Section 3: Protected by the colossus: What stakes for
Cameroon in the present state of affairs?
This question is important for Cameroon first, then for the
foreign powers interested in the sub-region. It is interesting to see what
benefits there are for a country to be protected by the colossus - the hyper US
power. An important question toward the end of this study is what becomes of
Cameroon in this environment of quest for virgin territory and resources in
Central Africa. The issue of how Cameroon sees itself and perceives others
takes us to the study of other poles of attraction in the Gulf of Guinea such
as Gabon, DRC Congo and Angola; examine how Cameroon can benefit from the
present state of relations, as well as the future of Cameroon US relations. The
impact of a greater American presence in the sub-region, and the consequent
power tussle among countries of this part of the world are difficult to
evaluate. US engagement will provoke not only a more muscular commitment by
Central African countries for leadership positions, but it will also lead to a
somewhat `race for alignment'.294(*)
1. Cameroon and other poles of attraction in the sub-region.
Though as seen in the preceding chapter, Cameroon is a de
facto leader and consequent ally of great powers in the sub-region, this
position is coveted by some, detested and resented by other countries in the
sub-region. The most out-spoken of all these competitors to hegemony is Gabon.
Besides Gabon is the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. This situation
has two possible explanations; the general tendency of power politics among
nations or the hegemonic hubris inherent in all states,295(*) the fear of a powerful
neighbor, and on the other hand Cameroon's inefficiency in playing its
leadership role there by creating a power vacuum which other countries want to
fill.
Talking about Gabonese leadership pretensions in the
sub-region, «Gabon has always shown its leadership ambitions, Awoumou
says, that but it is not qualified to bear such a responsibility".296(*) These ambitions are
explained by the fact that Gabon has the highest rate of human index and that
until recently; it produced the highest quantity of petroleum. Apart from that,
Gabon is usually described as a relay for French policy and influence in
Central Africa, and that it has built an alliance system with Congo
(Brazzaville). Not only that, Gabon is seen to receive more international
personalities, such as presidents, prime ministers and ministers of foreign
affairs, especially of Chine, US, France and Latin American countries. To
consolidate these diplomatic advantages, Gabonese President, Omar Bongo, is
personally involved in several diplomatic issues such as conflict resolutions,
famine and disease at the continental level.297(*) For the past few years, Gabonese alliance with Congo
Brazzaville appears to be a constant factor in asserting its appetite for a
leadership position. Both countries share several historical, cultural,
economic and geopolitical similarities, which President Bongo hopes to rely on,
especially that president Bongo has the main mediator on Congolese conflicts.
Writing on the `Cameroon-Gabon couple' as an engine for
Central Africa, Awoumou refutes Gabonese capacity to lead the sub-regional
bodies (CEMAC/ECCAS) with several reasons. He states emphatically that
«Libreville is disqualified [from leading the sub-region] because it does
not adhere to regional integration projects, preferring simple cooperation and
diplomatic activism.»298(*) Gabon seems to block community initiatives such as
freedom of movement, the right to establishment, and is not enthusiastic paying
of its dues (retaining more than 60%). Though these actions in disfavor of
integration initiatives cannot by themselves disqualify Gabon as a regional
leader (even aligning with Congo),299(*) they add to more convincing factors. They are
geographic, demographic and politico-economic factors. Geographically, Gabon
has a surface area of 267 667 km², while Cameroon has 475 442 km²
while a low population density of eight inhabitants/km², makes the country
difficult to secure. Demographically, both Gabon and Congo amount to only five
million in the 29 million total for CEMAC. That population deficiency handicaps
Gabon's power ambitions. From an economic and political perspective, Gabonese
economy is in recession due to a reduction in oil production (the principal
element in the country's GNP), while Congo is in a reconstruction process after
many years of conflict. On the other hand, Cameroon is not as easily influenced
by the other countries in the sub-region as Gabon.300(*)
Gabon is not however the only contestant to Cameroonian
hegemony in the sub-region. A more serious candidate is Angola. With increasing
oil production and the third attraction to US investments in sub-Saharan
Africa, Angola poses a more serious threat to Cameroonian ambitions to lead the
region, especially from a US perspective. If one of the measures of power is
military capacity, Angola stands to beat Cameroon with 2.5% of GDP for military
issues while Cameroon runs 1.5%. apart from that, Angolan experience in civil
war, though giving it a bad position because of the need to build stability,
gives the Angolans betters possibilities in military issues than Cameroon,
especially than Angola participated actively in DR Congo civil war form 1998 to
2004.
What will happen when the DRC will become politically stabilized?
It is possible to posit that the DRC will weild more power that Cameroon for
several reasons. First, it has access to the sea as Cameroon does and would
service Rwanda and Burundi. Secondly, it has more resources than Cameroon,
which if exploited in the best way would propel its economic power. Third, it
has a larger population with a historical capacity to influence the region, as
was the case in the early days of colonization. More over, the DRC was the
Western ally during the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa (apart from South
Africa). With former President Mumbutu, the US channeled funds to combat
communism and promote capitalism in Central and East Africa. Most scientific
works published about US Cold War policies towards Africa stress the role
played by DRC.301(*) It
is therefore likely that with the present competition of foreign powers in the
DRC (between South Africa, the EU and America), Cameroon comes to lose its
privileged position.
There has also been a leadership tussle between Cameroon and
Equatorial Guinea since the latter become an oil exporting country with
enormous resources. According to Chouala, the 2004 diplomatic crisis that
erupted between the two countries was essentially a leadership crisis. For him,
the struggle is to `capture' US strategic presence.302(*) Chouala further explains
that by accusing Cameroon of harboring mercenaries, Equatorial Guinea was
trying to discredit Cameroon as a country which supports
mercenaries/terrorists, and thereby receive support fron the US. Alluding to
the general context of power struggle in the sub-region, Chouala concludes
that
In this international crusade against Cameroon, Equatorial
Guinea is more or less discretely supported by continental powers which are
targeting the oil riches of this country, and who relate Yaoundé's
withdrawal with an increase in their own influence. That is certainly the case
with South Africa, which is seeking to have a foothold in Equato-Guinean oil
wells.303(*)
This clash of powers in the sub-region is not only with South
Africa, but, especially, with Nigeria, such that the coming of the US only
exacerbates this clash.
* 294 Aligning with great
powers leads to power multiplication, economic facilities and leadership
asserting.
* 295 This hubris is
motivated by security threats, as Thucydides noted about the Peloponnesian War,
`what made war inevitable was the power of Athens and the fear that created in
Sparta'.
* 296 Awoumou, - C. D. G.
«Le Couple Cameroun-Gabon : Moteur de l'Afrique Centrale?»,
Enjeux N°17, October-December 2003, p.5.
* 297 The Gabonese
authorities, especially the President himself, have been active in peace
negotiations in CAR, DR Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, etc.
This is precisely the f role a sub-regional ally would play.
* 298 Awoumou, op, cit,
5-10
* 299 Note however that Gabon
is not as absent on the sub-regional scene as Awoumou seems to explain. Gabon,
for instance holds the post of governor of the sub-regional financial body
(BEAC), stock exchange market and executive director of the Gulf of Guinea
Commission.
* 300 On this Cameroonian
attitude, see Chouala Y. A., «La Crise Diplomatique de Mars 2004 entre le
Cameroun et la Guinée Équatoriale : Fondements, Enjeux et
Perspectives», GRAPS / CEAN-IEP, 2005.
* 301 See Herman J. Cohen,
Intervening in Africa,Super-Power Peacekeeping in a Troubled Continent,
New York: St. Martin's Press, LLC, 2000, Karl p. Magyar (ed), US
Interests and Policies in Africa, Transition to a New Era, New York: St.
Martin's Press, LLC, 2000, Peter J Schraeder, United States
Foreign Policy Toward Africa. Incrementalism, Crisis and Change,
Cambridge: CUP, 1994. And finally, P Duignan and L.H. Gann, The US and
Africa. A History, Syndicate of Press of the University of Cambridge,
1884.
* 302 Chouala, « La
Crise Diplomatique de Mars 2004 Entre le Cameroun et la Guinée
Équatoriale : Fondements, Enjeux et Perspectives», op, cit. p8
* 303 Idem.
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