UNSC under this U.N Charter provision [Anald Chopra, 2001:41].

The adoption of provisional measures by the UNSC often has an effect ranging far beyond the confines of a purely temporary action. This provisional measure may induce a calmer atmosphere leading to negotiations. These measures may set in train moves to settle the dispute upon the basis laid down in the UNSC resolutions, which called for the provisional measures. The action adopted by the UNSC, once it has decided that there exists with regard to a situation a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, may fall into either two categories. As Charles Kegley [1998:57] notes, «It may amount to the application of measures not involving the use of armed forces under Article 41 such as the disruption of economic relations or the severance of diplomatic relations and complete or partial interruption of economic relations». In addition, the UNSC may call for the «use of such force» as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security under Article 42 [Charles

Kegley, 1998:57]. The UNSC may feel that measures short of armed force as prescribed under Article 41 have been or would be inadequate. In such scenario as John Merrills [1998:45] puts it, it may take «such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security».

Military action is clearly the ultimum remedium for the UNSC and may only be undertaken if the UNSC considers that measures not involving the use of armed force would be inadequate or have proved to be toothless. These measures aim to weaken the capacities of hostile regimes to pursue aggressive military, domestic and foreign policies. The U.N Charter Article 42 also provides that such action may extend to demonstrations, blockades and other armed operations by members of the U.N. Under Chapter VII, decisions taken such as economic sanctions are binding on U.N members. It is under the U.N Charter, Chapter VII which enabled the UNSC to impose general trade sanctions on Iraq in 1990, but since then it has preferred imposing more `targeted' sanctions such as arms embargoes, travel bans, restrictions on diplomatic relations, and bans on key commodities, such as petroleum and diamonds in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and the Iraq oil for food programme.

Apart from its political functions, the UNSC in cooperation with the UNGA also assumes internal functions within the organization. The UNSC has a right to initiative under the U.N Charter by making recommendations to the UNGA concerning admission of new members [Art.4], suspension of membership [Art.5], the expelling of members [Art.6], and election of the U.N Secretary General [Art. 97] [Duska Anastasijevic, 2000:28]. In addition, the UNSC plays a role in the election of members of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] and of the members of the two tribunals it established for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague [Netherlands] and Rwanda in Arusha [Tanzania].

One of the most distinctive features of the UNSC is that it is the only U.N organ in which there is a formal rule of unanimity or `right of veto'. The UNSC is part parliament and part secret diplomatic conclave. As Yves Beigbeder [1994:18] asserts, «the Charter declares that decisions of the Council shall be by the affirmative vote of nine members and that, except for procedural

matters, the votes shall include the concurring votes of the permanent members». The one exception to this Charter rule is that in decision relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting [Art. 27[3]]. Thus, if nine or more of the 15 members vote in favor of a proposal but one of the five permanent members votes `no', the proposal will be nullified. The UNSC can veto virtually any decision including the proposals by the UNGA as a whole. A closer analysis however, reveals that there is no reference in the U.N Charter to the «right of veto». What is called the «right of veto» is intrinsically linked to permanent membership. Article 27 [3] of the U.N Charter merely calls for the «concurring votes» of the permanent members when the UNSC takes substantive decision.

The model on which the U.N was built has been proved to be too ambitious. The U.N Charter had been drafted on the assumption that the victors of the WWII would continue to co-operate as they did during the hostilities. Paradoxically, from the beginning, the U.N had been unable to function as designed. The working of the UNSC, a body designed to ensure the strong beat of the heart of the U.N Charter and its collective security provisions has over the years attracted widespread criticism. Instead of fostering co-operation, it became apparent in the early days of the U.N that the Post-War differences that had developed between the U.S and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] significantly limited the ability of the UNSC to take action. As Arnold Chopra [2001:42] argues, «The superpowers were inevitably on opposite sides of most issues and the U.S controlled the votes in the council». The USSR's interests being frequently threatened, and because of its conspicuous minority position in the UNSC, it was left with the veto as its sole weapon within the U.N machinery to thwart any action it considered injurious to its interests.

Since the U.N originated from a coalition of victorious wartime allies, the organization faced for roughly several decades questioning on how those «converted» to the antifascist side of peace might be admitted to the club [Yves Beigbeder 1984:45]. Over the years, vetoes have been cast to block the admission of member states as well as nominations for the U.N Secretary General. As John T. Rourke [2002:34] argues, «Despite all 14 other UNSC members having supported Boutros Boutros Ghali, the U.S veto ended his tenure as the U.N Secretary General». As the Cold -War evolved, within an economically and ideologically diametrically opposed world, the U.S

and the USSR approached this issue of new U.N membership, not from the viewpoint of who sided with whom during the WWII, but rather who sided with whom in the Cold-War. Thus, the U.S ensured that USSR allies applying for membership were denied the required UNSC majority. On the USSR side, in a bid to keep out Western- sponsored applicants, it used its veto recurrently [Robert Canton 1986:38]. In the early days of the U.N as James Barry [2003] argues, «The USSR Commissar and later Minister for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov said `no' so many times that he was known as `Mr Veto'.» Vyacheslav Molotov regularly rejected bids for new membership because of the U.S refusal to admit the Soviet republics. This state of affairs led in 1955 to a compromise deal which resulted in the admission of sixteen members of the U.N. As Charles Kegley [1985:128] asserts, «This compromise between the superpowers allowed the great powers to support a politically balanced package of applicants, including pro-Easterners, pro-Westerners, and neutrals». The compromise deal opened the floodgates, and, by 1980, the U.N had more than 150 members, roughly three times the original number.

It is apparent that the U.S and USSR would probably not have accepted the creation of the U.N without the veto power. This is because some exceptional privileges denied to Great Powers in the days of the League of Nations or in other security associations, the veto represents that right which was prerequisite of all sovereign states in the pre-U. N world, the right not to be overruled by other members. As Michael Roskin [1993:362] argues,

Stalin at Yalta in 1945 insisted on the veto provision, Churchill and Roosevelt went along. Stalin felt [correctly] that the USSR would be so outnumbered by non-Communist countries that it would suffer permanent condemnation. On the same basis, Stalin got the bizarre provision giving three UNGA votes to the USSR, whose constituent «republics» of Ukraine and Beloroussia were counted as U.N members.

One may observe that since the UNSC was originally intended to deal with most critical issues of national interests, and because these Great Powers hold the preponderance of means for the enforcement, such an arrangement may be considered a necessary departure from the complete abandonment of unanimity. Though it is impossible to escape the fact that the primary purpose of the veto is not to foster co-operation but to prevent action, the use of veto is often in contradiction to the literal terms of the U.N Charter and has been manipulated for national interests. The veto strangles the UNSC and prevents a broad consensus from guiding its work

across a wide range of issues surrounding global politics. This device however, in international politics helps Great Powers to make sure that their vital interests are not surrendered.

According to Adam Roberts [2000:41], «There was discontent when the U.S and Britain systematically blocked council action to impose economic sanctions on South Africa during the 1980s». Leland Goodrich [1999:60] notes that, «There was dissatisfaction when France and Britain blocked action on Suez in 1956; when the U.S refused action on Vietnam in the 1960s, 70s and when the USSR prevented action on Afghanistan in the 1980s». Today, the opposition is conspicuous because the UNSC, rather than failing to act, is now acting in ways that often seem motivated by geopolitical interests of permanent members. Currently, there has been sign that Russia and China are willing to veto any resolution punishing Iran because of its drive to control the nuclear fuel-cycle. Expressing the role of veto in the U.N system, Daniel Sheever [1999:59] notes that, «No important action can be undertaken by the U.N with any reasonable prospect of success in the face of U.S opposition. Conversely, if the U.S gives full support to a proposal, its chances of being adopted must be considered very high, unless of course the veto operates».

As Michael Roskin [1993:63] observes, «In speeches and corridor conversations, diplomats often point out that four out of the five permanent members are «European» [a concept that includes the U.S]. He adds that «Four out of five are `industrialized' countries. The four-fifths of humankind that live in the poor countries of the global South, they say, have only one voice, namely, China». The Chinese role in representing Third World Countries founds expression in President Robert G. Mugabe's speech, during his state visit to China where he implored to the Chinese leaders that Britain wanted to use the U.N Special Envoy for Zimbabwe, Anna Tibaijuka's report to put Harare on the UNSC agenda, but expressed hope that China a staunch ally since the days of the liberation struggle would use its veto to thwart such action. In Beijing, the Zimbabwe President said,

China, as a member of the United Nations and the Security Council, we appeal to you to act in defense of innocent people and nations in the Third World. My country at the moment is being brought into an arena of international publicity unnecessarily [Southern Times July 31, 2005].

This goes hand in hand with John Huggins' [1988:41] comment that,« It became the practice to use the veto more broadly both to stop the possibility of any sanction directed against permanent members, even to stop a mere critical resolution directed against an ally.» As John Sigler [2002:67] puts it «The U.S use of veto has traditionally been tied to Israel with the U.S vetoing anything critical of the Israel at the Security Council». In September 2003, the U.S vetoed a resolution drafted by Syria that denounced Israel's threat to remove the then Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat. Washington said the resolution was `flawed' because it did not include a robust condemnation of acts of terrorism by Palestinian militant groups [Ayala Maya 2005]. In 2002 the U.S blocked a draft resolution criticizing the killing by Israel forces and several employees and the destruction of the World Food Programme [WFP] warehouse in the West Bank [John Sigler, 2002:67]. These few examples illustrate how relations of the veto-wielding permanent members inter se etch the paths global events will take. The veto power was deliberately inserted in the U.N Charter by the Great Powers and universally accepted by the others as an automatic switch off, to prevent the UNSC from becoming involved in a great power showdown. Considering the end of the Cold-War, the less used veto now serves as Christian Brocker [2000:42] argues, «To prevent an ad hoc UNSC majority from ganging up on one of its permanent members, such as China for its human rights record. In addition, it forces the majority to consider minority positions in its resolutions, such as softening the sanctions against Libya for its failure to turn over those wanted for the airline bombings». In the Libyan case, it is when the sanctions were softened, China [and other members] abstained, allowing the resolution to pass.

