The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

Section 2: US and alliance building in a sub- regional perspective.

One of the words that appeared omnipresent in the speeches of American leaders, especially President Bush, is allies. Alliance building is as old as the history of IR. Thucydides' study of The Peloponnesian War is essentially a study in alliance building. Goldstein defines alliance in the following way: «An alliance is a coalition of states that coordinate their actions to accomplish some end.»^168(*) In other words, either written or not, alliances bind two or more states in the pursuit of a common goal. Major alliances are between great powers, similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Warsaw PACT. Nevertheless, small states can also ally with great powers. «For smaller states, Goldstein argues, alliances can be their most important power element, and for great powers the structure of alliances shapes the configuration of power in the system.» In this sense, every country needs some sort of alliances because of the power multiplication factor it offers. In other words, «Of all the elements of power, none can change as quickly and decisively as alliances.»^169(*) Alliances are traditionally fluid in realist thinking, made and broken easily. Goldstein emphasizes that «Alliances are not marriages of love, they are marriages of convenience. Alliances are based on national interests and can shift as national interests change.»^170(*)

The Pentagon therefore expressed need for major military commands where there has been a long-standing military alliances: in Europe and Northeast Asia. Additionally, a military command to support homeland security (Northern Command, a post-9/11 Pentagon initiative), and an African Command were going to make sense. In the campaign leading to US presidential elections in 2004, the democrats' candidate, John Kerry declared that "America must always be the world's paramount military power, but we can magnify our power through alliances."^171(*) American power could therefore be magnified by occasional, timely temporary alliances with small states such as Kuwait, but especially in the case of our study, with such states as Cameroon. As Denis Martin observed in 1998 about US alliance building with African countries, «on the international scene, alliances between small states with big ones are generally momentary».^172(*)

Such alliances, Nye warns, should not rely exclusively on hard power, wise policies based on a symbiosis of hard and soft power will build useful alliances for the American people.

But wise policies can reduce the antagonisms that these realities engender. Indeed, that is what Washington achieved after World War II: it used soft-power resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions that has lasted for 60 years. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power^173(*).

This call to apply soft power in post-9/11 anti-terrorist alliances seems to have an echo in US minds, at least in some parts of the world. But the defining of alliances along lines of interest after 2001 would lead the US into frictions. In today's world, Russia, Pakistan and Yemen are allies while the Cold War main allies such as France are wearing away. As Moisés Naím put it, «The attacks engendered new alliances and strained old ones.»^174(*)

On the African continent, US engagement with security and democracy issues in African countries is more and more driven by a mixture of geopolitical considerations and idealistic imperatives. US military presence in the Horn of Africa can be explained by an increased US interest in projecting military force into the Persian Gulf. In West and Central Africa, in the region called the Gulf of Guinea, US policy makers are focusing on the strategic value of oil.^175(*) North African gas and Southern African trade opportunities (and non-energy related resources such as gold and diamond) further determine US alliance building in Africa. The US needs regional allies in Africa, hub countries which can collaborate adequately in realizing American foreign policy goals. As D. Barkan notes, «Along with Nigeria and South Africa, Kenya is one of the three `anchor states' in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries that are key to the stability of the region because of location and resources»^176(*). But following regional groupings, the three countries cited by Barkan are not enough. The Northern region and Central Africa are key areas after 9/11. North Africa is important because of the necessity to ally with Muslim countries in the fight against terrorism, and also because of resources such as gas and oil. Central Africa is important because of its oil reserves and humanitarian crisis. While in North Africa the role of a hub country alternates between Morocco, Egypt and Algeria, Cameroon and Angola bid for Central Africa. We should note that sub-regional bodies such as CEMAC and ECCAS have not attracted as much US interest as SADC with which the US has special relations demonstrated in the SADC - US Forum.

