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Energizing toward independence: eu energy diversification policies since the Russia-Ukraine war: a comparative study of France, Germany, and Spain

par Alice Nicolleau
Brussels School of Governance - Master in Diplomacy and Global Governance 2025
Dans la categorie: Droit et Sciences Politiques > Relations Internationales

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Vesalius College, Brussels School of Governance
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

ENERGIZING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE:
EU ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION POLICIES SINCE THE
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SPAIN

Written by Alice Nicolleau

MA Thesis

Master in Diplomacy and Global Governance

Supervisor: Zafer Kizilkaya

Date of Submission: September 1^st 2025
Word count: 11902

Research Question:

To what extent have EU energy diversification policies been implemented into national strategies in Spain, France, and Germany since aftermath of the war in Ukraine?

Main argument:

EU energy diversification since the war in Ukraine has reduced dependence on Russia but produced uneven national trajectories: France leans on nuclear sovereignty, Germany on rapid LNG substitution, and Spain on hydrogen and regasification. These divergences expose persistent tensions between EU climate ambition and national energy security imperatives.

Abstract:

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in European energy governance, forcing the European Union (EU) to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate diversification strategies. This thesis investigates how EU-level diversification policies, notably REPowerEU, the revised Renewable Energy Directive (RED III), and the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), have been translated into national strategies in France, Germany, and Spain. Using a qualitative comparative case study and drawing on official policy documents, statistical data, and three expert interviews, the analysis traces the causal pathway from EU inputs to national instruments and measurable outputs. The findings show significant variation in national responses: France prioritizes nuclear power and cautious hydrogen imports to preserve sovereignty; Germany has relied on rapid LNG substitution and renewable acceleration but remains carbon-intensive; Spain leverages regasification and hydrogen export ambitions while constrained by limited interconnections. The comparison highlights the tradeoffs between energy security and climate goals, as well as structural asymmetries in infrastructure and resources. Overall, the study argues that while EU diversification has reduced vulnerability to Russia, its uneven national implementation reveals enduring tensions between common European objectives and domestic political, economic, and geographic constraints, seeking for more unity within Member States.

Keywords: European Union; Energy Diversification; Energy Transition; Member-States; Ukraine-Russia war

Table of content

I- Introduction 4

II- Literature Review 6

1) Energy Security in International Relations Grand theories 6

a) Concept of Energy Security 6

b) Energy security and power . 7

c) Interdependency and Cooperation .. 7

d) Securitization and Constructivism .. 8

2) Energy Transition at the EU Level . 9

a) Energy Transformation Measure . 9

b) EU Sanctions on Russian Energy 10

c) Green Transition and Sustainability Framework 10

d) Energy Governance and Policy Networks . 11

e) Critical Political Economy . 12

3) Member States Level: Implementation and Differentiation . 12

a) Persistent Divisions in Decision-Making . 12

b) The Evolution of the Energy Mix 13

c) Gaps in the Literature . 14

III- Conceptual and Methodological chapter ... 15

1) Theoretical approaches 15

2) Operationalization of key concepts . 15

3) Methodological framework . 16

a) Choice of Research Strategy .. 16

b) Comparative Case Study and Case Selection 17

c) Sample Design 18

d) Interviews 19

e) Ethical Considerations 19

f) Limitations 20

4) Methodology of Analysis 20

IV- Analysis 22

1) Analysis Framework . 22

2) European Union Policy . 23

a) Historic break: reducing dependence on Russia . 23

b) Sanctions 24

c) REPowerEU 24

d) EU climate framework and the role of nuclear power 25

3) Case-studies . 27

a) France . 27

b) Germany . 29

c) Spain .. 30

4) Within-Case Analysis 33

V- Conclusion .. 35

References .. 37

I- Introduction

At the European Union (EU) level, there has been a notable increase in interest in energy and climate issues in recent years. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered an unprecedented energy crisis within the EU, marked by soaring energy prices. This development pushed the EU to accelerate its energy transition efforts to reduce dependency on Russian hydrocarbons (Bricout et al., 2022; Miík, 2022).

The war in Ukraine occurs against a backdrop of a global climate crisis. Since the 1980s, Europe has been the continent most affected by climate change, with warming twice as fast as the average (Copernicus, 2024; Lee et al., 2023). In response, the EU has implemented a number of ambitious measures, notably reaching climate neutrality by 2050, with a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 (Climate Action, n.d.).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine exposed the EU's vulnerability through its dependence on Russian gas, intensifying debates between energy security and the transition toward green energies. Indeed, the EU decided to progressively reduce its imports of Russian energy, while Russia considerably diminished its exports. Reshaped by this crisis, Europe's energy policy is now guided by the "energy trilemma" of "environmental sustainability, equity, and energy security" (Kuzemko et al., 2022). Frans Timmermans, former EC vice-president for the Green Deal, said in January 2022 that: "If we really want to stop long-term making Putin very rich, we have to invest in renewables and we need to do it quickly" (Nugent, 2022).

The sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia demonstrated the EU's united strength, capable of responding rapidly to a geopolitical crisis. Nevertheless, it revealed tensions within the EU between short-term objectives (securing supply) and long-term ambitions (carbon neutrality by 2050) (Maruiak, 2024). While some Member States (MS) particularly dependent on Russian gas, have opted for short-term solutions, such as Poland with coal, others have maintained their commitment to GHG emission reductions.

Although replacing Russian energy supplies has been costly for MS and citizens, the crisis could also offer opportunities to accelerate the energy transition and develop more resilient policies (Miík, Nosko; 2023). This is the idea advocated by European institutions which, despite internal political challenges, have progressed towards more ambitious climate policies,

moving from limited and distinct initiatives to coordinated policies. According to Skjærseth (2021), the notion of "policy mixes" is necessary to provoke change, but it must be coupled with crisis factors to advance policies towards consensus. Launched in May 2022, the European Commission's REPowerEU initiative aims to diversify energy sources, save energy and produce clean energy. One of its main objectives is to increase renewable energy capacity to 42.5% by 2030 (REPowerEU, n.d.). However, concerns about the affordability of energy are strong, resulting in numerous studies and reports.

It is within this context that the present study is situated, aiming to address the following research question: " To what extent have EU energy diversification policies been implemented into national strategies in Spain, France, and Germany since aftermath of the war in Ukraine?" This research project operates in the framework of an ongoing geopolitical tension and the transition towards a greener future. Understanding the application of EU policies through comparative analysis is intended to shed light on their economic and diplomatic impact. Furthermore, I will attempt to provide some answers to the debate between the decisions that must be taken by policy-makers at either EU or national level.

The main hypothesis is to raise awareness of the importance of regional cooperation and Spain's potential diplomatic role in supplying renewable energy to Europe. In other words, green energy from southern countries could strengthen European integration and sovereignty, strategic partnerships and the EU's global leadership in the fight against climate change. My focus in this research is on Germany, France and Spain, three Member States with strong economic weight, size and population, but above with distinct energy strategies. Regarding energy transition, Spain and France adopted rules on gas and electricity costs, and Germany provides financial support for consumers. The lack of a coherent EU-wide rationing system challenges the evolution of its energy policy (Kuzemko et al., 2022). The EU needs to coordinate more effectively between different levels of governance (EU, national, local) to maximize the effectiveness of its actions against climate change (ECRA, 2023).

At the national level, Ukraine's conflict alerted German policymakers to economic risks from cutting Russian gas supplies, which accounted for 55% in 2020. Germany's ability to replace gas is challenging, highlighting its strong dependence on Russia (Halser & Paraschiv, 2022). The national strategy implemented since 2020 plans to integrate hydrogen into the energy mix, but the production, storage, and distribution of hydrogen present technical, economic, and

socio-political obstacles (McCay, 2014; Mankoff, 2025). In France, the idea that nuclear energy is essential for reducing CO2 emissions, economic growth and environmental sustainability is widely accepted, positioning the country as a model in nuclear energy in Europe. However, debates continue regarding the cost competitiveness and environmental impact of nuclear compared to renewable energies (Pata & Samour, 2022; IEA, n.d.). Spain has one of Europe's highest solar and wind resources, with solar energy potential 20- 25% above northern regions, and ranked 5th globally for wind installed capacity and second in Europe (Escario-Chust et al., 2023; AEE, 2024). Spain could hold a strategic role for the EU in supplying green energy to its European neighbors through interconnections (InfraHidrogeno, 2025; Editorial, 2023; 2024). However, Spain relied of 77.8% of energy imports in 2022, and plans to reduce it to 50% by 2030 (Morgado et al., 2024; MITECO, 2024).