Notwithstanding the obstacles caused by veto to the UNSC work, one may observe that its resolutions, passed by consensus have shown that the UNSC through multilateralism as exemplified by the 1990 U.N action against Iraq, can serve as a sharp tool and strong shield in the world's common endeavors to achieve international peace and security. During the 1990 action against Iraq, the UNSC was acting as had been originally intended and sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct. In addition, from an international relations perspective, the veto system kept the U.N alive longer than the League of Nations. Without it, one or several of the Great Powers would otherwise have either not joined it in the first place or else deserted it. The veto saved the U.N from damaging conflicts pitting directly its major members and from

involvement in impossible missions. The veto in the UNSC can be likened to a fuse in a house wiring system. If the system overheats, better to have a fuse blown [a veto] than the house blazing up. Thus the veto has become a safety valve that prevents the UNSC from undertaking commitments in the political field, which it lacks the power to execute.

The United Nations Security Council Peacekeeping efforts in Africa and its Weaknesses

The area most commonly associated with the U.N efforts to uphold international peace and security is that of peacekeeping. This is thus often regarded as synonymous with the activities of the U.N, particularly those of the UNSC. Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa was by no means free from surrogate conflicts generated by the Cold-War superpower rivalry. The end of the Cold-War led to a dramatically increased demand for U.N action in Africa. Daily, the sobering news of wars in Somalia, The DRC, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and a host of other countries assaults a common sense of humanity. While the role of the UNSC in a number of African conflicts has been commendable, this claim has been challenged by John Hawkins [2003:62] who observes that «Assertions that the U.N Security Council is seriously engaged in African affairs are supported by claims that 70 percent of the Council's work is devoted to African affairs». However, he laments that «Although Africa is host to the vast majority of conflicts in the world, it would appear that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the U.N Security Council and its key members».

Chronicling the history of peacekeeping in Africa, Thomas Weiss [1995:67] argues that, «The U.N peacekeeping can be said to have commenced early in Africa with successful placement of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEFI] to supervise the peace process in the 1956 Suez crisis». This was following an unsuccessful Anglo-French attempt to frustrate the Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. However, as Theo Neethling [2000:34] observes, «Historically, Africa first experienced U.N operations per se in the Belgian Congo in the early 1960s. This was the first time that a U.N force was deployed in Africa». In 1960, under Resolution 143, the UNSC established the U.N Operation in the Congo [ONUC]. Initially there was a danger that ONUC would not be able to fulfill its mandate, as there was very little cooperation on the part of Katangese leadership.

The situation deteriorated to such an extent that there was effectively no peace to keep. Consequently, peacekeeping gave way to more forceful methods. It is following Lumumba's request, that the U.N Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld invoked Article 99 of the U.N Charter and informed the UNSC that the events in the Congo were a «threat to international peace and security» [Theo Neethling, 2000:34]. The UNSC reacted to the warnings and adopted Resolution 143 on 14 July 1960 which authorized the Secretary General to provide the Congolese Government with «...such military assistance as may be necessary» and ONUC was established to assist the Congolese Government to maintain law and order [John Merrils, 1998:69]. The U.N operation was one of the largest undertaken by the U.N comprising at its peak strength, nearly 20,000 troops. As Theo Neethling [2000:34] points out, «Apart from being one of the most complicated of all peacekeeping operations, it cost the U.N dearly in terms of finances and lives including that of the U.N Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld». By the end of December 1962, Tschombe [The Secessionist Movement leader] renounced his goal of making Katanga an independent state. With the authority of the Congolese Government extended over the whole Congo territory, the ONUC mandate had been successfully fulfilled and operation ended on 30 June 1964 [Stephen Hill, 1996:38]. The major thrust in intervening in Congo debacle was to temporarily fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of colonial power thereby giving the newly independent state time to develop its own political, economic and geographical cohesion.

Following this Congo crisis, there have been many U.N engagements in different regions of the continent. Beginning with operations in Namibia and Angola in 1989, and extending during the 1990s to Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Liberia. In most of the cases, operations have been established amidst political turmoil. The civil administration broken down and state authority had often collapsed following bitter intra-state conflict. In addition, some of the states were ungovernable for many years. In all cases, law and order were affected in one way or the other. Under such conditions, though with difficulties and sometimes unsuccessfully, there was need to re-establish the necessary authority to enable a return to good governance and stability. Somalian crisis is an example, which underlines this argument. In 1992-1993, Somalia became the tragic proving ground for the U.N peacekeeping operations machinery of the post Cold-War history. Commenting on the Somalian fiasco, John Debarti [1998:51] argues that, «observers

saw as an opportunity to establish the new role of United Nations, an opportunity that would finally allow implementation of several Charter obligations.» This is because strategic, moral, civic, financial, and political issues that had been under wraps since WWII spilled into the open in Somalia. The experience of Somalia was, however, one of the major indicators of the UNSC incapacity to sustain the post Cold-War events. The situation as it developed was, in its essence unexampled and involved not civil war or non-international armed conflict in the normal sense but rather a governmental collapse so absolute that the status of Somalia as a state was potentially called into question [Thomas Weiss, 1995:58]. It became clear that the international community was unprepared to deal with most of these issues when the Cold-War rules were unsuitable for such eventuality.

In a bid to create conditions for the `uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia, Stephen Hill [1996:136] notes that, «The Secretary General informed the UNSC in November 1992 of certain options which the organization had in order to create conducive environment». The use of force under U.N command or a force of a multi-national coalition with Chapter VII enforcement mandate was proposed. It is when the U.S offered 28 000 troops to act as part of a U.N force to safeguard food and medical supplies that the Secretary General was quick to react. Thomas Weiss [1995:58] argues that, «In early December 1992, Operation Restore Hope was launched by the U.S led UN Task force [UNITAF] comprising of 30 000 troops, 28 0000 of which were American».

Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 794, the force was mandated through Chapter VII of the U.N Charter to use `all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia'. However, as Stephen Hill [1996:137] asserts, «right from the early days of the UNITAF operation, disagreements between the U.N Secretariat and the Bush administration were evident». It is when UNITAF turned over its operation to the second U.N Operation in Somalia [UNISOM II] on 3 May 1993, claims of success were hotly disputed. By the end of UNITAF's mandate, `the consensus within the aid community' was that it had failed to create anything resembling a `secure environment for humanitarian relief operations' [Stephen Hill, 1996:138]. It is soon after the UNOSOMII took over approximately one month later on 5 June, as Ingrid Lehman [1999:45] puts it, «24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in an ambush while inspecting an arms dump belonging to Aideed». In the

escalating spiral of violence which followed, UNOSOM II was to embroil itself in an intractable conflict leading to President Clinton's televised 7 October statement that `all American troops' would be withdrawn by March 1994 [Stephen M. Hill, 1996:137]. The major causes were, firstly, the gap between the operation's stated objectives and its actual activities. Secondly, were the problems created by UNOSOMII's command and control structure, and thirdly, there were divisions among the states which contributed contingents.

Commenting on the 3 October catastrophic event, Stephen Hill [1996:139] notes that, «The UNSOMII troops sent to apprehend suspected members of Aideed's `war cabinet', which was meeting at the Olympic Hotel in South Mogadishu, the U.S special forces found themselves ensnared in a battle». The battle left 18 U.S soldiers dead, 78 injuries and the abduction of a U.S helicopter pilot and a Nigerian peacekeeper. Compounding unrest over the high number killed, televised images of chanting Somalis dragging a U.S soldier's body throughout the streets of Mogadishu, and pictures of a distressed helicopter pilot held hostage resulted in the immediate collapse of `domestic support for the Somali Operation' [John Debarti, 1998:48]. This led to the U.S administration announcing of a complete withdrawal by March 1994. The failures of UNOSOM II can be attributed to the fact that this operation failed to take account of local culture and traditions. It attempted to isolate one of fourteen warlords and personalized a conflict in a culture which did not understand the concept of individual responsibility. In its attempts to capture one individual it killed numerous civilians, including important local elders, and turned a whole nation against it. This crisis, which impacted negatively to the entire U.N peacekeeping machinery, became a precursor of the 1994 Rwandese worst catastrophic event in the 20^th century.

The outbreak of conflict in Rwanda between Government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] in 1993 finally led to the U.N involvement in the long running crisis. As Theo Neethling [2000:45] asserts, «A U.N.Observer mission, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda [UNOMUR] was established following the adoption of Resolution 812 on 12 March 1993». Its chief mission was to monitor the flow of military supplies into the troubled region and was headquartered in Kabale [Uganda]. In 1993, negotiations between the warring parties led to Arusha Accords which contained agreement upon a ceasefire and preparations for elections and inter-communal integration of the armed forces. The quest for the implementation

of these Accords, led to the establishment of a U.N Assistance Mission, UNAMIR II, [John Hawkins, 2003:49]. Despite some setbacks, progress seemed to be being made and UNAMIRII's mandate was renewed in 1994. Theo Neethling [2003:50] notes that, «This relatively hopeful prospect was shattered by the death of Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira and Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda when the plane in which they were traveling was shot down on 6 April 1994». According to Linus Malu [2002:68], «This set off a wave of massacres, in which the Prime Minister, other Ministers and UNAMIRII peacekeepers were among the first victims». This event led to an outbreak of civil war in Rwanda involving the `genocidal' mass slaughters with which the name of the country has become synonymous at the end of the 20^th century.

