The U.S foreign policy in the horn of Africa

Hopefully, to understand Kenya's pro-Western posture it interesting to evaluate Kenya's relationship with her former colony Britain, as this had a major an impact in Kenya becoming of strategic interest to the US during the Cold War. Mainly, Kenya was under British rule for over fifty years, and by the time the country conquered its independence in 1963, strong intricate/sophisticated commercial links had been united with Britain. Kenya became among the largest beneficiaryof British aid in Africa during the Cold War era.At independence Britain gave Kenya the resources it needed to help establish the Kenyan Armed Forces, and thus became Kenya's largest supplier of arms, it trained troops and gave them substantial assistance, therefore establishing strong military ties.46(*) Kenya's strong relations with its former colony had a major influence in Kenya staying a pro-Western country.

The U.S. government has long viewed Kenya as a strategic partner and an anchor state in East Africa. In order to spread its ideology and defeat the Soviet's vision to conquer the Horn, The U.S. policymakers considered Kenya as a vital important, after Ethiopia, for its safeguarding national interest and effectively to counter the Soviet Union expansion. Kenya appeared in the agenda of the U.S. foreign policy just one year of being independent state. As is being usually associated Kenya was previously among one of the region's state that was dependent on foreign aid. In other words, even during the colonial era, Kenya was more depended in British fund aid for development and assistance.

Furthermore, from the beginning of the Cold War, Kenya was regarded as the main pro-Western country in the region, and thus became a great ally and aid recipients of the US in the Horn of Africa states.The United Stateswas regarded Kenya as a vital staging point for US forces armies in the Indian Ocean, somewhat because it was viewed/considered by the US as its main/principlegarrison in the region leading to a severe increase/growth in economic aid to the country between 1974 and 1985 as the US protected Kenya's position. Congress explained the aid growth by arguing in 1984 that:

`Kenya occupies an important position on the Indian Ocean in proximity to world energy resources. Our national security objective is to ensure out continued access to the region in times of crisis. To do this we must continue to contribute to Kenya's economic development, stability and military preparedness.'^47(*)

In addition, Kenya and the United States have long been close allies and have enjoyed cordial relations. The United States provides equipment and training to Kenyan security forces. This has come when Kenya frequently felt threatened by Somali's vision for a greater Somalia particularly after the NEP insurgencies and the Ogaden conflict in 1977. To protect its territory, the country thus began a military build up.The government of Kenyawanted much closer ties with the US. The country asked for a US military survey on Kenya's protection requirements. This justified the birth of closer military relations between Kenya and the US.

The United States and Kenya have established a close diplomatic relationship for decades. In the late 1970s, for instance, at the height of the Cold War, U.S. security cooperation with countries in the Horn of Africa took on intensified strategic priority during contingency planning for possible U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf, and Kenya's port in Mombasa was regarded as a stable alternative to options in Somalia. Therefore, Kenya and the US signed an agreement in which Kenya would offer a base to the US and in return it would benefit a military aid and fund for development assistance. This included till the Reagan administration's policy covered to «contain» soviet impact in the region. In 1990, the aftermath of the Cold War, United States gave the priority, when it came to its foreign policy, to political and human right abuses by Moi's administration, even though Kenya's strategic location and stability provided that relations remained cordial, helped by Kenya's role as a hub for international humanitarian relief operation in Sudan and Somalia

To Kenya-US relations during the Cold War, It looked at the security concerns that emerged during this period and US foreign policy towards Kenya driven influenced by these concerns. Immediately/Soon after independence Kenya adopted a non-alignment policy as analyzed by John Okumu (1997). After its economic link with its ex-colony the country depended on towards the West as opposed to the East. Largely owing to the ideology posture Kenya favored and its strategic position in the Greater Horn of Africa it became a strong ally and major aid beneficiary of the US.

IV. The Cold War and interstate relations

c) The impact of the Cold War on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations

d) Defining Inter-State Conflicts Patterns

The word interstate/inter-state is a combination of two words: inter, which stands for between or among, and state, which indicates a nation or a country, identified by territory, authority, population, legitimacy and government. Hence, interstate relations imply interactions between or among nation states. The Oxford English Dictionary defines interstate/inter-state as «lying, extending or carried on between independent states or between states belonging to a union, federation, etc.»^48(*) The opposite is intrastate/intra-state, which includes activities within the state, while interstate involves two or more states. Basically, the interstate relation between the Horn of Africa states was been damage by the Cold War leaders dividing the region into two camp. In addition, it created interstate war between Ethiopia and Somalia and at the same time it has weakened the relationship between Somalia and Kenya owing of Somalia was claiming Somali-region in Kenya NFD (Northern Frontier District) that Somalia believes still today that these regions belong to Somalia and the colonial powers gave it illegally to Kenya one part, Ethiopia another part and finally Djibouti which is also majority Somali inhabitant.