The methodology used follows a qualitative, comparative approach, where the data collected during the three semi-structured interviews with four experts is supported by documents analysis. The data collected is thus innovative and will enrich the literature on energy transition in Europe, offering a new angle on this subject. The results reveled the need for more unity between the Member States to move further toward independence, there has been notable successes, but the energy strategy remain fragmented between MS.

The first section of this paper consists of reviewing the theoretical state of published research. Secondly, we will discuss in detail the methodology used to answer the research question. Finally, before concluding, the study's results will be analyzed highlighting the contributions and limitations of this thesis.

II- Literature Review

1) Energy Security in International Relations Grand theories a) Concept of Energy Security

First and foremost, the concept of energy security is widely discussed in the literature, but there is no consensus on its definition (Yergin, 2006; Löschel et al., 2010). However, according to Quemada et al., (2012), this concept is based on three fundamental dimensions: sufficiency, continuity, and affordability. Sufficiency and continuity relate to the need to ensure a stable and available supply capable of meeting consumers' immediate needs. Affordability, on the other

hand, pertains to long-term market dynamics and depends on various factors such as technological advancements, the discovery of new energy sources, and the balance between supply and demand. In addition, Stern (2002) differentiates between short-term operational security, which seeks to prevent unexpected supply disruptions, and long-term strategic security, shaped by developments in supply and demand. Johnson (2005) emphasizes the importance of resilience to exceptional circumstances in the short term, whereas long-term security incorporates structural factors related to markets and investments. Neorealism frames energy security as a strategic power struggle in which states primarily aim to minimize their dependency. This perspective aligns with the EU's prioritization of reducing its reliance on Russian gas (Cesnakas, 2010; Ba°kan, 2024). The definition advanced by the EU encompasses the following: cybersecurity, emergency oil stocks across MS, critical mineral access, industrial production capacity for renewables, protection of critical infrastructures, adequate electricity supply, security of gas supplies, and sufficient gas storage capacities (Worl Energy Council, 2022).

b) Energy security and power

Contemporary theories in international relations focus on security but tend to downplay the role of power in energy-related issues (Kilinç-Pala, 2021). Authors from the realist school consider energy security to be inherently linked to power and the balance between independence and interdependence. This perspective helps explain why states seek to secure critical resources (like energy) in order to maximize their survival and influence. With structural neorealism, Waltz (1979) argues that energy, especially exports, acts as a shield against external threats: by increasing others' dependence, Russia strengthens its own security. Energy is viewed as a political tool for asserting national dominance, ensuring protection, and responding to threats (such as through sanctions). It thus becomes a strategic lever in a geopolitical game, that is, a soft power tool, defined by Nye (1990) as the ability to wield influence through attraction rather than coercion. Russia has used its natural resources to keep Europe in a state of dependence (Ba°kan, 2024; Dhaka, 2023).

c) Interdependency and Cooperation

According to Keohane and Nye (1977), the theory of complex interdependence explains that even rivals can be bound by shared economic interests. This interdependence contributes to

reducing geopolitical tensions and fostering cooperation. In this context, the control of energy flows becomes a mean of exercising political influence through dependence and persuasion, without resorting to military force or coercion. However, challenges to the exercise of soft power arise from ongoing efforts in energy diversification and the green transition, which undermine traditional leverage (Ba°kan, 2024).

This perspective aligns with the neoliberal discourse, which argues that economic cooperation persists despite political tensions (McGrath, 2016; Wilson, 2019). Energy interdependence generates relative stability, and multilateral commitments portray the energy sector as a vector of both economic and political resilience (Ba°kan, 2024). Within this framework, the creation of organizations like ITER, a program of international cooperation in fusion energy research and development, illustrates how countries can come together to address a common challenge (ITER, n.d.). However, this type of cooperation is not without tension, particularly between Russia and the West, leading to delays and renewed doubts about Russia's participation. In this regard, cooperation has been weakened by European and American sanctions linked to the conflict in Ukraine (Bentsen et al., 2014).

d) Securitization and Constructivism

More recently, scholars adopting a constructivist perspective have expanded the analysis of energy-related decision-making by arguing that such decisions are not solely driven by material factors (like geography or economy), but also shaped by social constructs, identities, norms, and perceptions (McGrath, 2016). As Wilson (2019) points out, framing energy issues as existential threats often leads states to implement nationalist and protectionist policies, thereby fueling international tensions and increasing the risk of resource-related conflicts. This process, named securitization, highlights that energy decisions are not merely determined by material or geographical factors but are also deeply influenced by social perceptions and the ideological frameworks within which states operate.

Similarly, Marusyk (2019) underlines that the energy relationship between the EU and Russia is shaped by configurations of identities, norms, and interests that go beyond pure economic reasoning. Mitrova and Melnikov (2019) have shown that the discourse surrounding the energy transition itself constitutes an arena of ideological confrontation, where mutual perceptions and normative battles largely define strategic orientations. In this light, the EU's efforts to diversify

its energy sources and reduce its dependence on Russian gas are driven not only by material imperatives but also by ideational dynamics, where political narratives, identity representations, and threat perceptions play a central role (Siddi, 2023).

2) Energy Transition at the EU Level a) Energy Transformation Measure

In the context of climate change, energy transformation refers to the various actions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, so the process of shifting from fossil fuel to renewable energies (Ellabban et al., 2014; Rybak & Manowska, 2023). To assess the effectiveness of this transformation, the literature presents several quantitative tools. Firstly, the Energy Transition Index (ETI), developed by the World Economic Forum in 2018, evaluates the progress made by countries in transforming their energy systems. It is based on the idea that energy transition must not only support economic growth and social development but also strike a balance between three key pillars: (1) promoting economic development, (2) ensuring secure and reliable access to energy for all, and (3) preserving the environment. The ETI is structured around two areas of analysis: the current performance of a country's energy system, and on the country's readiness and capacity to transition (WEF et al., 2023). It measures both the present state of energy systems and how well-positioned countries are to meet future challenges linked to energy transition (Rybak & Manowska, 2023). In 2025, global ETI improved by 1.1%, the energy system improved by 1.2%, but the report revealed that the transition improved more slowly than the 10-year average (Ashraf et al., 2025).

Secondly, the World Energy Trilemma Index (WETI), published annually by the World Energy Council, evaluates the performance of 127 countries in managing the balance among three objectives: providing reliable energy (energy security), ensuring universal access (energy equity), and minimizing environmental impact (WEC, 2024). The report shows that Denmark and Sweden rank first, France is fifth, Germany sixth, and Spain tenth (Worl Energy Council, 2022). The WETI relies on both national and international data. It thus is as a valuable resource for governments, experts, and researchers to benchmark performance, identify best practices, and adjust energy policies for greater sustainability. However, these indices do not take into account the role of energy imports, an important gap especially in the context of the EU's energy dependency (Rybak & Manowska, 2023).

b) 10

EU Sanctions on Russian Energy

In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU's energy strategy shifted from energy interdependence to energy independence (LaBelle, 2024). Gradually, the EU imposed sanctions on the Russian energy sector, starting with coal, followed by oil and gas. These sanctions faced strong opposition from several MS, which argued that Russian oil and gas imports were their only viable option making unanimity among EU countries the Union's main challenge (Barigazzi & Kijewski, 2022). In order to preserve cohesion, the European Commission called for a collective effort to reduce gas consumption during the winter of 2022-2023, prioritizing support for MS in difficulty (European Commission, 2022a; Council of the EU, 2023). Through these sanctions, the EU aimed to weaken the Russian economy and thereby undermine its military actions in Ukraine (Maruiak, 2024).