The response of the U.N and its member states to this situation is flattered by a description as merely inadequate. UNAMIRII having by this stage virtually wound down, at the request of Rwanda, the UNSC terminated its mandate in 1996. Apart from its rather unimportant and ineffective humanitarian endeavors, the record of the UNSC in Rwanda must be reckoned one not only of unmitigated failure but also of scandalous unconcern. Explaining the unwillingness of Great Powers to intervene in Rwandese tragedy, the Canadian General, Romeo Dallaire, the then Commander of the UNAMIR II contends that, «instead of recommending sending troops to Rwanda, a nation's officer came to me and said, `They wouldn't send them because there are no strategic interest, no strategic resources'. He adds that, «In fact, they said, the only thing that's there are humans», [John Sigler, 2002:98]. Nevertheless, despite this UNSC remarkable failure, it is imperative to note that the only positive result was the subsequent establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] by the UNSC Resolution 955 of 1994, which has made a contribution both to dealing with the aftermath of actually or virtually genocidal conflict. It is after this unsuccessful mission in Rwanda that a series of crises erupted in the former Zaire [now DRC], which ended the Mobutu regime in 1997, followed by the 1998 DRC civil war.

The war in the DRC which broke out on the 2^nd of August 1998 in Eastern border town of Goma was regarded by some scholars and historians as the `First Africa's Modern War' [Christian Blocker, 2000:42]. This results from the fact that six countries, namely, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia committed their troops to the embattled

country. Within weeks after the 2^nd of August, the rebels had seized large territory of the country. As Anthony Obinale [2003:69] argues, «Within few weeks, the Angolan army recaptured several towns in the South-West, and a rebel push towards Kinshasa was turned back with help from Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops». However, the rebels maintained their grip on the eastern regions. The rebel movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy [RCD], was supported by Rwanda and Uganda. In a bid to peacefully resolve the crisis, the UNSC under Article 41 of the U.N Charter called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, and urged states not to interfere in the country's internal affairs [Christian Blocker, 2000:43].

As Tiambiao Zhou [2002:56] notes, «Efforts by the U.N Secretary General, the OAU and the South African Development Community [SADC] led on July 10, 1999 to the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement». This agreement was signed by the DRC, along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The agreement provided for an end of hostilities and for the holding of an inter-Congolese dialogue. Anthony Obinale [2003:69] points out that, «The UNSC in August authorized the deployment of 90 U.N military liaison officers to strategic areas in the country and to the capitals of the signatory states to help implement the agreement». In an effort to maintain liaison with the parties, assist in implementing the agreement and monitor security conditions, the UNSC in November 1999, established the United Nations Mission in the DRC [MONUC]. In its quest for monitoring implementation of the cease-fire, support disarmament and demobilization, in February 2000, the UNSC expanded the size and mandate of the mission [Tiambiao Zhou, 2002:57]. The continuing hostilities by militias and foreign armed groups in the Eastern part of the DRC, and the threat they posed to the holding of elections in the country, led to the UNSC on the 28^th October 2005, under resolution 8541 extending the U.N Mission in DRC until 30 September 2006. In addition, the UNSC authorized an increase of 300 personnel in its military strength [John Kalima, 2005:4]. Though continued fighting has currently prevented full deployment and limited the functioning of the military observers in the field, especially in Ituri region, the country has became relatively peaceful after the signing of the April 1, 2003 Sun-City [South Africa] Accords. The general elections are slated to start in March and culminate in the Presidential contest on April 29, 2006.

In the post Cold-War period, the UNSC has made great strides in resolving conflicts in Africa. Peacekeeping operations have emerged as relevant and successful means of resolving longstanding and seemingly complex conflicts on the continent in the post Cold-War milieu. The willingness of the U.N to commit itself to the largest and most costly peacekeeping operations in Africa has been commendable. Nevertheless, the UNSC's inability to timeously or not to respond to conflict has been questioned. In many cases, the UNSC was able to find a threat to the peace, but the finding was not always a prompt one. The Darfur [Sudan] crisis, Sierra Leone civil war, the Rwandese crisis and Somalia, are few examples which show lack of steadiness in the UNSC's practice with regards to the finding of a threat to the peace on African continent. However, it is imperative to note that besides planning, lack of sufficient personnel as well as equipment, the most serious emerging problem for the U.N at the end of the 1980s was the dearth of peacekeeping funds. Hence as the U.N peacekeeping enterprise dwindled, the U.N started promoting regional approach to peacekeeping under Article 52 and 53 of the U.N Charter.

The African Contribution Towards International Peace and Security under Article 52 and 53 of the United Nations Charter

In the early 1990s, the UNSC launched an unprecedented number of peacekeeping operations, including highly ambitious and very costly missions in Bosnia, Somalia and Cambodia. By the mid-90s, political and financial support for peacekeeping operations had waned, especially in the U.S. This period, troop contributing countries' support shriveled as the U.N fell behind in its payments and military challenges in civil war situations grew. As the U.N peacekeeping looked unpromising, peacekeeping operations by regional organizations became a necessity.

The U.N Charter framework recognizes the importance of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. According to Hilaire McCoubrey [2000:34], Article 52[1] of the U.N Charter stipulates that,

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangement or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations.

The U.N Charter, Article 52[3] stipulates that, «The Security Council shall encourage the pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or agencies». It is these Charter provisions that form the basis for regional peacekeeping. In addition, regional organizations may conduct peacekeeping operations as long as those operations are in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N Charter. In case of enforcement measure or measures without the consent of the parties to the conflict, those measures have to be authorized by the UNSC [Art.53 [1]]. The U.N has conducted a number of peacekeeping operations together with regional agencies. Franz Cede [1999:78] argues that, «As stated in the «Supplement to An Agenda for Peace» [U.N.Doc.A/50/60-S/1995/1], certain guiding principles can be identified for such operations». In a parallel mission the U.N can have a leading role and be supported by regional organization. It is under these guiding principles that in Liberia the U.N only supported the Eastern Community Monitoring Group [ECOMOG].

Considering the U.N Charter provisions, it is patently clear that regional security organizations, such as ECOMOG and the SADC, are ipso facto legitimate. The key provision for the present purpose is article 53[1] of the U.N Charter which stipulates that, «The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council». Thus, all measures taken by the regional arrangements in maintaining international peace and security shall at all times be duly reported to the UNSC. It is under this Charter framework that in a bid to compliment the U.N's efforts in area of peace and security, different regional organizations have been established in line with this peace support paradigm.

African regional and sub-regional organizations emphasize that any peace support or peace enforcement action must, as international law requires, be undertaken in accordance with U.N norms and specifically within the legal framework of Chapter VII and VIII of the U.N Charter. ECOMOG is a `non-standing' force consisting of land, sea and air components, that was set up

by the sixteen-member states of the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] to deal with the security problem that followed the collapse of the formal structure in the Republic of Liberia in 1990 [Franz Cede, 1999:3]. The establishment of ECOMOG was essentially sequel to the request of former Liberian President Samuel Doe for ECOWAS intervention. It is after a total breakdown of law and order, that the force intervened and successfully restored an atmosphere that permitted the reinstatement of a functional state structure in Liberia. As John Sigler [2002:69] argues,

The first major conflict resolution agreement executed under the auspices of ECOWAS was the 1989 Protocol on Mutual Defense Assistance signed in Freetown, Sierra Leone, which provides for a non-standing military force for the purpose of mutual military assistance to members of the community attacked by external aggressors.

This protocol provides for collective response when external forces attack a member state and when such attack is likely to endanger the peace and security of other member states. In pursuance of peace in its area of jurisdiction, Derek Ingram [2000:47] notes that, «ECOMOG forced armed groups to accept negotiations that, in most cases, led to cease-fire, and it has been tasked to monitor and enforce the provisions of cease-fire». Nevertheless, because the factions that signed these cease-fire agreements do not so in good faith, violations have been rampant. As Briget Moix [2001:42] argues, «This compels ECOMOG to use force to get the recalcitrant parties to adhere to what was agreed upon. Sometimes this will involve outright and large scale military operations against the most belligerent insurgent group». The ECOMOG mission, at this stage, changes from intervention to peace enforcement. In West Africa, ECOMOG has been tasked to carry out disarmament, the formation of interim or transitional Governments, the return of refugees, military reform, the staging of general elections, ensure security of U.N personnel and to assist in the process of military reform. At this stage, its mission changes from peace enforcement to peacekeeping.

Despite problems of command and control, among others, ECOMOG has achieved more success than expected by its founders and international community. It is a clear proof of what is possible if African states pool their resources to address African disputes. There are positive signs that ECOMOG has created awareness among West African leaders and military experts that the force is fine-tuning. Within the relatively short period of its existence, ECOMOG has

gone full circle from peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Liberia, to restorative intervention in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The ECOMOG experiment in Liberia has been widely acclaimed as one of the most successful and unparalleled in the history of peacekeeping.

In Southern Africa, Heads of State and Government have supported peace support measures that promote collective security in the sub-region. On political front, these measures include the establishment of Front Line States [FLS] in 1970, Southern Africa Development Community Conference [SADCC] in 1980 and SADC in 1992 which superceded the two previously stated bodies [John Dzimba, 2001:34]. Throughout its existence, SADC has successfully established a political solidarity that has sustained and deepened the desire for regional integration. Maxwell Khobe [2003:104] notes that,«SADC has also created common political values, systems and institutions in order to build a firm foundation for democratic governance». On 14 August 2001,in Brantyre, Malawi, Heads of states and Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. This led to the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security [OPDS], which incorporated the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee [ISDSC], which was established in 1977 as a substructure of the FLS.