1.1. Ogaden War

Ethiopia and Somalia are two neighboring countries located in the Horn of Africa. Both countries share a long and problematic border which has troubled their relations since pre-colonial period. They had never acknowledged on the exact location of their border. In 1977, the two countries fought over the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden which Ethiopia grabbed during African scramble the nineteen century and the issue still remains unresolved.

In 1885, rival European powers such Great Britain, France, and Italy divided among the land populated by the Somali ethnic kinship in the Horn of Africa and added some of them in the neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya.^49(*)The main issue in Somalia's future, though, was not the overwhelming poverty, but the legacy of colonialism. After Somalia's independence, Somalia refused to recognize the Anglo-Ethiopian demarcation which fixed its borders with Ethiopia during the colonial period (The Geographer, 1975, pp. 3-6). Instead, the new republic adopted a policy of irredentism for the creation of a Greater Somali Republic.

However, the end of colonial rule in Africa had led to the creation of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1960, formed from British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, covering an area of 246,155 square miles and with a population of some 3.2 million by the late of 1970s. However, as opposed to the ethnic and religious diversity of Ethiopia, homogeneity characterized Somalia: the country was 98.8 percent ethnic Somali, and 99 percent Muslim, ^50(*) and arguably this homogeneity contributed to the Somali people's support for Siad's determination to reunite all ethnic Somalis in one nation. Nor could any Somali easily overlook, or forget, the dream; both five parts into which Europeans had divided the nation. Tom Farer, a professor at Rugers University and specialist on the Horn region, remarked in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa that the creation of the Somali Republic 1960 was «the first step toward the consummation of the national unity», and warned that «it would not be the last.»^51(*)

In addition, in Siad's view, the European «scramble for Africa» had destroyed Somalia in the nineteenth century, dividing the country into five parts: British Somaliland, Italian Somalia; the French took hold of what is today known as Djibouti, a tiny nation on the Red Sea (previously called French Somaliland); the fourth part, Ethiopia also grabbed a chunk of Somali land called the Ogaden; the fifth was Northern Frontier District (NFD) now emerged with Kenya.^52(*) The five-pointed star of the Somalia flag represented each of the divisions, and many Somalis still dream today of the day when Somali ethnics will be reunited one more time and build one nation (see Figure 1 & 2 below).

FIGURE 1: Political Map of Africa^53(*)FIGURE 2: Map of the HOA and Neighboring countries^54(*)

In early 1955 Ethiopia further took over the Somali region of Haud, a protected area which was the cornerstone grazing land for the Somali pastoralists living along the Ethiopia-Somalia border on the basis of Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 (Mukhtar, 2003, p. 93). The agreement of Ethiopia and the United Kingdom changed the limits of British Somaliland to expel most of the Haud in Ethiopia. The annexation accompanied a secret treaty with Britain in 1954 and the departure of British authority from the pastureland region in the same year (The Geographer, 1975, pp. 3-6).

Although a delegation from British Somaliland led by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who later became prime minister in Somalia, requested Haile Selassie the return of the Haud to Somalis in a meeting in Addis Ababa in May 1960, the Emperor persisted that the area is part of Ethiopian territory and is nonnegotiable (Qaybe, 2013, p. 36). Thus, the modern Ethiopia-Somalia relations are clearly characterized by mutual suspicion and antagonism that can be traced back to this history.

The policy of the first two civilian governments in Somalia was to get back the lost Somali territories in a peaceful way as stated in article IV (4) of the Somali independence national constitution which says, «The Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means, the union of all Somali territories». But as Farah (2009) described in his unpublished PhD Thesis `Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990', the Somali civilian governments between 1960-1969 were encouraging and hosting leaders from the Ogaden and NFD including the leadership of the Western Somalia Liberation Group (WSLG) which was founded in 1961 to liberate Ogaden from Ethiopia.

Although Emperor Haile Selassie and Somalia's first president Aden Abdulle met during the 1963 OAU conference, the two leaders acknowledged that all aggressions and media propaganda should be stopped (Ghalib, 1995, pp. 106-107). That was initially viewed as a positive step taken by both Ethiopia and Somalia towards peaceful resolution of their border dispute. But the 1964 border war, Ethiopia's persistent efforts in holding the disputed territory and Somalia's failure to restrict the activities of Ogaden rebels broke off any possibility of improving the two country's relations (Ghalib, pp. 106-107).

But Somalia aborted support to the Ogaden rebels in the final year of the civilian government led by Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (1967-1969) who tried to find self-determination for Somali people in the disputed territories through diplomacy (Farah, pp. 115-117). From then Ethiopia-Somalia diplomatic relations appeared to be improving due to the new Détente policy approach by Egal. As a result, Ethiopia acknowledged the existence of a territorial dispute with Somalia and was seemingly willing to solve it through diplomatic channels (Farah, p. 117).

Furthermore, Siyad Barre, Somalia's president, planned to invade the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with the assistance of the Soviet Union. However, the latter did not support the invasion. Indeed, the USSR warned him not to do so, as it was trying to reconcile both neighboring countries. Barre did not pay attention to the USSR. He invaded the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in 1977. The Soviets were not sure which country to support. The USSR did not feel comfortable to lose the military facilities in Somalia, yet Ethiopia was a better choice considering its bigger size. The USSR was not actually in favor in the policy of the Greater Somalia. It was only interested with the coast and the military facility at Berbera. Ethiopia also needed arms for protection against continuous conflicts with Somalia. There were conflicts every now and then, especially along the Ogaden region. Somalia supported the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) in the Ogaden region, and were behind the conflicts every now and then along the Ogaden boundary

It is interesting to note that the European colonies' strategy of dividing the Horn of Africa people had a major impact after the colonization. In the case of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict it was due to the outcome of the colonial system of division of the region. It could be said that African states fall in a proxy war just few years of being independent states. They had been influenced the ideology spread by the two superpowers and without thinking deeply the feedback that it might have in the region. In other words, the Horn of Africa did not take the full measure of how to handle this new policy when the region is too' fragile to solve its own problems. Unfortunately, each state gave the priority to its interest regardless of the common interest of the region.

Despite the fact that the region was being manipulated by the superpowers in somehow, but it is also important to underline that the inter-state conflict was the outcome that created by the former colonies of the region: Italy, Britain and France. In addition, during the cold war, the preoccupation of regional security was narrowed to military security. The superpowers did not solve the problem of regional conflicts. In fact, they worsened internal conflicts with the free flow of arms. They were ready to supply arms, which fuelled military based regional conflicts and worse, diverted resources meant for development.

The superpowers were concerned with their selfish interests of winning as many clients as possible. They were not after development of their allies. Makinda adds, «The overriding interest of the superpowers was not to help Somalia but to pursue their own global and regional agendas.»^55(*)The emphasis of the superpowers was military, economic and nuclear competition, however, not in their countries lest they cause damage and loss o f lives, but in the territories o f their surrogates.

However, both sides (the Soviet block and the U.S. block) of the Cold War leaders had shattered the Horn of Africa's peace and stability creating an interstate conflict; this is the case between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia claiming that Ethiopia detains illegally part of Somalia territory called "Ogaden region". This conflict had to do with the Cold War since the Soviet and Cuban gave a military support to Ethiopia. In order to rescue the Ethiopian army, which seemed to be defeated, the Soviets and Cuba reinforced the help to the Ethiopian army in order to push the Somali army back into conquered territory and defeat the Somalia army. In fact the outcomes and impact of the Cold War era drove the region into proxy war and truly the region emerged into interstate war which was basically, according to the political analysts, the consequences of the external rivalry.

* ⁴⁶Ibid.,p.369

* ⁴⁷Congress in 1984 as quoted in Wanjiru Kihoro, Kenya: The US Connection and Its Implication for

Development.(Thesis submitted Leeds University October 1987) p. 27

* ⁴⁸J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. 8 (2nd edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) p. 1140.

* ⁴⁹Scott Peterson, Me Against my Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda (London: Routledge,

2000), 11

* ⁵⁰ «  Basic Data on Sub-saharan Africa , » Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, NO 2036, March 1980, Library of Congress, Washington DC

* ⁵¹Testimony, TOM Farer to House Sub-committe on Africa, March 28, 1977, foreign Assistance legislationfor FY78 part 3: Economic and military Assistance Programs in Africa, March 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, April 28, 1977, H461-37, 95^th congress, 1^st Session, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

* ⁵² I. M. Lewis, ed., Nationalism and self-Determination in the Horn of Africa(London : Ithaca Press, 1983), p.74

* ⁵³World Atlas. Retrieved March 17, 2018, from http://www.world-atlas.us/africa-map.gif

* ⁵⁴Horn of Africa map, United Nation, Retrieved March 3, 2018, fromhttp;//www.un.org/Depts/cartographic/map/profil/horn-r.pdf

* ⁵⁵ Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder: LynneRienncr Publishers, 1993) p. 51