Consequently, a radical shift in energy flows has occurred: in 2020, the EU depended on Russian gas for 40% of its supply, which had dropped to less than 10% by January 2023. Meanwhile, Europe previously used 60% of Russia's export capacity, saw its pipeline imports fall by 80% in February 2023 (IEAa, n.d). Consequently, the EU turned to new LGN providers, notably the US and Qatar (Lambert et al., 2022).

c) Green Transition and Sustainability Framework

Given these disruptions, the EU identified an opportunity to accelerate its energy transition by promoting long-term strategies, by increasing investments in renewable energies: solar and wind power, and hydrogen (LaBelle, 2024; Maruiak, 2024). Surely, the conflict in Ukraine highlighted the EU's challenge of balancing Green Deal goals with energy security. The literature on green transition raises questions about the EU's capacity to align its energy diversification policies with its climate objectives because Russia's invasion of Ukraine refocused political priorities around energy security, to the detriment of environmental and social ambitions (Kuzemko et al., 2022).

In this context, the Commission launched REPowerEU in May 2022 to reduce gas consumption by 18% and increase renewables to at least 42.5% by 2030, while also raising investments in storage, hydrogen, and interconnections of EU electricity networks (Energy, n.d., Commission Européenne, n.d.). This initiative is structured around the energy trilemma, theorized by

Kuzemko et al. (2022), which now guide Europe's energy strategy around three core pillars: diversification of energy sources, development of renewable energy, and improved energy efficiency. Gitelman et al. (2023) operationalize this framework by proposing a detailed typology of diversification forms at the European level: (1) technological diversification, or the expansion of the energy mix; (2) institutional diversification, including the adaptation of regulations and governance models; and (3) integrated management of energy planning. They advocate for a systemic approach, framing diversification not merely as a response to crises but as a strategic lever for sustainable transformation.

Finally, the debates surrounding nuclear energy have regained interest in the literature. The discourse was previously dominated by a technical approach promoting nuclear as a controllable and low-carbon energy source highlighting innovations (Omar et al., 2022). Recent research has adopted a more holistic perspective with a greater emphasis on energy policy, security, climate change, and long-term sustainability (Fernández-Arias et al., 2024).

d) Energy Governance and Policy Networks

To mitigate its vulnerability, the EU has diversified its suppliers, notably by increasing pipeline imports from Azerbaijan, Algeria or the US (Russell & EPRS, 2020). According to Kuzemko et al. (2025), understanding the ongoing global energy system transformation requires more than a mere technical rebalancing, but must be viewed as a dynamic, open-ended, and conflict-laden process. They identified three dimensions shaping contemporary governance: material infrastructures, spatial organisation, and the political tensions that arise around energy choices where actors, interests, and conflicts confront one another. Their approach goes beyond traditional state-centric logics, integrating broader global realignments, such as North-South tensions, debates surrounding fossil gas as a «transition fuel,» and the rise of new non-state actors. In the same vein, Miík (2022) argues that the 2021-2022 crisis exposed the EU's weak external energy coordination, calling for more integrated, multi-level governance to align energy security, decarbonization, and external partnerships. Moreover, Goldthau and Sitter (2020) distinguish between International Political Economy, which explains the fragmentation and power asymmetries in global energy regimes, and Global Public Policy, which analyzes the tools used to shape new forms of energy governance. They argue for moving beyond binary oppositions between liberal, market-based and realist, security-driven approaches to develop hybrid strategies suited to today's energy challenges.

e) Critical Political Economy

Despite the measures undertaken, the EU must contend with the economic dimensions of the crisis. It has introduced support mechanisms such as windfall taxes on energy companies and financial assistance for vulnerable households (Kuzemko et al., 2022). National initiatives within the Union, including efforts to cap gas and electricity prices, illustrate the diversity of approaches in the absence of a coherent energy rationing system (European Commission, n.d.; Kuzemko et al., 2022). Theories of critical political economy offer relevant insights into why energy diversification trajectories often defy purely institutional or technical explanations. According to Goldthau and Sitter (2021), current institutional structures and dominant interests, whether state or private, contribute to a fragmented, incomplete and deeply unequal energy governance system. Their conceptual framework first reflects the influence of powerful companies and dominant states in shaping energy regimes to serve strategic interests, and then raises questions about why global regimes continue to fail to be effectively inclusive or efficient.

However, the energy transition is neither a linear nor consensual process. Rather, it is shaped by a balance of tensions between proponents of fossil gas and advocates of a rapid shift toward renewables. These tensions also stem from institutional resistance, technological access asymmetries, and North-South dynamics (Kuzemko et al., 2025). Al-Saidi (2023) offers an original perspective on energy relations between Europe and the Middle East, approaching them through the lens of international political economy. He criticizes the EU's overly short-term vision and calls for longer-term, more balanced cooperation strategies, taking into account internal dynamics of supplier countries, such as reforms, political stability, and infrastructure security. In his view, Euro-Mediterranean energy integration represents a major geoeconomics lever, though it remains constrained by issues of trust, mutual dependence, and fairness.

3) Member States Level: Implementation and Differentiation a) Persistent Divisions in Decision-Making

The energy crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine has divided MS with divergent national interests regarding the development and implementation of a common energy policy. For instance, Hungary exercised its veto, then the «constructive abstention» to express opposition to sanctions against Russia (Maruiak, 2024). Such divergences have weakened the EU

cohesion and solidarity, exposing the institutional framework's limitations in tackling energy security challenges (Miík & Nosko, 2023). The debate over strengthening decision-making integration through qualified majority voting is lively in the energy domain (Ondarza & Stürzer, 2024). Although this reform could contribute to collective energy security, it faces resistance because some MS fear to lose national autonomy (Miík & Nosko, 2023).

b) The Evolution of the Energy Mix

The energy transition within the EU is advancing, but unevenly across MS, which are moving at different paces (ACER, 2025). The reports highlighted that coal, historically central in some countries such as Germany and Poland, is gradually being replaced by wind power, solar energy, biomass, and hydropower. Several examples stand out, including strong growth in offshore wind energy in Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as significant solar energy expansion in Spain and Germany. Moreover, in mountainous or forested countries, biomass and hydropower make an important contribution (EEA, 2023; Rybak & Manowska, 2023).

In 2022, Brodny and Tutak analyzed the similarities among EU Member States in terms of sustainable energy development using indicators such as energy consumption per capita, energy productivity, renewable energy share, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and dependence on energy imports. They identified four clusters: (1) Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, characterized by high per capita energy consumption and Total Primary Energy Supply available in a country (TPES); low energy import dependence, high energy productivity, and low GHG emissions. Then, (2) fifteen countries with moderate consistency, lower energy consumption and productivity than Cluster 1, lower renewable shares, higher GHG emissions, and medium dependence on imports; (3) Poland, Czechia, and Estonia, showing considerable diversity, low import dependence and thus greater autonomy, average energy productivity, but high per capita GHG emissions due to coal (Poland, Czechia). Finally, (4) Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Austria, marked by high per capita energy consumption, TPES similar to Cluster 1, moderate renewable shares, high import dependence, energy productivity, and GHG emissions (Germany, Ireland). This classification highlights the differentiated energy profiles and challenges of EU countries in achieving sustainable energy development (Brodny & Tutak, 2024).

Weiner (2022) points out that Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), historically highly dependent on Russian gas, must develop greater contractual flexibility and further integrate their energy markets to strengthen their energy security. Meanwhile, the major Western MS have adopted differentiated energy diversification strategies according to their national, industrial, socio-economic priorities, renewable potential, and geopolitical exposure (Tabagari, 2022). For instance, according to the International Energy Agency (2020), nuclear energy is expected to contribute around 15% of the emission reductions needed by 2050. However, in 2021, renewables accounted for only 23% of the energy mix, still far below the 40% target set for 2030. Despite ongoing debates over the costs and environmental impacts of nuclear power, it remains central to France's energy strategy (Pata & Samour, 2022).

The literature presents a set of indicators used to measure the energy transition at the MS level. Among these, the %RES indicator evaluates progress in the energy transition by measuring the share of renewable energies (solar, wind, geothermal, or biomass) in total energy consumption (Kang et al., 2020). Between 2013 and 2022, most MS recorded an increase; for example, Germany's share rose from 13.76% to 20.80%, while Estonia's increased from 25.36% to 38.47%. Furthermore, dependence on energy imports has also evolved. In Germany, for instance, it increased by approximately 6%, whereas in Estonia it decreased by 8% during the 2013-2022 period. These indicators reflect disparities that correspond to the varying capacities of MS to reconcile energy transition with supply security (Rybak & Manowska, 2023).