The Organ's Protocol Article 2[2] stipulates that, «The specific objectives shall be, to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict, intra-state conflict and aggression». The OPDS's mandate includes a long list of principles and methods to be employed in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict by peaceful means. These include, provisions concerning preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation, negotiations, conciliation and adjudication by an international tribunal and the development of various protocols. As Maxwell Khobe [2003:105] observes,«OPDS is a prerequisite for SADC as an organization, to address regional peace and security issues. The fact that SADC members have agreed on its structure signifies an important shift in thinking among member states». With the establishment of OPDS, any military action must be based on a collective decision, not taken by individual members or a select of group of countries. In addition, on 26 August 2003, Heads of State and Government in Tanzania signed the SADC Mutual Defense Pact. This Pact regulates all forms

of collective security in the region. The main objective is to operationalize the mechanisms of the SADC Organ for mutual cooperation in defense and security matters. The philosophy of the SADC framework is based on the principle that security is a holistic phenomenon not restricted to military matters, but incorporates political, social, economic and environmental issues. Its objects are not confined to states, but extend in widening circles to include peoples, the inhabitants of a geographic region and the global community [Linus Malu, 1998:34]. As ECOWAS has been conducting sizeable and robust peacekeeping missions, the SADC member states have undertaken numerous peacekeeping training and other capacity building projects. The SADC coalition in the DRC [1998] and Lesotho [1998] distinguished themselves from other sub-regional initiatives in the degree to which troop contributors were able to deploy and remain operational without foreign assistance. In the DRC, troop contributors largely sustained their operations without outside assistance. As Linus Malu [1998:34] argues, «When the warring parties in the DRC gathered in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999 to sign a cease-fire pact, they endorsed an agreement initiated and mediated mainly by SADC». The U.N played only a facilitating role. In addition, SADC adopted the strategies of disarmament, peaceful resolution of conflict and institutional development as the foundations on which peace, human security and conflict prevention should be built. At the continental level as David Malone [2003:20] notes, «SADC has been active in the establishment and consolidation of the AU, its institutional programmes such as the Peace and Security Council and the New Partnership for Africa's Development [NEPAD]».

In a bid to fulfill the U.N Charter mandate in area of peace and security, co-operation between regional organizations and the UNSC remains vital. The U.N faces acute resource constraints. The P-5 of the UNSC are perceived as being reluctant to become directly involved in conflict in far-flung areas whose strategic significance has diminished since the end of the Cold-War. As a result, these factors have compelled successive U.N Secretary General to call upon regional bodies to complement the world body's efforts in peacekeeping and peacemaking. To this end, Article 52 and 53 are vital to the future of regional peace support action. In the post Cold-War milieu, with under-funded U.N, a broadly based and flexible view of Article 52 and 53 of the U.N Charter have become a necessity. As the following Chapter analyses, these Charter Articles remain crucial as they form the linchpin for any country to claim a seat on the UNSC.

CHAPTER 3

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Introduction

Since 1997,the UNSC reform has been debated in an «open-ended» committee which media correspondents covering the U.N reform dubbed «The never-ending committee» [Alvin Leroy 2005:4]. In a world torn by nuclear threats, terrorism, war crimes and human rights abuses, a strong UNSC to promote international peace and security and defend international law has been proposed. The UNSC has played a much more complex role in the post Cold-War era than in the past because of its increased role in global politics, and hence its failures are more evident and its reform has become more urgent than ever. Most states agree the UNSC is a near zilch in effectiveness but collide on reform measures. There is little clarity, let alone consensus, about what reform might mean in practice. States agree, that the UNSC's membership and institutional structures reflect outdated geopolitical realities and political thinking shaped by the world of 1945. For more than a decade, nations have been debating the UNSC reform in the UNGA. However, practically, substantive and substantial reform has proved virtually impossible. Proposals have come and gone, but no membership blueprint has yet won the needed support for such institutional alteration. Currently, a new burst of diplomatic energy has enlivened this vital debate.

Having deliberated at length on the `Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change' [2004], the AU Executive Council on the 7^th and 8^th March 2005 adopted a Common African Position, known as «The Ezulwini Consensus» in Swaziland [Daneshi Sarooshi 2005:4]. The AU proposal was formally presented to the UNGA on July 14, 2005. As Daneshi Sarooshi [2005:4] notes, «Under the Ezulwini Consensus, the 53 AU member states agreed to ask for an increase of UNSC seats from 15 to 26, with 6 of the 11 new members being permanent ones with veto rights and the rest five non-permanent ones». Two of the six new veto-wielding permanent seats should go to African countries while another two to Asia, one to Latin America and Caribbean and one to Western Europe.

The High-Level panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes report [2004] suggests that, «The new members of the UNSC should have contributed `most to the U.N financially, militarily and diplomatically', particularly through contributions to U.N assessed budgets and participation in mandated peace operations». However, AU member states demanded the right to select African representatives to the UNSC and setting up its selection criteria for African contenders. As Anthony Parsons [2005:5] argues, «According to `Ezulwini Consensus', the AU criteria will be based on the representative nature and capacity of those chosen». Nevertheless, these criteria have still not been explicitly defined. Although countries like Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Egypt and Kenya have shown interest in representing Africa on coveted seats, the AU is still flummoxed as to which of its member states to endorse.

The AU Position adopted in Swaziland was reiterated at the AU Summit in Sirte [Libya] convened on July 4-5, 2005. In Sirte, all 53 states that make up the AU unanimously reaffirmed the initial position demanding two permanent seats with veto rights. The text of the declaration, made public on July 5, 2005 reads, «We reaffirm our commitment to ensure the success, in unity and solidarity, of our common position with a view to enabling Africa to choose its representatives in the Security Council to act in its name and on its behalf,» the Heads of state and Government said in the declaration on U.N reform [Anthony Parsons [2005:5].

This Sirte declaration was again reaffirmed on August 4, 2005 at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia]. As Robert Massie [2005:4] argues, «Delegates from the Group of Four [G4], [Brazil, Germany, Japan and India] aspirants for permanent Council seats also attended the meeting in the hope of winning crucial African support for their proposal». However, the AU maintained its position and rejected a compromise deal sold to some African leaders, including the then AU Chairman Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, by the G-4 at this extraordinary Summit. As Sydney Yehuda [2005:2] notes, «The proposal had called for abandoning the veto right for Africa's bid and abandoning the fifth seat of non-permanent members in the UNSC». The majority of AU member states, namely, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Congo, Mali, rejected the proposal. According to Mohammed Bedjaoui [2005], «In Addis Ababa Summit, 46 of the 53 AU states backed the AU's position taken in Sirte [Libya] to push for the 15-member UNSC to be expanded to 26, including six new permanent seats with veto-wielding powers». In a bid to sell

AU position, following President Robert G. Mugabe's [Zimbabwe] request, a committee of ten Heads of state from two countries each of the continent's regions was set up [The Herald 10 November 2005].

The President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah [Sierra Leone] chaired High Level Committee's report was adopted on October 31, 2005. The report expressed Africa's tenacious adherence to its position as broached in 1997 Harare Declaration, reinforced in Ezulwini, Swaziland, and at Sirte, Libya, in July 2005 and then restated at AU Extraordinary Summit in Addis Ababa in August 2005 [Robert Massie 2005:7]. Member states unequivocally stated that Africa should maintain its position and seek to convince the rest of the world, including the P-5 members of the UNSC to repair the long-standing injustice to the continent. African Heads of state and government reiterated in the statement on November 1, 2005 that, «Full recognition of Africa in the Security Council means not less than two permanent seats, including veto» [Robert Massie, 2005:7]. It is on the 23^rd-24^th January 2006 in Khartoum, that AU leaders reaffirmed the AU's position and agreed to delay tabling its resolution at the Council until it had sold its position to the powerful UNSC veto-wielding members.

Running contrary to the AU position is the G-4 proposal. As Thomas Bruha [2005] notes «At an event held on the 25^th March 2005 at the Millennium U.N Plaza Hotel, in New York, the G-4 presented the essentials of their draft framework resolution that they hoped the UNGA was to adopt during the September 2005 Summit». These countries believe an expanded UNSC should include, on a permanent basis, countries that have the will and the capacity to take on major responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security.

According to Martina Metzger [2005],«On July 6, 2005 in New York, the G-4 formally deposited a draft resolution with the co-sponsorship of 27 countries, which later became 29». This draft envisages enlargement of the UNSC to include six new permanent seats [two each for Africa and Asia, one for the Western states and one for Latin America and the Caribbean] and four new non-permanent seats [one each for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Eastern Europe]. Whether the new permanent members will be granted a power of veto is to be discussed and decided at a review conference to be held 15 years after

the entry into force of the Charter amendment [Thomas Bruha, 2005]. The G-4 has decided to stand by its draft and canvass support for it. This group of influential states embarked on a furious lobbying campaign with particular attention being paid to African states that could make up a powerful bloc in the world body where a two-thirds majority in the UNGA is needed. The G-4 states perceive their position as a pragmatic scheme that may succeed in getting the required backing of two-thirds of the UNGA, as well as being accepted by the current powerful veto-wielding members.

The AU wants veto power for two new permanent seats it hopes to get on the UNSC in an historic reform of the U.N. As this reform exercise gathers momentum, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt have been classified as the front-runners jostling to fly African flag as permanent members in a reformed UNSC. However, the debate about expansion of permanent membership of UNSC is unusual with respect to Africa in that unlike other UNSC's members, the consideration is based on continental representation rather than on the individual economic or military strength of the countries to be considered. Although the AU has made its position clear, outside the continent, the G-4 adopted a position which prompted the G-4's allies in Africa led by the Nigerian President, Oluseguni Obasanjo, to caution against an all-or-nothing approach.

As Frazer Caron [2005:5] observes «South Africa and Nigeria, and indeed Africa, hold the view that the UNSC should be expanded in the permanent and non-permanent categories to make it more representative, effective and acceptable». This position was reaffirmed when South Africa President, Thabo Mbeki, at a media briefing in Addis Ababa on August 4, 2005 argued that, «If existing permanent members insisted on keeping their veto, then the same privilege should be extended to new permanent members». In an effort to shape and determine the AU position, South Africa and Nigeria worked with other African states. However, in a marked departure from the traditional stand of the AU, Nigeria and South Africa steadily gained support, when they proposed that, like the G-4 states, Africans should drop the veto idea because too many objections were being raised. This unanticipated Nigerian position came after the July 25, 2005 meeting in London by Foreign Ministers, which it chaired, in a search for a compromise deal with the G-4 states. As Locke Barnaba [2005] argues, «Nigeria agreed to

consider a compromise with the G-4 group, in which new members would not get veto rights». In addition, the compromise would allow a new additional seat that Africa had wanted for itself exclusively, to become a seat that can be rotated among Africa, Asia and Latin America.

