Niger's Foreign Policy With France under General Seyni Kountché (1974-1987)

4.3 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED NIGER'S FOREIGN POLICY

4.3.1 LAND-LOCKED STATE

The study of land-locked states elaborates the importance of direct access to the sea. Twenty-six of the total world states are land-locked. Twelve of them are in Africa. Niger is one of them.

In attempting to develop theories about land-locked states, East looked for common factors other than their lack of sea frontage and selected fairly common denominators of weakness and buffer state status. ⁴

Austria, Afghanistan and Mongolia provide example of buffer states status. Surrounding maritime states are advantageous because of the absence of the boundaries of powerful neighbors. If a land-locked state is internationally self-sufficient, then it needs not rely on coastal states for its external trade. The common concern of land-locked states involves the securing of access to the sea. Tit has long been argued that access to the sea and the internal usage of navigable waterways accessible to the ocean going vessels is a natural right.⁵Another concern of land-locked states is the securing of free movement of goods across the territories of coastal states free of tax.

Niger is an economically weak and land-locked state and therefore, she is inevitably dependent on the will of Nigeria, Benin republic, Cote d' Ivoire, Togo and Ghana. Much of Niger's trade to Europe passes thought the ports of Lagos, Cotonou, Abidjan, Lomé and Tema. In fact, the route through the port of Cotonou has been used as an alternative, although it is costly, in case, the Nigerian route is not available. The Nigerian civil war alarmed the leaders of Niger and made them explore other routes.

«Much of the good neighborly relationship between Niger and Nigeria could be explained in terms of the formers dependence on the facilities of the latter for a great part of her trade with the rest of the world». ⁶

Since the bulk of African trade is with extra African countries, an easy and reliable access to the coast is of paramount importance. Consequently, most if not all-African land-locked states have tried to maintain a cordial relationship with countries through whose territories the bulk of their exports and imports must pass.

4.3.2 THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Thus, the authorities in charge in Niger, both before and after independence, pursued a policy, which resulted in making the Nigerien economy dependent upon a single primary commodity.

To be fair, attempts were made to try and diversify the economy, for instance, the introduction of cotton in 1956 in the center proved quite successful. ⁷ Furthermore, Governor Ramadier had a second look at the by now notorious naturally irrigated basins of the Niger River valley. But once it was realized that the development scheme devised in the 1930s had come to nothing, not just because of official neglect but also because the peasants of the west simply had no experience of irrigated cultivation, whatever plans existed were apparently abandoned.⁸

Another attempt, profitable and successful to a degree, was to encourage the exportation of goatskins from the Maradi region to Europe, where they were able to compete with the better-known goatskins variety from Sokoto.⁹ It was followed by a general expansion in the exportation of hides and skins.¹⁰

Finally, some of the credit for the establishment of Niger's second (small) groundnut oil mill (at Matameye in 1954) must go to the administration (French). ¹¹ However, all this amounted to very little in the long run, and neither cotton nor skins nor hides were of much importance compared with groundnuts. Above all, the administration seems to have neglected the subsistence sector completely.

Why then this emphasis on groundnuts and especially why the heavy tax burden? The answer, in our opinion, is to be found in the fact that the process of decolonization had been set in motion by the early 1950s. The French were (by virtue, one could argue, of the myth of the «white man's burden») under a moral obligation to provide Niger with what we could call the prerequisite of a modern state, state machinery according to the European model. This meant equipping Niger with a (modest) infrastructure of institutions and services; a parliament, a government, a civil service etc. it also entailed the building of roads, airports, hospitals, schools and the like.