4) Gaps in the Literature

While quantitative indicators are rich in information, there is currently a lack of comparative data on the evolution of energy mixes across EU Member States since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. To address this gap, I empirically analyze the cases of Spain, France, and Germany, highlighting how recent geopolitical tensions differently influence national energy diversification strategies. I will also cross-reference the technical dimension of the energy transition with security challenges, which are too often treated separately in the literature. By integrating political discourse, national perceptions, and identity narratives, I will attempt to demonstrate their structuring role in energy decisions. Finally, drawing on a qualitative method, I aim to access the internal logics of action and tensions that escape purely macro or quantitative approaches, while incorporating the often-underestimated role of sub-state actors and energy communities in the concrete implementation of European policies.

III- Conceptual and Methodological chapter

1) Theoretical approaches

First and foremost, I would like to highlight that the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis is multidisciplinary. This approach enables me to analyze the EU's energy diversification by integrating perspectives that address both structural dynamics and agent-level interactions, while combining technical, legal, theoretical, and practical dimensions.

It is particularly relevant to examine the role of European institutions in international cooperation and norm-setting within the context of the energy market (Herranz-Surrallés & Fairbrass, 2021). Neoliberal institutionalism offers a lens to analyze the functioning of supranational bodies to mediate MS interests and to understand the interaction between regulatory frameworks and the implementation of national policies (Wigell, 2015).

In order to understand the pressures exerted on EU Member State governments and the Union itself, it has been important to investigate the role of businesses in shaping energy policies, which can be explored through the lens of political economy (Fouquet, 2016; Van de Graaf & Sovacool, 2020).

Finally, we must keep in mind that the energy transition is primarily driven by climate change and environmental concerns. It was therefore essential to examine the long-term commitments of the EU and MS to achieving the Green Deal objectives and to explore how these commitments influence the shift toward renewable energy, particularly through Green Transition and Sustainability Theories (Zhang & Kong, 2022).

2) Operationalization of key concepts

To structure my analysis, I operationalize the three key concepts guiding this thesis: energy security, energy equity and environmental sustainability. Energy security, as defined previously, allows me to examine, through European and national policies, how states and the EU have ensured a stable energy supply for citizens and industries (Rodriguez-Fernandez et al., 2022). I also sought to understand the implementation of energy policies, specifically how EU legislative directives have been adapted to national strategies, and vice versa. Energy equity

refers the accessibility and affordability of energy supply across the population, environmental sustainability is the process in which nations decarbonize and manage other environmental issues (World Energy Council, 2024). Next, energy diversification, the central concept of this thesis, is the strategic broadening of energy supply sources in the context of energy transition. This is analyzed through national investments in renewable energy, LNG infrastructure, and other alternative energy sources (De Rosa et al., 2022). Finally, geopolitical influences were also examined, particularly at the EU's level, and the pressures that shaped energy policy decisions (Kuzemko et al., 2024).

This thesis understands «implementation» as a causal chain from EU-level inputs to national instruments and observable outputs.

· Inputs (EU): REPowerEU, RED III, the revised EED, AggregateEU and joint purchasing, ACER guidance, and EU financing instruments.

· Instruments (national): NECP updates, regulatory frameworks, interconnection projects, FSRU/LNG procurement.

· Outputs (observable): changes in import dependency, electricity carbon intensity, renewable energy share, interconnection capacity, and indicators of affordability/security (price volatility, curtailments, outages).

Methodologically, I use process tracing to link specific EU inputs to national instruments, complemented by document analysis and semi-structured interviews. This makes causal mechanisms explicit.

3) Methodological framework a) Choice of Research Strategy

To effectively address my research question, this thesis adopts a qualitative and comparative approach. This dual methodology is particularly valuable for gaining a deep understanding of how MS have implemented EU directives on energy diversification in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions caused by the war. The qualitative approach is well-suited for exploring complex and context-specific phenomena, as it enables the identification of non-quantifiable factors such as political priorities, internal dynamics, and external pressures that influence the implementation of energy policy (Clark et al., 2021). By adopting an inductive method, I want to ensure that conclusions emerge from the specific contexts of the selected case studies.

b) Comparative Case Study and Case Selection

Comparative approach

The design of the comparative case study adopted in this research is grounded in the methodological principles outlined by Yin (2017) and Gerring (2004). The comparative case study methodology provides a robust framework for analyzing the nuanced implementation of energy diversification policies across different national contexts ("Quick Start to Case Study Research," 2010; Yin, 2017). It combines both descriptive and explanatory elements, enabling a thorough understanding of the challenges and adaptations specific to the case-study (France, Spain, and Germany), while maintaining theoretical relevance for other EU Member States facing similar issues. This methodology enables an exploration of how the EU balances its supranational objectives with national interests, thereby identifying recurring patterns and divergences in policy implementation (Yin, 2017). It also facilitates a deeper examination of institutional dynamics, geopolitical pressures, and policy responses in each case.

Case Study Selection

The comparative approach provides a better understanding of the national implementation of EU energy diversification policies by highlighting both similarities and differences. It thus ensures understanding of how the EU reconciles its supranational objectives with the interests of MS, and identifies recurring trends and divergences in policy implementation (Yin, 2017; Ivankova & Creswell, 2009). This approach also facilitates a closer examination of institutional dynamics, geopolitical pressures and policy responses in each case.

I have carefully chosen to focus on Spain, France and Germany according to their distinct energy profiles, and their strategic importance in the EU energy landscape. To begin with, Germany illustrates well the difficulties faced by certain MS in adapting to the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, being historically dependent on Russian gas. Germany's transition to LNG and renewables as part of its «Energiewende» initiative offers interesting prospects for balancing energy security and sustainability (Scholten & Bosman, 2018). Secondly, I opted to investigate the situation in France, a country with a strong commitment to nuclear power. The French strategy offers a unique perspective on how traditional energy sources coexist with the EU's decarbonization objectives (Herranz-Surrallés, 2021). Last but not least, I found Spain of great interest for its potential leadership in developing renewable

energies, and its geographical position allows for an exploration of how its growing dependence on North African gas imports highlights the geopolitical dimensions of energy diversification evolves (Omar & Grätz, 2022).

c) Sample Design

Regarding participant recruitment, I chose a combination of two non-probability sampling methods to maximize the quality of the data collected and address practical needs of availability, based on the work of Clark and his collaborators (2021).

Firstly, convenience sampling facilitates the rapid recruitment of accessible and relevant participants for the research, based on their availability and connection to the topic. While this method limits the generalization of findings to a broader population, it is pragmatic for gaining access to energy policy experts. Adapted to the time and resource constraints of a master thesis project, it ensures an efficient and targeted approach (Clark et al., 2021). Secondly, the snowball sampling method is used to expand the network of participants. This approach relies on an initial group of identified respondents who will be invited to recommend other relevant experts (Clark et al., 2021).

In this regard, candidates are recruited through the professional online platform LinkedIn, by networking at events related to the EU energy transition, such as the «January Energy Breakfast by SEA - LNG» and «Nuclear Europe», and through my personal network. LinkedIn facilitates the identification and contact of professionals with specific expertise in energy policy, working within EU institutions and from each of the targeted country. I have first targeted institutions and companies, then looked at the positions and the employees. Additionally, I used my personal and professional network already established, which includes contacts in the energy policy field, developed through prior projects and lectures I attended.

In France, the targeted institutions include the French delegation of the S&D group in the European Parliament, the Ministry of Energy Transition, the Energy Department of the French government, and the Ministry of Environment. The Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER) of the European Commission and NuclearEurope is also relevant. Key positions include advisers and policymakers specializing in energy, climate diplomacy, carbon markets, and sustainable strategies. In Germany, the targeted institutions include the European Parliament,

the Ecologic Institute, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, and Agora Energiewende. Positions range from energy and climate policy advisers to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), accredited parliamentary assistants, and policy officers. Research-oriented roles affiliated with think tanks underline Germany's analytical and forward-looking approach to energy transition and climate justice. In Spain, the targeted institutions include the European Parliament, the Ministry for Ecological Transition, APPA (Association of Renewable Energy Companies), think-thanks, and RWE Renewables Iberia.