South Africa was also believed to have reasoned with Nigeria alongside some other Southern African countries. However, North African countries, namely, Egypt and Algeria were leading a group of African countries which wanted to have the veto power or nothing [Frazer Caron, 2005:5]. Concurring with Frazer Caron, John Bhaka [2005] contends that, «South Africa's Mbeki also hinted that Africa could compromise on its demand for veto power on the Security Council if the reform has to materialize». This was illustrated in President Mbeki's speech in Parliament on September 1, 2005 when he said, «I don't believe our approach would be that we are making a demand and if the demand is not met, we walk away and go home» Frazer Caron [2005]. It is during the 4^th August 2005 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, the then AU Chairman President Obasanjo advised his fellow African leaders to compromise and advance the U.N reforms arguing that,

The main issue before us is to decide either that Africa will join the rest of the world, or the majority of the rest of the world, in bringing to a conclusion a demand for U.N reform, or if Africa will stand on a non-negotiable position that will certainly frustrate the reform efforts.

The Nigerian President's search for a compromise was unequivocally expressed when he told Heads of state and Government in Addis Ababa that the continent's quest for two permanent seats with veto on the UNSC was `unrealistic». He cautiously added that, «Those powers that have veto won't give it willingly». At the opening of the 4^th August 2005 Addis Ababa Summit, President Olusegun Obasanjo argued, «We need to negotiate with other groups, unless our objective is to prevent any decision. Let be no under no illusion: Africa stands to lose more than any other region» [Frazer Caron, 2005]. He urged flexibility when dealing with the UNSC reform, and compromise with the G-4 to ensure African representation on the powerful UNSC. In his comment on the 4^th August 2005 Addis Ababa Summit outcome, John Brenda [2005:6] argues that, «President Thabo Mbeki argued strongly at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in favor of the compromise as the only realistic way for Africa to get permanent seats. But the Mugabe camp prevailed». Challenging the African demand for veto power, Femi Fani Kayode,

Spokesman for Nigerian President, argues that, «Our position is that it is best for us to be there, rather than insisting on a veto» [Frazer Caron, 2005]. As the September 2005 UNGA Summit approached, Nigeria and South Africa had appeared ready to give up the right to veto, saying compromise might be necessary to get the permanent seats for Africa. This group's philosophy has been that once Africa becomes established on the UNSC, the issue of veto power can be pursued later. Therefore, they suggest that without being a permanent member of the UNSC, Africa cannot start to talk of veto. Hence, it is advised to first take advantage and get what is immediately available now.

The course of action, overtly taken by Nigeria, and covertly by South Africa at Addis Ababa Summit did not augur well with other African states. As the AU Summit wrapped up its sessions, the Nigerian proposal on the need to show more flexibility towards forging a unified African stance on the expansion of the UNSC membership was rejected. A group of countries led by Algeria considered that the continent must stick to its first demand and not to be associated with the G-4 initiative. Several AU states, especially, in North Africa, vigorously opposed the Nigerian-driven compromise deal. According to Jibrin Abubakhar [2005] «Egypt accused Nigeria of abandoning African interests to increase its own chances of clinching a permanent seat on the U.N Security Council». The oil producing state «tried to subjugate the African position to narrow interests in a way which does not reflect the required transparency in dealings between African states», the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit said. While Nigeria had said the 24 July, 2005 G-4 and a group of African states meeting in London reached a consensus, the Egyptian delegate, Minister Sameh Shukri, expressed disappointment arguing that, «If the Nigerian approach continues, it will lead to a fracture in the African position and the consequences of that would be grave»[John Mara 2005:6].

It is apparent that if the current state of affairs continues, it may threaten the pursued reform process goals. Throughout the U.N existence, the incumbent veto-wielding P-5 have been resisting any expansion in veto-wielding membership category. Combined with this division within the continent, these P-5 may exploit such weaknesses and put on hold the reform process. The division may lead to deeper cracks in the UA position. It is likely to create more

fragmented groups, and more proponents and opponents of the Nigerian and South African position, which will definitely create an awful picture for Africa.

The UNSC reform involves too many political considerations, geopolitical interests, and the settling of many old scores. The G-4 position regarding the UNSC reforms has led to political skullduggery within the AU bloc, a situation which may put the entire process into disarray. The fact that there is now a multitude of different positions on the UNSC reform means that there is little or no chance that the required two-thirds majority will be attained in the UNGA. Although there have been disagreements in a number of AU deliberations, it is imperative to note that African votes carry heavy weight in deciding the fate of the U.N reform, especially the UNSC. In order to be adopted, the draft resolution needs to have support from two-thirds of the 191 UNGA members including 53 African countries. Thus, their 53 votes either way could make or break the resolution. Nevertheless, the way the U.N Charter is presently crafted, any of the UNSC veto-wielding members can put the reform on hold.

Although it has been perceived that obstacles to the large-scale reform of the U.N may reside above all in the split between the rich North and the poor South, the ` haves' and `have-nots'. A division within the AU and the G-4 regarding this reform exercise is likely to stall the whole project. The bone of contention is whether the African countries should negotiate with the G-4 on the issue of veto which the African countries have demanded in their own proposed resolution, but the G-4 group carefully set aside for later discussions. Currently both resolutions have been tabled at the UNGA, after African states under the AU banner failed to reach a truce with the G-4 countries. It is vital to note that the G-4 and AU joint formula is so crucial because it is about the best way for any resolution on the expansion of the UNSC can obtain the much-needed two-thirds in the UNGA. However on the one hand, most African states have strongly insisted that Africa must have two veto-wielding members in an expanded UNSC. On the other hand, a group led by Nigeria and South Africa wants the demand for veto power dropped. According to Ayala Maya [2005], «The G-4 soft pedaled on the issue of veto power after the current permanent members warned that if they insist on veto, the whole idea of reform of the Council would be scuttled». This veto freeze has been seen as a strategic shift designed to win

the incumbent veto-wielding members' support. It has been also seen as realistic after realizing that the P-5 will not give up or dilute their treasured veto. These were reaffirmed by the Japanese Prime Minister, Jenichiro Koizumi, who argued that, «The freeze on demanding veto rights was unavoidable, the current permanent members will resist any attempt to infringe on their vested interests.» [Ayala Maya, 2005].

The calls for the AU-G-4 joint formula have been steadily louder. This results from the fact that a coalition between Africa and the G-4 bloc is seen as a sure winner and the best strategy to grab the necessary votes. However, AU under this joint formula will have first to forswear veto power in hopes of persuading the incumbent veto-wielding P-5. As Sydney Dawson [2005] argues, «The effort to expand the UNSC suffered a serious blow when negotiations between the G-4 and AU to submit a joint proposal fell apart in Addis Ababa Summit». Although neither proposal individually has currently the support of two-thirds of the UNGA, it can be argued that a joint proposal would be more likely to meet such threshold.

The gap between the G-4 draft resolutions and the AU proposal is not all that wide. These groups agree that the number of permanent members should be increased. The differences are that the AU draft gives full veto rights to the new permanent members and proposes that the number of the non-permanent members should be increased by a total of five countries, with two of them from Africa [compared with one nonpermanent seat in the G-4 draft]. Proposing on how this gap can be filled, Jarrod Weiner [2005:4] argues that,

The United States, a permanent member with veto power is against new countries getting the veto. If the G-4 and the AU both submit draft resolutions for voting, there is a strong possibility that both sides will fall. In order to gain the 128 votes necessary for adoption, the opposition must be kept to under 63 votes. The number of countries that can be expected to definitely oppose the G-4 draft is said to be around 30. So if it fails to attract many African votes, the G-4 draft is not going to be able to see the light of day. And most attention must be devoted to integrating the G-4 draft and the AU proposal.

There is widespread support for enlarging the UNSC to reflect the global realities of the 21^st century. Nonetheless, as the current state of affairs has shown, there are still serious barriers, which must be understood and navigated. Considering the P-5 veto power and their vested interests, the following Chapter analyzes the possibilities of amending the pillars of the U.N charter, especially Article 108 and the prospects and challenges the AU proposal faces.

CHAPTER 4
THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING AFRICAN UNION PROPOSAL OR OTHERWISE

Introduction

«If you think the Monarch is regressive, you do not solve the problem by doubling the size of the Royal family». [Ian Williams, July 26, 2005].

There is possibly nowhere else on the globe that a reformed UNSC is awaited with much anticipation as on the African continent. In all U.N structures, none is a bigger or frustrating target for U.N reformers than the UNSC. For many years, states have been advocating its expansion arguing that adding new members will remedy the democratic and representative deficit it suffers. Nevertheless, schism on whether new members should have veto therein has created a logjam to this project. In a bid to avoid marginalization during this restructuring exercise, for Africa to be heard and recognized as an equal partner in global politics, AU came up with a two-veto seat proposal. While AU was hopeful that the September 2005,UNGA Summit would vote on a proposal, the history's largest gathering of world leaders fell far short of completing the major changes AU sought. The failure of any one proposal to elicit support from the two-thirds of the UNGA members clearly indicated that the Second San Francisco is unlikely. Considering the role of veto in global politics and the P-5 veto-wielding members' vested interests, this chapter answers numerous questions and outlines on how long will the Addis Ababa 53-member AU proposal for two veto status seats, under the current state-centric system will sustain pressure from within and outside Africa. The focus is on the pillars of the U.N Charter such as Charter amendment, especially Article 108. Article 23 and the AU's contenders voting behavior in the UNGA were analyzed.

The effort to create a more effective UNSC that accounts for the changed global security climate has become a geo-political challenge for power and influence. Africa, a home to probably the largest number of crisis-ridden in the world, feels that this opportunity to rectify the imbalance within the main U.N Organ should not be missed. To this end, this largest single bloc at the U.N is exercising its political and numerical clout by refusing to back down on its demand for two veto-wielding seats in the UNSC shake up.