1. An increasing economically-based interest

Alliances are not solely for military purposes, and in this case, they are not only for the fight against terrorism. US interest in Central Africa and/or Gulf of Guinea is also economic, that is trade and aid. Both aspects have increased and are seemingly intertwined. Though there has been - since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11 - greater emphasis on `trade not aid', African governments are understood to have limited means in the fight against terrorism. Equally, weak, poor states are more fragile and attractive to terrorists than robust ones. It is not only the fight against terrorism; Africa constitutes what Kansteiner referred to as, `the last great emerging market',^177(*) a growing economic partner which needs to be protected and harnessed. The growth of trade interests with Africa in the years following 9/11 is due to the need to diversify economic partners on the one hand and change of US administration from Democrats to Republicans, on the other hand. The building of private sector links between the United States and Africa, and between Europe and Africa as particular economic features of the post 9/11 grand strategy offers several challenges and opportunities. There has been much focus in the press on US economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The US has always had an interest in the resources of the region, but the 2001 terrorist events have changed the nature of trade relations between the US and Central Africa. It is with this in mind that Booker et al declared that, «In 2003 U.S. policy toward Africa will be driven almost exclusively by geopolitical considerations related to Washington's war plans against Iraq, and by its geostrategic interests in African oil.»^178(*) This oil, though available in North and part of East Africa, is found essentially in the Gulf of Guinea.

Chad-Cameroon Pipeline

The largest of American investment in sub-Saharan Africa is the Chad - Cameroon Pipeline project in the Gulf of Guinea. The Chad through Cameroon oil pipeline cost about $3.5 billion USD, financed by the World Bank and run by Exxon Mobil. Inaugurated in 2004, the pipeline moves oil (255, 000 barrel per day) from the Chadian region of Doba to the Cameroonian marine town of Kribi for export. This project has reinforced American oil interest in the region, making the Gulf one of the busiest areas of the continent.

Map 2. Source: EIA Annual Energy Review 2005.

«Traditionally of French influence, wrote Awoumou, the Gulf of Guinea and its hinterland (Chad, CAR, Niger and the Great Lakes region) is the more becoming an area of American interests.»^179(*) A greater part of this interest is covered by the pipeline project which could have a far-reaching proportion. Awoumou explains this proportion in the following way: «the construction of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline and its future extension to Niger, CAR, Sudan and Libya reinforces the geostrastegic dimension of this zone".^180(*) This vital interest, with the potential of the region has heightened American presence and the need for security measures. Therefore, while the Horn of Africa remains a `center for fight against terrorism', the Gulf of Guinea, at the center of which is Cameroon stands out as the `center for economic interests'.

The importance of the region is expected to grow from its present 15% supplies to the US to 25% by 2015. According to Walter Kansteiner, former US Under-Secretary of State for African affairs, African oil "has become a national strategic interest". This view corroborates with that of Ed Royce, the influential Republican senator for California and chair of the Congress African sub-committee, maintains, "African oil should be treated as a priority for US national security post 9-11".^181(*) Equatorial Guinea produced 350, 000 barrels per day since 2005 while Nigerian production has increased to 3.5 mm barrels of oil per day. On the other hand, Angola produces about 1.5 mm barrels. That explains why four (Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon) out of five countries of highest US investment in Africa are in the Gulf of Guinea. With America having lifted sanctions on Libya, as the country with the largest oil reserves in Africa, and with the possibilities of exporting Libyan oil through the Gulf of Guinea, this region represents one of the fasting growing interests of the US in the world. As Toure^182(*) noted, most of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea are not OPEC members (except Nigeria and Angola), offering more guarantees for US supplies.