The interviews were conducted with two experts from the European Commission's DG ENER focusing on the EU and Germany, a representative of NuclearEurope focusing on the EU, France and Germany, and a researcher from the Elcano Royal Institute think tank focusing on Spain.

d) Interviews

For data collection, I opted for semi-structured interviews, which are based on an interview guide organized around key themes, giving interviewees the freedom to elaborate on their answers or introduce new elements. As noted by Bernard (2006) and Horton et al. (2004), this approach is particularly relevant for exploring motivations, behaviors, and institutional dynamics. Semi-structured interviews enable a nuanced understanding of participants' perceptions and experiences (Fontana & Frey, 2005). This method is therefore ideal for examining the complex processes associated with the implementation of energy policies, providing individual perspectives on institutional challenges and international dynamics. The questions are structured around four thematic: (1) Geopolitical matters, (2) EU Policies, (3) Companies and market, (4) Energy transition, (5) Energy mix. It is through these thematic that I then analyzed the concepts of energy diversification, transition, equity, security, and environmental sustainability. This thesis draws on three interviews conducted with four participants, each providing input on the three national case studies and on the European level. The questions addressed in the interviews were tailored to the expertise of the participants.

e) Ethical Considerations

Ethical standards are an integral part of my work. Key measures include informed consent, where participants were provided with detailed consent forms outlining their rights and the

purpose of the research. I made sure to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants by anonymizing personal information and securely storing the data in a password-protected folder, to which only I have access. Additionally, all data are deleted upon submission of the thesis.

f) Limitations

First, the scope of the study is limited by the focus on three countries, which restricts the generalizability of the results to the entire EU. Moreover, biases in the data may arise, particularly because the responses from the interviewees often reflect subjective viewpoints, influenced by the roles and experiences of the participants. Comparative constraints also represent an important limitation. The variability in data availability and the contextual differences between the countries studied complicate the possibility of making direct comparisons. Finally, as Gerring (2004) observes, while case studies can shed light on similar phenomena in other contexts, their aim is not to produce statistical generalizations. Comparative case studies, by nature, present limitations, especially when it comes to generalizing results. In my research, the results are context-specific, and cannot be generalized to all EU Member States. While the findings are not statistically representative, my aim is to provide in-depth, context-specific information for the countries studied. These limitations are mitigated through the use of methodological triangulation and the transparent presentation of results.

4) Methodology of Analysis

The aim of the analysis is to compare the responses to the Russia-Ukraine war in terms of diversification of energy sources, and the EU's policy strategic implementation in the three selected countries. For the semi-structured interviews, I apply an inductive analysis of the collected data to identify patterns and recurring ideas, allowing unexpected themes to emerge (Caulfield, 2023). The thematic analysis provides a structured approach to coding central themes, combining similar codes to create overarching categories. This process is particularly relevant for identifying relationships between themes (e.g., a correlation between energy independence and investments in renewables).

The first step in the analysis is to code the interview transcripts using NVivo, a software program specifically designed for qualitative data analysis. NVivo facilitates systematic coding

and subsequent thematic analysis, allowing for the identification of recurring patterns in the texts and the construction of an analytical framework, including the emergence of unexpected themes. This process is particularly useful for this thesis, which aims to gather expert opinions and highlight potential gaps in official reports. Thus, the following themes were identified:

· EU strategy to reduce dependency:

· EU energy policies and legislation

· Nuclear and EU

· France strategy and energy mix

· Spain strategy and energy mix

· Germany strategy energy mix

Once the themes have been identified, each case are analyzed independently to examine its specific initiatives. This includes the following sub categories:

· EU: Historical break with Russia, REPowerEU plan, AggregateEU, Sanctions, Renewable expansion, Nuclear Debate

· France: Nuclear, strategic autonomy, renewable energies, hydrogen policy, EU positioning, Risks

· Germany: Pre-war dependency, renewable energies, nuclear ambivalence, social backlash, EU positioning

· Spain: Renewable leadership, hydrogen hub, nuclear phase-out, interconnexions, challenges

This intra-case analysis provides us to examine the recurrent patterns identified for each case separately, considering their specific context and the implementation of EU energy policies (Ayres et al., 2003).

The thematic analysis also aims to compare the coded data in order to assess how each country integrates European directives into its national policies and to identify any tensions or contradictions between national approaches and EU objectives. This leads us to the final step of the analysis: the comparative cross-case analysis, a research design that compares different groups or cases at a single point in time to identify meaningful differences or patterns between

them (Ivankova & Creswell, 2009). To do this, the identified themes are compared to pinpoint common challenges these countries face, as well as the unique approaches they have adopted to address these challenges. For instance, all three countries experienced difficulties post-2022 related to energy dependence, but their responses likely differed.

IV- Analysis

1) Analysis framework

This analytical section aims to answer the research question: «To what extent have EU energy diversification policies been implemented into national strategies in Spain, France, and Germany since aftermath of the war in Ukraine?» This question is essential to understanding the energy strategies in terms of diversification of energy sources in the EU and the three Member States studied in this research.

To answer the research question, the results obtained are examined as described in the methodology section in order to conduct an in-depth and critical analysis. Three semi-structured interviews with four experts form the main basis of the empirical data through narratives. Analysis using NVivo software enabled thematic coding, which will guide this section and is structured around key dimensions, including the EU's collective response (strategy, standards and legislation), the national energy mixes of the three Member States, the role of nuclear power, prospects for hydrogen, infrastructure and new energy dependencies. To ensure the robustness of the analysis, the narratives of the interviews are triangulated with official EU documents and reports, allowing both the information gathered to be verified and placed in its institutional context. These sources will be explicitly included in the critical narratives, in accordance with Chicago style standards.

Thus, the analysis is initially organised around the study of EU policies and the collective response to the war, before focusing on case studies of France, Germany and Spain, then proceeding to a comparative analysis between cases and finally to a critical evaluation and theoretical integration.

2) European Union Policy

a) Historic break: reducing dependence on Russia

The war in Ukraine, the subsequent decision by the United States to cut energy ties with Russia, and the EU's awareness that it should not participate in financing the aggression have been called a revolution. Before 2022, nearly half of the gas imported by the EU came from Russia, as one DG ENER interviewee pointed out: «We have gone from 45% Russian gas to less than 20% in two years. This is a historic break.» Indeed, the share of Russian gas in EU imports via the pipeline fell from over 40% in 2021 to around 11% in 2024, and combined with LNG, imports from Russia accounted for less than 19% of total EU gas imports in 2024, representing a major decrease in a very short period of time (European Council, 2025). The EU has also acted on oil, an important source of energy revenue for Moscow, by imposing progressive sanctions and rapidly diversifying its supplies. For the EU, the dual motivation behind this strategy is clear: to reduce the structural vulnerability of its energy system and to stop financing Russian military aggression.

Furthermore, the war has also brought the issue of energy security to the forefront of European debates, described as «the fact that we need sufficient energy at affordable prices, and of course decarbonized». The EU's energy policy had previously focused on decarbonizing production, but the conflict has highlighted the need to simultaneously ensure security of supply, affordability and environmental sustainability. Energy affordability became particularly salient with rising energy prices, and the role of nuclear power was reconsidered as a source of dispatchable capacity to support the energy transition without compromising security of supply.

Moreover, the soaring energy costs caused by the energy crisis have highlighted a new challenge of preserving European industrial competitiveness. This trend stems directly from the surge in energy prices, which has put many companies in difficulty, struggling to maintain their production in Europe. EU policies accordingly aim to focus on competitiveness and anchoring industries in Europe while enabling them to decarbonize, which represents a considerable challenge.

b) 24

Sanctions

The sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia have gradually targeted Russian coal, oil and gas. The embargo on coal was relatively easy to implement, given its limited share in the European energy mix and therefore easily substitutable, but the oil and gas embargo proved more complex. As one interviewee said, oil is a globalized market, «easy to transport by ship», which facilitated the shift to other suppliers. The difficulty lies in implementing the EU's gradual embargo on maritime imports, which account for the essential part of flows to Western Europe. In order to counter attempts to circumvent the sanctions, the EU had to reinforce its surveillance of the «ghost fleet», consisting of ships operating in the shadows to clandestinely transport Russian oil using concealment tactics. In contrast, gas depended on fixed infrastructure (gas pipelines, LNG terminals), making it a structural vulnerability much more complex to address.