As John Becker [2002:40] argues «In the UNGA, African states account for nearly 30 percent of the votes, simply few states would have to join these states in order to block passage of any proposed reforms». As Diagram 4.1 indicates, in order to change the structure of the UNSC, African position remains vital. The African approach to UNSC reform reflects the continent's aspirations to make it more reflective of today's world landscape of power, as opposed to 1945. Introducing the AU proposal, Nigeria's delegate said it contained a `reaffirmation' of the commitment to strengthening the U.N, including the UNSC, that the Council would be better placed to perform its primary responsibility if it was more inclusive [Mark Migba 2005]. It is believed that the proposed reforms will finally institutionalize Africa's capacity to bring its viewpoint and perspective to global political debate. Although there are insurmountable obstacles to face, notably, Charter amendment, the two-thirds votes by the UNGA members and all veto-wielding P-5, Africa presented an integrated vision of a just UNSC expansion, which considered all geographic regions and guaranteed a balanced representation of all civilizations and cultures.

The AU over the past Summits reaffirmed its position that it will accept nothing short of being offered two permanent seats with veto. The September 14^th-16^th historical UNGA Summit was seen as a unique occasion to take bold decisions in the areas of reforming the UNSC. Paradoxically, when the U.S President appointed John Bolton as the U.S ambassador at the U.N as soon as Congress went into a month-long recess, he sent a warning signal to reformists that

the U.S was not keen on the U.N reform agenda. As Horma Bartese [2005] puts it, «John Bolton released proposals that effectively emasculated reform initiatives by the AU countries». John Bolton sent to his fellow ambassadors to the U.N a list of 750 amendments to a document outlining a blueprint for reform painstakingly compiled by the 59^th UNGA session President, Jean Ping. Lau Breckon [2005:2] who described John Bolton as «Washington's diplomatic demolition expert,» observed that, «his stance could effectively scupper AU ambitions for the continent to be awarded two permanent veto power seats in an expanded UNSC». As the Summit wrapped up the 35-page document, world leaders endorsed on U.N reforms had only one sentence on the need for the 15-member Council to become «more broadly representative, more efficient and transparent» [George Mackman, 2005:4]. At this level, compromise was virtually impossible as UNSC seats meant losers and winners, with each group having drawn enough opposition to prevent a resolution from gaining a two-thirds vote in the 191 UNGA. The 700-plus changes at the very late stage heralded the U.S's résistance in making the UNSC stronger. This state of affairs became a reminder to the AU bloc that, while the 1965 reform was a product of increasing cohesion among the non-aligned states, this harmony fell apart when put to test after the end of the Cold-War.

Notwithstanding global consensus on the need to reorient the UNSC, the global South's outlook remains different from those of the developed and industrialized North. This means the success of the AU and U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan's project of reforming the world body; mainly the UNSC remains precariously hinged on the shifting and increasingly divergent interests of the North and the South. While the AU pinned its hope on the September 2005 UNGA Summit, expectations were dashed by the Summit document outcome, which became «historic» to some, and «outrageous» to others. Commenting on Summit outcome, the sharpest criticism came in the closing speech by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who described the document to have been «conceived in darkness and brought forth from the shadows». The Indian ambassador at the U.N, Nirupam Sen, made the astonishing charge explaining that «the most powerful member of the UNSC, the U.S, was opposed to re-introducing resolutions on the expansion of the Council because the aspiring nations [G-4 and AU members] had bitten off more than they could chew» [Horma Bartese, 2005]. These sentiments were echoed by the representative of Nigeria, Sola Ongunbanwo, who said, «President Olusegun Obasanjo and AU

Commission chair Alpha Omar Konare are jointly working on jump starting the process, African states want to return to the table to advance what is diplomatically attainable, where for now the politically desirable is not attainable»[Horma Bartese, 2005]. During the UNGA Summit, internal rifts over rival formulas, the opposition of the U.S and the John Bolton amendments successfully left the original document on UNSC reform in tatters.

African countries erroneously perceive that because African issues dominate more than 60 percent of the UNSC's agenda and that several practices and historical factors deprived the continent of representation in the veto permanent category, therefore, demanding two permanent seats with veto power was non-negotiable. Although this sounds correct, it may not form the linchpin for such demands. African problems may dominate debate in the UNSC but may not threaten global stability and Great Powers' direct interests. This however, is in contrast with the Middle East, where the situation may affect the existing construction of power. According to House Freedom report [2002], African issues dominate the UNSC because «African states are incapable of maintaining collective security over their own continent». The current UNSC reform debates have shown that issues of national interests take precedence over other political imperatives. Thus, the 1965 event, the first ever amendment to the U.N Charter may not repeat itself. This is because as Horma Bartese [2005] observes, «Nationalist China, which had to be extra careful for fear of losing its seat in the U.N, voted in favor of the UNSC reform in order to maintain favor with the non-aligned states who had the power to eject it from the U.N». The country's persistent pursuit for defending national interests was expressed by the then USSR representative Nikolai Fedorenko who opined that his country favored a redistribution of the non-permanent seats because it «would inevitably reduce the share of the Western countries' seats»[Horma Bartese, 2005]. His statement underscores the continuing primacy of the nation-state in the perennial quest for prestige and status in international relations, which is also reflected in the current UNSC debate. In 1965, it is apparent that the USSR made a strategic decision to tie the African and Asian states' desire for UNSC reform to the issue of seating Communist China.

According to Theodore Shabad [2005:4], «The Bush administration expressed its opposition to
all proposals on the table. While the administration has stated that it is open to a modest

expansion of the UNSC, it does not support an expansion of 10 or 11 new members». Instead, the U.S has formally backed Japan's bid for permanent membership on the UNSC and has expressed its willingness to consider `two or so new permanent members' and `two or three additional non-permanent seats', allocated by region to expand the UNSC to 19 or 20[Theodore Shabad, 2005:4]. Japan, which hosts the largest concentration of American troops in Asia, is the main U.S ally in the region, and Washington views Tokyo as a vital geo-political counterweight to Beijing. The U.S position was reaffirmed on July 12, 2005 after the U.S Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, held talks with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura, in Tokyo. In addition, the U.S supports Brazil on the grounds that this Latin American country comes in without veto power [Theodore Shabad, 2005:4].

It is evident that the U.S reached its `reasonable' conclusion from more traditionally sordid premises. If the U.S could not convince a mere 15-strong UNSC into backing the invasion of Iraq, then it would be harder for it to twist the arms of 26 members. Thomas Hamilton [2005:5] argues that, «The more revealing is that the U.S made it clear that it would not support permanent seats for any country that snubbed the Bush regime build up to the invasion». Just as Germany qualifies, AU, with all of its 52 members also condemned the war. While France and Britain back the G-4 proposal, no Great Power ever came out in support of the AU formula. This was illustrated in August 2005, when AU Summit delegates adopted the report by the High Level Committee of 10 [in charge of selling AU's position], chaired by the Sierra Leone's President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. During the Summit, delegates said in future the committee should make contacts at the highest levels and not through officials. The general feeling was that officials like Ms Jendayi Frazer [The U.S Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs] were too low and of no «political substance» to represent official thinking in the Bush regime [Herald 10 November 2005].

This was reiterated during the Khartoum AU Summit [23rd -24^th January 2006] when concerns were that the committee had not done enough and had not approached the P-5 members to sell Africa's position. In Sudan, President Mugabe charged that,

Assuming that the outcome of taking our campaign to the five permanent members is to realize that they do not support Africa's position, this summit must ask itself one question: Does the US, Britain or any of the five permanent members have the right to block Africa's position to permanent members of the UN? [The Herald, 27 January 2005]

The failure of AU proposal to draw much support from Great Powers led Eddy Maloka [2005] to argue that the AU's «intransigent demand for veto» could cost the world progress regarding the enlargement of the UNSC. He adds, «We believe that the AU position was a strategic error ... the `all or nothing' approach is not in the best interest of Africa». His views were echoed by Adekaye Adebajo [2005] who feels that, «The Council reform is unlikely to happen, but if the AU had accepted the G-4 proposal, the UNSC reform would have been more likely». One may observe that Africa is demanding more than it would appear that the U.N members or the U.N system is capable of giving. Supporting this view, Jerome Cartillier [2005], concurs that, «Many observers believe that by choosing to insist on having the right to veto, Africa has failed a test of time and squandered an opportunity». He adds that, «The AU position was also seen as `tragic' because its non-compromise position on UNSC reform will in all likelihood keep the continent outside an important political forum». Although during the last Summit in Khartoum [Sudan] AU members went into the trenches and said its position for full veto-seats was nonnegotiable, this new power game paradigm places Africa in an awful situation. However, although P-5's national interests have become a stumbling bloc, Africa, being the largest bloc in the UNGA, and by the fact that the global South is not represented in the UNSC, Africa richly deserves a seat in the UNSC with all privileges.

Taking into account the December 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes and the Kofi Annan's In larger Freedom [2005] reports, neither model involves any expansion of the veto. The 2004 report suggests that, «We recognize that the veto had an important function in reassuring the U.N most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the existing members' veto powers». The panel only urged the use of veto to be limited to matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake and refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. The 2004 report concludes that, «We recommend that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto» [Michael Brenham, 2005:6]. The two alternative models proposed by the Panel and the U.N Secretary General for achieving greater representativeness, attention almost wholly focused on Model A, envisioning six new permanent seats, but without any change to veto powers, and Model B, which would have added no new permanent seats but

created a number of renewable four-year positions that would be potentially available to enable the presence on the UNSC of all the most important regional players. The G-4 proposed a plan similar to Model A. It is apparent that if only the AU could have agreed with the final position of the powerful G-4, and realized that an extension of the veto was unattainable, the six-permanent seats model had every chance of winning the necessary UNGA two-thirds support.