We have in short, a policy of «modernization» designed to implement as fully as possible the principle implicit in the FIDES programme. This required funding, and since the funds granted by the FIDES proved inadequate, the immediate source of new revenue was perceived to be the expansion of groundnuts exports. The caution advocated by Governor Toby having thus been brushed aside, the end result is neatly illustrated by the budgets between 1958 and 1961. External funds represented one-third of revenue in 1958, a huge 57 percent in 1959 and slightly less than 50 percent in 1961. The rest originated for the most part, directly or indirectly, from the commercialization of groundnuts at (and the point is worth repeating) prices subsidized by the French. Geographically, one «subdivision» («Cercle» after 1956), that of Magaria, provided close to 50 percent of the revenue not originated from external funds. As far as expenditure is concerned, the «budget de fonctionnement», designed to cover operating and maintenance costs, continued to absorb some 90 percent of the budget ¹²

We may now conclude that the administration after 1954, in sharp contrast to the administration under Governor Toby was now particularly concerned with laying the foundations of a balanced although modest economy. It was a spendthrift administration which sacrificed the future for the present and the basic for the spectacular; an administration which thus contributed to accentuate the fragility and disequilibrium of the Nigerien economy, and so to accelerate the process of structural underdevelopment. Furthermore, as the study of budget indicates, the very burden of modern state machinery, however modest, became so heavy that it seemed to rule out any possibilities of real economic development. The price of modernization and independence, on the terms dictated by the French and the «evolves» was so high that the average Nigerien could barely afford it, if at all.

If we consider the politicians and the «evolves» as a corporate group, the least we can say is that, after the transfer of the reins of power between 1957 and 1960, they did not try to reverse the policy inaugurated by the French. Indeed, it was in their interest to maintain this policy since it guaranteed their standard of living. This they certainly did. For instance, between 1958 and 1961, the civil service multiplied rapidly and salaries raised steeply both in absolute and relative terms. ¹³ As J. Delpy has remarked, the budget became «exclusivement un instrument de distribution de pouvoir d'achat». ¹⁴

The fact that the final stage of the process of decolonization took place during a period of very favourable climatic conditions locally (in sharp contrast with the period of colonial conquest at the turn of the century), and also a period of rapid economic growth in the world at large, probably had the effect of concealing some of the potentially damaging effects of the economic policy summarized above. No one asked in 1960 what would happen if, or rather when, drought struck again (as it did after 1968, and especially between 1972 - 1974. ¹⁵ in conformity with J. Tilho's prediction in 1928); ¹⁶ if the French should decide one day to discontinue the programme of subsidizing groundnut prices as they did in 1967); ¹⁷ if the price of groundnut oil on the world market should drop drastically (as it did in the 1970s); and if Ghana should decide to close its borders to seasonal laborer (as it did under the Busia administration). All these factors came together during the early 1970s. The result was a disaster of some magnitude known as the Great West African Drought and Famine of 1972 - 1974. (Naturally, in 1972 - 1974 as in 1913 - 1915 and in 1931 - 1932, «there was an incredible lack of a sense of urgency to start with», personal tax was not suspended and tax collection remained much better organized than relief.) ¹⁸

Even 1980 look reasonably bright because of revenues from a new and unexpected source; a source that has quadrupled in value since the steep rise in oil prices after 1973. We are referring to the uranium mine at Arlit in Air from which in 1978, the Government of Niger collected an estimated 12 billion CFA francs in royalties. ¹⁹ It remains to be seen, however, how far the consequences of the Harrisburg incident will affect the external trade of Niger. But the future of Niger lies in its subsoil, rich in minerals and probably also in oil. ²⁰

The French strategy is best understood as combining several motives. The most powerful of these was to minimize the cost of maintaining French presence and control by promoting cash crops and by re-orientating preexisting monetary systems and patterns of trade so that the colonial administration cold capture more of the surplus. The French also wanted to avoid the civil unrest that might result if the Nigerien people were brought to the point of starvation, and to this end, they instituted programs of improved livestock production and food storage. They did not have little motivation to invest enough to make the rural economy more productive, nor did they seem concerned about the long-term environmental impacts of their agricultural and pastoral policies. As a result, the French left Niger with a minimal technology and research base on which to build future economic development.