These measures are part of the broader framework of the REPowerEU roadmap launched by the Commission in direct response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the energy crisis. This document guides the EU in eliminating imports of Russian energy by 2027 (European Commission, 2025). EU Member States must then draw up national plans setting out how they will gradually ban Russian energy imports by the end of 2025.

The sanctions against Russia have served a dual purpose: reducing Russia's energy revenues and creating the conditions for a faster energy transition. But they have also revealed divisions between MS that are able to diversify their supplies quickly and those that are still heavily dependent.

c) REPowerEU

The REPowerEU plan form the cornerstone of the EU's energy strategy. It mobilizes €300 billion with the aim of accelerating energy diversification and climate transition, in other words, ending dependence on Russia and pursuing the Green Deal's 2050 carbon neutrality targets (Commission Européenne, n.d.). To achieve this, the plan provides for the financing of renewable energy development in the European energy mix, the modernization and expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure, and increased support for hydrogen.

The LNG has quickly become `the linchpin of European energy security', as one interviewee commented. The EU has become the world's largest importer of LNG, mainly from the US, which accounted for 46.0% of 2024 share of LNG arrivals, H1 2024 (Global LNG hub, 2024). In parallel, the EU has diversified its trading partners to include Qatar and Azerbaijan. Also, unlike gas which depends on infrastructure for transport, LNG is more flexible but still requires LNG terminals and interconnections to supply landlocked countries.

Thus, the REPowerEU plan foresees the accelerated construction of floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) and the adjustment of cross-border transport networks to ensure flows are redistributed across Europe. REPowerEU combines short-term solutions (security of supply via LNG and international contracts) and long-term solutions (climate transition through renewables, efficiency and hydrogen), demonstrating the EU's willingness to avoid substituting one dependency for another, but rather to lay the foundations for European energy sovereignty.

In addition, the AggregateEU mechanism, introduced as part of REPowerEU, is a platform designed to aggregate gas demand and facilitate joint purchases, enabling MS and European companies to strengthen their position in negotiations with international suppliers. The mechanism helps to rebalance the power relationship between major global exporters and the European market, with participation by companies being voluntary. Here, the Commission acts as an intermediary and provides a framework; in fact, the EU does not impose directives on MS regarding their energy mix but acts as a facilitator.

One of the most significant changes induced by the energy crisis is the reorganization of European gas flows. According to one interviewee, «before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, gas flowed from east to west, and now it flows from west to east». This reversal of flows has been made possible by the gradual modernization of interconnections and the development of LNG capacities, which has led to the structural reorganization of the European gas market and is undoubtedly one of the EU's most notable achievements in response to the energy crisis, despite the persistence of national interests.

d) EU climate framework and the role of nuclear power

As mentioned, the idea behind the EU's energy strategy is to link energy security to its ecological transition objectives, a dual «crisis and climate» agenda. The legislative texts

included in the Fit for 55 package reflect this, in particular the RED and EED (European Council, n.d.). The Renewable Energy Directive (RED) promotes the share of clean energy in the European energy mix through the latest revision of RED III in 2023, which sets a binding target of 42.5% renewable energy by 2030, with an indicative target of 45% (European Commission, 2023).

Meanwhile, the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), revised in 2023, sets a legally enforceable target of reducing energy consumption by 11.7% by 2030, based on projections made in 2020 (EET, n.d.). As one interviewee highlighted, this approach reflects the principle of «efficiency first»: the fastest and most cost-effective way to reduce import dependency is to consume less. These texts are anchored in multi-level governance, whereby the EU sets the objectives and MS must implement appropriate national plans, confirming that the EU is acting more as a direct player in the energy transition and as a facilitator regarding the energy mix. The interview with DG ENER experts emphasized this point: «Our role is to facilitate diversification (...) but diversification is the responsibility of the Member States».

It is against this backdrop that the debate on nuclear energy has arisen. Prior to the war, the debate on nuclear energy was already evolving, particularly with regard to sustainable finance taxonomy. Now, «many politicians, both at EU and MS level, realize that nuclear will be essential to achieving energy transition goals while maintaining security of supply in Europe». However, some argue that nuclear power cannot be part of the immediate strategy to meet the challenge of decarbonization and that it is rather «a long-term strategy».

On the financial front, various European funds are available to support the transition to low-carbon production, but «many of these European funds are not accessible to nuclear energy». For example, the Just Transition Fund is mainly intended for renewable energies, and this type of mechanism remains closed to nuclear power. The length of projects and the capital costs of nuclear power prevent funding and financing the construction of new power plants, which poses challenges in terms of return on investment, as investors need stability. The EU recognizes the advantages of nuclear power, and this should be reflected in its policies to «send clear signals that the EU considers nuclear power on an equal footing with renewables». These funds could send a message to investors: «they can invest in nuclear power, and the EU supports these investments». As an experts said, the EU plans to wait until 2028 before including nuclear as a mechanism for producing low-carbon hydrogen, which creates a competitive advantage for

renewables and delays investment in hydrogen. From a technical perspective, nuclear and hydrogen can operate well together thanks to the stable capacity factors of nuclear power, unlike renewable energy sources, which are useful for electrolysers and low-carbon heat production for industry.

The Illustrative Programme for Nuclear (PINC) published by the European Commission under the Euratom Treaty provides a comprehensive overview of investment needs across the entire nuclear lifecycle. The 8th edition estimates that €241 billion will be needed by 2050 to support the extension of the lifetime of existing reactors and the construction of new power plants (Enerdata, 2025). The motivation for developing nuclear power is not solely economic. Extending the operation of existing reactors is as a fact «the cheapest source of energy», but a «low-carbon base load capacity» is also needed to build a decarbonized European electricity system, which includes nuclear and hydrogen, as battery storage alone would be massive.

3) Case-Studies

a) France

France promotes nuclear energy in its energy strategy, and the war has provided it with «an opportunity to further defend nuclear energy». At the European Council level, a growing number of countries no longer oppose nuclear energy and its decision-making. France is at the forefront of this movement, leading the Nuclear Alliance of Member States, an informal alliance of 13 MS that support decisions favorable to nuclear energy at the European level, such as its inclusion in the taxonomy, in the «net zero» industry law, or in state aid regulation.

Simultaneously, E. Macron established a national strategy announced on 10 February 2022, asking EDF, France's leading national energy company, to build six new EPR2 reactors and commissioning studies for eight additional EPR2 units. He also instructed authorities to extend the operating lives of existing reactors beyond 40 years, potentially up to 50 years or more, if safety permits. The industry documents presented this programme as potentially delivering roughly 25 GW of new capacity by 2050. The investment is important: €50 to €67 billion for the first six reactors, plus tens of billions more for the subsequent ones (World Nuclear News, 2022). The French President portrays nuclear power as a dual pillar alongside renewables, ensuring that France preserves its industrial leadership and energy sovereignty.

Nevertheless, critics were highlighted by interviewees, notably the example of the past project «Flamanville EPR», which experienced years of delays, exponential costs estimated at €23,7 billion including interest during the construction phase, compared to €3.3 billion planned (Cour des Comptes, 2025). Additionally, EDF experiences financial pressures due to policy changes regarding nuclear power plants in recent years. Finally, the issue of social acceptability remains sensitive as France, marked by the `Gilets jaunes' movement, continues to view the question of electricity prices as eminently political. This is where the French paradox lies, because its electricity mix is already decarbonized by nuclear power, yet it is lagging behind in the deployment of renewable energies. In the words of one interviewee: «When you look at a map of the carbon intensity of electricity production in Europe, France is one of the greenest countries on the map», yet «France risks being fined for failing to meet its 2030 renewable energy targets, and is regularly called to order by the European Commission for noncompliance with RED targets». This is a major challenge for France, as highlighted by an expert from DG ENER: «Wind and solar energy are underperforming in France: authorizations are too slow and local opposition is strong». The problem is that the EU sometimes favors certain technologies over others instead of focusing on decarbonization. This debate fuels France's defense of a technologically neutral approach, which would prioritize CO2 reduction targets over renewable energy quotas.

Concerning hydrogen, France is ambitious with the national H2 strategy, aiming to create a complete system, from production to industrial uses, but production remains low and costly. Besides, France remains cautious about imports from Morocco or Spain, as it prefers to maintain an approach of industrial sovereignty and security of supply. This trend is reflected in the fact that today, «three-quarters of the hydrogen consumed in the EU is carbon-based», meaning that most of the hydrogen consumed in France, as in the EU, remains fossil-based. The priority is therefore to decarbonize the existing hydrogen used in heavy industrial sectors (chemicals, fertilizers, ammonia) before considering expanding its uses. The challenge for France is therefore to «ensure that these hydrogen-intensive industries have access to clean and affordable hydrogen». Future needs are significant, and it is not certain that France will be able to produce enough green hydrogen, so the main focus remains on securing sufficient domestic decarbonized production for industry.

France's energy strategy is rooted in a logic of strategic autonomy, which is based on the assumption that nuclear power is the main pillar, supplemented by a gradual increase in hydrogen and renewable energies. However, this vision remains fragile due to the technological and financial uncertainty surrounding nuclear power, and the social acceptability of energy choices in a context of high price sensitivity.

b) Germany

Germany illustrates in a paradigmatic way Europe's energy vulnerability prior to the war in Ukraine. In 2021, Germany was a major importer of Russian Gaz representing 53% of its exports to the EU via Yamal, Nord Stream 1 and 2 (Ziomecki, 2025). Its energy model was based on a structural dependence on Russian gas, which directly fueled the country's industrial pillars, notably the chemical, steel and automotive industries. The invasion in February 2022 put an end to this equation, forcing Berlin to urgently rethink its energy system. While the sanctions regime still allowed Russian oil to be imported, these flows quickly dwindled, and Germany compensated by accelerating diversification. In 2021, the country had no liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, but in less than three years, six floating storage and FSRUs were commissioned in the north of the country at Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel and Lubmin, accompanied by increased imports of US and Qatari LNG and a strengthening of pipeline supplies from Norway, and occasionally from Nigeria and Libya. This strategy, described as a «puzzle, mosaic» by one interviewee, has transformed Germany, which «not only imports for its own consumption, but now also exports, for example to Austria», reversing the flows that previously only ran from east to west.

Simultaneously, the coalition government (SPD, Greens, FDP) has accelerated the deployment of renewables, aligning the RED III objectives with the national law. Solar, wind and hydrogen became the pillars of the transition, with the latter being crucial for decarbonizing heavy industry. As one interviewee from DG ENR points out: «In the case of Germany, they have been extremely ambitious» and «extremely quick in accelerating the deployment of renewables in recent years, in parallel with the construction of its LNG terminals». At the European level, Berlin is positioning itself as a driving force for renewables but remains uncertain about nuclear power. Indeed, despite the energy crisis, Germany has maintained its schedule, with the permanent closure of its last three power plants in April 2023, after a temporary extension of a few months for energy security reasons. This is a paradox because it has led Germany to import

massive amounts of French nuclear electricity. It should be noted, however, that the carbon intensity of the German electricity mix (363 gCO2eq/kWh) remained around fifteen times higher than that of France (21.7 gCO2eq/kWh) in 2024 (UBA, 2025; RTE, n.d.).

Therefore, as one expert stresses, «Germany realizes that opposing nuclear power solely for ideological reasons leads nowhere», even if no recovery plan is envisaged in the short term apart from a distant opening towards SMRs or fusion. Nuclear policy remains marked by internal tensions: «the Chancellor is not opposed to nuclear power and often takes positions in this direction», but «the Ministry of Ecology says the opposite and responds to public consultations on low-carbon hydrogen by stating that it should not include nuclear power». Germany is clearly trying to clarify its internal dynamics with the new government, and has even started attending, without participating, the informal nuclear alliance meetings at the European Council.

Nonetheless, the energy crisis has revealed social divisions, notably the protests against the `Heizungsgesetz' heating law. According to one interviewee, «people felt that the pace was too fast and unfair». This episode reflects the struggle to balance climate urgency, energy security and social acceptability. The case of Germany highlights the dilemmas that MS face with regard to the energy transition.

c) Spain

Spain is a unique case, given its excellent solar and wind resources, with a highly concentrated population of 50 millions inhabitants along the coast and in Madrid. This makes it relatively easy to build wind or solar farms, as the interior is sparsely populated. However, the challenge for renewables lies in market saturation, leading to very low capture rates for solar plants, limited to 5% of the average electricity price in April 2025, reducing investor attractiveness. This vulnerability pushed Spain to change the electricity market at EU level, led by Teresa Rivera. In May 2022, Spain and Portugal obtained regulatory approval from the European Council and the Commission for what is known as the Iberian exception, which consists of capping the electricity prices at which gas-fired power plants can sell electricity on the market. This was authorised on the grounds that Spain is isolated from the rest of the EU, forming a so-called «electricity island».

Spain has often advanced this argument: «We want more interconnections; if you don't provide them, we need exceptions because we are not on an equal footing with the rest of the MS and we suffer from isolation», which, in energy terms, translates into higher prices since isolated systems are more expensive than integrated systems.

On the other hand, the hypothesis of Spain having the potential to supply renewable energy to its European neighbors was confirmed by the experts, thereby contributing significantly to European energy sovereignty. However, social, economic and political variables involved in exporting renewables to the rest of the EU complicate this vision. Firstly, Spain prioritizes decarbonization by 2050. Secondly, social acceptance by the Spanish population would be a major obstacle. According to an interviewee: «This idea that we will install a lot of renewables in Spain to export them to the rest of the EU starts to circulate in Spain (...) there is this narrative that we don't want to become an «energy colony». Spanish wind and solar farms have a limited impact on employment because these projects require a significant workforce during construction, but the staffing requirements for maintenance are extremely low, depriving local populations of direct economic benefits. Finally, the Spanish energy landscape is marked by the strong presence of private players, with Iberdrola, the leader in renewable energies, pushing for an acceleration of the transition, while Repsol together with the oil industry are restraining progress, particularly in the transport sector, claiming that industrial employments must be preserved.

Despite the great potential for renewable energy, its interconnections are limited. In 2022, its electricity connection rate with France was only 3%, well below the European target of 15% by 2030. As one interviewee explained, Spain and Portugal are only connected to Europe by two interconnections: one in Catalonia and one in the Basque Country: «That's very little, which is why we talk about the «Iberian energy island»».

For instance, the Bay of Biscay extension project, involving a 370 km submarine cable with a capacity of 2 GW, making the total FR-ES exchange capacity increase from around 2.8 GW to 5 GW once the project is completed (target commissioning date 2028), got considerably delayed (MITECO, 2024). As one interviewee noted: «France was not very enthusiastic about opening up its network further to Iberian renewables» but the blackout in April 2025 made Spain push for more interconnexions with France (Abnett, 2025). In terms of gas, Spain plays a strategic stabilizing role thanks to its network of gas pipelines and, above all, its LNG infrastructure.

With seven regasification terminals, it accounts for nearly a third of European capacity. As the interviewee notes: «Spain has the largest regasification capacity in Europe, but it remains underutilized due to insufficient connections with the rest of the continent». This imbalance was partially corrected in 2022, when France agreed to increase its gas import capacity from Spain by around 20% through technical adjustments.

Then, in December 2022, Spain, France, and Portugal announced the creation of the H2Med corridor, including the BarMar subsea pipeline connecting Barcelona to Marseille. The goal is to transport 2 million tons of green hydrogen per year by 2030, representing around 10% of the EU's estimated consumption. The expert points out that «the initial idea was to use BarMar in a hybrid way, first to transport gas and then hydrogen, but the European authorities have decided that it will be used exclusively for hydrogen». H2Med is recognized as a Project of Common Interest (PCI) by the European Commission and is included in the REPowerEU strategy.

Another important factor is the Mediterranean dimension, illustrating the vulnerability of Spain's energy security. First, the 1,400 km Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (MEG), which transported Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal via Morocco, was closed in October 2021. This is a direct consequence of tensions between Algeria and Morocco, placing Spanish diplomacy in a delicate situation. A few months after the closure, Spain indicated in a letter to King Mohammed VI that it recognized de facto Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which led Algeria to freeze `all trade relations with Spain, with the exception of natural gas'. Second, regarding hydroelectricity, Spain is a mountainous country and hence has significant potential to easily generate hydroelectricity, despite its Mediterranean climate and irregular rainfall. As an interviewee points out: «There are many droughts in Spain, and we expect this trend to increase with climate change». Pumped-storage projects face long environmental permitting procedures, which slows the deployment of large-scale storage capacity. These projects are usually located in the mountains, which requires many permits that are difficult to obtain.

By contrast, Spain currently operates seven nuclear reactors that supply around 20% of its electricity production (World Nuclear Association, 2024). In 2019, the government approved a plan with the private companies owning these plants, setting a phased closure between 2027 and 2035. However, the energy crisis and the major power outage on the Iberian Peninsula in April 2025 have reignited the debate (ENTSO-E, 2025). While the current government is

maintaining its phase-out target, some industrialists and the Christian Democratic Party are open to extending the life of nuclear power plants by 10 years. This view is also supported by an expert from NuclearEurope: «In Spain, we are seeing the closure of reactors that could still be maintained and produce energy for years to come (...) this has major consequences for jobs, competitiveness and energy security. The challenge of decarbonization is immense, we must invest in all capacities: nuclear, renewables and hydrogen». In Spain, the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis have reshuffled the deck: to have a stable electricity system, diversification is preferable.

4) Within-Case Analysis

In order to pursue the analysis, each case is compared in this section, highlighting similarities, differences and structural divisions. As a reminder, in the current environment, France has nuclear sovereignty but remains vulnerable in terms of renewable energies, Germany made significant efforts in renewable energies, focuses on LNG and its position on nuclear energy is uncertain, while Spain concentrates on renewable energies and hydrogen but remains predominantly opposed to nuclear energy.

It is noteworthy that these countries have converged on a strategy of accelerating the diversification of energy sources since 2022, resulting in a radical decline in Russian energy imports, but this `success' masks a substitution by other dependencies (US, Norway, Algeria). The EU has been the conductor of the energy crisis, but without a single score. All three countries have mobilized REPowerEU as a specific emergency framework, and the EU has been a facilitator through the objectives to be achieved, the financing and the mechanisms implemented, but remains non-prescriptive on the energy mix, which is left to the discretion of the Member States. The three countries seek to strike a balance between energy security (availability), decarbonization (combating climate change), and affordability (price) at their own level.

However, the hierarchy differs, with Germany favoring industry and accessibility, France favoring strategic sovereignty, and Spain favoring climate opportunities. In addition, there is a growing trend in each case towards LNG, especially in Germany with the rapid construction of new terminals and the development of renewable energy and hydrogen. This responsiveness

from MS contrasts with the EU's historical slowness on energy issues and demonstrates the effectiveness and relevance of the EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Beyond the differences, there are structural fractures in the energy mix of the three cases analyzed. France has a real asset in terms of sovereignty, but the reality is that it imports uranium to produce nuclear power, particularly from Africa and Central Asia, which hides an invisible external dependency (WITS 1, n.d.). This illustrates the logic of `energy security and new dependencies': apparent sovereignty is in fact based on external supply chains, shifting vulnerability without eliminating it. Germany, which opted for a post-Fukushima approach, i.e. phasing out nuclear power, is exposing itself to direct economic (higher energy prices) and industrial (loss of competitiveness) vulnerabilities by relying mainly on imports of US LNG (WITS 2, n.d.). This illustrates how a national policy can reinforce extra-European dependence. We find here the dynamic of `alternative dependencies' from Russian gas, Germany is now exposed to a new vulnerability linked to LNG imports, revealing the limits of the transition as an energy security measure.

Comparing these two cases also shows that the dependencies are different in nature: France's dependency on imported uranium remains largely «invisible» in public debate, while Germany's dependency on LNG is «visible» and highly politicized, as it involves costly infrastructure and direct exposure to geopolitical tensions. This asymmetry of dependencies complicates European unification, as it produces different perceptions of energy vulnerability and therefore divergent priorities within the EU.

Spain, positioned as a «model student» in the transition and with the EU's renewable energy ambitions, faces geographical isolation and a lack of interconnections with the rest of the continent, placing it in a geopolitical and infrastructural vulnerability. Spain's renewable energy potential remains under-exploited, highlighting the limitations of the «multi-level governance» approach: the EU sets ambitious targets (Fit for 55, RED III), but Member States remain the dominant actors in implementation, and structural asymmetries such as interconnections are not offset by sufficient European coordination. This limits the EU's ability to transform its energy diversity into a real strategic advantage and raises the criticism that the limits of European integration are not related to resources but to governance and solidarity between MS. The EU's vulnerability is fragmented, which hinders the implementation of a unified strategy and increases the EU's dependence on short-term solutions. The EU must ensure energy security

through pragmatic management of national asymmetries rather than internal convergence. This struggle to harmonize trajectories also undermines EU's credibility as a Normative Power Europe, as defined by Ian Manners (2002). Although the EU has strong climate ambitions with the Green Deal and carbon neutrality, national differences (nuclear, LNG, interconnections) weaken the projection of a consistent normative power.

This divergence also applies to nuclear, preventing the emergence of a unified model. Even though the debates have evolved, especially with Germany's informal participation in the nuclear alliance meetings at the Council, the EU's international credibility is enfeebled, as it cannot speak with one voice in global energy and climate negotiations. The hydrogen issue is also causing new tensions as plans for massive imports from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa raise fears of «green extractivism», where the European transition would be at the expense of producer countries, and reproducing both asymmetries of dependency and post-colonialism dynamics (Sadik-Zada et al., 2025).

Thus, through these three cases, the EU appears to operate on a logic of coordination rather than real integration. Different national trajectories and multi-level governance can become a real asset if they are managed as structured complementarity.

V- Conclusion

I would like to outline some limitations regarding the results of this analysis which I think are important to be aware of before concluding. Firstly, the interviews are subject to an institutional bias, as the interviewees are mainly directly linked to European institutions, which may overrepresent the official discourse, with a tendency to minimize failures and highlight successes, while leaving little room for societal voices that receive less visibility in this thesis. Furthermore, the results are not static, such as Germany's position on nuclear energy, meaning that we can expect the conclusions to evolve in other directions in the coming years or months. With regard to European policies, particularly REPowerEU, it is difficult to measure the impact at this stage as the transposition process is still ongoing. Finally, the methodology used is ideal for highlighting national energy trajectories, but on the other hand, it can give the impression of fragmented European coherence without incorporating collective dynamics.

This thesis has thus confirmed that the EU has accelerated the diversification of energy sources, and need more unity between the MS to move further toward independence. The EU has succeeded in rapidly disengaging from Russia, significantly reducing its imports, which led to diversification primarily in geographical terms, with a shift in supplies towards the US, Norway, Algeria and Qatar. On the other hand, structural diversification (renewables and hydrogen) is progressing more slowly and differently across MS. The result is a historic acceleration but one marked by increased fragmentation. Yet there have been notable successes. Germany has built floating LNG terminals in record time, while continuing to massively expand renewables to achieve 80% decarbonized electricity by 2030, reinforced by the reversibility of gas flows with its neighbors. France, for its part, has confirmed nuclear power as a pillar of its energy sovereignty, with the announcement of new EPR2 reactors, the extension of the lifespan of existing power plants and active participation in the H2Med hydrogen corridor. Finally, Spain has accelerated the deployment of large-scale solar and wind projects, affirming its position as a leader in green energy and its capacity to become an energy hub via H2Med and gas pipelines.

These developments coexist with ongoing limitations, where energy mixes diverge. At the EU level, fragmentation is evident in disagreements over green taxonomy and interconnections. Meanwhile, new dependencies are emerging, fueling new paradoxes regarding European sovereignty. Several conditions appear essential to ensure future success as follows: reform of the electricity market to stabilize prices and boost investor confidence; the establishment of strategic infrastructure such as Iberian interconnections, hydrogen corridors and massive storage capacities; political discourse toward social acceptability and unified Europe, in order to avoid local opposition to energy projects; and finally, more ethical energy diplomacy, capable of limiting the risk of green extractivism and promoting more balanced partnerships.

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