In their pursuit of raisons d'être, states use whatever institutions available to serve their interests. In a world where the U.S has no challenger, its global presence, as great as, of that of any empire in history, trying to control its actions through the UNSC begins to resemble the Roman Senate's efforts to control the emperor. The P-5 members that wield the veto in the UNSC are unlikely to view with favor any encroachment into their privileged realm, unless they believe the contenders' entry serves their particular interests as it was in 1965. In addition, one may observe that the idea that Great Powers will continue to participate, politically or financially, in an institution whose purpose has become to limit their powers has no precedent. If the UNSC continues to materially disagree with U.S foreign policy on critical issues, the U.N could come to resemble its defunct predecessor, the League of Nations. In spite of public declarations, the P-5 are content with the present arrangements and oppose any changes that might dilute or take away their veto power or expand their club in veto category. The U.N Charter Article 109 reserved the possibility of a General Conference for the purposes of reviewing the U.N Charter [Thomas Hamilton, 2005:4]. Nevertheless, it is patently clear that the P-5 preferred setting the bar high for any changes. They not only resisted efforts to convene such a conference but also tacitly communicated their intention to safeguard their veto rights. Considering the U.S build up to Iraq war, it can be deduced from its attitude that no U.S leader will permit the UNSC to stand in the way of pursuing the U.S's projected interests in national security.

The veto, the P-5 wield elevates them to the ranks of the five most powerful countries in the world body, giving them the ultimate authority to declare war and peace, and also decide on who should or not be subjected to international sanctions. As Michael Brenham [2005:6] argues, «Although arguably the UK and France as well as Russia are no longer considered Great Powers, their permanent status with veto power gives them a substantial voice in

international politics». As the debate over Iraq shows, enhancing the UNSC's role is a principal objective of French and Russian foreign policies. This is because these countries will be given a say about where, when and how the U.S unparalleled military power will be projected so long as Washington works through such framework. These P-5 with veto power are in essence, guarding themselves, they will neither relinquish nor dilute their veto power by allowing more veto-wielding members in their privileged club. It may be observed that by insisting on veto, Africa may have pulled the plug on its proposal since it is unlikely that the P-5 will amend Article 108 of the U.N Charter, the most difficult step for any UNSC reform endeavors.

The U.S Department of State identifies votes of fundamental national interest in the UNGA annually. As the U.S Department report [2005] indicates, voting records of key African contenders may dent AU's hopes of getting two proposed permanent seats with veto. The report indicates that support for the U.S voting position on key issues over the past five years among the key UNSC contenders has been low. Evidently, this report remains vital to the U.S in considering the current reform agenda. According to the report, the analysis of actual votes [not including consensus votes] in the UNGA over a six-year period [1999-2004] reveals that five of the leading candidates voted against the U.S more than 70 percent of the time.

According to the report [2005], the records of the three leading African contenders are poor. Nigeria and South Africa voted with the U.S just 25 percent of the time, while Egypt, a huge beneficiary of U.S aid, sided with it in only 18 percent of the votes. In addition, as the report indicates, of the 190 [excluding the U.S] members of the UNGA, Nigeria and South Africa rank 104^th and 106^th respectively. Egypt ranks very near the bottom at 168^th , behind Sudan and just ahead of the so called `rogue regimes' [Iran, Libya, Burma, and Syria]. The report indicates that support for U.S voting positions in the UNGA fell since 1999 for all African countries competing for the UNSC seats. In 2004, as the report indicates, Nigeria voted with the U.S just 15 percent of the time, and South Africa only 11 percent of the time. In 1999, these two countries voted with the U.S 35 percent, and 40 percent of the time, respectively. Egypt's record was pitifully low [8.5 percent] in 2004 [down from 29 percent in 1999]. Voting exercise on key issues, African contenders are a cause of concern to the U.S. The report [2005] suggests that South Africa and Nigeria voted against the U.S position on key votes on average of 80

percent of the time between 2000 and 2004. Egypt voted with the U.S just 16 percent. The U.S did n

ot receive a single vote of support from Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt on any key vote in 2001. The report continues that worse than their actual voting records is the fact that these countries' opposition to U.S priorities is increasing. The report suggests that South Africa and Nigeria have sharply reduced their level of support for the U.S on key votes since 1999. In addition, in 2004, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt voted with the U.S on just two key votes.

The UNSC Contenders: Average Voting Coincidence with the U.S. in the UNGA [1999-04].

Source: The U.S Department of State: Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2004

[August 10, 2005], Average Calculated by the Heritage Foundation. * Does not include Consensus Resolutions.

Considering the level of support on key issues by African contenders, with doubled veto as proposed by the AU proposal, if adopted it will make it far more difficult for the U.S to work through the expanded UNSC. Hence, the U.S is unlikely to accept the AU reform roadmap. This incongruity in UNGA voting by African countries jostling The

U.S is likely to perceive these countries being less supportive of its policy priority once they are granted two veto seats in the UNSC. Apart from the UNGA, African countries have been als

o less supportive of U.S policy priorities in UNSC. This can be illustrated by the 2003 voting -

in UNSC, when African non permanent members were among the «Uncommitted Six»
[Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, Chile, Mexico, Pakistan], which stood defiant and refused to

endorse the U.S's war in Iraq [Lau Breckon, 2005:5]. The U.S will view the expanded UNSC undermining its effort to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It may perceive military action in its interests being less likely to receive U.N support. Hence, this AU reform route is likely to be abandoned.

Country	Share of Global Gross National income [%]	Share of World Population [%]	Contributions to regular U.N. Budget 2004-06[%]
USA	32.7	4.6	22.00
Japan	12.6	2.0	19.49
German	6.2	1.3	8.66
Britain	4.9	0.9	6.13
France	4.5	1.0	6.03
China	4.0	20.4	2.03
India	1.6	16.7	1.88
Brazil	1.4	2.9	1.52
Russia	1.1	2.3	1.10
South Africa	0.3	0.7	0.29
Egypt	0.3	1.2	0.12
Nigeria	0.1	2.1	0.04
P-5 members	47.2	29.2	35.26
G-4 Group	21.8	22.9	31.53
AU contenders	0.7	4.0	0.45

Source: James D. Fearon, Comments on the Report of the High-level Panel, in: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 89, 100. For the UN contributions: Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations, Res. of the UN General Assembly A/RES/58/1 B 3rd March 2004.

In area of cheque-book diplomacy, African contenders still lag behind. The G-4 contenders, namely, Japan and Germany are pillars of the global economy, both are bigger than UK and France, and both are more economically powerful than any member of the UNSC except for the U.S [Lau Breckon, 2005:4]. As Table 4.1 indicates, Germany contributes 8.6 percent of the U.N. budget, surpassed only by Japan [19.4%] and the U.S [22.0%]. Four permanent members of the UNSC pay less, Britain [6.1%], France [6.0%], China [2.0%] and Russia [1.1%][U.N report 2005]. Even in UNGA voting, Germany and Japan [members of the G-4], their record is excellent [though it is thought to be not reliable by the U.S report [2005]]. Surprisingly, they realized that in global politics, power is not shared voluntarily and decided to give up their quest for veto seats in an expanded UNSC. These countries realized that global powers with

veto power, financial and military control over the U.N are only likely to allow that kind of reform, which reinforces and favors their respective national interests.

Japan's contribution to the annual U.N budget and peacekeeping operations, and its unsuccessful bid for a permanent seat, sends an indicative signal to the AU, showing where one could draw a line when reform involves veto power. Despite its high-powered lobbying and the tremendous influence it wields as the world's biggest aid donor, Japan has failed to convince the majority of the remaining member states that it richly deserves the title of a «veto-wielding big power»[Michael Brenham 2005:6].

Although the amount of membership dues is assessed according to a country's ability to pay. As table 4.1 indicates, AU contenders' contributions remain contentious. Commenting on African countries contribution to the U.N Wafula Okumu [2005:5] argues, «Payments are often still not made on time. African countries are notorious for late payments and delinquencies only matched by the U.S, which intentionally withholds payments as a way of exerting pressure on the U.N or to make political points». However, as indicated by the U.N Financial Regulations Rule 5.4, South Africa and Egypt had already paid their dues, $5,196,166 and $2,135,411 respectively, for 2005 by the end of January. Since 1996, South Africa has consistently paid its U.N dues on time. Between 1991 and 2004, Egypt paid its dues in time six times. As of 16 December 2004, South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria had paid their full dues to the U.N regular budget. However, as Wafula Okumu [2005:5] argues, «While Nigeria has always paid late, Kenya has been chronically delinquent». Although financial capability is not listed amongst the U.N selection criteria, it cannot be ignored, and may end up as de facto criteria unless adequate provision is made to cater for poor countries. In addition, the UNSC contenders must have sufficient financial resources to enable them to staff their New York and Geneva U.N Missions with adequate and highly qualified personnel. Furthermore, the UNSC must adopt resolutions it has the financial capacity to implement.

The U.N Charter Article 23[1] does not mention any qualifications, to which permanent members of the UNSC should conform. However, the function of the UNSC suggests that the permanent members would be the member-states most capable of performing this function. In area of promoting international peace and security, all African contenders played crucial role

and their efforts have been commendable. As Wafula Akumu [2005:5] argues, «In areas of troop contributions for peacekeeping efforts, Nigeria is ranked 7th, South Africa is 10th, Kenya 13th and Egypt 49^th». In this area of peacekeeping, Kenya claims the distinction of being the second top African nation troop contributor to all U.N missions. All AU contenders believe to have contributed positively to emerging African values and practices in peace, justice and governance. While this effort is commendable under Article 23, lack of financial clout hampers African efforts to be heard in the UNSC corridors of power.