Several other opportunities exist in Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea and its hinterlands for US investment in oil. Apart from the known 1.25 billion barrels in Sudan for instance, Toure estimates that this quantity would even triple if the peace settlement between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) holds as we observe today.^183(*) More access to oil control and exploration will be provided in Southern Sudan, the CAR, the Darfur area and Eastern Chad. All these oil resources could be channeled through the Gulf of Guinea, and Cameroon should be central in such prospects. Above all, Gulf of Guinea oil has several advantages as noted by Robert Murphy, a state department adviser on Africa, «much of West Africa's oil is offshore, insulated from domestic political or social turmoil. Political discord or dispute in African oil states is unlikely to take on a regional or ideological tone that would result in a joint embargo by suppliers at once.»^184(*) This observation only followed Vice President Cheney's statement that "African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulphur giving it a growing market share for refining centers on the east coast of the US".^185(*)

However, one of the main goals of US Africa policy is to accelerate the full integration of African economies in the world system. For this, the Bush Administration has doubled development assistance to African countries to better prepare them for this global integration. Indeed, since 2001, U.S. assistance to Africa has grown from approximately $700-800 million to about $5 billion in 2006. Development assistance funds are channeled through two main mechanisms; the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). It is also possible to conceive economic programs from the democracy perspective. Harris Owen notes a belief that the most reliable indicator we have of a country's chances of achieving a viable, stable democratic system is its economic performance.^186(*)

For the past ten years, the US has accorded development grants to Africa worth about 1$bUS per year. While keeping this aid, the Bush administration intends to pay closer attention to commerce and investment. One of the key instruments for African development elaborated by the Bush administration is the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The account is intended to offer assistance to developing countries that qualify for the program through performance in good governance and market economy. Central African countries, which are likely to benefit from the Account, have a real challenge in overcoming their long record of corruption and bad governance.

As for AGOA, Mrs. Frazer described the way Central Africa could benefit in the following way: «AGOA can be particularly beneficial to Gulf of Guinea countries that are trying to diversify their economies and reduce their economic dependence on oil and gas.»^187(*) This is because AGOA offers to provide free and no-quota entry into the US of a wide range of African goods. In that framework, African entrepreneurs are schooled on efficient management, production and packaging to allow easy access, while economies are generally helped to benefit from AGOA offers. Participation in this growth and opportunity act is however subject to respect of human rights, political reforms and good governance conditionalities. These reforms, generally called democracy and the rule of law are believed by American policy-makers to provide a favorable environment for business

* ¹⁶⁸ Goldstein, op. Cit. P. 102

* ¹⁶⁹ Goldstein, op, cit. P. 102

* ¹⁷⁰ Goldstein, idem.

* ¹⁷¹ John Kerry, May 27, 2004 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Kerry/html

* ¹⁷² Martin D. , Les Etats Unis ont-ils Une Politique Africaine?, Politiqu e Africaine, paris, 1998, p. 6.

* ¹⁷³ Nye, Jr. «The Decline of America's Soft Power», Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2004.

* ¹⁷⁴ Moisés Naím, «Seven Surprises One Year Later», Foreign Policy, September/October 2002.

* ¹⁷⁵ See Salih Booker, William Minter, and Ann-Louise Colgan, «Africa Policy Outlook 2003,» Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2003.

* ¹⁷⁶Barkan D. «Moi's Kenya», Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, 2004

* ¹⁷⁷ Walter H. Kansteiner, op, cit.

* ¹⁷⁸ Salih Booker, William Minter, and Ann-Louise Colgan, «Africa Policy Outlook 2003,» Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2003.

* ¹⁷⁹ Awoumou, op, cit. p4

* ¹⁸⁰ idem

* ¹⁸¹ Both views have been reported by Jean-Christophe Servant, «The new Gulf oil states» Le Monde diplomatique, January 2003, electronic edition.

* ¹⁸² Toure, paper presented at the CODESRIA 11th General Assembly in Maputo, Mozambique, 6-10 December 2005, on the Theme: «Rethinking African Development: Beyond Impasse, Towards Alternatives», p8.

* ¹⁸³ Toure, op,cit. p9

* ¹⁸⁴ Jean-Christophe Servant, «The new Gulf oil states», op, cit.

* ¹⁸⁵ Idem

* ¹⁸⁶ Harris notes that `A great deal of statistical work by social scientists has produced strong evidence that the transition to stable, democracy correlates closely with wealth.' in «A Democratic World», op, cit.

* ¹⁸⁷ She was speaking during the February 2006 visit to Cameroon.