It is imperative that the principle of sovereign equality as enshrined in the U.N Charter Article 2[1], finds expression in the UNSC composition with all privileges currently enjoyed by the P5. It is undisputable that the UNSC is outdated and its reform is needed to mirror the current political realities. However, national interests, balancing representation and efficiency have become major hindrance to the current reform debate. Most importantly, the UNSC must be expanded to a reasonable number of states which can reach decisions with dispatch in crisis, and membership should include a reasonable cross-section of states that, relative to their region, can bring economic, military, and political assets to implement collective decisions. Although the African response has been cast as one of high principle, considering the P-5 vested interests, turning on two vetoes seats, in reality was seen as having been driven by familiar political imperatives. Five vetoes already impaired the good performance of the UNSC, with their own national interests, adding more may lead to gridlock, the UNSC will fall victim to political impasse, conflicting interests, inflexibility and inability to accommodate future change. In addition, consultations with capitals, time zone differences, and multiple languages add to the burden. An overextended and underfunded UNSC will be weaker than ever. This led Peter Walsum [2005:2] to argue that, «No one can seriously believe a Council with 26 members can be more effective than one with 15, but it has become politically incorrect to point this out».

It is vital to focus on how to limit the use of veto, not on how to proliferate it. As far as the right of veto, that numerous states would want abolished is concerned, the elitist principle of power will undoubtedly keep it, because its abolition is, as Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett [2000: 23] note, «a splendid idea, but a fully unrealistic one». This was also ruled out on 9

August 2005, by the U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan, who described it as »utopian» attempts to either abolish the existing vetoes or create new permanent seats with veto powers. He said that, «It is utopian to think we can do it. Many member states would want to do that, but it is not possible». He added that P-5 are not willing to create additional vetoes. The most important as Annan argues, is to have «effective representation on the UNSC, and make it more democratic, to ensure that voices of other regions are heard» [Wafula Akumu, 2005:5]. In any reform exercise, there is bound to be much résistance from the beneficiaries of the status quo. The G-4-AU compromise may help break the current logjam by blending their proposals and requesting for veto power after they have been granted permanent seats in the UNSC.

The AU must recognize that under the current state-centric system, driven by national interests, proposing two veto-wielding seats must be in tandem with perceived potential support abroad. Historically, the Charter has only been amended once in 1963. Nevertheless, the P-5 vote on the 1963 amendment did not reflect their true preferences with respect to the reform proposal, but were part of the larger Cold War strategic interaction. In the event that the ongoing discusion fails to produce a new UNSC that will be responsive to the needs of all stakeholders, capable of responding to current global challenges, many countries will loose faith in the system. The worldview will therefore continue to be «might makes right». This may not only result in the dissatisfied countries looking for alternative mechanisms, outside the U.N system for dealing with international peace and security, but also in the elite states losing a very important tool for pursuing their national interests under the guise of international security. There is also the option, at least in theory, of discarding this system and transferring its functions to the UNGA. The future UNSC reform requires that the small states reassert their power in numbers, and vote together as they did in 1963. Although African states maintain their demand for two veto-wielding seats, but due to the fact that none has the military capabilities and influence to justify such a position, the end of the U.N Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the 59^th UNGA President, Jean Ping's tenure of office may slow the tempo of this reform project.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

«Just as it was illusory in the 18^th century to re-propose the Athenian model on a national scale, so too today it is equally illusionary to re-propose national models of democracy and representative institution at an international scale.» John Negri [2005:6].

The current neo-Westphalian world order, characterized by complex interdependencies rather than simple linear causality models, shapes global international relations. This new paradigm has reinforced pleas for the revisiting of multilateralism and for an aggiornamento of the UNSC to the new international relations discourse. The principles and purposes of the UNSC, as set out in the U.N Charter, remain as valid and relevant today as they were in 1945. While purposes should be firm and principles constant, the UNSC and practice thereof, must move with time. The growing challenges facing today's global society can only be resolved through coordinated and multilateral efforts. Considering its mudis operandi, the UNSC is called upon to address conflicts from a comprehensive approach. The major problem has been that the current UNSC composition does not reflect the dramatic political and economic changes that have occurred in global society in the last sixty years. This situation is believed to have resulted in unevenness in the UNSC's response to and interest in various conflicts. However, despite résistance from the current P-5, for the UNSC's decisions to command international respect and promote international political progress as well as international law, restore the U.N legitimacy and credibility, finding a formula which does not threaten P-5's interests, but treats all U.N members equally, remains a sine qua non criterion.

From a relatively homogenous outlook on global challenges, to an extremely diverse, a more UNSC representative by the U.N family of nations would enhance global international peace and security conferred thereto by the U.N Charter. However, while the UNSC's decisions command worldwide respect, the need for increasing veto power is a noble idea, to achieve this goal under the current anarchical power struggle-ridden international system by adopting AU formula as Chapter four has patently demonstrated remains a myth. As Chapter four has revealed, the current UNSC reform conundrum results from the fact that the UNSC, an arena where states faithfully pursue their national policies and priorities according to the larger

realities and forces governing world politics, states are pulling in opposing directions. Thus, making the AU formula unworkable. The question of who would get a seat on an expanded UNSC, and with what powers, remains contentious. In the absence of a clear set of objective criteria for UNSC membership, consensus among states and agreed upon formula, jockeying at the UNSC for any new veto-wielding seat will remain a farce.

The UNSC reform exercise as it has proved, the P-5 members' vested interests will often lead them to oppose the AU blueprint. Like all conflict-riven politics, the UNSC reform has become a complex process of bargaining, jostling, posturing and outright threats, reconciling divergent interests, as well as different views of the world and preferences on how global institution should be organized. With specific reference to the veto provision, it has become clear that in 1945, the U.N Charter was drafted to safeguard the core interests of the Great Powers who were involved in its drafting. Hence, the incumbent five veto-wielding members are unlikely to view with favour any incursion of new members into their privileged sphere, unless they believe that such situation serves their respective interests as witnessed in 1965.

Since the establishment of the U.N, many reform proposals have been proposed. In practical, however, substantive and substantial reform has proved virtually impossible. This is because throughout the U.N existence, states have been experiencing insurmountable obstacles. The P-5 constantly erected a barrage of résistance that successfully thwarted any meaningful reform in veto-wielding membership category. These obstacles successfully prevent any possibility of amending the fundamental pillars of the U.N Charter, especially Article 108 which requires the affirmative concurrence of all P-5. Although it was hoped the 60^th UNGA Summit would alter the status quo, the beneficiaries thereof, stood firmly. The overall outcome was described by AU members as disappointing. The UNGA outcome underpins the sentiments that world politics is characterized above all by egotistical states operating in an anarchical environment. This epitomizes power drive of nation-states operating without higher authority. These P-5's résistance to UNSC reform clearly illustrates states drive to maximize power as both ends and means. It is a clear indication that in international politics, power is not shared voluntarily, and negates idealists' beliefs that states have been satisfied to share power rather than persistently fighting for it. All in all, as propounded by realist theorists, it illustrates how international

politics remains a continuous struggle among states seeking to dominate each other in the conduct of their own affairs.

The veto has been a sturdy pillar in the foreign policies of the P-5. In the event that veto becomes difficult to get or abolish, the AU must mobilize pressure and persuasion to get P-5 members limit their veto use, especially in cases of genocide, Charter amendment, appointment of the U.N Secretary General and other grave human rights abuses. Vetoes should only be allowed on peacekeeping and enforcement measures. Similarly, the 186 non-permanent states should make joint efforts to limit other special P-5 privileges, such as claims on high Secretariat posts and World Court seats. The AU must approach the G-4, which is a powerful and influential group and blend their proposals by reaching a compromise and abandon their quest for permanency with veto power before their acceptance into the `inner circle' [UNSC]. To this end, they can provide major diplomatic muscle in this veto-restriction effort.

While the UNSC reform is important for Africa, African unity is equally vital. The go-it alone strategy practiced by some countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa may further jeopardize the continent's quest for two veto permanent seats. Throughout this reform discussion, there has been growing opposition among African countries that believe the AU proposal would diminish their chances for a seat on the UNSC, or that oppose a regional rival's ascent to power. The strength of the continent is the ability to speak with one voice and its ability to act together. African unity must emerge, Heads of states and Government must be committed to this reform, not just in words, but also by deeds. This is because opposition within region assures broad opposition outside the continent and guarantees defeat for the aspirants, especially, in the UNGA voting process.

It is imperative for the AU to revitalize the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] forces. NAM states increasingly voted together during the years prior to the first reform vote indicating that they had the numerical ability not only to sway resolutions favored by either the U.S or the USSR, but also sufficient numbers to pass resolutions favored by neither of the Great Powers.

Since the resolution to amend the U.N Charter requires only a two-thirds majority, the NAM states would have more than enough votes to increase their own power and representation on the UNSC. Although with the increased membership arising after the break-up of the USSR, as diagram 4.1 shows, Asian and African numerical strength can still exercise influence by continuing to work together.

For the UNSC to fulfill the aspirations of a truly benign new world order, there is a need for search of a balancing point, within a reasonable amount of time, so that the UNSC may truly reflect the strong points of the international community and become an instrument for a more effective and universal action. Since the expansion of the UNSC is a geo-political contest for power and influence, the UNSC reform architects must recognize that, akin to AU proposal, crafting a reform framework, which creates additional veto power without outside support, will undoubtedly be a long and arduous road. Although it is important for the UNSC to become an inclusive organ of the U.N which treats all states equally as stipulated in the U.N Charter, such veto-creating proposal uncorroborated by the P-5 will always remain a myth. Reform will not occur unless the current veto-wielding permanent members and those outside the UNSC sphere genuinely pursue it. Otherwise, the UNSC system will remain a political arena where the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must.

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The UN security council reforms: myth or reality? an african analysis

Abstract

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTIONBACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER 2

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Introduction

CHAPTER 3

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Introduction

CHAPTER 4THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING AFRICAN UNION PROPOSAL OR OTHERWISE

Introduction

CHAPTER 5CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Bibliography

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER 4
THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING AFRICAN UNION PROPOSAL OR OTHERWISE

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS