The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

We will present in this general introduction the main questions one should be asking while studying the implications of September 11 (2001) terrorist attacks on global, regional and sub regional issues. Our main preoccupation in this section of our work will be to find hypothetical, methodological, theoretical and analytical frames within which the study will be carried out. In this sense, we will present below the problématique of our research endeavors, as well as tentative answers to such questions. However, it is from the literature review that the problématique precedes. Explanations of methodological and theoretical choices are given as well as the objectives, interests and limits of study.

An overview

Cameroon United States (US) relations are not recent in history. Well before diplomatic and consular relations were established between the two countries in 1960, both peoples had known some kind of contacts from the days of the Slave Trade, when several Cameroonians, in the company of other Africans were deported to work in plantations in the New World. Though the country was officially a member of the Non-Aligned Movement after independence, there were no doubts that it was classified in the US - led Capitalist block.^1(*) With the end of the Cold War and the relative marginalization^2(*) of the African continent, the US returned to its democratic rhetoric given that democratic and human rights records of many African countries were not encouraging. As far as Cameroon is concerned, we will be investigating the changes that took place in the nature of relations with the US at the turn of the millennium. We will particularly be interested in the reasons for and nature of changes observable from September 11 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attacks. The questions we ask ourselves are, how is the US now ranking its Cameroonian and Central African priorities with respect to security, relief, trade and development assistance and to what extent has Cameroon increased its share of US aid vis-à-vis other countries in the sub-region. Such findings will give us a clue of the extent to which US strategies have shifted after the tragic events of 9/11.

The events that happened on 9/11 have been central in US foreign policy formulation, redefining its goals, limits, enemies and strategies. Owen Harris observed in late 2003 that «9/11 was not a disaster merely to be avenged, but an opportunity to reawaken and, some say, direct America back to its true historical mission».^3(*) It is the liberal capitalist democracy mission of changing the world, spoken about by Fukuyama as an End of History? The US being a global super-power, 9/11 has also been important in shaping international relations studies by introducing new concepts while modifying old ones. It has influenced regional studies, the finance market, transportation systems, cultural relations, security questions, and global focus. Since the implications of 9/11 were differently received and managed by every continent, it is interesting to study what it meant for Africa.^4(*) If the US is a major world player, and a major partner for Cameroon, what were going to be the implications of these changes in their bilateral relations? After becoming important as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in the years following 9/11, how has Cameroon formulated its US policy if any? In other words, 9/11 has global, regional, sub-regional, sectorial and even Cameroonian consequences.

The place of September 11 in Africa-US policy was well underscored by the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs of the US Government in the following way,

A number of key priorities the Bush Administration has for Africa were in place before September 11, as well as after. Yet, September 11 did change our world, and it changed our approach to Africa in terms of how we are going to do business; and in terms of priorities.^5(*)

US post 9/11 interest in Africa is underscored by President Bush's consultation with African Heads of State. He met in his first two years of office with more African heads of state than any previous U.S. President did during their terms. We are studying this heightening of relations vis-à-vis the presence of other foreign powers in the region such as France, China and Great Britain, though China seems to pose a more serious challenge to the US in Central Africa than France. Our paper seeks to understand from both internal (within Cameroon) and external (Central African) factors.

This paper studies the changes mentioned above through different diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural foreign policy decisions and transnational interactions between Cameroon and the US. But how do we study the change of posture in US-Cameroon relations without reading the context in which these changes appear? The context here is the implications of a post 9/11 grand strategy for the US and the increasing importance of the Central African Sub-region in terms of energy and security imperatives for the Great Powers. The role of CA appears in the general context of growing US interest in Africa which has led the US government to reassess the importance of the continent in which the US Department of Defense now needs «a more acute sense of the strategic importance of Africa. In the post-9/11 world, we have a better knowledge of threats from territories that are likely to be prey to power vacancy».^6(*)

If the US avoided confrontation with France during the Cold War in the latter's zone of influence, today the US has become more forceful to the dismay of her former, albeit unreliable ally, because of the growing energy and security importance of CA.^7(*) Clinton's administration's proclamation of an end to the myth of Africa as a French backyard marks a turning point that has been exploited and amplified by the 2001 events. This was the subject of the policy of «Trade not Aid» proclaimed in the speech of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher during an African tour in 1996 «...the time is gone when Africa could be divided up into spheres of influence, where foreign powers could consider entire groups of states as their private domain».^8(*) From a global perspective, 9/11 has brought about major changes in US military spending. In 2001, the US military expenditure of $325 billion was the same as the next 14 biggest militaries combined. By 2005, the Pentagon was outspending the next 14 militaries by $144 billion.

Research idea

This research is conceived to understand and explain the accommodation of growing US interest in Central Africa in relation to two elements: Cameroon's strategic position and Cameroon's political history. It will have to explore how Cameroon came under the US world empire building, confronting other powers in the sub-region, and having Cameroon as a strategic partner (proxy) in the sub-region. Our topic is: Cameroon in Post 9/11 [2001 terrorist attacks] US Policy toward Central Africa.

Interest and Justification

Cameroon is located in the very coveted Gulf of Guinea. This gulf had been a center of interest as a gold mine and a source of slaves for the Americas in past centuries. In recent years, it is a center of oil, nickel and other minerals, as well as timber, cocoa and rubber. It is therefore of little surprise that this study focuses on such a center of attraction. Our interest to the study of this area came from personal observation of a somewhat shuttle diplomacy that has been going on between the US and Cameroon for some time now. The question that came to our mind was `why should the US become so active in Cameroon when it used to be the work of the French'?

Such a study has many justifications. Academically, it should provide researchers of policy analysis a frame of reading Cameroon US relations. It should also provide students of Central African affairs, especially in relation to the US the lenses through which to read ongoing events in the sub-region. This work is also policy relevant because it should provide policy makers enough information and choices in formulating and conducting foreign policy decisions. This refers particularly to Cameroonian decision-makers.

Objectives

It is necessary to clarify what we want to achieve at the end of the paper. The goals we want to achieve through this study could be grouped into four categories.

1. Explicate the place of Cameroon in the sub-region of Central Africa.

2. Explain the changes that have taken place in US foreign policy since 9/11.

3. explain the role of energy resources and the fight against terrorism as the principal paradigms of US action, as well as the role of ideas, beliefs and bureaucracies in US policy in the sub-region in particular and the continent in general.

4. Understand the reaction of Cameroonian authorities in the face of these phenomena, while proposing possible courses of action.

Limits

This paper is limited to studying certain aspects of foreign policy that relate to our topic. Specific limits are set in three areas; geography, history and perspective. With relation to space, this study is limited to the two countries of the US and Cameroon, where Cameroon is studied in the general context of its place in Africa, especially Central Africa to US policy-makers. This does not mean that the general world context will not be evoked. It will be done, especially the implication of France and China in Cameroonian geopolitics. The second limit that relates to history sets this paper as focusing on post-9/11 relations, though drawing from post-Cold War years. This limit is important from the point of view of the major changes that have taken place in Cameroon US relations particularly and Africa US relations in general. The juxtaposition of those two dates will help us have a clear reading of the implications of 9/11. As for the question of perspective, it is necessary to specify here that this paper will study Cameroon US relations particularly from the US perspective. This is because it is the goal of the researcher to discover how the US perceives Cameroon after 9/11. In the same vein, we will not catalogue all the changes that have occurred in those relations within the time range. We will dwell mainly with `high policy' issues. This gets us away from a particularly diplomatic history to offer a holistic foreign policy reading of relations between the two countries.

Literature review

The particular topic of Cameroon US relations does not abound with much publication. However, some researchers and political analysts have had to discuss the subject. It is useful for research endeavors to review the state of the art, so that the researcher can build on past works. Until now, authors have simply noted a `rivalry' between France and the US in Africa; others have underscored the growing interest Africa has for the US. Yet other authors have studied the Golf of Guinea as a strategic pivot of great power rivalry and interest especially for the US. We will argue that the U.S. is fast replacing France in Cameroon as the imperium, and that Washington envisages Cameroon as a proxy for the region in the post 9/11 grand strategy.

Following the Iraq war of 2003, a group of lecturers in I.R.I.C. (International Relations Institute of Cameroon) wrote a book on the African perception of the war particularly and Africa US relations in general. Writing on the implications of the war on Africa, Pondi offers the following analysis

In Africa, a particularly vulnerable continent with multiple cultural and historical links, marked with susceptibilities with the United States, this victory [of the coalition over Iraqi forces] rather leaves a bitter pile for the popular appreciation of the inhabitants. This is so for at least five reasons.^9(*)

These five reasons, he identifies to be 1. The failure of operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992; 2. the inadequate responses to the 1998 US Embassies bombings in Nairobi and Das es Salam with neither official mourning nor compensation for the innocent lost of Africans' lives;^10(*) 3. The US penchant for military force with the consequent destruction of lives and property; 4. The ease with which the US was spending $100 billion while several Africans wallow in misery; 5. The disparity between funds for war and those for reconstruction.^11(*) In all these analyses, apart from the first two that have direct links both with our topic and 9/11, the other analysis are important only to understand the changes that have been taking place in Africa US relations at large. It is likely that while many African would sympathize with 9/11, reactions regarding the Iraq war, as studied by Pondi, are rather hostile. Our work will pay only partial attention to how Cameroonians (both the population and the government) reacted to 9/11, while studying how the US applied post 9/11 changes to Cameroon.

In an article published in 2005, Mvomo Ela wrote on «Petrostrategie et appels d'empire dans le Golfe de Guinée» (Petrostrategy and invitations for empire in the Gulf of Guinea). In this article, the author examines the changes and reconfiguration of power that has been taking place in the region of the Gulf in recent years. Mvomo describes the Gulf of Guinea as running from West Africa to Angola, describing the region as «un espace enjeu».^12(*) In his view, the stakes of the Gulf of Guinea lay in the «increasing instability of this home of disorder»^13(*) - the Middle East. That is to say that the regain of interest in Central Africa is due to insecurity in the Persian Gulf. In the same studies, and to justify this assertion, Mvomo states that «7 of the 8 billion barrels of oil reserves discovered in the world in 2001 are found in the Gulf of Guinea».^14(*) The specialty of oil in this region lies in three factors; its quality (low sulfuric quality), its location offshore (for the most part) shelters it from social and political instability, and the easy access due to favorable fiscal and administrative conditions.^15(*)

In effect, in spite of these advantages, the Gulf of Guinea (to which our zone of studies belongs) is in fact liable to considerable insecurity. Mvomo's paper identifies the Gulf as the `crossroads of African civilizations'<sup>16(*)</sup>, which could likely suffer from three ills; (1) socio-political uprising (as is the case with the Ogoni people in Nigeria, a case which could instigate other peoples in the region in a spillover effect), (2) drug trafficking, and (3) rise of Islamic fundamentalism. These ills have been exacerbated by pouches of socio-political instability in almost all the countries in the region. This leads Mvomo to explain the notion of `invitation for empire', referring to the tempting resources in the region and the need for empire builders to secure them.^17(*) The problem with considering the Gulf of Guinea in the new posture of Cameroon US relations is that it is largely dominated by Nigeria. The heavy weight of this country in the Gulf of Guinea Commission does not explicate the role of Cameroon in the Central African zone and how the US intends to promote and valorize that position. Chouala has observed that «in the geopolitics of the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria constitutes at the same time the strategic rival and the main military threat to Cameroon».^18(*) Though we shall study the stakes of the Gulf of Guinea and Cameroon in US policy toward the region, our main focus will be the Central African zone.

What is the role of Cameroon in this heightening of interest in the sub region? It is to this question that a special issue of one of the most widely read Cameroonian daily, Mutation,-Les Cahiers de Mutation, consecrated some reflections with a revealing title, «Que cherchent les Etats Unis au Cameroun?»^19(*) [What is the US seeking in Cameroon?]. Analyses (from journalistic facts) here are based on the simple assumption that contrary to the difficult years of the 1990s when relations between the two countries were strained, the 9/11 events have ushered a new trend of relations centered on the resources of the sub region. The important question Nkot (editor) asked is this «could Cameroon be a place where a deadly battle is being fought between the US and France (?)».^20(*) Screening through the different aspects of Cameroon US relations, the authors of the special issue elucidate on the place Cameroon occupies in the minds of US policy makers, as well as the image Cameroonians have of the US. This document, though one of the rare to tour the question of Cameroon US relations, especially in the post 9/11 era, has the principal flaw of being journalistic. It does not ask the real questions of scientific research; neither does it analyze the facts gathered. It however gives us an insight into some of the main issues that confront politicians of both countries in dealing with bilateral relations.

US - Cameroon relations have been read from other angles. Studying US presence in the region from a security perspective, NDJOCK considers Central Africa to invite the US for action because of the spiral of conflicts;

Faced with this `spiral of conflicts', the UN, on the proposition of Cameroon (shared by the other states of the sub-region of Central Africa), created on 28 May 1992, the Permanent Consultative Committee of the United Nations on Security Issues in Central Africa (PCCUNSI-CA).^21(*)

This reading does not only bring to the lamplight the motives of the US in the sub-region, but also the place of Cameroon as leader and facilitator in a conflict-ridden zone. For the US to manage conflicts in the region in particular and Africa in general, it became indispensable to create a structure, a security forum, a military program which can carter for such needs. This needed to be without the implication of US military in actual battles. Njock sees ACRI (African Contingency and Response Initiative), which corresponds with the new US security policy towards Africa to work «...with regional allies who, eventually would do the interventions which neither Washington nor the Europeans do want to get involved any more».^22(*) In this concept, a country like Cameroon could play that role of a regional ally in US intervention in the Central African sub-region.

The US policy in Cameroon could also be studied from a center - periphery North-South paradigm. In this sense, foreign power presence in Cameroon requires a realist reading. This study has been done by Ebolo Martin Dieudonne. For him,

The implication of the US and France in the Democratization Process in Cameroon operates simultaneously on the promotion of the political and economic liberal model, and on the promotion of their national interests. Only that the US commitment towards the instauration of a democratic state of law looks more stated than the rather ambiguous role played by the French in this key country of their African backyard.^23(*)

This work is important because it studies the behavior of US policy-makers toward Cameroon in the 90s. The vision of the US as different from that of the French is important in understanding the changes that took place after 9/11. The link between democracy and foreign policy, especially in those years, and the changes in Cameroonian politics is well specified when Ebolo says «For some people, the future of liberty, stability, peace and the US depends to a certain degree on the future of democracy.»^24(*) In this case, a somewhat interdependence exist between the political future of both countries, and bilateral relations are constantly shaped by internal politics. Ebolo once more explains this when he says «Opposition forces have largely cautioned the US actions [in Cameroon] at the time when they were criticizing, not without vehemence, French activism.»^25(*)

Central question

From the literature above, one can identify a real problem, a dysfunction between academic theory and what is practiced. We would have expected the US to shy away from engagements in Cameroon due to its Middle East and Asian commitments. The real question then comes up; why should the US pay [relative] attention to Cameroon in the post-9/11 era in spite of American commitment in the Middle East, with all the financial and military consequences that entails? In other words, what explains US interests in Cameroon in spite of their engagement in other parts of the world? A subsidiary question is this; how does the US policy maker see Cameroon while considering the Central African sub region?

Hypotheses

We provide tentative answers to the questions posed above. Our first hypothesis is that changes within Cameroon during this period have been attractive to the US government. The second is that there are geopolitical characteristics that attract the US policy maker, and that these traits are both within Cameroon and related to the entire sub-region. Cameroon exhibits particular geopolitical and geostrategic qualities that attract the US in its efforts to secure the Gulf of Guinea. Our main argument being that since 2001, Cameroon is growing into a strategic U.S. partner in the region, and that for Cameroon to benefit extensively from this state of affairs, the policy - makers must construct a proactive strategy of foreign interests vis-à-vis the US.

Methodology

By methodology here, we refer to prevailing theories, principles and analytical methods in a given discipline. We present here the methods we will resort to in studying our topic, as well as collecting, assembling, classifying, and analyzing data.

Our work will be structured such as to reveal the most important questions surrounding the penetration of the United States in the Central African sub-region. To come out with this we have divided our work into four chapters. Chapter one examines issues related to the internal factors for US interest in Cameroon. This is logical for the fact that our hypotheses above advances that the reasons for US interest in Cameroon are both internal (to Cameroon) and external. Chapter two examines the external factors, that is, US interest in the sub-region. With the factors explained, the third chapter then presents instances of US interest and intensification in Cameroon and in the sub-region. Chapter four focuses on the geopolitical implications of a greater US presence in Cameroon and in Central Africa. A preliminary chapter dealing with methodological issues introduces these four chapters; and a concluding chapter that evaluates our work, provides policy options, give recommendations and suggestions for further studies.

Data shall be collected from four sources, policy documents, libraries, interviews and observation. Reviewing policy documents will provide primary sources of data. But data will principally be collected through the secondary source, i.e. library (especially wed library, webliography). To the library shall be associated other sources. One of these shall be interviews with academic experts, policy makers (US embassy in Yaoundé and MINREX), keen observers, etc. We will rely equally on personal observations on national and international events and politics.

Our method of assembling data will be comparative. Classification here is considered from a political and a historical perspective. Historically, we will compare relations before and after 2001 and see the changes and continuities. Relations before 2001 are considered from about the 1996 and even back to the 1990s, while relations after 2001 span from 2002 to 2006. Political classification refers to assembling data according to the two political entities under study (the US and Cameroon).

In terms of data analysis, we have adopted three approaches, geopolitics, constructivism and foreign policy analysis. Our first Approach is geopolitical. Our geopolitical approach US - Cameroon - CA relations as an expression of strategic purposes expressed through different ideologies and analytical frames. By geopolitics, we allude to the concept describing the influence of political, ideological, geographical, economic and socio-cultural environment on a state's policy and the nature of its relations with its surrounding nations^26(*). With the goal of analyzing in the must exact possible way the environment in which political decisions are taken, geopolitics takes into account the preoccupations of all the actors present on an international scene, be it statesmen, diplomacy, the army, NGOs or public opinion; that is merging the domestic and the foreign scene in the politics of nations. This geopolitical study will lead us into the concept of alliances so dear to realists, only that alliances are not built now on traditional realist lines, but in a constructivist perspective.

The constructivist approach. Constructivism is the distinctive approach to international relations that emphasizes the social or inter-subjective dimension of world politics.^27(*) It is an approach of international relations that emphasizes how ideas, norms, and institutions shape state identity and interests, based on the idea that identities and interests are constructed through dialogue and exchange. Constructivists insist that international relations cannot be reduced to rational action and interaction within material constraints (as some realists claim) or within institutional constraints at the international and national levels (as argued by some liberal internationalists). For constructivists, state interaction is not among fixed national interests, but must be understood as a pattern of action that shapes and is shaped by identities over time. In contrast to other theoretical approaches, social constructivism presents a model of international interaction that explores the normative influence [the influence of norms or preferred values] of fundamental institutional structures and the connection between normative changes and state identities and interests. At the same time, however, institutions themselves are constantly reproduced and, potentially, changed by activities or states and other actors. In constructivists thought, institutions and actors are mutually conditioned entities.^28(*)
Constructivism's most famous scholar, Alexander Wendt, noted that "anarchy is what states make of it", that is, anarchy is a condition of the system of states because states in some sense 'choose' to make it so.^29(*) By this he means that the anarchical structure that neorealists claim governs state interaction is in fact a phenomenon that is socially constructed and reproduced by states. For example, if the system is dominated by states that see anarchy as a life or death situation (what Wendt terms a "Hobbesian" anarchy) then the system will be characterized by warfare. If on the other hand anarchy is seen as restricted (a "Lockean" anarchy) then a more peaceful system will exist. In this sense, constructivism, as an approach, could either be realist or idealist or both. According to constructivists, international institutions have both regulative and constitutive functions. Regulative norms set basic rules for standards of conduct by prescribing or proscribing certain behaviors. Constitutive norms define a behavior and assign meaning to that behavior. Without constitutive norms, actions would be unintelligible. The familiar analogy that constructivists use to explain constitutive norms is that of the rules of a game, such as chess. Constitutive norms [agreed upon rules] enable the actors to play the game and provide the actors with the knowledge necessary to respond to each other's moves in a meaningful way.^30(*)
Our methodological frame therefore acknowledges the fact that the US foreign policy is characterized by the geopolitics of globalism. This tendency to control strategic zones operates on an indirect rule ideology, whereby a `strategic ally' serves as an entry point into a zone of interest. But the strategic ally needs to be treated as a `good friend', protected and valorized. In Cameroon US relations, we will read constructivism from the different theories that could be used to explain changes and choices. In this sense, the construction of relations is complex. Here, actors are not only states, but also resources, governmental and non-governmental institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, constructed and supposedly common enemies or values (such as international terrorism, poverty, HIV/AIDS, democracy, the rule of law, etc.), such that no single actor or factor explains what states call national interest. Institutions, resources and states therefore mutually constitute entities. In the same way, several theories of IR will be employed to understand the construction of Cameroon US relations since 2001 as seen below.

We will also use the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach. FPA is defined by Jackson and Sorenson as «a means-end way of thinking about goals and actions of government; it is an instrumental question», asking the «best method or course of action for reaching a target or destination».^31(*) Policy analysis does not only account for what is practiced, but gives correct or good advice on particular decisions taken with respect to certain interests. As Jackson and Sorenson put it,

It puts the IR scholar into the mind-set of the foreign policy-maker. It therefore reduces the distance between the theorist who is involved in thinking about foreign policy and the policy-maker or practitioner who is involved in framing and carrying out foreign policy.^32(*)

In this sense, policy analysis is directly linked to decision-making analysis. This is because, according to White, «it focuses the attention of the analyst on behavior of the human `decision-makers' who are involved in the formulation and execution of foreign policy».^33(*) We will not as much be interested in the processes of decision-making in post 9/11 US policy toward CA as in the outcome of the decisions. The influences of domestic actors, the processes and debates surrounding FP decisions are only considered in terms of relevance in the perception of what Cameroon and the region represents in the post 9/11 grand strategy.

As all other domains of policy know their highs and lows, we will focus principally on high politics on the high - low continuum of approaches to the study of politics. This is because the decisions made commit the US vis-à-vis Cameroon or vice versa. Our analysis therefore goes beyond the simple routine in daily management of international issues. Our reading of Cameroon - US relations since 2001 will principally be in this domain of high politics, at least as far as Cameroon is concerned. High politics in Cameroon could be considered low politics for China or South Africa. To study our topic systematically, we will rely on FPA as described above, in which decision-making models, analytical frames in the behaviorist tradition will be explored.

From another perspective, on the hard-power/ soft-power continuum, we will read the US policy toward Cameroon as being more soft than hard, inscribed in cooperation and interdependence. This involves diplomacy, treaties, negotiations, law making, collective bargaining, economic, social, cultural and scientific cooperation and even the politics of vigorous (legitimate) competition.^34(*) Though the relations could be read sometimes as a hybrid of hard and soft, and though the neo-Marxist will talk of the obedience of small satellite nations to the dictates of their great-power protectors, we will focus on the predominant soft-power policy of the US towards Central Africa.

On the two epistemological camps: "positivist" and "post-positivist", we inscribe our paper on a positivist perspective. In this regard, we use methods of the natural sciences by analyzing the impact of material forces such as state interactions, size of military forces, balance of powers, etc. This explains our use of IR theories such realism, idealism, interdependence, etc., as described below.

Theoretical framework

The word `theory' is used in a bewildering variety of ways in the study of IR. It is applied to propositions and arguments at varying levels of abstraction, and debates over its most appropriate meaning have proceeded apace with little consensus achieved. If there is no agreement on how best to understand the term, let alone how best to engage in developing and criticizing the existing stock of IR theory, there is much great consensus over the ways which the term is used. A theory explains patterns by elaborating on why they take place. In one (in)famous expression, a theory explains laws of behavior. According to this conception, theories are useful instruments. If we know why and how events relate to each other, we then may be able to intervene and perhaps change reality to suit our purposes. We will present below the IR theories through which we will read the place Cameroon occupies in post-9/11 US policy toward Central Africa. Three theoretical frames of international relations will be pertinent in this work; realism, idealism and interdependence. Realism shall be our main analytical frame, while idealism and interdependence will be subsidiary theories, supporting realism. This choice makes sense because it appears that realism is the main theory that explains US goals, while idealistic and interdependent talk only come to complement or justify the realist thinking. But to understand the theories, we need to start by explaining the levels of analysis as paradigms within which IR should be studied.

The most common taxonomy in the field of IR refers to three levels of analysis - international, domestic, and individual. This is a forum of the international arena in which states are the core actors. Yet the state is not necessarily the appropriate level at which to focus analysis. The behavior of states in the international arena may be best explained as the outcome of domestic political processes among groups or institutions within states, or by the behavior or specific individuals within those groups or institutions.
One possibility for theory [and methodology] is to focus exclusively on the international political system. Such an approach presumes that domestic politics can be safely ignored in explaining state behavior. For example, realists tend to focus on changes in the balance of power among states as a property of the system's anarchic structure. A second possibility for a theory of international relations is to treat the behavior of states as a consequence of domestic politics, the behaviors of domestic interest groups and/or domestic political institutions. States are the nominal actors in the international system, but national behavior is determined by the action and interaction of bureaucracies and legislatures, political parties, business and union lobbies, and other advocacy groups. Finally, the behavior of states in international affairs can be treated as the consequence of the actions and interactions of individuals, such as heads of state. In this conception of international relations, national behavior may reflect either the particular choices of powerful individuals or the collective consequences of numerous individual choices. In either case, however, understanding how states behave in international affairs requires attention to individual interests, habits of thought, or world views.^35(*)

Realism: a theory of international relations that emphasizes states' interest in accumulating power to ensure security in an anarchic world, based on the notion that humans are power-seeking and that states act in pursuit of their national interests. It should be noted that classical writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes are often cited as the "founding fathers" of realism by contemporary self-described realists such as Morgenthau, Aron, Kennan, E.H. Carr, J. Hertz, Niebuhr, M. Wight, N. Spykman, etc.

Realism, sometimes called the `power-politics' school of thought or political realism in one form or another, has dominated both academic thinking of international relations and the conceptions of policy-makers and diplomats. The ideas associated with it can be traced to the ancient Greeks and Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War is widely regarded as the first sustained attempt to explain the origins of international conflict in terms of the dynamics of power politics. Machiavelli in The Prince (1513) and Hobbes in Leviathan (1641) also provided crucial components of this tradition, especially in their conceptions of interests, prudence, and expediency as prime motivators in the essentially anarchic context of international relations.^36(*)

Realism came under challenge on essentially methodological grounds by the behavioral or social science approaches but it reappeared in the 1980s in the guise of neorealism. Despite criticisms on their methodology, a generation of distinguished scholars continued the power-oriented approach of their predecessors. Among these were: R. Aron, H. Bull, H. Kissinger, R.E. Osgood, R. Rosencrance, K.W. Thompson, R.W. Tucker, K.N. Waltz and Arnold Wolfers.^37(*) International politics, according to realists, indeed, all politics, is thus defined as `a struggle for power'. `Power' in this sense is conceptualized as both a means and an end in itself, an ability to influence or change the behavior of others in a desired direction, or alternatively the ability to resist such influences on one's own behavior.^38(*) The idea of self-help is central as it expresses the notion of sovereignty, which emphasizes the distinction between the domestic and external realms. The addition of an `s' to the word `state' creates not just a plural, but involves crossing a conceptual boundary. States answer to no higher authority and so must look to themselves to protect their interests and to ensure survival.^39(*)

In this work, we will adopt the branch of realism called Peripheral Realism. This refers to a foreign policy theory arising from the special perspective of (Latin American) peripheral states and represented by the work of Carlos Escude, for example. This view of international relations regards the international system as having an incipient hierarchical structure based on perceived differences between states: those that give orders, those that obey, and those that rebel. The peripheral approach introduces a different way of understanding the international system: that is, from the unique viewpoint of states that do not impose 'rules of the game' and which suffer high costs when they confront them. Thus, the foreign policies of peripheral states are typically framed and implemented in such a way that the national interest is defined in terms of development while confrontation with great powers is avoided, and autonomy is not understood as freedom of action but rather in terms of the costs of using that freedom.^40(*) Both the US and Cameroon have interests and want to defend those interests. Curiously, both actors avoid confrontation, Cameroon, as a peripheral state, sometimes resist orders.

Idealism or liberalism is so widely defined that only certain basic tenets can be described here. Idealists believe strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is possible to base a political system primarily on morality, and that the baser and more selfish impulses of humans can be muted in order to build national and international norms of behavior that foment peace, prosperity, cooperation, and justice. Idealism then is not only heavily reformist, but the tradition has often attracted those who feel that idealistic principles are the "next-step" in the evolution of the human character.^41(*) Idealists prescribe what could be - IR as a quest for law and morality. For liberals, IR are all sorts of relations that states, international governmental and non governmental organizations and individuals have either in a formal or informal, bilateral or multilateral setting. These relations are sure competitive; but they can be pacified if regulated by a system of international norms based on human rights and freedoms. However, only democratic and free-trade practicing states can bring about such liberties. Anarchy and war are the results of fundamentalisms. But the absorption of frontiers initiated by globalization and democracy will eliminate conflicts and bring peace.

Liberals or idealists see international relations as a potential realm of progress and purposive change. They value individual freedom above all else, and they believe that the state ought to be constrained from acting in ways that undermine that freedom. Domestically, the power of the liberal state is limited by its democratic accountability to its citizens, the need to respect the demands of the marketplace and the rule of law.^42(*) One of the most cited idealists of the 20^th century is US president, Woodrow Wilson. In efforts to secure support for the League of Nations, with idealistic undertones, he declared in 1919 to Congress,

America is believed in throughout the world because she's put spirit before material ambition. She is willing to sacrifice everything...that freedom may reign throughout the world...Let us bind ourselves in a solemn covenant that we will redeem this expectation...that the world shall follow us...and that in leading, we will not lead along the path of private advantage or national ambition, but we will lead along the paths of right, so that men shall always say...American soldiers saved Europe and American citizens saved the world . ^43(*)

In the 1920s and 1930s, liberalism was disparaged as a form of `idealism' or `utopianism' by the self-proclaimed `realists' of the time. This was a label that was indiscriminately applied to the work of Norman Angell, Woodrow Wilson and Alfred Zimmern<sup>44(*)</sup>. But liberalism is no longer marginalized in the study of international relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore communism as a global competitor to capitalism, has provided an opportunity for contemporary liberals to assess the legacy of their intellectual tradition and its [current] relevance, although some contemporary trends may appear to vindicate the insights of the `idealists', liberalism must respond to new challenges as the forces of global capitalism undermine the apparent `victory' of liberal democracy in the Cold War. This triumph will be examined to see the extent to which it has influenced Cameroon US relations. We will therefore asses the implication of ideas, beliefs, and legal/moral issues such as democracy and the rule of law in Cameroon US relations.

In all, it is only the society that applies a capitalist economic system, guarantee human rights and adopt democratic political regime that is likely to apply idealist principles. It is when these principles are applied to the world that there could be perpetual world peace. In other words, if states give priority to individual rights instead of the rights of states they would become interdependent and equal.

Interdependence means mutual dependence: peoples and governments are affected by what happens elsewhere; by the actions of their counterparts in other countries. In this sense it can constitute an analytical framework for the reading of Cameroon US relations. Clemens has observed that

The concept of interdependence fits our complex world where high-low politics converge and domestic-external realms intertwine.... It acknowledges the continuing importance of states but also the rising tide of cross-border transactions by nongovernmental actors^45(*)

The movement of resources and persons, the necessity of understanding, the existence of common enemies and common friends makes interdependence a structuring concept of IR. In this regard, it is Clemens' belief that, «It signifies mutual dependence... mutual vulnerability. ...it is a relationship in which the well-being of two or more actors is vulnerable or at least sensitive to the changes in the conditions or policies of the other.»^46(*) In this sense, changes in Cameroonian politics will affect the US in as much as policy changes in the US will affect Cameroon.

We should however be careful in the circumscription of our concept because «Two countries share strategic interdependence if they cannot defend against one another.»^47(*) Interdependence in Cameroon US relations will not be studied in terms of strategic mutual dependence, but relative human and transnational interdependence. We will use this concept to understand trade relations between the two political entities, considering the extent to which that breeds confidence and reliability. But we will keep in mind Kupchan's observation that «Whether interdependence breeds trust or instills resentment depends entirely upon the political context in which economic integration takes place.»^48(*) This concept will help us not only to analyze present trends in Cameroon Us relations but also the future of such relations. Interdependence will be read here as a hybrid between realism and idealism. There are many varieties of realism and idealism. However, a third perspective focused on interdependence took place in the late 20th century. This theory posits an international stage where actors are linked so closely that they can both hurt and help one another. The key players are governments of countries (states), but other actors are gaining influence, from the World Trade Organization to General Motors, Amnesty International, MTV, and drug cartels. Our world (and consequently US - CA) can be said to be on an escalating interdependence.

We should note that these theories were greatly challenged by the 9/11 events. Different IR scholars have turned to read post 9/11 international studies as a triumph of one or another, but hardly all of these theories.^49(*) Our work however primes the role of states, for as Harris Owen noted, of all the issues of globalization and interdependence, «In the interim, states have shown themselves to be extremely tough, durable and adaptable institutions, still the only entities that most people are prepared to fight and die for.»^50(*)

Definition of relevant concepts

Many of the concepts we resort to in this paper need definition. Notions such as ally, policy, post-9/11, shall be specified so that that further usage will be clearer and less polemical. We will begin by defining the region under study; CA, Cameroon and the United States of America (US).

Central Africa as a region under study represents one of the most difficult areas whose definition is neither granted nor easily understandable. This area could be defined either as a concept (of regional science with a hybrid, blur and split identity), an economic entity (integrative) or a historical creation (historical reduplication of a colonial pan African project).^51(*)

As a geopolitical entity, Central Africa preoccupied German minds during the Scramble for Africa that culminated in the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference. As architects of geopolitics, the German «Mittelafrica» project considered Central Africa to run from Malawi and Mozambique, passing through Angola, the Congo Basin, CAR, the Northern Cameroon Savannah right to Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea.^52(*) Other authors noted by Chouala^53(*) have made a further distinction between an Eastern Central Africa and a Western Central Africa. West Central Africa refers to Angola, the two Congo, Cameroon, CAR and Gabon, while East Central Africa regroups Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Rwanda and Burundi. At the same time one can talk of French and British Central Africa, the one constituting of Afrique Équatoriale Française (AEF) and the other of the British colonies of Kenya, Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania. It appears from the above that CA refers to former AEF to which Cameroon and former Belgian Congo are grafted.^54(*) Cameroon's entry came in after the Germans were defeated during the First World War, while the former Belgian colonies came in after independence when the Cold War was ragging on.

In this work, we will adopt the 1983 Lagos Plan definition of Central Africa with the creation of Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). According to this Plan, ECCAS members are Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, CAR, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. We should note that the UN Economic Community for Africa's Central African sub-regional representation also defines Central Africa to include these countries. As a regional science with a hybrid, blur and split identity, CA has certain geographic, human, economic and socio-political components. In this respect, CA covers about 5 391 953 km2 comprising equatorial, sub-equatorial and tropical temperatures, with the largest forest in the continent and the second largest ecosystem in the world. With a total population estimate of about 100 million inhabitants and eleven countries, CA has a vast opening to the sea, with important water storage and reserves such as the Congo Basin. The population displays a variety of ethnic groups, languages, religions (mostly Christian, traditional religions and Islam) and practices.

Map 1. Cameroon in Central Africa

Cameroon. The earliest inhabitants of the country called Cameroon probably were the Pygmies, who still inhabit the southern and eastern forests. However, Bantu speakers were among the first groups that invaded Cameroon from equatorial Africa, settling in the south and later in the west. On the other hand, The Muslim Fulani from the Niger basin arrived in the 11th and 19th centuries and settled in the northern part of the country, the present day three provinces of Far North, North and Adamawa. Contact with Europeans began in the 1500s. During the next 3 centuries, Spanish, Dutch, and British traders and explorers visited the area, and engaged in costal slave trading and other forms of remote trading. Christian missions appeared in the mid-1800s with outstanding missionaries as Alfred Saker and Joseph Merricks. Formerly a German colony, Cameroon was handed over to Britain and France as a mandate after WWI, to be later made a Trusteeship territory before independence in 1960.

Though Cameroon achieved independence in an insurrectional environment, Chouala, asserts that «Cameroon has gone from an insurrectional past to a situation today of relative stability of political institutions and social peace.»^55(*) This passage is observable from the peaceful transition at the helm of the state between Presidents Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya, as well as the 1990 introduction of multi-party politics. The introduction to democracy provoked socio-political unrest accompanied by violence, repression and international criticism, but the situation was «progressively pacified.»^56(*) Cameroon has pursued a relatively calm political environment through economic crisis and Structural Adjustment Programs to present-day post Completion Point of the Heavily Poor and Indebted Countries initiative situation. With a population estimate of about 17.3 million,^57(*) Cameroon's border countries are Central African Republic 797 km, Chad 1,094 km, Republic of the Congo 523 km, Equatorial Guinea 189 km, Gabon 298 km, and Nigeria 1,690 km.

US 9/11 policy. This terminology refers to the strategy adopted in the US after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On this memorable day, Islamist terrorists belonging to Al Qeada took several US planes hostage. Two were driven into the twin World Trade Towers, one into part of Pentagon and the other to crash in Pennsylvania. Authors such as William J. Dobson have had a rather contradictory reading of 9/11. According to him, 9/11 is «The day nothing much changed», for he questions, «Did 9/11 actually alter the state of world affairs?»^58(*) This he says is because 9/11 did not alter the balance of power but rather aggravated the imbalance. He then concludes that «American policy has changed only at the margins.»^59(*) Some others, and a majority, have read a somewhat «new shape» of US policy after 9/11. Among these is Gaddis. In Surprise, Security, and the American Experience^60(*) he gives a brief account of what happened on September 11, before analyzing what it means for American history and diplomacy. In the opening pages, Gaddis compares the impact of 9/11 to that of «the Challenger disaster of 1986, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the death of Princess Diana in 1997, or the Columbia disaster of 2003^.»^61(*) In the same way, he likens the impacts of that day to the assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The real question to Gaddis^62(*) is this «what would it mean, for Americans, to have to live henceforth in a world of insecurity in which this separation of the personal from the historical could no longer be assumed?»^63(*) The richest assessment, and probably the most vital contribution Gaddis provides for our paper is his analysis of the historical pattern of surprise attacks and the consequent grand strategy developed by American governments. In 1812 (August 12) the British surprisingly set the Capitol on fire, in the same way the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, just as terrorists exploded the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11. After the treaty of Ghent in 1814,^64(*) it was US Secretary of State, Quincy Adams who devised the first grand strategy made up of three elements: preemption, unilateralism and hegemony. The post 1941 and 9/11 grand strategies also had the very components. Our work studies how this preemption, unilateralism and hegemony have modified Cameroon - US relations since 9/11. The events on 9/11 were a sequestration^65(*) not only for Americans but also for the rest of the world. This rest of the world includes Cameroon and the CA Sub-region. The 9/11 attacks plunge into the history of ideas, strategies and foreign policy in the United States. We will look at that a little closely.

Since the founding of the US, three central debates have shaped the country's internationalism and the grand strategy that had followed from it: whether realism or idealism should guide statecraft, how to reconcile the competing cultures and interests of the country's different regions in formulating grand strategy; and how to manage partisan politics and limit its effect on the conduct of foreign policy.^66(*)

The northern states, by virtue of the religious fishing communities that settled there, favored a foreign policy governed more by law and reason than by might [or realism]. The North's idealism gave rise to a liberal strain of isolationism, one that opposed on principled grounds both westward expansion and America's engagement in great power rivalry. In contrast, the more agrarian and mercantilist South tilted in the direction of realpolitik though, Jefferson preached a more rural republican idealism and southerners were more comfortable with the use of force as a tool of statecraft, especially to protect the free flow of trade. At the same time, a popular individualism took root in the South, giving rise to a libertarian strain of isolationism based on opposition to an ambitious foreign policy and the strong central government that it would require.

Populism would also mix with elements of American idealism, giving rise to the notion of U.S. exceptionalism. The supposition that the United States was a unique nation with a unique calling in the world would further strike unilaterialism and encourage the country to chart its own course when it eventually engaged in efforts to reshape the international system. Hence the complementary, even if paradoxical, nature of America's simultaneous attraction to isolationist and unilateralist extremes.^67(*)

The United States had to avoid too much interdependence with Europe lest it be lured into the geopolitical rivalries of the Old World.^68(*) «Any submission to, or dependence on, Great Britain, tends directly to involve this continent in European wars and quarrels,» the essayist and champion of independence, Thomas Paine, proclaimed.^69(*) Representing the realist camp, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay took a different approach. In Federalist 6, Hamilton acknowledged that

There are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars.^70(*)

But he exhibited little patience for the notion of either a democratic or a commercial peace. «Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?» Hamilton asked. He posed equally sharp questions about the alleged link between trade and peace. «Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the object of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power and glory?»^71(*) Jay agreed with Hamilton's more pessimistic realism, noting in Federalist 4 that «it is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations will generally make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it.»^72(*) As far as Hamilton and Jay were concerned, America should be guided by sober self-interest just like any other country. It is likely that this same sober self-interest guides America today, as far as CA is concerned.

The United States could most effectively safeguard its security by isolating itself from Europe's geopolitical rivalries. Idealists and realists found this common ground for such reasons as natural security by virtue of its distance from Europe. President George Washington succinctly made the case in his farewell address to the nation in 1796:

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course... Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand on foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition...?^73(*)

Away from these beliefs and debates about the real choices and nature of policy after major crisis, a few months after 9/11, the US went to war in Afghanistan along side NATO, as well as regional partners such as Pakistan. In 2003, the US went to war against Iraq in an environment of a divided Security Council and world wide protest. In both wars, the US achieved rapid success - toppling the regime in Afghanistan and Iraq (the Taliban and Saddam Hussein respectively). However, continued violence in both countries, and the exacerbation of security issues in Iran and North Korea have minded this initial US success. Yet September 11 went deeper even than a casual impact on US minds. The US had long been invulnerable: never conquered, never occupied, and never invaded (apart from the brief foray by British troops in 1812 as stated above). The terrorist actions were a violation, the rape of a country, and Americans reacted with horror, anger, and determination. Much of the world responded. The US won its sympathy and admiration.^74(*)

But that does not mean that the whole world read 9/11 in the same way. Though the events drew for the best sympathy and for the worst empathy around the world (partly because of the foreign nationals among the victims), several criticisms have been raised as to how the US interpreted and/or acted upon the events. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or to show any link between Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein has raised world wide criticism. Baroness Williams criticizes the US in the following way,

The administration of George W. Bush uses a harsh, moralistic and sometimes bullying language that grates on allies' ears. Allies are presented as sometimes useful, never essential. International treaties, protocols, codes of conduct and all the rest of it are seen as so many petty encumbrances threaded by Lilliputians around a purposeful and upright Gulliver with much work to do.^75(*)

Baroness is not the only one to view 9/11 as a means for the US to sideline allies, discard international institutions and assume hegemony. In most parts of the world, 9/11 was differently perceived.^76(*)

Policy (foreign). Public policy could be described as a sum-total of factors that contribute to state decision, and how this is influenced. It is any process by which the state apparatus comes to a certain number of actions or non-actions with a specific political program.^77(*) The sector here is foreign policy and the action is that of optimizing bilateral or multi-lateral relations with a foreign political entity. Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia defines Foreign Policy (FP) as «a set of political goals that seeks to outline how a particular country will interact with other countries of the world and, to a lesser extent, non-state actors». Foreign policies generally are designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through aggression, war, and exploitation. «Foreign policies are the strategies used by governments to guide their actions in the international arena.»^78(*) In this sense, it should spell out the objectives and means state leaders such as the Head of State (presidents, prime ministers, kings, ministers of foreign affairs) want to accomplish. A country's foreign policy can be influenced by many different variables, including its historical alliances with other nations, its culture, and type of government, its size, geographic location, economic ties, and military power. A country's foreign policy is usually aimed at preserving or promoting its economic and political interests abroad and its position in the world.

The making policy is understood and practiced differently in the United States and Cameroon. Under the Constitution of the United States, both Congress and the president have the responsibility of setting U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Constitution also dictates that some of that power be shared between the two. In general, the president shapes foreign policy, with the advice of the Secretary of State and the Department of State. Congress approves the funding needed to carry out that policy. The U.S. Senate must also approve any treaties initiated by the president by a two-thirds vote. In addition, Congress can criticize actions the president and administration have carried out. In reality, the most influential players in the development of U.S. foreign policy are the President and the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, of course, the Director of Central Intelligence, who provides the other key members of the foreign policy team with the latest information on world events.

The case in Cameroon is much more different because of the nature of the political regime. In deed, the regime in Cameroon being presidential, foreign policy decisions are concentrated on the president while the other government agencies are simply in charge of executing. However, some authors have witnessed that foreign policy decisions in Cameroon are both dispersed (between different actors) and concentrated (on the president). From tradition and the law, Biloa Tang states that the President is «the referential in matters of foreign policy.»^79(*) The same view is held by Atanga^80(*) whose study showed that the foreign policy decision-making process in Cameroon is both concentrated and dispersed. This he says is because it brings into the arena several actors, advisers, lobbyists, tools, each being able to influence one another and even the final decision. The National Assembly is hardly involved in foreign policy issues except with international treaties for ratification. In all, domestic policies and polity have more influence on foreign policy in the US than in Cameroon.

CHAPTER ONE: FACTORS WITHIN CAMEROON

FOR US INTEREST IN CAMEROON

In traditional interdependence talk, trans-nationalism creates an environment in which domestic-external realms intertwine. In this case, «The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred».^81(*) This implies that what happens in the domestic affairs of a state could and usually does shape the foreign policy of other states vis-à-vis the former. James Rosenau defines transnationalism as «the processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups, and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events.»^82(*) The whole idea here developed is that domestic politics influences foreign policy making. More so, domestic decisions taken in particular states determine the behavior of third party states. It therefore appears that changes within the state of Cameroon are bound to influence the way the US sees and treats Cameroon. In this sense, the history of relations between the two countries, Cameroon's political stability, Cameroon's natural resources, her geopolitical position, her multinational engagements and her cultural prowess, are all factors that need to be reviewed to better understand the place Cameroon occupies in US minds after the 9/11 events.

Section 1: History of US presence in Cameroon as an incentive

The trends of interests observable from 9/11 in Cameroon US relations are a culmination of exchanges between the two political entities for more than a century. Africa, though, has not always been important to the US as E.J. Keller noted, «Africa has never been central to US foreign policy»^83(*) because of its minimal role in world affairs and economic exchanges for several centuries now. Keller dates US relations with Africa back to the 18th century: \u8220°Some US involvement in the continent can be traced to 1789, official US attitudes toward Africa have been marked by at worst indifference and at best neglect\u8221#177;.^84(*) That is why James Dao calls Africa `the neglected stepchild of American diplomacy'.^85(*)

From the late 1890s when the first US missionary reached Cameroonian soil to the end of the Cold War, Cameroon maintained fairly good relations with the US. However, special trends were observable from the 1990s when bilateral relations between the two countries were strained. A significant change was however observable from the turn of the century. Below, we will look at the nature of the history of relations between Cameroon and the US and examine the internal changes in Cameroon that contributed to those changes in US attitude.

1. The period before diplomatic relations

The history of relations between the US and Central African countries dates as far back as the slave trade years. In those years, several Africans were deported to work in plantations in the New World (present day America). Though the exact number of slaves from the continent is highly disputed, and that it is not known how many people came from Central Africa (and worst still from Cameroon), it is likely that several men and women from the region worked in the US hundreds of years before European colonization. This slave trade linkage still stands as an element in relations between the US and Cameron. The linkage works through the Black community that makes up part of American life. The various Black syndicates, NGOs, pressure groups and lobbying forces such as the Congressional Black Caucus militate for US moral responsibilities toward Africa in issues such as humanitarian intervention, human right promotion, democracy, disease, etc.

Very different relations existed in the late 1890s through the actions of American missionaries towards the continent. Mead observed recently that «Religion has always been a major force in U.S. politics, policy, identity, and culture. Religion shapes the nation's character, helps form America's ideas about the world, and influences the ways Americans respond to events beyond their borders.»^86(*) This is not because religion is an official US policy, though the US government is committed to religious freedom, but because the government is bound to protect its citizens. More so, it happens in foreign policy analysis that governments develop interests in particular regions because of the path-finding, exploratory and evangelical work done by missionaries. Evangelical Christians have long played a prominent role in US public life, contributing to a tension between the country's religious impulses and secular leanings.

This hubris has driven the American nation since its foundation, given that the U.S. religious tradition grew out of the sixteenth-century Reformations of England and Scotland. Mead, in this respect observes that «Religion explains both Americans' sense of themselves as a chosen people and their belief that they have a duty to spread their values throughout the world.»^87(*) It is in religion that one of the most important driving forces of US foreign policy, Manifest Destiny, finds explanation.^88(*) America is not only going to be a beacon but a crusader of Christian values.

It is in this sense (for Christian evangelization) that the first American landed on Cameroonian soil. Deutchoua identifies Dr. Aldophus Clemens Good of the Presbyterian Church of America to have reached Cameroonian soil from Gabon in 1890.^89(*) After visiting several Cameroonian localities, he preached the Word of God, created friendship and attempted at integration into the Cameroonian society, before settling at Efoulan in Yaoundé. Before dying of acute malaria in 1894, Dr. Good implanted the first American Presbyterian Mission Station at Efoulan, and was succeeded by Evangelists Frazer and Johnson. As Deutchoua concludes, «So did Dr. Good lay the foundations of the American Presbyterian Mission and consequently the presence of the US in Cameroon.»^90(*)

It is however more appropriate to say that Cameroon was almost inexistent in US minds (at least the public and the government). Relations between pre-independent Cameroon and the US were read within two paradigms, anti-colonialism and an application of the Monroe Doctrine. As missionaries cared about the spiritual welfare of Cameroonians, Cameroon shared with the American people a similar colonial past. Though there are hardly any people on earth who have never been colonized, many Americans sympathized with anti-colonialist activists in Cameroon well before World War II. Though US history abounds with cases of imperialism (San Diego, Hawaii, Philippines, etc.), and that the US averted only some form of colonialism,^91(*) it is important to note that America never supported European colonialism in Africa.^92(*) In relation to the Monroe Doctrine, US preference to remain locked in the western hemisphere, asserting «...as a principle... that the American continents, by the free and independent condition they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects of future colonization by any European power»^93(*), has consisted of the so-called isolationism. This perception of IR contributed in keeping them out of Cameroon.

Official relations with government implications toward Cameroon were noticed at the dawn of WWI. This happened when the US government signed conventions in 1919 with the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon to get WWI veterans employed in the social and religious sectors in Cameroon. This accord opened the way for several doctors, engineers and teachers from the US and other countries such as Canada and Switzerland, to come to Cameroon.^94(*) The 13^th February 1923 treaty signed between France and the United States further consolidated the intentions of the US government to invest in religious and social projects in Cameroon and marked the beginning of the arrival of a significant amount of US citizens on Cameroonian territory.^95(*)

After WWII, relations between Cameroon and the US were managed in the general context of US policy toward Africa. The US needed to get more directly involved in what was happening in this European backyard. In 1951, US vice consul in Leopoldville (headquarters of Afrique Équatoriale Française - AEF) visited Cameroon to talk about security issues as well as the opening of a US consulate in Douala. Closer relations between the two entities could be explained at the time by the fear of communist threats in Africa, reasons why a percentage of the Marshall Plan funds were destined for European possessions in Africa among which was Cameroon.

Between WWII and 1960, US-Cameroon relations were marked «... by an incoherence of US policy shared between anti-colonialism and anti-communism, between its past beliefs and the realities of present stakes of international issues.»^96(*) At the time when a nationalistic spirit was vibrating in Cameroonians, a spirit attributed to American Presbyterian Church missionaries such as the famous singer Rosa Page Welch who invited Cameroonians to catch `the democratic spirit of the great American nation', the US was confronted to communist inspired nationalists. Consequently, the US aligned behind the French in all UN resolutions relating to Cameroon.^97(*) It could be said that the US supported nationalism only as much as it did not bear communist threats. But the missionary schools had already fashioned Cameroonian minds, as was the tradition of missionary thinking in those days, in traditional Wilsonian idealism-to struggle for independence.

2. The period after diplomatic relations

Diplomatic relations can only be established between independent states. Cameroon (French) proclaimed independence on January 1st 1960. This opened the way for proper Cameroon US relations to begin. In the same year, official relations were established between the US and Cameroon. Between 1960 and 1989, both countries had very good relations characterized by several states and working visits by Cameroonian authorities to the US during the mandates of Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan and Georges Bush. To that we should add that heads of missions were regularly accredited to Yaoundé and Washington. Apart from differences regarding covert US support for racists regimes in Africa,^98(*) the period between 1960 and 1989 as an age intense cooperation and good friendship.

Relations between the US and Cameroon from the 1960s were not special as such. The reasons are that the world was divided into two camps; the capitalist and the communist or the West and the East. The US led the Western camp in which Britain and France are key members. To reduce the burden of the `fight against communism', the US left less strategic zones such as Africa to her European allies. In this plan, CA lies under French influence.^99(*) In this way, French control and influence in Cameroon during the Cold War meant American presence and influence.^100(*)

During this same period, especially in the early 1960 when the government (Cameroon) was at war against UPC activists, the US was poised to support government actions. The reasons being that UPC leaders were pro-communists, especially after declaring intentions to resort to a Mao-type thug war against what they termed `French proxy'. In full expression of the domino theory, the US was therefore bound to support anti-communist, anti-UPC activities in Cameroon.^101(*)

Apart from strategic and geopolitical issues (high politics) which the US managed through France, all other domains of diplomatic relations (low politics) were managed traditionally, that is through embassies in both capitals. In this regard, and on an unofficial side, it is the Catholic Relief Services that opened assistance to Cameroon in late 1960 before finalizing cooperation by signing a convention with Cameroonian authorities in 1961. USAID opened an office in Cameroon in 1962 with the arrival of Peace Corps. Peace Corps' arrival in Cameroon just a year after its creation by President J.F. Kennedy showed US intentions to build a strong Cameroonian economy that will facilitate bilateral trade and prepare Cameroon to fight against communism. With the Cold War as a backdrop, President Kennedy had formed the Peace Corps to harness the idealism of America's youth and direct it outward to improving the world. Volunteers working with Peace Corps are expected to work on development projects such as health, education, teaching and other rural development projects related to the disadvantaged sector of the population. The USAID office remained in Cameroon until its closure in the 1990s.

The main actors in Cameroon US relations are the principal persons, ideas and paradigms that have shaped the nature of relations between the two countries. In this sense, it is important to identify the principal organs and agencies involved it managing relations, and well as figures that have been most important. US-Cameroon relations have been affected by concerns over human rights abuses and the slow pace of political and economic liberalization, as well as US budget realities. Though the USAID program was closed, some 135 Peace Corps volunteers continue to work successfully in agro-forestry, community development, education, and health. The United States Information Agency organizes and funds diverse cultural, educational, and information exchanges. It maintains a library in Yaoundé and helps to foster the development of Cameroon's independent press by providing information in a number of areas, including U.S. human rights and democratization policies.

DOD - department of defense

DOS - department of state

NSA - national security advisor

HR - House of Representatives

Figure 1. Source: author.

It is important to note that though the table does not reflect the general trend of relations between the two countries, it gives clues on three periods in Cameroon US relations: the period before 1990, 1990 to 2001, and 2001 to 2006. 2001 to 2006 has witnessed several bilateral treaties yet to be documented.

The table below recapitulates the formalization of Cameroon US relations through bilateral treaties and agreements.

Main treaties and agreements between the US and Cameroon
Treaty or agreement	Place of signing	Date of entry into force
Convention between the United States and France relating to the part of the Cameroons under French Mandate	Paris	June 3, 1924
United Kingdom: Rights in the Cameroons	London	July 8, 1926
Peace Corps Program	Yaoundé	September 10, 1962
Investment Guarantees	Washington	March 7, 1967
Livestock and Agriculture Development	Yaoundé	May 18, 1978
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	Yaoundé	June 19, 1980
Investment Treaty with Cameroon	Washington	June 2, 1986
Scientific and Technical Cooperation: Earth Sciences	Reston and Yaoundé	November 9, 1988
International Express Mail Agreement between the United States Postal Services and Postal Administration of Cameroon	Yaoundé and Washington	August 1, 1990
Employment	Washington	January 15, 1993
Cooperation in the Global Learning and Observation to Benefit the environment (Globe) Program	Yaoundé	November 6, 1998
Scientific and Technical cooperation in Earth Sciences	Yaoundé	October 10, 2001
Consolidation, Reduction and Rescheduling of certain Debts	Yaoundé	March 21, 2002
Open-Skies Agreement	Yaoundé	February 16, 2006

Figure 2. source: author's arrangement with data from US embassy, Yaoundé

Section 2: Geopolitical factors for US interest in Cameroon

In global political thought, Cameroon has particular potentials to attract the American policy maker due to location, stability and resources. In this sense, both the socio-cultural and the politico-economic prowess of this country plays an important role in understanding recent moves by Washington toward a hitherto `dead pole' of US foreign policy. In order to appreciate the internal factors within Cameroon that have brought about intensification in relations, we will examine the political changes that have taken place, before examining more constant factors such as natural resources and geographical location.

1. Political stability and change of US policy

The political changes that have been taking place in Cameroon are very important when studying internal factors for change of US policy. Historically, we can talk of tension in the early 1990s and stability at the turn of the century. A comparison between the difficult transition in Cameroon immediately after the Cold War and the relative stability around 2000 brings out clearly the American foreign policy game of a `big stick', within specific ideological settings.

i. A difficult political transition in the 1990s

With the Cold War and its ideological and geopolitical implications well over, it was necessary for the US to champion the cause for democracy world wide, since «... the traditional posture of US defense for human rights and democracy as a dogmatic, ideological and diplomatic message...»^102(*) was on its way. The democracy-oriented US foreign policy had been underway before the end of the Cold War and had even been attributed to the end of the war. In 1984, President Reagan helped form the National Endowment for Democracy, the international arms of labor unions, businesses, while encouraging the Republican and Democratic parties to support foreign political parties, free enterprise and independent unions as the foundations of democracy. In 1990, President George Bush emphatically insisted on the new role and posture of US policy in the world.

Out of the troubled times...a new world order can emerge: a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace... A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice...A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle.^103(*)

In other words, the Cold War paradigm of focus on anti-communist activities to the detriment of one of the fundamental ideological concepts in American foreign relations - democracy and human rights, was well over. It was now time for the US government to champion the cause of democracy in traditional Wilsonian thought. President Clinton who succeeded President Bush reiterated this perspective in a remarkable speech to congress in 1995. «As we move from the industrial to the information age, from the cold war world to the global village, he argued, we have an extraordinary opportunity to advance our values at home and around the world.»^104(*) What are these values which America must advance? They are democracy, the rule of law and peace - to make the world a safer place to live in. If the world becomes a global village, America would be obliged to deliver the global commodity to the entire village. «Let me say again, the one bright line between domestic and foreign policy is blurring, Clinton argued forcefully, you readily sea that foreign-domestic distinctions begin to evaporate in so many profound ways.»^105(*) The events happening in hitherto unknown areas or countries of benign neglect were not going to be ignored anymore. America was ready to pay the entire price and shoulder the whole burden. Though there has traditionally been Congressional disagreement on foreign policy issues, and that at this moment many congressionalists were clearly isolationalists, Clinton convinced the congress that «we have always agreed on the need for American leadership in the cause of democracy, freedom, security and prosperity.»^106(*) For these reasons, in Clinton's words, «The isolationist are simply wrong»^107(*) because the US would take democracy to the undemocratic peoples of the world. The cause of democracy in `undemocratic' parts of the world was not just rhetoric in US foreign policy formulation, but a defining working ideology, directly linked to state security. The US reading of the political events in Cameroon in the 1990s should be understood principally from this liberal interdependent perspective.

The post-Cold War political situation in Africa, on the other hand, was quite appalling. Several French newspapers wrote on African apocalyptic political transition to democracy. The March 26 edition of Jeune Afrique's provocative title, «Pourquoi la Presse Francaise s'attaque à l'Afrique» (Why French newspapers Attack Africa), captured this situation.^108(*) Reproducing some of the headlines of French newspapers such as «Que Faire de l'Afrique Noire?»; «La Faillite de l'Afrique»; «Pourquoi l'Afrique Craque»; «L'Afro pessimisme» «L'Afrique s'enfonce dans le marasme»; «L'Afrique en panne»; «L'Afrique en déroute» (what is to be done with black Africa?, the Failure of Africa, Why Africa is Breaking, Afro pessimism, Why Africa is Plunging into Waste, Africa in a breakdown, Africa uprooted). The conclusion is that Africa is not only on an economic collapse, but on a political delusion. That in spite of foreign aid for development and the so-called democratic wind of change, Africa, especially francophone Africa is doomed to fail. In this vast Francophone Africa, Cameroon was one of the key countries from which examples were drawn to demonstrate disappointment of a difficult dissolving into democracy.

Within academic circles, the debate on a `democratic culture' in African countries has centered on two poles. On the one hand, some researchers believe that democracy was totally absent in African countries because Africans are traditionally totalitarian<sup>109(*)</sup>; on the other hand, that democracy cannot work in Africa because it is an imported phenomenon. However, as Sindjoun or even Larry Diamonds argue, «authoritarianism being a social construction can also be deconstructed»<sup>110(*)</sup>, but since it is part of culture, it cannot disappear `overnight' though `not impermeable to change'. But this change required foreign intervention as argued by Patrick Quantin:

...the influence of external pressures on these societies... The origins of these pressures are found in the role of international actors: World Bank, International Monetary Fund and western donors: United States, France, Germany, etc. Their doctrine is expressed in the concept of `political conditionality' of which [is] the World Bank[`s] `From crisis to sustainable development' (World bank, 1989).^111(*)

The US is identified by Quantin as one of the principal external factors that put pressure on African countries to introduce democratic change. Cameroon, as one of the six countries studied by Quantin, does not escape this pressure.

Diplomatic documents from both Cameroon's MINREX and the US Department of State all indicate the period between 1989 and 1997 as a period when the US needed to reorient its African policy. Simultaneously, it was a period of socio-political instability in Cameroonian political history. In effect, the end of the Cold War left the US with an unprecedented hegemonic position. With the disappearance of communists' threats in Africa, there was the need to focus on market economy, free trade, democracy and human rights as well as humanitarian interests.

Cameroon's political situation was particularly violent. On May 25 1990, the SDF was born in Bamenda with so much heat that the whole country was shaken. Shortly after, several other political parties were born. In this era of confrontation and reported vast human right violations, as Mbile puts it, «A completely new and alarming complexion had come into our politics, burning, destruction and killing.»^112(*) Since the mid 1960s, Cameroon was ruled as a one-party state. However, in 1990, following public and international pressure for democracy, and in spite of cry for a single party state by members of the ruling party, President Biya declared to party members; «We must be ready to face competition».^113(*) Hardly did he know it was going to be a violent competition. In April 1991, riots and `ghost town' paralyzed the cities of Douala, Bamenda, Bafoussam and Buea, while the army constantly engaged in bloody confrontations with the population. The general out-cry was for a national conference and multi-party elections. It is out of this pressure that a series of elections were organized.

From 1990 to 1997, several elections held in Cameroon in a generally tensed environment. But these elections were in themselves what Ambroise Kom calls «the impossible swallowing of democracy».^114(*) Cameroon's democratic history was in its worst years. It was the March 1992 Parliamentary elections that opened the way to a period of turmoil. The elections held in a general context of violence and intercommunity confrontations especially in the Northern provinces of the country. C.P.D.M.'s victory could be attributed to dispersion within the opposition on the one hand and intimidation on the other.

The 1992 presidential elections were seen as crucial by political actors and observers. Many expected Fru Ndi to win the elections given his popularity. An example of stakes on Fru Ndi's electoral victory and pre-electoral maneuvers is the resignation of the then Governor of the East province who later sought asylum in the US, more reasons for Cameroon - US tension.^115(*)

The opposition took to the streets when the Supreme Court declared incumbent President Biya as winner of the October 11 presidential elections. The bras de fer between the authorities and the opposition obliged President Biya to declare a state of emergency till the end of that year. Mbile describes the situation in those years;

The general boycott ordered by the S.D.F. opposition created such an impact on the economy of the country coupled with the then prevailing world economic situation that the nation faced a near collapse, especially in the affected provinces of the North West, Littoral, West and South West^116(*).

With the declining legitimacy of the president's authority, the government was obliged to send the army to re-establish public order. Accused of electoral fraud, the party in power found itself in several corruption scandals while the country descended in a bleak future. In 1998, the imprisoning of Mr. Pius Njawe, a private journalist, for reporting on the president's health malaise, did not escape the attention of the public while raising an international campaign for press freedom in Cameroon. In this environment, the government needed the support of its partners, especially strong partners such as France and the United States.

Figure 3. source: author

Elections in Cameroon in the 1990s.

Date	Type of election		Feature/participation	01/03/1992
Parliamentary	Boycotted by S.D.F.		11/10/1992
Presidential	Most parties participated but vigorous contestations.		21/01/1996
Municipal	Boycotted by S.D.F.		17/05/1997
Parliamentary	Most parties participated, complains of fraud		12/10/1997
Presidential	Most opposition parties boycotted.

US reaction to political tensions and the human right situation was quite remarkable. The State Department's human right reports on Cameroon were regularly and overwhelmingly deploring. In a key Central African state such as Cameroon, some foreign diplomats, especially Americans pose publicly with opposition party leaders and clearly affirmed the need for free and fair elections. In the diplomatic tensions that emerged, Cameroonian authorities protested against what was termed in those days `interference in Cameroonian domestic affairs' while the Department of State published unequivocal communiqués criticizing Cameroon's democratic process. The publication of the 1992 presidential elections report by the US elections agency - National Democratic Institute (NDI) - showing the SDF candidate as winner, further worsened the already existing tension between the two countries. The report found «serious fault with the electoral process in Cameroon».^117(*)

This situation led the Bush administration in 1992 to freeze of all public funds to Cameroon, as well as the closure of the most important US development agency in the country, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Though the US administration has since ascribed the closure to budgetary constrains, it is hard to prove that the decision to close USAID was not motivated by the then diplomatic tension. This situation raised old debates of whether democratic institutions, behavior and ways of thought can be exported and transplanted to societies that have no experience of them, and that this can be done in the course of a few years. Harris Owens even argues against it; «While the United States can provide an example to emulate, democracy is not a commodity which can be exported, or a gift that can be bestowed. One size and style does not fit all.»^118(*) Democracy building usually requires more time to go full flesh.

With the heightening of political and social upheavals, the US authorities were not very optimistic about the political future of Cameroon. Describing the political history in retrospect, a 1996 background note on Cameroon described the country in the following way: `In 1982, Ahidjo resigned as President of Cameroon and was constitutionally succeeded by his Prime Minister, Paul Biya, a career official from the Bulu-Beti ethnic group. Ahidjo remained leader of the ruling party, but his influence waned. His supporters failed to overthrow Biya in a 1984 coup, and Biya won single-candidate elections in 1984 and 1988. Biya also won a multi-party election in 1992 which was considered seriously flawed by international observers'.^119(*)

Disagreement between the US and Cameroon stemmed principally from human rights issues. Washington expressed regular concerns over what they saw as a resolute gap between official statements and the actual respect of fundamental rights by the Cameroonian government. It is under these circumstances that the US ambassador to Cameroon, Mrs. Frances Cook was declared persona non grata by Cameroonian authorities in 1993. Cameroon government's grievances were principally the Head of Mission's `special relations with the opposition and her public declarations deemed contrary to her status and mission.'

US fears were exacerbated by the fears of `democratic conflicts', given that «to the democratic process of the late 1980s and early 1990s, succeeded a dynamics of conflictualization.»^120(*) Several countries in the Central African sub-region (CAR, Zaire, Congo, etc.) had experienced armed conflicts linked to the process of democratization. Cameroon did not need to follow in the same line.

From the late 1990s, it was becoming clear that any apocalyptic vision of Cameroon was not justified. With a `democratic', or at least a better constitution in 1996, elections in 1997 and a coalition government put in place, it became clear that Cameroon's young democracy needed to be supported, encouraged and helped, not derided. The US should have heeded Owen's remark; «To be viable, political institutions and political cultures require a long, organic, indigenous growth, and to attempt from without a sudden dislocation of what exists is more likely to produce unintended consequences than intended ones.»^121(*)

ii. Cameroon's acquisition of political stability at the turn of the century

The American policy-maker has really never lost heart of the importance of Cameroon as a partner or as a new member of the ever-growing democratic empire. The greater part of the post Cold War tension had been with hardliners under the Republican executive and Congress. With the coming of President Clinton, the idea of extending the American concept of national security to the economic sphere progressively applied. In this sense, Washington was prepared to invest in promising countries in the two domains of democracy and free trade.

The importance of Cameroon per se does not appear quite significant in US minds. What appears rational is Quantin's comment stating that «After the first phase of transition experiences, by 1991 - 1992, western and multilateral pressures became more prudent and conservative.»^122(*) Not only was the concept of democracy progressively replaced by good governance, but it appeared more useful to support incumbents than rely on `uncertain newcomers'. In this sense, Cameroon's political stability alone is not sufficient in explaining US temperance and moderation, on the one hand, and `return' to Cameroon on the other hand.

Though some trends of change were observable from 1994, it is actually in 1997 that smooth bilateral relations `resumed'. After the presidential elections that held that year, the US seemed to be less critical. Three visits by US officials leave us with these impressions; that of the director of Central African Affairs at the State Department in 1997, of the Secretary of Transport (Rodney Slater) in 1998 and the important delegation of US mayors and businessmen led by the Mayor of Washington D.C., Mr. Marion Barry from the 7^th to the 12^th November. Both personalities gave positive notes about the elections as they were received by the President of the Republic of Cameroon. The red-carpet reception given to these guests could be interpreted as efforts by Cameroonian government to woo a disgruntled major partner.

Though the election of President Bush in 2000 was with an isolationist air, with little interest in foreign policy, 9/11 seemed to change all that. With hard-liners in the Congress, the US became the more interventionist, reassessing its policies allover the world. On the other hand, Cameroon, as other African countries embraced a world wide assessment of its economic, political and social policies. With changes underway at the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) towards the creation of the African Union and the consequent challenges for African states, the Cameroonian government was obliged to adjust to international standards and work towards good governance and democracy.

Following the advent of 9/11, relations between Cameroon and the US needed to be more than smooth. They needed to be excellent, especially for the fact that the bombings had demonstrated that America needed friendly countries on the one hand and other sources of energy on the other hand. Cameroon needed to show itself as a friend of the US and willing to joint in the fight against terror. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (in 2001 and 2003 respectively) left no doubts as to how far the US was ready to go against their enemies.

With the passage of time, Cameroonians, both the governing and the governed acquired greater political maturity and readiness to fairly play the game of democracy. After most opposition parties boycotted the Presidential elections of 1997, we notice that since then electoral activities in Cameroon have seen the participation of major political parties. Also, electoral practices have been less violent, though not necessarily fair. It is with this in mind that, in his speech to the Senate Sub-Committee on International Relations, the Ambassador-designate, Marquardt described Cameroon as having «been relatively stable.»^123(*) This stability has not been acquired only by elections, but also by efforts in good governance, the rule of law and an improved human rights record. We should however keep in mind that «U.S., France and Great Britain stay severe censors only in the African countries were their interests are low.»^124(*)

This stability is however described as `relative'. This is because of three main factors; supposed elections fraud, separatists' threats and social ills such as poverty and corruption. In October 2001, growing tension between the Biya Government and separatists lobbying on behalf of the country's 5 million English-speakers intensified. The resulting confrontation led to three deaths, several arrests. The following year's Parliamentary and Municipal elections (July 2002) resulted in an overwhelming Biya's party's win amidst opposition claims of fraud and vote-rigging. But the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in October of the same year granting the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon consolidated national peace and stability through a patriotic effect, especially when Nigeria rejected the ruling. The events following this ruling gave patriots in Cameroon sympathy for the regime in place, thereby furthering political stability.^125(*)

The 2004 presidential elections were crucial to Cameroon's future - a test of its democratic progress. Since 2002, all major opposition parties were participating while international observers from the Francophonie, the Commonwealth and the African Union were present to follow the electoral process. President Paul Biya still emerged winner of a new seven-year term. In Marquardt's words, «Presidential elections in October offer Cameroon a new opportunity to demonstrate overdue progress on the road to democracy.»^126(*) The attainment of the Heavily Poor Indebted Countries initiative in April 2006 and the decision by the Paris Club of major lending nations, two months later, to cancel almost all of Cameroon's $3.5 billion debts, was further proof of relative political stability. In the words of former French ambassador to Cameroon, «What obstructed investment in the past, that is difficulties from the state and corporations that depend on the state, these difficulties are today removed.»^127(*)

2. Cameroon's cultural and political heritage as an attraction to the United States.

Cameroon's particularity is drawn from Africa's rich and varied heritage. The variety of African anthropological history makes it difficult to be studied under broad classifications in history or politics. However, in the broadest sociological and political classifications, some unifying traits can be identified. It is in this sense that Cameroon gained its common appellation of `Africa in miniature', explained by Marc Gilbert as a country «of varied geography (ranging from rainforest to savannah to desert), ethnography (from Fulbe/Fulani to Pygmy), languages (both French and English as well as traditional Central and West African languages) and religions (Christianity and Islam as well as indigenous belief systems).»128(*) It is this varied cultural and political prowess that we will be considering here in relation to how that has changed in recent years and influenced US interest in Cameroon. Gilbert's work accounts for why world historians, especially Americans, are `engaging this land' both in history and politics and why so many world historians are likely to return to Cameroon after working there.

i. Cameroon's multi-lingual heritage.

The description of Cameroon as Africa in miniature exposes the country's multi-lingual belonging and how this is of interest to Americans, as well as how this makes of Cameroon a regional ally for US initiatives. Officially bilingual (English and French), and belonging to the Commonwealth, La Francophonie and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and with three of the four language families in Africa, Cameroon stands as an entry into Francophone African studies for Americans and as a bridge between the three major languages of the African Union and the UN.

Cameroon's bilingualism and the `rush to learn English'^129(*) that characterizes Cameroon's cultural and socio-political and even economic scene today also reveals a new configuration of alliances. Inscribed in the constitution,^130(*) Cameroon's bilingualism follows the process of globalization which tilts more to the Anglo-Saxon World of which America is a prominent leader. The process of bilingualism in Cameroon has followed both internal changes (linguistic policy) and external re-alignments (diversification of partners and adhesion to la Francophonie and the Commonwealth).^131(*) We must however understand that this spread of English, as Jean Marie le Breton demonstrated, is not credited just to the Commonwealth, but also to other powers.^132(*) The success of English in Cameroon as elsewhere in the world results from its large migration and status as a world lingua franca, its liberal ideology of democracy, its ability to dominate scientific research and its capacity to open up to other cultures. In this sense the US plays a very important role.

The point here is that Cameroon corresponds to the image of a country whose English-learning history has kept rising. Several Cameroonians have not only engaged in learning English, but look up to America as a privileged destination for studies. In the study done by Madina (cited above), to the question «To which system would you turn to if you were to study abroad?» relating to the Anglo-Saxon or French system, 72% said `to the English system', because it as softer and more practical - for specialization.<sup>133(*)</sup> Taking for granted that all Anglophones in Cameroon would prefer the English system, and that the English system is predominantly American, we could conclude that US interest in Cameroon is not unconnected to this `all English', `rush for English' advantage. In Madina's words, «Cameroon is inclined to Anglicization which is imposed by globalization ... and should favor the construction of new alliances out of the francophone world which has always been its referent setting».^134(*)

More so, in as much as the Commonwealth considers Cameroon to be an entry point into a predominantly francophone Central Africa,^135(*) the US considers Cameroon to be an entry into this same region, and an ally within the OIC. Cameroon's belonging to these three international organizations and geopolitical entities becomes an attractive factor to the US is post 9/11 alliance-building strategies.

On a similar line, we should note that Cameroon's linguistic exuberance is quite inviting to great powers interested in Africa. In the over 250 languages spoken in Cameroon, we find 24 major African language groups. Of Joseph Greenberg's four African language family groups (Afro-Asiatic, Niger-Kordofanian, Nilo-Saharan and Khoisan groups), three are found in Cameroon (Afro-Asiatic, Nilo-Saharan and Niger-Kordofanian). Since these languages are the most spoken on the continent and that the Khoisan group is spoken by less than 100,000 people in Southern Africa, Cameroon represents one of the most strategic linguistic poles for non-Africans interested in studying the region. Added to this linguistic exuberance is the religious blend presented by CIA World Fact Book as composed of: indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian 40% and Muslim 20%. This blend, which could also be found in other African countries, associated with the linguistic and ethnic diversity, gives the sense that «Cameroon is one of Africa's most naturally and culturally diverse countries.»^136(*)

Other cultural attractions in Cameroon, which are not the least, are Cameroonian soccer reputation and its tourism and music potentials. Cameroon's success in soccer, after reaching semi-finals in 1990 and winning the Sydney 2000 Olympic gold medal, as well as other world and continental performances have made of the country a considerable attraction in the world. Beating the US in FIFA classifications, and classified first African football nation for several years, it is little wonder that Americans get interested in Cameroon. More so, Cameron has several tourism sites such as the Mount Cameroon which is the highest peak in Central and West Africa. In the same line, Cameroonian music ranks high in the sub-region, challenged only by the Congolese (DRC) music, with such musicians as WES Madico and Manu Dibango, who are well known to a cross section of American peoples.

ii. The particularity of Cameroon's political history.

Historically, Cameroon is a former colony^137(*) of the three European strongest countries: Britain, France, and Germany. In July 1884, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France each attempted to annex the area, with Britain from the West and the French from the South, North and East, and the Germans as new-comers in the late 19th century Scramble for Africa. In a treaty with local chiefs, the German Consul of Tunis, Tunisia, extended a protectorate over Cameroon. Germany strengthened its claim and expanded its territory by treaties with the United Kingdom and France, but British and French armies invaded the German colony in 1914 while World War I was ragging. A 1919 declaration divided Cameroon between the United Kingdom and France, with the larger, eastern area under France. A 1922 League of Nations mandatory decision sanctioned this division, giving France 70% percent of the territory and Britain the rest. In 1946, the United Nations converted the mandates to trusteeships. By December 1958, the French trusteeship was ended, such that French Cameroon became the Republic of Cameroon on January 1, 1960. In February 1961, a plebiscite under UN auspices in British (west) Cameroon determined whether people wished union with Nigeria or with the new Republic of Cameroon. Northern voters chose to join Nigeria; southern voters, Cameroon. On July 1, 1961, the northern area was absorbed by Nigeria.

On October 1, 1961, the southern part joined French Cameroon, and the new Federal Republic of Cameroon was created. From 1961 until spring 1972, Cameroon was governed as a federation, with east (formerly French) Cameroon and west (formerly British) Cameroon having individual governments--each with a parliament and ministries, in addition to the federal government structure. In 1972, President Ahidjo proposed abolition of the federal structure. A May 20, 1972, referendum gave widespread endorsement to the proposal, and a June 2 decree proclaimed the United Republic of Cameroon retroactive to May 20. On January 25, 1984, a constitutional amendment made its official name the Republic of Cameroon.

This political heritage is important in US minds for the fact that the tripartite colonial experience has given Cameroon international cognizance, prestige and honor. We should understand US interest in building a constructive engagement with a prestigious African country. Such an engagement would create a collaborative framework with American most valuable European allies (Britain, Germany and France). We should notice that other former German colonies were given as Mandates either to France or Britain; Cameroon alone stood to be partitioned for geostrategic and geopolitical reasons.

In all, Cameroon's political history reflects events and ideologies in the entire Third World history, as well as major events in world history. This has been aptly captured by Marc Gilbert when he wrote of Cameroon that

It also possesses an archetypical experience of indigenous state formation, of colonial conquest and administration, of the First World War, of the Mandate System, of Negritude, of Afro-Asian independence movements, of the Cold War, and of post-colonial society, economy and polity.138(*)

Cameroon could therefore be the gate way into learning about Africa and the world, especially to non-Africans. In all this diversity, we should note that Cameroon shares similar political, economic and social history with the US, in terms of independence struggle, colonization, non-aligned but pro-capitalist economy and First and Second World Wars anti-fascist/Nazi struggle.

3. Cameroon's resources

The CIA world fact book presents Cameroon in an attractive way; «Because of its oil resources and favorable agricultural conditions, Cameroon has one of the best-endowed primary commodity economies in sub-Saharan Africa.»^139(*) This primary commodity economy turns around oil reserves, other natural resources such as water, iron ore, bauxite and nickel, and environmental possessions. We will examine these resources below in the light of US interests to discover how they have contributed to increase US involvement in the country since 9/11.

The Oil attraction

US attraction to Cameroon should be understood from a global energy security crisis which obliges great powers to seek new energy sources. According to The Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Cameroon has proven oil reserves of 400 million barrels as of January 2005. The majority of Cameroon's reserves are located offshore in the Rio del Rey basin of the Niger Delta. Less significant reserve deposits are located in Douala/Kribi-Camp basins off Cameroon's western coast, and onshore in the northern Logone-Birni basin. With the peaceful resolution of the Bakassi conflict, Cameroon's oil production is expected to rise in the coming years.^140(*) If these oil reserves are added to the 250,000 barrels of Chadian oil pumped through the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project with the terminal in Kribi, US interests in Cameroon after 9/11 will make more sense.

Economic observers agree that greater macro-economic planning and financial accountability would enhance prospects for economic recovery. But this must be associated with privatization of most of Cameroon's remaining non-financial parastatal enterprises; elimination of state marketing board monopolies on the export of cocoa, certain coffees, and cotton; privatization and price competition in the banking sector; implementation of the 1992 labor code; a vastly improved judicial system; and political liberalization to boost investment.

i. Other natural resources

The change of posture toward greater interest in Cameroon could equally be explained by the enormous natural resources of the country. In general, Cameroon's natural resources are suited for agriculture, forestry and industry. Testifying before the Senate as a nominee head of mission for Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, Niels Marquardt described Cameroon as follows: «It boasts a large, well-educated population, a reasonably developed infrastructure on which both it and its neighbors depend, ample natural resources, a strong agricultural base, and considerable environmental treasures.»^141(*) This statement gives a clue of Cameroon's potentials in resources and the invitation those resources give to the US. Soils and climate in the south encourage extensive cultivation of crops such as cocoa, coffee, and bananas. In the north, natural conditions favor crops such as cotton and peanuts.

Cameroonian national territory reserves enormous resources. The southern rain forest has vast timber reserves, but large areas of the forest are difficult to reach. The southern rivers are obstructed by rapid waterfalls which offer these sites opportunities for hydroelectric development. The Wouri River estuary provides a harbor for the country's principal seaport city, Douala. In the north the Benoué River is seasonally navigable from Garoua into Nigeria. Petroleum and natural gas are found offshore, and iron ore in the south near the coast. Northern Cameroon has large deposits of bauxite and limestone. With much unused arable land, abundant energy resources, and one of the best educated populations in Africa, Cameroon has great development potential.

ii. Environmental interest

Cameroon is also a major battleground of environmental resistance against rainforest loss, with much of its pristine rainforest having been sold off to Western industries. The process of industrialization in world economies have not only resulted in economic interdependence, but has also intensified international interdependence through its impact on the world's natural environment. An American environmental interest in Cameroon is based on the need to protect the `world collective good' of the Congo Basin forest with all its effects on the ecosystem. Since there is no world government to decide on how states have to exploit their natural resources, «states must enter into multilateral negotiations, agreements, and regimes».^142(*) The environment has gradually taken on the dilemma of a tragedy of the commons, as is the case with fisheries, expressing the danger of environmental depletion on the globe, especially in managing the oceans.^143(*)

After different Earth Summits have instituted the notion of sustainable development to protect endangered species, and guard the earth against global warming, western powers have been putting pressure on poor countries, especially in Africa to respect international environmental conventions. This promotion is done by rewarding conformist states and sanctioning recalcitrant ones. The Commission on Sustainable Development, largely funded by the US, monitors states' compliance with the promises they made at Earth Summits, hearing reports from UN environment agencies and environmental NGOs such Greenpeace.

While the oceans constitute the `global commons' with a high risk of over-fishing, dumping of toxic waste, oil shipments and recurrent spills, the rain forests harbors half of the world's species. Although the US has a larger forest than Cameroon, the Amazon and the Congo Basin constitute the richest and more vulnerable of collective goods. The `debt-for-nature swaps' have been worked out by western banks and environmentalists in which debts are cancelled in exchange for state's agreement to preserve forest.

Several meetings have been held in Yaoundé on forest conservation, the most recent of which is the conference of parliamentarians of Central African countries principally sponsored by the World Bank and the US. The choice of Yaoundé to host most of these conferences reflects the environmental location of the country and the risk it represents as a beacon. Cameroon is located midway between the northern tropical savannahs that need reforestation and the southern (Congo Basin) equatorial rain forest that requires conservation. The country could therefore serve as a testing ground for experiments on managing both issues. In the same way, because Cameroon is the gateway into the region, Yaoundé has a better position to be a good crossroad for environmental issues. This must be associated to the fact that Cameroon has the most dynamic economy in the region and would be likely to exploit resources unsustainably.

Assessing the importance of US implications in environmental issues in Central Africa, US Undersecretary for African Affairs, Frazer, declared that «We are actively engaged on the environment front through a variety of local organizations that help countries protect native flora and fauna».^144(*) Cameroon's role in forest conservation is linked to its position as an out-let for countries such as the CAR and northern part of DR Congo, whose timbers are exported through the Cameroonian port of Douala. In this sense, it is America's preoccupation to «ensure that commercial use of forests, particularly in the Congo River Basin, is sustainable and environmentally responsible», Frazer concluded.

Visiting the US on 28 July 2006, Cameroon's then Minister of forestry and wildlife, Egbe Achuo, told the press that "Washington -- Cameroon's environmental future depends on creating new economic opportunities and a new, cooperative mindset in the communities surrounding protected areas».^145(*) The appellation of `Africa in miniature' referring to Cameroon also owes to the country's biodiversity potentials with more than 9,000 varieties of plants while 18 percent of the nation's territories are protected areas, somewhat above the global average of 12 percent. But how does Cameroon create "the right of use, without abuse" when 70 percent of Cameroon's citizens depend on natural resources for their livelihoods?

The US, with interest in the global good and wielding enough political power could rally for and provide funding and expertise in developing a sentiment of global belonging. With $150 million to conserve tropical forests worldwide, the State Department funding goes through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which channels funds through some of its conservation partners.  The Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE), a long-term USAID initiative, helps combat deforestation and ensures biodiversity. Cameroon seems to be responding to these efforts especially because of the cash involved. Apart from extending 825,377 hectares of national parks, as a Central African giant, Cameroon has build trans-boundary conservation programs with CAR, Congo Brazzaville, DR Congo and Gabon. Elisa Walton, Washington File staff writer calls Cameroon «one of the leaders of environmental conservation in the region» by "making history as a reference in Africa." ^146(*)

The US and British sponsored Global Forest and Trade Network, a World Wildlife Fund (WWF) initiative to improve forest management, has also engaged the Cameroonian government.  About 25 percent of Cameroon's forest is included in this program, which helps train forest administrators and local populations in conservation techniques while supporting community forest management. It is equally a center of interest how to help industries (mostly American, but also French) interested in decreasing their environmental impact obtain international funds to do so.

Third world countries constantly question US sincerity in pressurizing for environmental pollution when America remains one of the highest polluters of the global environment. American refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol has considerably affected Central African image of US sincerity, especially when this is associated with the fact that environmental depletion through wars is far greater than unsustainable exploitation. The Exxon Mobil World Bank sponsored Chad Cameroon pipeline and the environmental consequences, and especially the recent (January 2007) oil spill at the Kribi terminal has exacerbated these fears both with the Cameroonian government and local NGOs such as the Centre pour l'Environnement et le Developpement (CED).

4. Geographical location: a country strategically opened to the sea with Useable airfields

Cameroon occupies a central position in central Africa in particular and Africa in general. Located at the crossroad between West, North, East and Southern Africa, it offers several geostrategic and geopolitical advantages. It is for this reason that the US-Africa website says that «Cameroon lies at the intersection of West Africa and Central Africa.»^147(*) As a general information site linking Africa and the US, and generally visited by Americans, this description of Cameroon has a strong bearing upon the role Cameroon plays and can play in Africa - US relations. Within the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), Cameroon stands as the `natural and legitimate leader.'^148(*) As the only country bordering the other states of the sub-regional community, Cameroon plays a major role in the political and economic affairs of Central Africa.

The fact that Cameroon is opened to the sea is not specific to 9/11. But the events leading to 9/11 and the consequent re-definition of US policies and strategies around the world gave a new meaning to useable sea and air ports. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were all done with the help of aircraft carriers stationed in the sea, and marines penetrating through seaports. Cameroon has two main seaports, Douala and Limbe, with the Limbe port being a deep-sea port or natural harbor.^149(*) The Douala port is one of the busiest in Central and West Africa. While recent works on the Limbe port are geared at making it one of the most competitive in the region. These two ports are opened to the Atlantic Ocean, and useable round the year. The opening to the Atlantic Ocean means that transactions between the US and Cameroon could be direct since the two countries share the same ocean. This ocean, the second largest in the world and the busiest, opens to important seas such as the Mexican Gulf, the Gulf of Guinea, the North Sea, the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and the Antilles Sea. In its vast form, the Atlantic Ocean stretches from the Arctic in the north to the Antarctica in the south; with a surface area of about 82 millions km sq. An opening to this very important water body is therefore an inviting asset for foreign powers.

The importance of these ports must not be undermined in post-Westphelian territorial states of land-locked/ ice-locked countries. The Douala ports (air and sea) are likely to provide access to the entire sub-region, either to countries where no such ports exist, or to those where there are not enough facilities. The American Embassy of Yaoundé maintains a branch office in Douala, because of its capacity as a port city, to be an entry point for shipments for the Embassy in Yaoundé and nearby countries.

The country's big and bustling seaports that serve as points of entry for goods sent to destinations all over Central Africa and the growing US energy and security interests in the region partly explains recent intensification of Cameroon US relations. This geographical location at the center of Africa, between tropic/equatorial forests, between Central and West Africa further explains this phenomenon. Added to this is the fact that Cameroon is surrounded by oil and mineral rich countries like Nigeria, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, and the CAR. Therefore, Cameroon's role as leader of the sub-region's integration body is a role that satisfies both Cameroon and the US. These sub-regional factors of US interest in Cameroon will be studied in the next chapter.

Analyzing geographical position and US energy supplies, Colonel Daniel Smith of the US Army concludes that «Fourteen of the fifteen main sources of brut oil for the first two months of 2004 either came from territories with direct access to the US soil or an opening to the sea for direct transportation.»^150(*) As for Chad, which is the fifteenth country, Colonel Smith concludes that since it is land-locked, its oil is exported through Cameroon. This completes the chart of supplies of American oil through countries with direct access to the sea. In this way, the American `easy rider' gets the best oil at very low prices. This Cameroonian location adds to the advantages of African oil. Much of it lies beneath the Atlantic or near the West African coast, which makes it simpler to transport to the United States than oil from the Persian Gulf or the Caspian Sea.

1CHAPTER 2: SUB-REGIONAL (CENTRAL AFRICA)

FACTORS FOR US INTEREST IN CAMEROON

Factors within Cameroon are not sufficient to explain the new posture in US interest toward Cameroon. In geopolitical studies, the environments within which foreign policy decisions are taken are indispensable in understanding the meaning of those decisions. From 9/11, US foreign policy was re-adapted to meet new challenges; a re-adapting that took note of Cameroon's geopolitical and geostrategic importance. If the threat to US world power came from powerful challengers during the Cold War, the real threat since 9/11 comes from new sources. These are terrorism, diverse kinds of religious fundamentalism, the drug trade, climate change, situations of extreme poverty coupled with stagnation still existent in some parts of the globe, particularly Africa, and from the feeling of long-term economic decadence and exclusion.

The definition, in US minds, of the nature of relations with Cameroon was going to be done within the CA sub-region in particular and Sub-Saharan Africa in general. Developing relations with Cameroon as a model and a gateway into that vast region became paradigmatic to the US. The importance of the Gulf of Guinea and its opening to the large Atlantic Ocean, as we will see, particularly explains this new posture. Inside this vast body of water lies an important sub-marine fauna and some of the most productive fishing sites and oil reserves in the world. This ocean that opens to the Cameroonian coast equally spreads to the British Isle, Ireland, North America, and the coasts of West, Central and South Africa. The riches of the Gulf of Guinea in terms of natural resources and strategic position makes the area one of the busiest and most coveted in the world, such that building strategic alliances and securing it has several pay-offs.

Section 1: US policy after 9/11, from defense of democratic values to fight against terrorism.

We have understood that from 1990 upwards, the US moved from the fight against communism to the defense of democratic values. However, the 9/11 events changed everything, introducing new imperatives to the US policy maker. Prior to those events, there lived in the US a generation of Americans who had been born into peace and prosperity and had come to think of America as invulnerable. With the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama, as many Americans thought, proclaimed The End of History^151(*). By this, he meant that the end of communism was synonymous to the triumph of capitalism and democracy as the sole world politico-economic system. The kind of conflicts the world would experience would be what Fukuyama's contemporary, Huntington termed The Clash of Civilizations.^152(*) In that thinking, the 19th century was that of a clash of nations, the 20th the clash of ideas while the 21st would be a century of a clash of civilizations in which religion would be a predominant factor.

However, 9/11 changed all that. Americans learned that their primacy does not mean invulnerability. The post-Cold War rhetoric of democracy and free trade was to be modified by a greater paradigm - the fight against terrorism. President Bush expressed this change in a September (12) address, saying that «For America, 9/11 was more than a tragedy -- it changed the way we look at the world.» America had come a long way to discover her weaknesses. In the words of State Department Policy Planning Staff, Donald K. Steinberg, «Even a country with an unprecedented economic, political, military and cultural power, and nestled behind vast oceans cannot be fully insulated from every threat, particularly in a world marked by globalization.»^153(*) The threats and the dangers of this new period included transnational threats ranging from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to global poverty and HIV/AIDS.

1. US interests in the sub-region. The growth of strategic interests

Since the tragic events of 9/11, the US has been reassessing its interests and strategies at a global level. This reassessment stands on strong ideological grounds which President Bush expressed thus: «On September the 11th, we learned that America must confront threats before they reach our shores, whether those threats come from terrorist networks or terrorist states.» In this reassessment, Africa has come to play a greater role. This is the summary of the Foreign Policy Agenda which is updated annually by the State Department. The role Africa has to play can be explained by security strings of interdependence emerging from 9/11. This idea was succinctly expressed by Greg Behrman during a lecture on African Agenda thus, «Today, the destinies of the United States and Africa are bound in many ways that are not widely appreciated. They are bound by common challenges, common threats, and common opportunities.»^154(*) On his part, Steinberg argues for the importance of security, and especially security in the broad sense to American citizens, asserting that «September 11 reminded us that the most fundamental charge of any government is to protect its own citizens. In the words of the Constitution, we must `provide the common defense.'» (op, cit.) It is in this view that several task forces have been created, with one covering Africa and the Middle East and concerned with arms smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism and infectious diseases.

Does military superiority guarantee national security? The answer to this question is important in understanding US engagement in Africa in general and the Central African Sub-region in particular in post-9/11 security planning. As Foreign Policy editor, Moísé Naim put it, «A key surprise of 9-11 was that the impregnability of the American territory was a myth and that massive military spending was not enough to shelter the nation from its enemies.»^155(*) Responding to the terrorists' attacks by boosting military spending, outweighing the combined defense budgets of the next 25 countries that rank highest in the world, was not enough. It was necessary to engage with ally countries and strengthen regional organizations such that they should be ready for military intervention.

Prior to the events of 9/11, Africa's place in US security interest was minimal. This can be seen through the place Africa occupied in the Department of Defense; the whole continent was managed under the European Command (EUCOM), while the other continents each had separate commands. J endayi Fr azer explained the place of Africa in US priorities before and after 9/11 thus;

Befo r e September 11^th, there was a hier a rchy of r egional inter ests, and that hier a rchy star ted with E ur ope, then w ent to Asia, and the Middle East, and encompassed economic interests, par ticularly those in the emerging markets in Asia, then Latin America, and then Africa somewher e at the bottom.^156(*)

This hierarchy as Frazer explains is due to historical, economic and strategic interests. Post Cold War campaign raised the visibility of other regions in the world, leaving Africa where it has always been - at the bottom. But 9/11 changed that hierarchy of interests. «Now it is much more of a circle. The terrorist network that we are trying to disrupt and disband is everywhere», declared Mrs. Frazer.^157(*)

Africa's place is underscored by the creation of African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) launched in 2002 in replacement of African Crisis and Response Initiative (ACRI) which could no more cope with the new face of American security challenges. Studying ACRI as US response to security challenges to Africa, Ndjock Bapah puts it this way: «ACRI corresponds with the new US security policy towards Africa, to work with regional allies who eventually would do the interventions where neither Washington nor the Europeans do want to get involved any more».^158(*) ACRI therefore fitted in the solution for the resolution of conflicts in Central Africa. But with the 9/11 events, ACRI could no more meet up with the challenges. The establishment of ACOTA therefore corresponds with the changing nature of security challenges. It is intended to create partnership with African governments for join military operations towards addressing conflicts and crisis

It is also hoped that ACOTA would complete US support for democracy in Africa, and will foster peace and development. After more than 6000 African soldiers were trained under ACRI, ACOTA has been training thousands more, prepared for peacekeeping operations in the continent. Reflecting post-9/11 security thinking, ACOTA has been attributed a more robust capacity for military intervention in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN charter. One of the basic principles of ACOTA is the support for regional groupings. Central African groupings (ECCAS and CEMAC) are prominent in this regional perspective, and it is there that Cameroon has to play an indispensable role.

US security interest and strategies in Central Africa could be read from a double perspective: the ACOTA perspective and the military base perspective.
On the military base perspective, the US has indicated the need for a military base in the sub-region. The location of such a base has so far been Sao Tome and Principe, though it has been reported that a military base is underway for the south of Angola.^159(*) Washington's intention to boost its troop presence in the Gulf of Guinea is related to the fact that it is a troubled region that now provides more than 15% of all U.S. oil imports, a percentage slated to rise to 25% within 8 years. Vast offshore oil reserves in a large, ungoverned area where narco-trafficking and terrorists' training could provide hotbeds of instability, invites Washington and its NATO partners.

More over, the security of the American people is continually interlinked with the state of affairs in other parts of the world, especially Africa. It became clear after 9/11 that events happening in Africa had direct or indirect implications on the safety of the United States. The thought in 1994 that the Rwandan genocide did not threaten the security of the US could no longer be entertained. As Steinberg put it, «in today's interconnected world, crises in the Middle East, Kashmir, the Andes or central Africa won't stay put. They cause suffering and instability not just in one region, but spill over and spark conflict elsewhere.»^160(*) In this thinking, a failed state in Central Africa poses threats to the security of the entire region and consequently of the US.

This security threat of failed states is exacerbated by different kinds of conflicts. In almost all the countries in the sub-region, there are civil conflicts. We could cite here to illustrate the Southern Cameroon National Council's claims and the complain filed by the Bakweri people against the State of Cameroon; the persisting instability in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria; the civil war that has rocked Chad these past months as well as the confrontation between Northern and Southern traders the oil-rich region of Doba; the rebel action against government forces in the CAR; the 2004 aborted coup against Equato-Guinean President and the Bubi claims of marginalization; violent manifestations of the Ndolou people in South-East Gabon demanding better conditions and share of oil revenues; the unsettled instability in the Pool region in Congo (Brazzaville); the claims of the Cabinda people in Angola and the demobilization of former UNITA militia, the continuing violence and Balkanization of DR Congo; and lastly, the remaining suspicion between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. This high risk for conflicts heightens US security needs in Central Africa. Not that 9/11 has any direct links with these conflicts, but that global changes after that date, the grand strategy, have given a new meaning to these conflicts because of terrorism and the new meaning of African oil to Washington.

It is because of security in one of the most conflict-stricken areas in Africa that the US has heightened its military presence. In Africa, the US disposes Air Force installations in Dakar Senegal and Entebbe, Uganda. The largest US military base in Africa is the US Middle East Command Unit in Djibouti. But there are Naval installations in Sao Tome and Principe, and military trainings in Cameroon, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger and Chad.^161(*) While the Air Force in Senegal does surveillance in the countries in the sub-region, the one in Uganda follows up security issues in East Africa. The base in Djibouti is quite strategic because it supervises the Indian ocean, the Horn of Africa and terrorism and trafficking in the lower part of the Middle East (Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, etc). Trainings with Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia center around a security belt built around the Pan- Sahel solidarity.

In all, US Defense focus on Africa should go beyond strategic port and airfield access to include natural resources, particularly energy, in addition to military professionalism, capacity building, instability, and transnational terrorism. Ms. Theresa Whelan expressed this need thus, «As Africa becomes a larger player in the world oil market, and more exploration takes place, we need to assess possible implications for us, in terms of US security interests.»^162(*) An either-you-engage-in-all-or-in-nothing dilemma obliges the US to go beyond military garrisons to civilian community development projects. Security, then embraces a broad range of issues, though the prime issue in US minds is the fight against terrorism. In reality, US strategic interests in Africa lie in two areas, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalists in East Africa and the Horn, and access to African oil.»^163(*)

2. US interests in the sub-region: the global fight against terrorism.

Three tendencies appeared in US foreign policy after the Cold War. The first tendency focused on global reform concentrated on human rights, development and democracy, in partnership with international organizations. The second tendency was that of `selective containment', another variant of world containment this time around confronting specific threats while building strategic alliances with regional partners. The last tendency was isolationist or `selective engagement' preferring that the US does not commit herself to the areas in without strategic US interest, rather, the US should build a fortress, an anti-missile fortress to protect itself against the world.^164(*) After 9/11, the US policy towards Africa carried these three tendencies, with more focus on the first two. Though Africa cannot be considered as the main front, the continent has played a no negligible role in the fight either because it has housed terrorists in the past or because it has several times been a victim to terrorists' attacks. In that respect, it could replay the scenes of the past (either as victim, author or both). It is because of this that the Bush Administration set aside $100 million to fight terrorism in Africa (excluding the horn which relies more on the Middle East Command MECOM).

We could understand 9/11 from the perspective of the motives for the terrorist attacks. President expressed this in a 2006 (12th September) Whitehouse address as follows: "Dangerous enemies have declared their intention to destroy our way of life.» 9/11 was therefore understood as an attack not just on a nation but on a way of life and the fight against such enemies of American power must be pursued everywhere they hide, even if it is Central Africa. This American war is not just military, Bush said, «It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation.»

The US has been committed to fighting against transnational threats such as drug and human trafficking, banditry, money laundry and piracy. Terrorism is only the most prominent form of such threats, such that the change after 9/11 has been more of emphasis than substance. That emphasis however required new thinking and better strategy and means. One of the newest factors to think about terrorism in Africa is its connection with energy resources. Africa's greater contribution to energy needs diversifies sources and creates relative stability as it reduces over-reliance on oil from say the Middle East. The US is quite aware of the dangers of this growing contribution, dangers linked to the so-called `oil curse'. This idea was expressed succinctly by Ms. Theresa Whelan thus: «the United States, because many of the oil companies operating in Africa are US companies, will have an increasing number of potentially soft targets in Africa that could become attractive to terrorist groups interested in making a point and poking at us.»<sup>165(*)</sup> Most of these `soft targets' which are rich in oil are found in the Gulf of Guinea. The vulnerability is exacerbated when governmental reaches of most of these countries do not go beyond their capital.

Most of the countries surrounding Cameroon have these traits of attractive targets to terrorist groups. The presence of suspicious groups in the north of Nigeria, especially their use of Shari'a laws, violence and proselytism, the violence surrounding oil installations in the south, and government incapacity to deal with these threat menaces the entire region. On the other hand, rebel movements in Chad, supposedly supported by the Islamic Sudanese government are feared to be infiltrated by terrorist movements. The same case applies to the CAR where the same ideological and Sudanese supported rebel group has invaded the north of the country. Considering that Chad, Sudan and Nigeria are oil producers and that the CAR has gold and diamond, these threats become more serious. The spillover effects of such conflicts required that the US adopt methods that can adequately address the situation.

An important factor in dealing with terrorism in Africa is to see how Africans perceived the terrorist attacks. In this sense, it should be acceptable that 9/11 has not only been a change in US perception of Africa, but also in African perception of the US. Talking about these changes and African response, Kansteiner affirmed that «Africa's tremendous support of and cooperation with the United States since the September 11 attack, through intelligence sharing and the tracking of `financial' and `people flows'» is significant both in understanding African response and in the fight against terrorism in the continent.^166(*) Africans have been dealing with one form of terrorism or another for a long time before America got its share. In other words, «Africa has had a long history of coping with domestic terrorism.»^167(*) However, before the fundamentalists, it is food security, diseases and lack of basic infrastructure that constitute the worst of all terrorism in Africa, and America has to coop with this too. In that sense, we might agree again with Frazer when she says that «We can look at 9-11 as having provided certain opportunities. It was a tragic event, and it was a wake-up call in many ways. But it also presented many opportunities.» These opportunities are both for Africans and Americans, to combat all forms of terrorism.

Section 2: US and alliance building in a sub- regional perspective.

One of the words that appeared omnipresent in the speeches of American leaders, especially President Bush, is allies. Alliance building is as old as the history of IR. Thucydides' study of The Peloponnesian War is essentially a study in alliance building. Goldstein defines alliance in the following way: «An alliance is a coalition of states that coordinate their actions to accomplish some end.»^168(*) In other words, either written or not, alliances bind two or more states in the pursuit of a common goal. Major alliances are between great powers, similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Warsaw PACT. Nevertheless, small states can also ally with great powers. «For smaller states, Goldstein argues, alliances can be their most important power element, and for great powers the structure of alliances shapes the configuration of power in the system.» In this sense, every country needs some sort of alliances because of the power multiplication factor it offers. In other words, «Of all the elements of power, none can change as quickly and decisively as alliances.»^169(*) Alliances are traditionally fluid in realist thinking, made and broken easily. Goldstein emphasizes that «Alliances are not marriages of love, they are marriages of convenience. Alliances are based on national interests and can shift as national interests change.»^170(*)

The Pentagon therefore expressed need for major military commands where there has been a long-standing military alliances: in Europe and Northeast Asia. Additionally, a military command to support homeland security (Northern Command, a post-9/11 Pentagon initiative), and an African Command were going to make sense. In the campaign leading to US presidential elections in 2004, the democrats' candidate, John Kerry declared that "America must always be the world's paramount military power, but we can magnify our power through alliances."^171(*) American power could therefore be magnified by occasional, timely temporary alliances with small states such as Kuwait, but especially in the case of our study, with such states as Cameroon. As Denis Martin observed in 1998 about US alliance building with African countries, «on the international scene, alliances between small states with big ones are generally momentary».^172(*)

Such alliances, Nye warns, should not rely exclusively on hard power, wise policies based on a symbiosis of hard and soft power will build useful alliances for the American people.

But wise policies can reduce the antagonisms that these realities engender. Indeed, that is what Washington achieved after World War II: it used soft-power resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions that has lasted for 60 years. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power^173(*).

This call to apply soft power in post-9/11 anti-terrorist alliances seems to have an echo in US minds, at least in some parts of the world. But the defining of alliances along lines of interest after 2001 would lead the US into frictions. In today's world, Russia, Pakistan and Yemen are allies while the Cold War main allies such as France are wearing away. As Moisés Naím put it, «The attacks engendered new alliances and strained old ones.»^174(*)

On the African continent, US engagement with security and democracy issues in African countries is more and more driven by a mixture of geopolitical considerations and idealistic imperatives. US military presence in the Horn of Africa can be explained by an increased US interest in projecting military force into the Persian Gulf. In West and Central Africa, in the region called the Gulf of Guinea, US policy makers are focusing on the strategic value of oil.^175(*) North African gas and Southern African trade opportunities (and non-energy related resources such as gold and diamond) further determine US alliance building in Africa. The US needs regional allies in Africa, hub countries which can collaborate adequately in realizing American foreign policy goals. As D. Barkan notes, «Along with Nigeria and South Africa, Kenya is one of the three `anchor states' in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries that are key to the stability of the region because of location and resources»^176(*). But following regional groupings, the three countries cited by Barkan are not enough. The Northern region and Central Africa are key areas after 9/11. North Africa is important because of the necessity to ally with Muslim countries in the fight against terrorism, and also because of resources such as gas and oil. Central Africa is important because of its oil reserves and humanitarian crisis. While in North Africa the role of a hub country alternates between Morocco, Egypt and Algeria, Cameroon and Angola bid for Central Africa. We should note that sub-regional bodies such as CEMAC and ECCAS have not attracted as much US interest as SADC with which the US has special relations demonstrated in the SADC - US Forum.

1. An increasing economically-based interest

Alliances are not solely for military purposes, and in this case, they are not only for the fight against terrorism. US interest in Central Africa and/or Gulf of Guinea is also economic, that is trade and aid. Both aspects have increased and are seemingly intertwined. Though there has been - since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11 - greater emphasis on `trade not aid', African governments are understood to have limited means in the fight against terrorism. Equally, weak, poor states are more fragile and attractive to terrorists than robust ones. It is not only the fight against terrorism; Africa constitutes what Kansteiner referred to as, `the last great emerging market',^177(*) a growing economic partner which needs to be protected and harnessed. The growth of trade interests with Africa in the years following 9/11 is due to the need to diversify economic partners on the one hand and change of US administration from Democrats to Republicans, on the other hand. The building of private sector links between the United States and Africa, and between Europe and Africa as particular economic features of the post 9/11 grand strategy offers several challenges and opportunities. There has been much focus in the press on US economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The US has always had an interest in the resources of the region, but the 2001 terrorist events have changed the nature of trade relations between the US and Central Africa. It is with this in mind that Booker et al declared that, «In 2003 U.S. policy toward Africa will be driven almost exclusively by geopolitical considerations related to Washington's war plans against Iraq, and by its geostrategic interests in African oil.»^178(*) This oil, though available in North and part of East Africa, is found essentially in the Gulf of Guinea.

Chad-Cameroon Pipeline

The largest of American investment in sub-Saharan Africa is the Chad - Cameroon Pipeline project in the Gulf of Guinea. The Chad through Cameroon oil pipeline cost about $3.5 billion USD, financed by the World Bank and run by Exxon Mobil. Inaugurated in 2004, the pipeline moves oil (255, 000 barrel per day) from the Chadian region of Doba to the Cameroonian marine town of Kribi for export. This project has reinforced American oil interest in the region, making the Gulf one of the busiest areas of the continent.

Map 2. Source: EIA Annual Energy Review 2005.

«Traditionally of French influence, wrote Awoumou, the Gulf of Guinea and its hinterland (Chad, CAR, Niger and the Great Lakes region) is the more becoming an area of American interests.»^179(*) A greater part of this interest is covered by the pipeline project which could have a far-reaching proportion. Awoumou explains this proportion in the following way: «the construction of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline and its future extension to Niger, CAR, Sudan and Libya reinforces the geostrastegic dimension of this zone".^180(*) This vital interest, with the potential of the region has heightened American presence and the need for security measures. Therefore, while the Horn of Africa remains a `center for fight against terrorism', the Gulf of Guinea, at the center of which is Cameroon stands out as the `center for economic interests'.

The importance of the region is expected to grow from its present 15% supplies to the US to 25% by 2015. According to Walter Kansteiner, former US Under-Secretary of State for African affairs, African oil "has become a national strategic interest". This view corroborates with that of Ed Royce, the influential Republican senator for California and chair of the Congress African sub-committee, maintains, "African oil should be treated as a priority for US national security post 9-11".^181(*) Equatorial Guinea produced 350, 000 barrels per day since 2005 while Nigerian production has increased to 3.5 mm barrels of oil per day. On the other hand, Angola produces about 1.5 mm barrels. That explains why four (Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon) out of five countries of highest US investment in Africa are in the Gulf of Guinea. With America having lifted sanctions on Libya, as the country with the largest oil reserves in Africa, and with the possibilities of exporting Libyan oil through the Gulf of Guinea, this region represents one of the fasting growing interests of the US in the world. As Toure^182(*) noted, most of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea are not OPEC members (except Nigeria and Angola), offering more guarantees for US supplies.

Several other opportunities exist in Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea and its hinterlands for US investment in oil. Apart from the known 1.25 billion barrels in Sudan for instance, Toure estimates that this quantity would even triple if the peace settlement between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) holds as we observe today.^183(*) More access to oil control and exploration will be provided in Southern Sudan, the CAR, the Darfur area and Eastern Chad. All these oil resources could be channeled through the Gulf of Guinea, and Cameroon should be central in such prospects. Above all, Gulf of Guinea oil has several advantages as noted by Robert Murphy, a state department adviser on Africa, «much of West Africa's oil is offshore, insulated from domestic political or social turmoil. Political discord or dispute in African oil states is unlikely to take on a regional or ideological tone that would result in a joint embargo by suppliers at once.»^184(*) This observation only followed Vice President Cheney's statement that "African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulphur giving it a growing market share for refining centers on the east coast of the US".^185(*)

However, one of the main goals of US Africa policy is to accelerate the full integration of African economies in the world system. For this, the Bush Administration has doubled development assistance to African countries to better prepare them for this global integration. Indeed, since 2001, U.S. assistance to Africa has grown from approximately $700-800 million to about $5 billion in 2006. Development assistance funds are channeled through two main mechanisms; the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). It is also possible to conceive economic programs from the democracy perspective. Harris Owen notes a belief that the most reliable indicator we have of a country's chances of achieving a viable, stable democratic system is its economic performance.^186(*)

For the past ten years, the US has accorded development grants to Africa worth about 1$bUS per year. While keeping this aid, the Bush administration intends to pay closer attention to commerce and investment. One of the key instruments for African development elaborated by the Bush administration is the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The account is intended to offer assistance to developing countries that qualify for the program through performance in good governance and market economy. Central African countries, which are likely to benefit from the Account, have a real challenge in overcoming their long record of corruption and bad governance.

As for AGOA, Mrs. Frazer described the way Central Africa could benefit in the following way: «AGOA can be particularly beneficial to Gulf of Guinea countries that are trying to diversify their economies and reduce their economic dependence on oil and gas.»^187(*) This is because AGOA offers to provide free and no-quota entry into the US of a wide range of African goods. In that framework, African entrepreneurs are schooled on efficient management, production and packaging to allow easy access, while economies are generally helped to benefit from AGOA offers. Participation in this growth and opportunity act is however subject to respect of human rights, political reforms and good governance conditionalities. These reforms, generally called democracy and the rule of law are believed by American policy-makers to provide a favorable environment for business

3. US interests in the sub-region: The intensification of humanitarian interests

One of the inescapable goals of the US in the sub-region of Central Africa is democratization, human rights and disease, here put under humanitarian interests. The question in the minds of US policy makers toward Africa is this: how will Africa be integrated into world economy without human rights? That is there is no development and economic progress without human rights and democracy.^188(*) Speaking about this, the Director of the Office of African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense declared in 2002 just after the events of 9/11, that «One thing we have learned in trying to build African capacity for support and humanitarian relief, it is important to build self-sustaining capacity.»^189(*)

US interests in Africa has been largely shaped by humanitarian concerns. The Clinton Administration divided US interest around the world into three categories; vital interests involving issues of national survival and that of key allies, important national interests relating to economics or trade with key regions in the world, and finally humanitarian interest - democracy, disease and respect for law. According to Rugumamu, «Sub Saharan Africa fell into this last category»^190(*). This assertion makes meaning when we think of the level of involvement of American officials in African issues, the amount of money spent on Africa by the different administration. Similar conclusions were drawn by Lyman when he wrote that «US interests in Africa are usually framed in terms of humanitarian and moral concern over poverty, war, and natural disaster as a reflection of the African American population in the United States, whose advocacy on behalf of Africa needs to be respected».^191(*) But Lyman advocates for a radical change in a new approach to terrorism.

If we define democracy as a way of selecting the government by competitive election involving reasonable political transition, and liberalism as a set of values and institutions, including the rule of law, an independent judiciary, an honest and impartial civil service, a strong respect for human rights and private property,^192(*) we will conclude that there is little liberal democracy in Central Africa. However, democracy can exist without liberalism and vice-versa. In this case, it could be said that of all the regions in Africa, Central Africa exhibits a particular lack of both.

US efforts to build democracy in Africa seem not to be just rhetoric, but a real engagement, a central belief in American political history. American deployment to encourage democracy, facilitate the organization of free and fair elections, build a strong and dynamic civil society, foster the respect for human rights, initiate reforms, is symbolical of how much the US policy-maker believes in these values. In this light, the issue of democracy and the rule of law are hardly absent on the agenda when American officials have to meet African leaders. Almost fifty of the fifty-three countries in Africa have received American aid for democracy and good governance.

Building democracy is more than elections and politics. It involves judicial reforms, a better administration of justice, creation of local resource centers, partnership between the private and the public sectors and improving the condition of women and young girls. In considering the interrelationship between liberalism and democracy, we should recognize that the former is the precondition of a successful implementation of the latter, rather than vice versa. If not, democratic governments can assume intrusive and oppressive power, in the same way as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stewart Mill worried about the 'tyranny of the majority'.^193(*)

It is for these reasons that Peace Corps Volunteers work in Central Africa to help strengthen the agricultural sector, which will eventually provide food security. The Peace Corps had an estimated 2,700 Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) serving in 26 sub-Saharan countries in 2005, up from an estimated 1,900 in 2002, because of the Administration's Peace Corps expansion program.^194(*) Food security initiatives in the region focus on agricultural diversification, commercialization of farm products, increase in foreign investment in the agricultural sector, fight against parasites that destroy farm products, while widening access to modern farming methods. An enormous amount of money is consecrated to this domain. Two geopolitical reasons explain US investment in this area. First, food insecurity is a cause to disease and socio-political unrest (which threatens US security on the domino theory perspective). The second reason is that, as Nye explained above, hard power has to be associated with soft power. Investment in oil and other resources, as well as military activities are rather repugnant to public opinion, while investment in the social sector brings about appeasement to public minds. Mrs. Frazer expressed this American conception of inter-link between poverty and terrorist activities when she declared during the symposium mentioned above: «The President explicitly said that poverty does not create terrorists. But poverty does create conditions in which terrorists can flourish, and to which youths in particular are quite vulnerable.»^195(*) Poverty alleviation is therefore directly linked to US national security and has constituted one of the areas in which humanitarian interests have increased in Africa.

Agriculture does not receive as much attention as health issues. The fight against infectious diseases such as malaria and AIDS constitute one of the principal humanitarian objectives of the US in Central Africa. The consideration of sub-Saharan Africa on the Western security agenda is new. Before the events of 9/11, the huge human toll of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa was insufficient to seriously engage Western security communities. In was in 1997 that a national program to fight against infectious diseases was launched in the US, followed by the Clinton Administration's declaration of AIDS as `a national security problem' in 2000. The experience of 9/11, when terrorists attacked the US from safe harbors within the failed state of Afghanistan, demonstrated the threat that failed states pose to powerful countries. The 2002 US national security strategy states clearly that «America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones»^196(*). But following the events of 9/11 and global change in US strategy, this program received more funds to fight against malaria. President Bush announced a $15b USD plan for HIV/AIDS for sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. Most of the countries in the 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa to benefit from this fund are in the Gulf of Guinea.^197(*) This plan is geared at providing anti-retroviral drugs to at least two million patients, avoid at least seven million new infections and carter for about ten million infected persons, especially orphans, widows and other fragile persons.

US fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa must be understood from a security perspective. The devastating impact of the pandemic in Africa is depriving countries of the ability to gather and field military and public service/private sector personnel. As Scott Evertz put it, «The pandemic in Africa, quite frankly, is threatening the ability of nations to do so [that is fulfill republican duties], and this represents a direct specific threat to their [African countries] ability to operate as effective modern nations.»^198(*) How would these nations then ensure national defense and domestic tranquility, not to mention regional security? Reading AIDS just as a health problem does not bring out these security implications because, in Scott's words, «it is rapidly having negative strategic implications in many African nations». If African nations fail or are devastated by the disease, it is not going to remain an African problem. In a globalized world where one cannot differentiate between domestic and international threats, other peoples are threatened by the pandemic. In US minds, as expressed by Scott, «At the more direct level, the continuing presence of HIV in Africa and around the world presents a public health threat to all nations, the US included.»^199(*) In this sense, Africa's health and America's health are intertwined and must be tackled corporately. After all, failed states provide enough power vacuums for terrorists to infiltrate.

We have only presented here what America intends to do. It is another question altogether whether they are succeeding. Though one could say that American intervention in Germany and Japan produced liberal democracies, one would not say so about other regions in the world. It has dominated the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean for more than two centuries, occupying Haiti and Nicaragua for several years. Harris Owen however notes critically, «Yet from 1900 to this day the region has not produced one genuine, stable democracy.»^200(*) If this bleak record is associated with the failure in effect democracy in the Philippines after 35 years, then there is room to question American success in implementing democracy in Central Africa. Most of these countries, as is the case with Central African countries, did not have liberal institutions as Germany and Japan did.

Section 3: Cameroon as a leader of the sub-regional

To be a great power's ally in a region, a country needs to demonstrate some ability to influence or exert some power. `Power' in this sense is conceptualized as both a means and an end in itself, an ability to influence or change the behavior of others in a desired direction, or alternatively the ability to resist such influences on one's own behavior. Leadership must be differentiated from hegemony or dominance. Dominance involves dictatorial capacities; hegemony means occupying a privileged positions and regulating affairs as required while leadership refers to the ability to pull to a given direction. Owona Nguini has been insisting that `Cameroon must play its leadership role' in a region wherein it has the capability to do so.^201(*) With the US vision of and interests in Central Africa now clear, it is important to study what role Cameroon can play in that vision. This role is inextricably linked to the place Cameroon presently occupies in the sub-region. Speaking during her February 2006 visit to the region and particularly to Cameroon, US Undersecretary for African Affairs, Jendayi E. Frazer, expressed US vision of Cameroon in the sub-region as follows, «A free and stable Africa, that is both prosperous and healthy, is an American hope and foreign policy goal. We look forward to continuing work with the people of Cameroon, as you pursue your vision of a better Central African region tomorrow.»^202(*) Cameroon's leadership role should be measures with traditional factors such as population, land surface, geographical location, GDP, human index, performance of institutions, political stability, military capacity and diplomatic performance.

The question is how to achieve a better Central Africa through Cameroon's leadership. Because of its geographic, ethnic, religious, climatic, cultural and linguistic diversity, Cameroon already plays a leadership role in three regional organizations: the CEMAC, ECCAS and the Franc Zone. Capable of meeting its needs in foodstuff and rich in natural resources, Cameroon has a respectable economy in Africa. After several years of economic stagnation caused by bad economic policies and the drop in the prices of cash crops, recent economic reforms have given the country good perspectives for the future, though the reforms need to be better structured. Generally speaking, Americans acknowledge Cameroon's status and leadership, especially its influence in the election of the American-supported 1998 UN Secretary General candidate Koffi Annan, and the impact that had in the relations between the two countries. It is with this in mind that Frazer declared, «We know that Africa has 48 sub-Saharan countries, and we are trying to build a sub-regional approach to our engagement there. We look within that sub-region to major countries that can have a big impact on their respective sub-region.»

1. Cameroon as a leader in the CEMAC

Cameroon appears to be the engine of the restrained Central Africa called CEMAC (Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale) . CEMAC is the Central African sub-region integration body that the succeeded I'Union Douanière et Économique des États de l'Afrique centrale (UDÉAC) in 1991. As a member of this six-member Central African Economic and Monetary Union, Cameroon plays a very important role in improving economic and political cooperation in the region. Chairing the Union and hosting the central banking system operated by the Bank of theCentral African States (BEAC), Cameroon has the largest economy in the Union. Acknowledging this role, U.S. Ambassador Linnet Deily declared in 2001, «Cameroon has the largest and most diversified economy in the six-nation Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).»^203(*) Cameroon's hegemony in CEMAC is asserted by its population, GDP, industrial production and military power.

Cameroon's population presents a massive economic asset. Of the 2006 34 million in the CEMAC, Cameroon alone weighed 17.3 million, while the other six countries share the rest of the 16.7 million.^204(*) This population is also of good quality with 55.5% between the ages of 15 and 64. Not only that, literacy level is highest in the sub-region and one of the best in the whole continent with: age 15 and over who can read and write being 79% (2003 est.). This high literacy level corroborates with massive higher education studies and research endeavors that makes of Cameroon a choiced partner in initiatives in the sub-region.

Cameroon's economy reflects the strength of its population, with macro-economic indicators relaying that population's dynamism. The 2006 Encarta Encyclopedia puts Cameroon's GDP at 9 060 millions USD (2002), with the other countries as follows: Equatorial Guinea, 2 118; Gabon, 4 971; Congo (Brazzaville, 3 017; Chad, 2 002; CAR, 1 046. This GDP power (about 50% of the sub-regions), associated with Cameroon's economic growth rate of about 5% per year since 1995, depicts the country's dynamic economy. In the sub-region, apart from Equatorial Guinea's 53% growth rate due to oil exports, Cameroon leads in its growth rate as the engine of the sub-region, with more than half of the monetary transactions of the area. This position has been greatly enhanced by the dividends of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project. Associated to these, is Cameroon's achievement of the completion point of the HPIC initiative by which CFA300 billion Frs. will be injected into the economy. Apart from representing 50% of CEMAC's population, Cameroon represents a strong university, agricultural and industrial pool in the sub-region. As Awoumou puts it, «Cameroon is the only country in the region to have initiated a real multinationalization of its enterprises»^205(*), especially that it is at the same time the only country to border all the other ones. More so, it has been the center of several integration policies while at the same time showing its capacity to initiate its own projects contrary to those of the sub-region as demonstrated by the Douala Stock.

Cameroon's leadership position is reinforced by the support it has been granting to other countries in the sub-region such as Chad, CAR and Equatorial Guinea. With regards to Equatorial Guinea, for instance, Cameroon granted a decisive support to this CEMAC country of about 500,000 inhabitants to help in its integration into the Franc Zone and its admission into the Union Douanière et Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (UDÉAC).^206(*)

This strategic position makes of Cameroon the hub of the sub-region, the capital of several international meetings and encounters. For instance, the French agency, LA Mission Économique de Yaoundé (Economic Mission in Yaoundé) that supervises French economic and financial interests in the sub-region covers Cameroon, Chad, CAR and Equatorial Guinea. The choice of Yaoundé to host French economic interests in the area is attributed to Cameroon's capacity to influence the other countries and its geographical location. Cameroon's capacity to lead development lies in basic factors: a reasonable education system, a developing middle class, significant access to information, a legal system that enforces rules of commerce in a way that foreign investors and traders find acceptable. The new Criminal Procedure Code, associated with Cameroon's investment charter, present some of the best on the continent.

Assessing the ways by which Western countries could achieve democracy around the world, Harris Owen instructs that it could be easier if strong economic conditions are developed first. If this is accepted, then «most attention and the greater effort should be directed at those countries that are approaching the transition stage, say, those with per capita incomes in the range of $US3,000 to $US6,000, incomes that are not derived from oil or mineral wealth.»^207(*) According to this analysis, Cameroon and Gabon would meet the $US3,000 to $US6,000 criterion. However, Cameroon stands alone as the country best approaching a transition because its revenue is not from oil.

2. A leading role in ECCAS

Central Africa, in UN terminology, especially the Economic Commission for Africa, is defined to consist of ECCAS countries.^208(*) These countries are Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, CAR, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. This region is sometimes defined in relation to the Gulf of Guinea, which on its part regroup ECCAS littoral countries plus Nigeria, Benin and possibly Togo.

Several countries have leadership ambitions in the region, the most out-spoken being Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola and Gabon. But Cameroon is more likely to constitute a better leader of the region and partner of the US. According to Chouala, «Nigeria is considered over-populated, huge, with a strong Moslem community and potentially explosive».^209(*) For these reasons, Nigeria will hardly be able to lead the Gulf of Guinea; it cannot lead ECCAS because it is not a member. Cameroon's leadership position is affirmed because being a CEMAC and ECCAS leader, relaying English and French, with a hegemonic position in the franc zone. As for Angola, Chouala refutes its leadership capability, saying that «Angola has a limited strategic peak given its situation at the lower slope of the continent».^210(*) This unfavorable geographical location gives credit to Cameroon, which is situated at the center of the Gulf, and which enjoys a Franco-British culture, more favorable for the other countries of the area. Though La Lettre du Continent^211(*) has reported that the US is targeting the south of Angola for the construction of a US military base, such a base does not necessarily make of Angola the leader of the sub-region and choiced partner of the US. As for Gabon, it will be unable to lead the sub-region because of its economic, geographical, demographic and linguistic size, as well as its little access to countries like Chad and CAR, deficiencies which Cameroon overcome. As for DR Congo, though geopolitically well situated and has a hegemonic history in the sub-region, the political situation marked by conflicts and the consequence of that on its economy, gives the leadership preference to Cameroon which has a more stable political and economic situation.

Cameroon's stable political and economic situation must be juxtaposed with the regional picture of armed conflict and civil unrest. Studying security issues in Central Africa, Ndjock Bapah saw the region as «that part of the continent where current African affairs are focused for close to ten years».^212(*) Writing in 2001, conflicts were still raging in such countries in Central Africa as Chad CAR, the Two Congos, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi and parts of Cameroon. It was a real challenge to the international community, as Ndjock wrote,

«Faced with this `spiral of conflicts', the UN, on the proposition of Cameroon (shared by the other states of the sub-region of Central Africa), created on 28 May 1992, the Permanent Consultative Committee of the United Nations on Security Issues in Central Africa (PCCUNSI-CA).^213(*)

The role of Yaoundé was quite central, not only in coordinating and hosting different meetings, but also in providing ideas, personnel and funds for the creation of a sub-regional security apparatus.^214(*)

More so, it is the wish of the US to see Cameroon play a more important role in sub-regional and regional issues, a role that measures it politico-economic prowess. In US minds, the weight of the countries in the Central African sub-region, and especially their socio-political conditions make Cameroon an unavoidable interlocutor on the political scene of the area, playing a more active security role. The US, according to Chouala, «is nurturing a strategy of co-sharing of regional influence with Cameroon».^215(*) This co-sharing is because the US is relatively new in the region, is geographically far off and has little knowledge of the region, especially that the region is prey to several political conflicts. It is in the same perspective that the meeting between the European Union and Central Africa opened in Yaoundé on September 20, 2006.

3. Zone Franc

Cameroon's leadership goes beyond the sub-region of Central Africa, extending to a greater part of francophone Africa. Apart from countries such as Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco and Madagascar which do not use the common currency known as the Communauté Financière Africaine franc, or simply the CFA franc, is used within CEMAC, the rest of former French African colonies use this currency. Within this geo-economic and geo-political entity lies the heart of yet another leadership strife on the one hand, and the French African influence on the other hand.

Cameroon has good geopolitical facilities like access to the sea, economic strength, and better basic structures and especially offers the US the opportunity to «balance the French in their own backyard, and Nigerian predominance in the West African basin.»^216(*) Cameroon's leadership offers a balancing opportunity not only to the Americans but also to the French. According to a report published by Jeune Afrique (January 28, 2007), «Cameroon is the biggest sub-Saharan French [Africa] client in 2005, 2, 8 millions USD of purchase» in military equipment.

At the end of this chapter, it appears clear that the construction of the national interest and its execution could create both peace and war, and that this construction usually takes into consideration the role of both private and public actors, beliefs and goals. Equally, we could say that national interest, in an interdependent world, has in mind the interests and needs of other actors, especially when these actors are allies. The September 11 attacks and the consequent reprisals in the Middle East first, and then to Africa and other parts of the world portray IR as essentially conflictual, though the conflicts could be born of liberal ideologies. If the authors of 9/11 were in a Clauswitzian theory of continuing war by other means, then the US response was geared in the same direction - oblige the adversary to fear and your will, while the dividends of this fight go to new-found [US] allies such as Cameroon.

The Cameroon official daily, Cameroon Tribune published an assertive title in October 2006, «Le Cameroun, leader de la zone franc» (Cameroon, leader of the franc zone).^217(*) Defining the franc zone as «West and Central African countries, including the Comoros Island, which use the CFA franc», the paper went on to explain how Cameroon has come to over-take Cote d'Ivoire. «It is now clear from the 2005 report of the Bank of France, cited by Jeune Afrique of September 24 -30, 2006, that «Cameroon has taken over from Cote d'Ivoire entangled in an inextricable political crisis. It makes up 18% of GNP of the franc zone and 37% of the CEMAC zone.» Cote d'Ivoire, which used to be first therefore, becomes second.

Cameroon's leadership in the three geo-economic zones described above should be considered with the main flaw of a quasi - absence of political leadership. Politically, Cameroon it is a beacon, not a hegemon, though with the potentials to lead. This politico-diplomatic handicap has considerable consequences on the economic from, given than diplomatic expertise and success usually woos investors and donors. In the same way that Ame r ican «hegemony» has never been truly hegemonic, Cameroonian leadership has not really been assertive. We should agree that a hegemonic power maintains its position of dominance not simply by force, business, or population, but also by the willingness of those in subordinate positions to accept the hegemon's leadership. This is the Weberian «belief,» which lacks in Cameroonian leadership - inner justifications and external consent.

CHAPTER 3: INSTANCES OF INTENSIFICATION IN

CAMEROON US RELATIONS SINCE 9/11

Apart from policy papers and researchers' works on the heightening of Cameroon US relation, it is necessary to measure practical and symbolic growth as witnessed by ordinary Cameroonians (especially) or even Americans (passively). This real growth came to the limelight recently when the US supported Cameroon in the Cameroon-Nigeria Bakassi dispute. Apart from the explicit fact that the Greentree agreement by which Nigeria finally agreed to withdraw troops was signed in New York (and not Geneva or Paris) under the auspices of the UN, the USA, France, Great Britain and Germany, it should be understood that the US had taken stance for Cameroon in the dispute. American support, well appreciated by Cameroonian Government was only a part of a series of strategic steps the US had been taking to affirm friendship with Cameroon. This chapter presents and assesses instances of this intensification and its impact in both countries, as well as the CA sub-region.

Section 1: Practical growth

1. Bilateral visits

Relations between states, conducted through the art of diplomacy, focus on three principal missions; representation, information and negotiation. When diplomatic relations open between two states, embassies are established. States conduct their diplomacy through these embassies where permanent trained diplomats live, but also through bilateral visits. Visits either come during periods of crisis or when the nature of relations change or become intensified. Such visitors carry out high-level or summit diplomacy in political, economic and socio-cultural domains. Representing their entire governments, state visitors negotiate important treaties, lobby for votes and press for trade and development contracts. Though the information sent by embassies are quite critical, those gathered by envoys and heads of states are more efficient because they are readily treated without going through the traditional administrative channel. Therefore, the level and number of visits between two countries is usually a reflection of the state of relations and perspectives of what these relations will be.

Practically, Cameroon US relations have witnessed a remarkable increase since 2001, though some changes were already observable from 1997. After the 1997 presidential elections in Cameroon, American personalities made several visits to Cameroon beginning with the Assistant Undersecretary for Central African Affairs who expressed American satisfaction at Cameroon's policy of opening and national unity. The visit and reception by Cameroonian president of US Secretary for Transport, Rodney Slater, greatly covered by the media, on the 11^th and 12^th of July 1998 already gave the impression that the US was back to Cameroon. It is during this visit that plans for an aviation agreement were discussed, given since he came to promote the US Safe-Skies policy in Africa. It is also during this visit that the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project was discussed. This American comeback was further strengthened by the December 1998 visit of a delegation of US Mayors and executives led by Washington D.C. Mayor, M. Marion Barry. We could also read from these visits Cameroon's efforts to better its image in the US through high-level officials and lobby channels.

It is however from 2002 that US visitors to Cameroon bore geopolitical and geo-strategic undertones. In 2004, invited by the Cameroonian Government, the United States Association of Former Members of Congress was in Cameroon as electoral observers for the October 11 Presidential Elections. Their positive note at the organization of the elections gave a greater impression about Cameroon to the US, especially after the strained relations that followed the 1992 elections. Starting in 2003, high-level US officials have been visiting Cameroon. Among these, we should note Senator Chuck Hagel; General Charles Wald, Assistant Commander of NATO Allied Forces; General Scott Gration, US Forces in Europe Command; BENS (Business Executives for National Security) Chair and CEO, General Charles G. Boyd; Admiral Michael Mullen of the US Navy, etc. It is also worth noting that President Biya granted audience in May 2004 to General Garlton W. Fulford, who chairs the Center for Strategic Studies on Africa in Washington, a center that operates as a think tank for US policy towards Africa. All these personalities focused on security issues and the strategic role Cameroon would play in an unstable but rich region.

As from 2005, this intensification of relations has been marked by officials directly in charge of foreign relations. In May 2005, Dr Cindy Courville, Special Assistant to the President at the National Security Council in charge of Africa, paid a historic visit to Cameroon. That was the first time a National Security Council official of that level was visiting Cameroon, and the sub-region. Received at the helm of the state, Dr Cindy explained that what happens in Cameroon is linked to the security of the American people. One year later, (February 2006), her colleague of the State Department was in Cameroon on the one hand to meet the president of the Republic and on the other hand to inaugurate the new US embassy in Yaoundé. We should not that Mr. Kansteiner's visit of African capitals in 2001 did not include Cameroon, but Dr. Jendayi Frazer's visit in 2006 included Yaoundé. It is because of the imperatives of the post 9/11 grand strategy that Cameroon has received increased attention from US policy-makers.

On the part of Cameroon, apart from UN General Assembly meetings in New York where President Biya meets US personalities in corridor diplomacy, it is the March 2003 visit to the White House that demonstrated the place of Cameroon in US policy towards Central Africa. At the invitation of President Bush, Paul Biya went on a state visit after close to 15 years of silence. During this visit, which took place at the wake of the launching of the Iraq war, President Bush celebrated Cameroon as a stable and well governed country, revealing the American vision of Cameroon in efforts to control the Gulf of Guinea.

In the same vein, Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni was on an official visit to the US between the 13^th and 16^th May, 2005. During this visit, he had a tête-à-têtes with the Advisor to National Security, M. Steve Hadley and State Department Secretary, Condoleezza Rice. He also met a cross-section of US businessmen and politicians. All these meetings focused on security and investment issues.

We should however note that Cameroon has not received some prominent US officials who have been to Africa. Since 1995, and apart from Rodney Slater who came to Cameroon in a regional and not really a Cameroonian perspective, several US visitors to Africa have not been to Cameroon. Among these are former President Clinton and other members of his government who visited Africa several times without coming to Cameroon. His collaborators such as Vice-President Albert Gore; the two Secretaries of State, Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher; Commerce Secretary, Ronald Brown; National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake; as well as First Lady and now Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton. In the same way, President Bush and Secretaries of State under his administration, Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powel have not been to Cameroon though they have several times been to Africa. We could however explain this absence (especially as from 2001 with President Bush) by a weakness in Cameroonian diplomacy, which has been ineffective in using the highest diplomatic channel to woo these personalities to Cameroon. The importance of high-level visits is should be understood as a way of wooing investors and providing international attention one's country, a thing Cameroonian authorities ought to do.

2. Economics and trade: the Chad Cameroon pipeline within AGOA

Economic relations between Cameroon and the US have also reflected the new US policy orientation toward Cameroon. In 2003, sub-Saharan Africa received 8.5 billion USD in terms of foreign direct investment, representing 6.3% of total US investment in developing countries. Equatorial Guinea received 823 millions, Nigeria 340, as highest destinations of US investment in Africa because they are oil-exporting countries. South Africa (89 million) and Cameroon (73 million) drew the highest investment in non-oil exporting African countries.^218(*)

Closed in 1993 for budgetary reasons, the United states Agency for International Development (USAID) resumed activities in Cameroon in 2002 from its Ghanaian headquarters.^219(*) The agency provides public aid for development by financing projects, and promotes trade through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The US Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa report published by Department of trade reflects the progress AGOA has had in Africa in general and Cameroon in particular. Issued in 2000, the Act is expected to permit the importation into the US of African products without quotas and custom duties. To do this, AGOA has to help African countries develop a market economy and produce materials corresponding to international standards.  It is thanks to this program that US importations from Africa increased by 39.9% in 2003, mostly from petroleum products, and 20% from non-petroleum products.

At a more technical level, the US has increased its support for agriculture in Cameroon especially the partnership research project in the University of Dschang (for Coffee and cocoa), as well as the «Food for Progress» program which has received $5 million. Cameroon is also one of the main beneficiaries of the US Funds for Aids that provide free drugs and assistance to patients, as well as family planning, malaria and control of other diseases. We should also note that Cameroon is among the countries to benefit from Microsoft's `Health Metrics' intended to vaccinate millions of children around the world. It is also for these reasons that Bill Gates personal representative was in Yaoundé in 2005 during the World Forum on Malaria.

On other economic issues, we should note that the return of the Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) marks the beginning of real growth in economic exchange between the US and Cameroon. This bank has, since its re-opening, been funding US expertise in the privatization process in Cameroon, as well as the commercialization of cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, banana and minerals. The US mission in Cameroon manages two types of assistance which entirely reflect their vision of foreign policy. There is the special Ambassador's Self-Help fund aimed at capacity building in local communities and the special fund for the promotion of democracy and human rights. These funds grant assistance to Cameroonians and it is expected that if they (Cameroonians) build a strong base and come out of poverty, they could be a better trading partner and political stronghold.

It is worth noting here that US financial assistance to Cameroon was closed to 40 million USD prior to the 1990s. But with the closure of USAID's mission to Yaoundé due to human rights reasons, official financial cooperation was reduced to strict minimum. Before 2003, neither EXIM Bank nor OPIC (the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) nor USTDA (United States Trade and Development Assistance) financed any projects in Cameroon, especially that Cameroon was classified Intermediate Less Developed Country. Though EXIM Bank started showing skirmishes of investment intentions in Cameroon from October 1998, it is only in the years following 9/11 that the Bank's board approved the financing of projects in Cameroon especially in relation to Cameroon's commitment to keep to agreements with the IMF. It is equally in this framework that Cameroon came to benefit from the sub-Saharan private investment funds project initiated by OPIC. In the same way, the African Development Foundation, which receives funds from Congress, has financed two projects in Cameroon worth CFA 130 million Frs. in the agriculture sector.

But it is not only the embassy that reveals instances of US interests in Cameroon. The private sector plays the biggest role. Apart from corporations such as Wackenhut (for private security), UPS (mails and international luggage transfer) and Pecten (petroleum distribution) which have been in Cameroon for several years, since 2001, other US giant firms have been implanted in Cameroon. Some of these firms include; AES (hydro-electric energy), TAUG (transportation), Geovics (mineral extraction), and several others involved in hardware, prevention of catastrophes, gas extraction and exploration.

3. Cameroon US Air route.

Several African countries are linked to the US through Europe, a Cold War air transport paradigm in which African affairs were left with European allies. In those years, only a few really key countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria had direct air links with the US. But after the Cold War and the re-defining of US policies in Africa, a few other lines were opened. During this period, Cameroon came to collaborate with the US in the Safe-Sky for Africa Initiative launched by the Clinton administration. The objectives were to better the quality of air services (air transport companies and airports) so as to increase the level of exchanges, draw investors and extend the tourism sector. Cameroon's participation in this Safe-Sky Initiative demonstrates its desire to reap the benefits thereof, while polishing its image in American circles.

It is however after the events on 9/11 (with the problems of air security that entailed) that the US defined an African aviation policy depending on US interests and security situation. In this policy, and considering the role Cameroon has to play in US policies in the continent, US authorities signed an open-skies agreement with Cameroonian authorities on Feb. 16, 2006 in Yaoundé. The Open-Skies Aviation Agreement was signed by Undersecretary for African Affairs, Jendayi E. Frazer, and Cameroonian Minister of Transport Dakole Daissala. It is however the US Transportation Secretary (Minister of Transport) Norman Y. Mineta who revealed the geopolitical undertone of the Agreement when he declared that «This agreement will allow U.S. airlines to provide their passengers with more options for travel to Africa while laying the foundation for Cameroon to serve as a gateway to and from the continent»^220(*). It is clear in this declaration that Cameroon's role in US policies in Africa has grown and that the country is no more an obscure Central African state, but a real anchor country not only for the Gulf of Guinea, but for the rest of the continent.

Though the US now has Open-Skies relationships with 75 aviation partners, including 16 in sub-Saharan Africa, the particular nature of this accord with Cameroon is how broad it is. In effect, the agreement permits unrestricted air service by the airlines of both sides (though in practice it is US airlines) between and beyond the other's territory, without restrictions on how often the carriers can fly, the prices they charge, or the kind of aircraft they use. A particular note is the fact that the agreement permits all US cargo carriers to fly between Cameroon and third countries without directly connecting to the US. The reference to third countries here calls to mind US interests in the sub-region, especially in countries such as Equatorial Guinea (which is served through the embassy in Yaoundé), land locked countries such as Chad and CAR, as well as other sub-regional countries without direct air links with the US such as Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Sao Tome and Principe, Niger, Sudan, etc. With the present conflicts in Darfur, and the possible spill-over to the entire region and the need for US surveillance, services and supplier flights, this accord with the Cameroonian government carries more weight than never before.

Cameroon as an anchor for Central Africa

Map 3. Source: author's adaptation from Microsoft Encarta 2005.

4. Cultural exchanges

Exchanges between the US and Cameroon have been positively affected by the 9/11 events. Investigating on the `Myths and Realities of the American Model' for the Cameroonian public, Roger A. Takaam states that «For most Cameroonians, the United States of America remains a prodigious land». He means a land where Cameroonians would like to visit. In other words, it is «... more than a myth, America, through what is called the American Way of life is more than reality; it is an attempt to build a dream».<sup>221(*)</sup> The `Americanization of Cameroon' is a process in globalization, which Takaam sees to be manifested through culture, especially the Hollywood culture. Looking at icons of the American culture such as the cinema (Hollywood, Columbia Pictures), music and musicians (what he calls `the hip hop generation'), vehicles (such as Chevrolet, Lincoln Navigator and Ford), and the writer concludes, «After all, it is always special to say `my latest acquisition is from the United States».^222(*) However, Takaam does not fail to note that it is not only dreams and ambitions that will welcome Cameroonians to the US, but also atrocities, misery and crime.

Picking up this cultural aspect of Cameroon US relations, and studying it from the perspective of Franco-American rivalry, Theiry Gervais Gango reads a geopolitical game in cultural manifestations between France and the US in Cameroon. For him, though «The United States model of investment in Cameroonian culture is not as visible as the French model»,^223(*) the Cameroonian society is fast becoming American, right from the interior. While «France likes arts, Gango argues, the US prefers cultural exchanges».^224(*) The US Embassy is increasingly organizing such exchanges. The US also intends, according to Gango, to invest in festivals, create more American Corners, support libraries and studies in general by providing books, while working for an increasing number of exchange programs that will bring together citizens of both countries. In all, «to make her position firm in Cameroon ... over 400 top personalities in Cameroonian administration, have been trained in the US ... in a country[Cameroon] where most posts in enterprises are fast becoming Americanized» ,^225(*) Gango reads from American thought.

Evolution of the number of visas given at the US embassy from 1995 to 2004

1995: 844

1996: 1613

1997: 1824

1998: 2398

1999: 4001

2000: 4038

2001: 5449

2002: 6380

2003: 6895

2004: 7125

Figure 3. Source: Consular section, US embassy, Yaoundé

To push the cultural idea a little further, the number of visas delivered to Cameroonians at the US Embassy should be considered. Jules Romuald Nkonlak studied that case with the observation that «though obtaining the US visa is so difficult to come by, many knock at the doors of the US Embassy daily».^226(*) While appreciating all the measures taken by the American government to ease the granting of visas, and recognizing the rise of the number of visas from 844 in 1995 to about 7000 in 2004, Nkonlak acknowledges that this quest for US visa is proof of the American dream that inhabits Cameroonian minds.

This continuing increase in visas expands the number of Cameroonians who have studied in the US. Accepting that the US has the best institutions of higher learning with close to 200 of the 500 most prestigious universities in the world, a greater number of Cameroonians studying there constitutes `soft power imperialism'. This reinforces the number of future high-ranking Cameroonian officials who would have studied in the US. Little wonder the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) Central African regional representation is based in Yaoundé.

This intensification of cultural exchanges can also be read through the Cameroonian lens, as seen through the activities of the American Language Center (Yaoundé and Douala) and the number of Cameroonians learning American English. Operational since the 1970s under the authority of the embassy, the ALC intends to spread American English while presenting US academic institutions and cultural life. Commenting on its mission, Madina sees the ALC as corresponding with the Americanization of the world, «At a moment when the US shows itself as the world super-power, everything is put in place to augment that power, and project it everywhere in the world».^227(*) In Madina's finding, most of those who study there are students who want to continue their studies in the US or any other country where English is the language of instruction. Workers who study there are those about to travel abroad or about to take a job in Cameroon with foreign firms. In this sense, Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) and GRE apply to students, while the United Nations Medical Licence Exams (USMLE), the GMAT, the LSAT and the PRACIS apply to nurses, businesspersons, lawyers and researchers respectively.

At a larger level, the US has been working on religious tolerance in Cameroon at different levels. In the area of religious freedom and tolerance, the Public Affairs Section organized a panel discussion on «Islam and Religious Tolerance,» excerpts of which were aired during two editions of the CNN weekly television program «Understanding Islam.» The Ambassador also reached out to the Muslim community of Cameroon by hosting an Iftaar dinner during the holy month of Ramadan in 2005. In addition, approximately 500 copies of the International Information Programs pamphlet «Muslim Life in America» were distributed to Muslim leaders throughout the country. To complement this, the American government, in partnership with private institutions, organized a conference in Yaoundé on Inter-Faith understanding and tolerance, which drew several participants from Cameroonian major religions.

5. The role of financial institutions such as the AfDB, IMF and World Bank. An interdependent reading

Financial institutions have come to play a more prominent role in Cameroon US relations than most people would realize. In this largely realist study in which states or state actors such as envoys, presidents and diplomatic missions play dominant roles, it is interesting to take up a transnational reading through multilateral institutions, focusing on financial international organizations such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Broadly speaking, US assistance finds its way to Africa through a variety of channels. Bilateral aid, also known as direct assistance, is given through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private and voluntary organizations (PVOs), contractors, and African government ministries and agencies. Multilateral aid, or indirect assistance, is given first to international financial institutions (IFIs) and U.N. agencies, which in turn channel it to Africa through their own programs.^228(*)

By definition, international organizations are none profit-making, none partisan, and not subject to the dictates of individual states. However, states defend their national interests within international governmental organizations. For this reason, it is possible that state A influences state B through an international organization. This is done because of the need for votes either in that institution or in another institution. These votes could either be in relation to specific projects, elective posts, sanctions or the adoption of a particular policy. In such cases, building coalitions becomes the task of diplomats. Here, the weight of an ally, its voting power (either in terms of points based on financial contributions as is the case of the three institutions mentioned above, or in veto powers as in the Security Council) and its capacity to rally other states to vote for its position are strong assets. Our point at this section of this paper is to examine the place the US has been giving to Cameroon within these institutions and how it exerts pressure on Cameroon through the former.

There have been sizeable changes since the turn of the century on how the US treats Cameroon within the African Development Bank (AfDB). Since its creation in 1963, and operational in 1964, the AfDB has been financing development and promoting self-sufficiency within the African Continent. In 1982, the bank was opened to non-regional members (exclusively for reasons of financing and consequently having voting powers) with the US holding 6,569 % of shares corresponding to voting powers while Cameroon holds less than 1%. The bank's present capital runs above $52billion, with two institutions: the AfDB itself and the African Development Fund (ADF). During the 2005 elections for the bank's chair, the US used its voting power to make decisive moves towards Cameroon^229(*). The US rallied its support for the Cameroonian candidate, alongside other Western nations such as Japan, Germany and Italy, and only gave the votes to the Rwandan candidate after it was clear that African voters did not support the Cameroonian candidate. Though we could understand the US choice of a Cameroonian candidate from the fact that the latter had studied and worked in the US, it is more likely to say that it was a geopolitical choice. As the Gabonese press put it, «The choice was assuredly more on states than on the individual»^230(*).

The actions of the World Bank in Cameroon's favor could be studied from the example of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. The project, we must remember, was financed entirely by the World Bank. How did the Bank come to decide in favor of the project with all the environmental, financial (cost # benefit) and political reports that stood in disfavor of the project? An international environmental organization representative explained to us that the American government insisted on having the project to consolidate their presence in Cameroon and the sub-region. Run by the American oil giant, Exxon-Mobil, the project is described as the biggest American investment in sub-Saharan Africa. US influence in the decision to finance the project lies in the former's influence in the Bank (headquarters, chair and contribution). What Leif Br ottem calls « The W orld Bank' s Great Gamble in Central Africa»^231(*) is not a gamble for the World Bank per se, but for the US, through the World Bank and Exxon-Mobil. The Pipeline started pumping oil in 2003, but that should not be only project the World Bank is/or has been funding in Cameroon thanks to US influence. We should also note the Bank's rating of Cameroon with data from rating agencies such as Standard and Poor's, Moody's, International Country Risk Guide and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (mostly US). The perceived role Cameroon would play in US policies in the sub-region was certainly planned before 9/11 as this project reveals, but it is after the events that this perception was accelerated, enlarged and concretized. As Ted Dagne described, «The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) is the principal multilateral channel for U.S. aid, but the United States also contributes to the African Development Bank and Fund and to United Nations activities in Africa.»^232(*)

The IMF has played even a more considerable role in the future of Cameroon-US relations. American influence in the IMF, which surpasses the influence of all other US rival powers in Cameroon has been adequately used as in the World Bank, to further US interests in the sub-region. From the Structural Adjustment Program to the Heavily Poor Indebted Countries initiative, the IMF has come to play roles appreciated by the Cameroonian government. In November 2002 the U.S. government placed good governance centre stage by spelling out plans for the allocation of funds from the $5 billion a year Millennium Challenge Account to countries that «justly govern,» «invest in people» and «promote economic freedom». Country assessment is done from data provided by the World Bank, national (US) sources, IMF, Freedom House and Institutional Investor Magazine. Cameroon's attainment of the Completion Point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2006 under IMF supervision has largely been attributed to Cameroon's partners such as France, but especially the US. This attainment has opened the way for Cameroon's creditworthiness with credit rating in relation to access to IMF funding and international capital markets, earning the grade of `good risk' by rating firms.

One would see the hand of the US in the American-run AES-SONEL's recent CFA 170 billion loan grab from international financial institutions. With concession agreements signed in 2001 between the government and AES, the company is one of the largest energy supplier in the Gulf of Guinea. According to a report published by THE POST newspaper, the electric power company obtained FCFA 170,548,820,000 following a 13-year loan agreement it sealed on December 21, 2006 with a number of continental and international financial institutions.^233(*) The funding, which will greatly expand AES activities to other countries in the sub-region while making national supplies better, came from a number of institutions. These are, African Development Bank (FCFA 40 billion), the Central African States Development Bank (FCFA 6.5 billion), the European Investment Bank (FCFA 42.6 billion), German's DEG (FCFA 9.8 billion), Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (FCFA 3.28 billion), International Finance Corporation (FCFA 45.9billion), PROPARCO (FCFA 19.6 billion), and Nederland's FMO (FCFA 3.2 billion). According to a press release issued by the company's Communications Service, the newspaper reports, the loan agreement is one of the largest financial packages ever provided to a sub-Saharan privatized utility. It is however, AES SONEL General Manager's comment, which enlightens the political strength of the loan, «AES SONEL intends to use this unprecedented agreement to improve the quality of energy supplied to the population, and consequently the perception of the image of Cameroon as a centre of attraction for international investment at the regional level.»^234(*)

In all, the US Government continues to provide substantial funding for these international financial institutions, (World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank), that provide financial and other assistance to Cameroon. Interdependence is here proven in the fact that both countries benefit from these institutions, Cameroon gets funding while the US gets influence, votes and acclamation.

Section 2: Symbolical intensification (around image and discourse)

There is a symbolical intensification in Cameroon-US relations around the image and discourses of the two parties. These are actions which are not in themselves concrete growth, but which should symbolize a greater US interest on the one hand and more Cameroon opening to the US on the other hand. The actions also show a progressive sympathy of Cameroon's image in US discourses.

1. US Head of Missions' out-door activities and public appearances; US Head of Mission's audiences with the presidency of the republic

The activities of the head of mission of an embassy are important in reading the nature of relations between the two countries. In this case, the US head of Missions' activities and public appearances in Cameroon have been revealing of the heightening of relations and how important Cameroon has become in recent years. From audiences with the Cameroonian President, to press conferences, participation in business forums, visits to Cameroonian cultural symbols (such as Fondoms) and natural [national] parks, the post 9/11 heads of US mission to Cameroon have given a clue to understanding what the years ahead could reserve to both Cameroon and the US.

Starting with Ambassador George Mc Dade Staples who arrived in Cameroon one month after the events of 9/11, the US gradually outlined specific goals to be reached by the Yaoundé representation. As from October 10, 2001, Mr. Staples set the pace for a new US policy towards the region. Ambassador Staples' recorded several appearances relating to the Pipeline project, the democratization process in Cameroon (after the 2002 Parliamentary and Municipal elections in Cameroon during which President Biya's party had a lamp slide victory) and the visit of several US officials to Cameroon. The most talked-about of these appearances was during the ragging debate at the UN Security Council in 2003 around the Iraq war and Cameroon's vote. In that year, while the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, De Villepin, came to convince Cameroonian authorities to vote for the French position, the US ambassador, in collaboration with other US personalities pressed for the American vision.

It is however Ambassador Niels Marquardt, appointed on July 2, 2004, who bit the record of US ambassadors in audiences with the Cameroon's President and public appearances. Upon, arrival, he led several delegations to meet President Biya (see bilateral visits above) just one month after his arrival. As a career-diplomat and having served in several countries, Ambassador Marquardt's personality, profile and determination are symbolic of US perspectives for Cameroon and the sub-region. The message of Heads of Missions' outdoor activities, which reflects American foreign policy ideology in the region, is that there needs to be a good environment for business. This good environment is democracy and the rule of law, while business involves American investment and geostrategic interests in the region. Though this vision of `no business without democracy' is profoundly misleading and highly arguable from an ontological perspective and from US diplomatic history, it however structures US thoughts for Cameroon and Central Africa.

US Heads of Mission to Cameroon

Robert C. Foulon: Consul appointed in May 1957, recalled in August 1959.

Leland Barrows: appointed on April 20 1960, recalled on September 6 1966.

Robert L. Payton: appointed on June 1967, recalled on May 27 1969.

Lewis Hoffacker: appointed on December 2 1969, recalled on June 6 1972.

C. Robert Moore: appointed on June 27 1972, recalled on July 29 1975.

Herbert J. Spiro: appointed on August 1 1975, recalled on May 7 1977.

Mabel M. Smythe: appointed on April 25 1977, recalled on February 24 1980.

Hume Alexander Horan: appointed on June 30 1980, recalled on May 17 1983.

Myles R.R. Frechette: appointed on June 1983, recalled on July 30 1987.

Mark L. Edelman: appointed on August 11 1987, recalled on March 19 1989.

Frances D. Cook: appointed on October 25 1989, recalled on January 1 1993.

Harriet W. Isom : appointed on August 17 1992, recalled on January 15 1996.

Charles H. Twining: appointed on December 19 1995, recalled on August 16 1998.

John Melvin Yates: appointed on December 6 1998, recalled on November 4 2001.

George McDade Staples: appointed on November 10 2001, recalled on July 10 2004.

Niels Marquardt: appointed on July 02 2004

These activities went beyond political and economic domains to involve humanitarian issues. Consequently, an agreement was signed in June 2005 between the US Ambassador and Red Cross Project Director by which the US government is to finance the fight against malaria and malnutrition among refugees in Yaoundé, worth 20 million USD.

Figure 4. Source: author's compilation with data from MINREX.

2. The role of the new US embassy in Yaoundé. An edifice in the image of future Cameroon-US relations.

The size of an embassy (building and personnel) usually reflects the nature of interest the sending country has in the host country. For instance, the US Embassy in Baghdad was announced to employ 3000 Americans (apart from Iraqis auxiliaries), reflecting the nature of US interests in the country. On the African continent, the US holds large embassies in countries like South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya. Upon examination, it could be interpreted that since these countries are sub-regional giants and US allies, the making of Cameroon into an ally required that the US builds an embassy that reflects the needs and interests, the representation and image the US has of Cameroon.

In the words of Secretary Rice, transformational diplomacy is «To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states...»^235(*) This work with partners requires re-deployment of US diplomatic personnel and the building of new structures around the world to reflect the new face of US policies. Until the building of the new structure, the US Embassy in Yaoundé still reflected the `vestiges of the Cold War posture' (as in other parts of the world such as Germany, India and DR Congo). According to the State Department,

To meet current diplomatic challenges, the Secretary will begin a major repositioning of U.S. diplomatic personnel across the world. In a multiyear process, hundreds of positions will be moved to critical emerging areas in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. Many of today's challenges are not limited by country boundaries, but are transnational and regional in nature, and require new thinking and more targeted responses.^236(*)

This `major repositioning' across the world, especially in `critical emerging areas' where challenges are transnational and regional, requires more targeted thinking in the State Department. It is in this framework that the new embassy in Yaoundé should be understood. As Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs remarked at the inauguration of the New Embassy compound in Yaoundé on February 16, 2006,

This embassy is a concrete demonstration of the United States' commitment to Africa and Cameroon. As many have noted, an embassy like this one in Yaoundé shows that we are indeed here to stay. In addition to our visible commitment to having a presence in Africa, we are evaluating how and where we deploy U.S. diplomats: Cameroon is a central destination! Our goal is to recalibrate where our professional talent works, taking into account today's global realities and focusing on regions where engagement is needed most. In the coming years, hundreds of diplomatic positions will be shifted to important emerging areas, such as Africa.

In terms of size and security measures, the embassy is reputed to be second only to the one in Egypt. The US will likely build other such embassies in other African states, keeping in mind the security imperatives imposed by 9/11, but the edifice in Yaoundé should be interpreted as a mark of the role it is going to play in the sub-region. This new edifice reinforces the role the embassy had already been playing as a center for Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Such a building therefore reflects US interests in the two countries, as well as in other countries likely to be serviced from Yaoundé as evident in the Open-Skies Aviation Agreement described above. The thought of an embassy as a concrete demonstration of the US commitment to Africa and Cameroon is reinforced by the personalities present at the inauguration.

Present at the inauguration ceremony was President Biya and the entire government of Cameroon (Ministers, Parliament executives, judicial authorities and private actors). Speaking during the ceremony, President Biya declared that «It [the Embassy building] will be a symbol of sustainable friendship and cooperation with mutually profitable effects». Knowing the President's charged agenda and his habit of avoiding appearances on such occasions, this presence and the lauding of the edifice as a symbol of the `American Dream' and future cooperation between the US and Cameroon offers researchers the meaning of the edifice.

Apart from the embassy in Yaoundé as mentioned above, the US runs a branch office in Douala. The role of this branch reflects the geopolitical role Cameroon plays in the sub-region. Describing the functions of this branch office, the State Department's website puts it thus: «The primary function of the Embassy Branch Office is to serve as customs facilitator for incoming shipments for the Embassy as well as U.S. Embassies in nearby countries.» These nearby countries should involve Chad, CAR, the two Congos (especially in times of conflict) and possibly Niger or even Darfur. This Embassy Branch Office, it should be noted had already played a strategic role during the Nigerian civil war, when the only access to refugees and displaced persons was the Douala sea port. Not only that, the branch has the task of meeting US visitors at the largest airport in the region - Douala international airport, performing consular duties, while conducting political and economic duties as required by the embassy in Yaoundé.

3. US public diplomacy in Cameroon; selling public image and doing business.

Public diplomacy is an important part of every diplomat's job description, whether the said diplomat is from a poor or a rich country. The art of conducting public policy in another country is called public diplomacy. By public policy here, we refer to «a sum-total of factors that contribute to state decision, and how this is influenced. It is any process by which the state apparatus comes to a certain number of actions or non-actions with a specific political program.»^237(*) Public diplomacy is therefore crucial to provide a common vision to diplomats as they engage foreign publics and media to promote their national interests in those countries. It is in this framework that US diplomats in Yaoundé, as anywhere in the world, work to implement US policy in Cameroon and the entire region. The Bush administration has not trumpeted its interest in African oil, partly to avoid antagonizing its Middle Eastern allies and partly to avoid generating a perception that it cares only about Africa's resources. But the administration has intensified its diplomatic activity with several African governments, sending clear signals that it is paying closer attention. The issue here is to see how this public diplomacy has emerged since the 9/11 events, to see what has changed in terms of goals, means and process. As Representative Edward R. Royce (California Republican and chair of African subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee) put it, "Paying Africa the diplomatic attention it deserves is important."^238(*)

In US diplomatic parlance, public diplomacy is managed by the Public Affairs section of the State Department or the embassy. In Yaoundé, this section of the US embassy (which consist of a press section, a cultural affairs section and the IRC) organizes and funds diverse cultural, educational and information exchanges programs within the embassy premises. This section handles the task of selling the public image of the US in Cameroon. In this position, the Public Affairs section works as the out-let of the embassy, conveying the messages, projects, and programs of the different sections to the general public. It is in this sense that we discuss public diplomacy here; not just as a press center or library, but as the window by which we perceive the activities of the American government and people.

With the economic assistance offered by the development agency of the United States (the USAID), as well the EXIM Bank and the Peace Corps, US public diplomacy in Cameroon consists of improving the condition of Cameroonians while doing business and selling public image. We will here briefly explain the different programs that constitute US public policy in Cameroon, though all the programs do not originate from the Public Affairs section, they are however channeled there. Most of these programs have been described elsewhere in this work, so we will focus here on those programs not yet so far covered. Below we will describe programs related to the military, the American corner, the Information Resource Center, the press and Human Right and Democracy,

The military cooperation between the US and Cameroon works within the International Military and Education Training program (IMET), which has been expanded to become Expanded International Military Education and Training (EIMET) program since 2002. This program began following the June 19, 1980 agreement between both governments, but has vigorously intensified since the turn of the century. The 9/11 events showed the need to equip `failing' states military to ensure stability and combat terrorism. IMET therefore operates on three fronts; training, joint exercises and exposure to democratic values of the American system. This explains the visit of 80 US marines (50 being medical doctors and specialists) to Cameroon in July 2005. Called the West Africa Training Course Medical Out-reach Program, this program worked in several Cameroonian villages, thus making very good impressions on the population. The public image tilt of this program is consolidated by the several visits of top US military officials as noted in section one of this chapter. More so, hundreds of Cameroonian military have received trainings and refreshers courses in the US and participated in ACOTA exercises. All these programs reveal Washington's desire to secure a region where oil and terrorist threats have heightened strategic interests.

The American corner is a public diplomacy strategy aimed at selling American image in different parts of the country, apart from the embassy and embassy branch office. It consists in providing information in different formats such as magazines, newspapers, tracts and books. Such corners have usually consisted of an office (as in provinces)^239(*) or a corner of a hall where a desk exists (as was the case at the National Assembly). Though they existed before the 9/11 events, they have considerably increased since then. The sense behind it is that America is for the worst unknown and for the better misrepresented by several persons in developing countries, and that such a distorted knowledge also partly explains 9/11. Therefore, making America known, especially its soft side, does not only constitute part of traditional diplomatic goals but carries the seal of post 9/11 grand strategy. For instance, the University of Buéa American Corner^240(*) has the following goals:

1. inform the public on the US,

2. provide scholarship programs to students

3. provide academic orientation for students

4. organize seminars and courses on American history such as the Black History Month

5. function as a mini Information Resource Center (IRC)

6. See students through for visas procedures, especially the American Lottery.^241(*)

The Information Resource Center (IRC), formally called the American Cultural Center (ACC), operates as an information collection center, an education center, a library, an on-line research center, a training center and a center for events such as book launch, press conference, public lectures, etc. This center has in recent years opened cooperation with libraries and schools in different towns in Cameroon through book donations.^242(*) As an information resource center, a name adopted in 2004 to reflect the changing nature of information technology and its impact on global knowledge, the IRC provides domain-related information to affinity groups such as parliament, military, press, agriculture, business, gender issues, medicine and health, sports, human rights, etc. in the new embassy, most written material has been removed from the IRC in favor of reference books and documents on democracy and business.^243(*) Though greatly competed by the French cultural center, the Public Affairs Section has expanded its activities to reflect American power and interest. These include:

- American Life Style on CNN,

- Black History Month, celebrated every february,

- Thanks Giving, celebrated by the entire embassy personnel and related branches such as the American School of Yaounde and the ALC,

- Etc.^244(*)

The IRC has also been active in fostering the learning of English as another strategy of spreading American values in Cameroon. The role of the US in the spread of English has been studied by Madina^245(*) and found to include the donation of books and the running of language centers and the American schools. Most state universities in Cameroon and institutions of higher learning such as the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC), the Higher Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication (ESSTIC) and the Higher Teachers Training College (ENS) have all received book donations from the US embassy in Yaoundé since 2000. To complement this, the US Voice Of America (VOA) has been broadcasting in short wave in Cameroon, and since the liberalization of the audio-visual sector in Cameroon, VOA has signed broadcasting agreements with a Cameroonian local FM station (Magic FM). Not only does this broadcasting facilitate English learning as the BBC does^246(*), but it also spreads US ideologies and culture. As seen above, the vehicle par excellence of spread of US culture is the American Language Center (ALC) which has boasted its activities since the events of 9/11.

The Embassy's Self-help and Democracy and Human Rights Funds are some of the largest in Africa. Information available at the IRC shows that the US government provided a commodity grant valued at 6 million USD in 2003, which funded agricultural development projects in the North and Far North provinces. Between 2004 and 2006, the US government spent about 20 million USD on this fund. To enable community-based liberal democracy, the embassy community projects in Chad and Cameroon after the pipeline. Compensation may also be given to communities in the form of a school building, a water pump, or a water tower. As Brottem notes, «In an approach unfamiliar to Chadians, communities have made democratic decisions about what to build. Normally, only the traditional authorities would make those decisions.»^247(*)

The trade and democracy programs of the embassy have attracted both admiration and criticism from Cameroonian press. These were other domains in Cameroon US relations covered by the special issue of Les Cahiers de Mutation. The AGOA initiative constitutes the main tangible expression of Cameroon US relations. Constant R. Sabang notices a net increase in US exports toward Cameroon from $55US million in 2001 to $184 million in 2003. On the Cameroonian side, a slight increase could also be observable.^248(*) Though he is rather pessimistic about the future of US exportations toward Cameroon, Sabang notes that there are prospects that Cameroon draws the best out of the AGOA initiative. Though it is regrettable, he says that «a small country like Mauritius, whose population is twice smaller than that of the town of Douala, should benefit from AGOA more than Cameroon which pretends to be the engine of Central Africa»,^249(*) Cameroon is said to have an enormous potential for the US market. Nevertheless, to Sabang, this potential will remain a waste except Cameroonian authorities develop strategies to draw the best out of AGOA. Though oil is likely to decline, Cameroon still has potentials in cobalt, nickel, timber, coffee, cocoa, textile, etc.

Leger Ntiga evaluated the state of cooperation in the area of democracy between the two countries. Under the broad topic of Democracy and Peace, Ntiga identifies four areas of development program by the US in Cameroon, democracy and human rights, support for community projects, the promotion of the social sector and military cooperation. The fund for democracy and human rights sponsors minor projects on those areas, including the training of journalists and young leaders on democracy, good governance and human rights. In the same line, the `self-help' fund finances small size projects that can create riches in given communities, leading to community development. The most visible project, according to Ntiga seems to be the Peace Corps. With 130 of them (in 2004) working on developmental projects in Cameroon, such as education, health, promotion of learning through libraries, fight against HIV/AIDS, sanitation, cultural preservation, etc., seems to be the most successful of US cooperation agencies in Cameroon. In this presentation, which looks rather scanty and non-analytical, military cooperation is said to be rather discrete to the public.

CHAPTER 4: STAKES OF US PRESENCE IN CAMEROON

If the Gulf of Guinea in particular and Africa in general is understood to constitute a region of imperial struggle between great powers, could Cameroon be a Rimland by which these powers shall control the heartland? During the February 2007 Africa-French summit, President Chirac observed that «Africa's rich natural resources do not only provide for development but also attract competition.» This prefigures imperial rivalry, which is not new in colonial history. In the late 19^th century, there was an unexpected clash between Africa's most ardent colonialists, the British and the French. It was in the Sudanese province of Fachoda. While the French were coming in from Morocco through Mauritania and French Sudan (Mali), the British were descending from Egypt on the one hand and British East Africa, on the other hand. The clash that followed between French troops and those of Lord Kishner constituted the only major clash between the two colonial powers in those years in Africa. Our interest in this chapter is whether such an imperial clash is not likely in the Gulf of Guinea, through Cameroon, and this time around not between the British and the French but between the US, the French and the Chinese. In fact, throughout history, hegemons have been challenged.^250(*)

Writing about the prospects for such a clash, Awoumou noted that «the rush for the Gulf of Guinea can be understood as a quest for power through the control of a zone hitherto of benign neglect, and the need for a diversification of sources of raw materials - oil».^251(*) The Gulf of Guinea, and especially CA is traditionally a French backyard, but its natural resources and strategic (economic, military, humanitarian) importance has invited other powers such as the US and China. The US however stands as the major great power investor in the Gulf, not withstanding the interests of Western countries such as France, Britain, Belgium and Spain; Asian countries such as China, Japan, Israel and India; Latin American countries such as Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela; and African powers such as South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco and Libya. One must also note the interests of «private actors of all kinds: multinationals, international organizations, ideologists, preachers, predators, businessmen...»^252(*) who have all made of the region an international cause of disagreement.

Section 1: stakes for the US

1. US and empire building in the Gulf of Guinea: need for virgin ground?

The US, today, enjoys a virtually unrivalled and unprecedented position in the international system. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is little doubt that the global reach and unilateral freedom of action of the lone remaining superpower has grown far beyond that of previous world powers. No Greecean Alexander or Roman Caesar or British monarch could have imagined the scope of U.S. influence. The Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Spanish, Dutch, British and Soviet empires were formally territorial entities, which the US is not. The US Empire today is manifested in military, economic and cultural terms. Our interest here is to see how this informal empire extends to the Central African sub-region. Commenting on this, John Bellamy Foster said, «the global actions of the United States since September 11, 2001, are often seen as constituting a `new militarism' and a `new imperialism'.»^253(*)

Studying the effects of American empire building on other countries in the world, Brzezinski asserts that «at the wake of the 21st century, America enjoys an unprecedented power in world history».^254(*) In this position, US power has effects on the global system, «the effect of whose stabilizing power is indispensable for international stability» including Central African security.^255(*) In the present world, according to certain schools of thought, national security is no more the internal affairs of the sovereign state. Usually, national powers are confronted with international violence. Boundaries have become so fluid, peoples have become so interwoven and violence has become so spread that the notion of national security must be redefined. The central question is this, how far must the US go to cover the space for her security? In fact, to secure herself and her allies, the US must attain the highest level of security.

If the US needs virgin land to extend her hegemony, which she attests to be a world commodity, are other parts of the world ready to accept Americanization? What Brzezinski contends with, though he is not the first given that Niall Ferguson had already posited that, is that American hegemony benefits the rest of the world, at least to some extent and at different levels. It is possible to imagine that in case a different power was to rule the world, it is not sure the common good will be delivered at the same proportions. His reserves, however, lie in the practice of globalization. If there is «a natural doctrine of world hegemony» in which one power must rule the world as has been demonstrated by Paul Kennedy, it is obvious that there are victims who are hegemonized by the dominant power. In the same vein, Americanization is sending a message of a single culture around the world, which is not bad culture anyway, but which submerges other cultures. Finally, globalization has served American power, accelerating global integration to the level where there are «no frontiers except for persons».^256(*)

If «the great powers of the past are too tired or too weak to endorse the role played by the US today» as Brzezinski stated at the beginning,^257(*) then we must accept that the US has some interest in some weak form of unilateralism. It is clear to Brzezinski that if America was to withdraw from world affairs as China did some five centuries ago, the world would plunge into chaos, and America with it. In any case, even if not in the near future, America will one day give her seat to another hegemon, and that is why Americans must begin reflecting on the type of legacy they would want to leave behind. The US is either a fortress with a threatening shadow on a mountain, or a city that illuminates the whole world, showing the way of progress and development.

However, Africa is likely to be a victim of this new imperialism. Bellamy observed that «Imperialism is constant for capitalism.»^258(*) The building of the American empire around the world has gone through carious phases. If «At present the world is experiencing a new age of imperialism marked by a U.S. grand strategy of global domination,» as Bellamy says, then greater US presence in Cameroon is precisely in that framework.^259(*) Especially that «One indication of how things have changed [since 9/11] is that the U.S. military is now truly global in its operations with permanent bases on every continent, including Africa, where a new scramble for control is taking place focused on oil.»^260(*) Through different publications, Bellamy shows adequately that if the idea of imperialism was refuted or contended during the cold war, and to some extend, after the Cold War, after 9/11, it is not only accepted but also vigorously defended. In a series of articles published on the subject, Bellamy asserts that the «The New Age of Imperialism» (July-Aug. 2003) corresponds with Kipling's the «White Man's Burden,» of US Imperialism (Nov. 2003). If that be so, he wonders, «Is Iraq Another Vietnam?» (June 2004). In «The American Empire: Pax Americana or Pox Americana?» (Sept. 2004), Bellamy states that America cannot bring peace to the world. He furthers this idea in another articles, with Brett Clark
»Empire of Barbarism» (Dec. 2004) looking at American atrocities in the name of empire, to end with «The Failure of Empire» (Jan. 2005).^261(*)

However, not everyone agrees with Bellamy's rather pessimistic reading of American imperialism and its effects on Africa. Naill Ferguson makes a point by making a difference between empire and hegemony - though empire is difficult to assert, hegemony is much easier and profitable to all across the board.^262(*) He quotes Kaplan as saying «there is a positive side to empire» in the same way as Sebastian Mallaby's American `neo-imperialism' as the best remedy for `chaos' engendered by `failed states' around the world.<sup>263(*)</sup> At the head of an `Anglophone Empire', America intends to bring about the `benefits of colonization' as an effect of imperialism.<sup>264(*)</sup> In this sense, the situation of Africans, and Central Africans in particular, creates the extension of `empire by invitation'.^265(*) If empire is «the extension of one's civilization, usually by military force to rule over other peoples»,^266(*) then American military presence in the Gulf of Guinea incorporates the region into the American empire. This dilemma becomes fearful when «imperialism of internationalism could last indefinitely in countries palpably incapable of stable self-rule».^267(*) Central Africa therefore appears to be an area to be incorporated in the Pax Americana, at all cost.

2. The cost of greater engagement

What will it cost the US if it is increasingly engaged in Central Africa, benefits and challenges? This question has underlined this work so far, but needs to be succinctly answered. In foreign policy formulation, in the realist tradition, policy-makers think first of their gain, the national interest. In our analysis, it will be important to start with what the US stands to gain by engaging in Central Africa through relations with Cameroon. But after we see that, we will have to see what it stands to loss, that is, challenges the US will be facing in the sub-region.

The US stands to gain in the following; fight against terrorism, fight against drug trafficking, access to natural resources, and control the sub-region. In the fight against terrorism, the US will monitor, in partnership with local governments the activities and possible infiltration of terrorists in such a strategic zone. This monitoring will involve a check on terrorists finance, recruitment and planning. As an important transit zone of drugs to the US and from Latin America, the fight against illicit drugs trafficking will be enhanced by greater control of the Gulf of Guinea. In the same way, greater engagement in Central Africa will secure energy resources against vandalism, expropriation and control by other rival powers. A total control of the sub-region will grant access to military facilities, the putting min place of a security belt and the furthering of democracy and the rule of law.

However, the US does not lose in mind the numerous challenges that engaging in the sub-region involves. These challenges could be budgetary, ideological, security and imperial clash. It has been noted throughout this paper that greater US presence in the sub-region requires budgetary sacrifices by US taxpayers. In fact, the more the engagement, the greater the cost. This budgetary sacrifice is made difficult by the slow pace to democracy and the rule of law in the sub-region. It could be explained that this slow pace is due to cultural differences between the two peoples, and that a people with a different political history will not embrace the American version of democracy over-night. It will cost time, energy and money to transform CA, though probably less sacrifices than in the Middle East. The US also has security challenges to face in the region. Local security systems are poor (both in funding and in management), putting US personnel and installations at risk. The Terrorist Index cited above also identified. In the Terrorism Index cited above, index's experts also disapprove of how it [US] is controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and its [US] dealings with failing states. Central Africa has most of these failing states and the US will have to develop a proactive approach in managing them.

The last challenge is how to manage relations with other powers, which also have interests in the sub-region. The prospects for imperial clash hunt the US policy-maker. The pace of Chinese penetration in the sub-region, the existing French installations make it a competition for the US to pursue its interests. The US would prefer to avoid confrontations, as it did during the Cold War, especially with the disagreements that exist between the US and traditional allies in places like the Middle East.

Managing relations with European allies is going to be a challenge. The Terrorism Index that assesses how America is tackling terrorism revealed in a pew that many policy experts in the US disapprove of how America is handling its relations with European allies.^268(*) It is therefore a real preoccupation for US policy-makers to engage in another confrontation with allies they need to woo. Ms. Theresa Whelan underscored this need in 2002 when she declared, «We have to continue to work with our European partners. This is a global partnership; the US and the Africans, as well as the US and the Europeans, that has been DoD's formula for success, and we now have to put that into practice.»^269(*) The problem of managing relations with European allies in the former backyard is well known in Washington, the real issue is what strategy to adopt. For the Department of Defense spokesperson, European expertise in military issues will be indispensable, especially in Francophone Africa. The case is however expected to be different in trade/resources issues.

When the AGOA was launched, it was immediately perceived in European capitals as a competitor to the Lome Accords. Agoa was then described in France as being «evidently part of a larger project for the promotion of a trade policy geared towards invading a market that till now has been European business and to secure the exploitation of strategic resources (oil, minerals...)».^270(*) In fact, if Washington needs Paris for peacekeeping, it does not need it for business, though there needs to be a concerted effort in promoting democracy. Though we do not know exactly how best the US has to manage relations with European allies while not losing sight of its own interest, it seems plausible that the US has to engage more formally and sincerely on African issues with European allies.

Section 2: stakes for other great powers.

1. A threat to the French

The importance of Cameroon to the French is underscored by the hospitality given to General de Gaulle in October 1940. After several attempts failed from his London refuge under Churchill,^271(*) he embarked on a search for a safe haven and troops in the African West Coast. After a failed attempt at German positions in September 1940 in Dakar, it was finally in Douala that de Gaulle landed. In his speech of gratitude, de Gaulle declared, «Today, I have regained my trust». It is therefore from Cameroon that major French attacks against German positions in the sub-region were launched, and from there that troops were gathered to liberate France.^272(*) So, not only can we say that Cameroon played a major role in French liberalization during WWII, but also that Cameroon has remained a central figure in French policies toward not only Central Africa, but the whole of Francophone Africa.

In an interview granted by former French ambassador to Cameroon, Jean Francois Valette, the latter assessed the negative image Cameroonians, and francophone Africa has of French policies. Showing exasperation at media perception of France, he said, «I simply belief that our Franco - Cameroonian relations is perceived through parameters which belong to the 60-70s. That comes up time and again in the press through titles focused or arrayed on the France-Afrique or such things.»^273(*) Public opinion is not less critical of the Americans or especially the Chinese, seems quite intolerant to the French especially of the dubious France-Afrique of the 60s and 70s.

This does not mean that French economic interest in Cameroon has diminished but that the media believes the French have never really left. Mr. Valette acknowledges French presence from a development perspective, asserting that «We need to know that today, after France, one of the main state donors in Cameroon is the European Development Fund which intervenes particularly in roads. Most roads existing in Cameroon are financed by Europe, are inside this Europe there is 25% of France. This, people ignore.» In other words, if France intervenes in its own right as the main donor for development, and as 25% of Europe, what is going to be the future of relations with greater intervention by the US? We should note that in spite of American greater presence, France remains Cameroon's highest supplier and greatest investor in terms of foreign direct investment, with about 160 commercial branches and 200 companies. Great-power rivalry in the region might gain unprecedented proportions.

Cameroon is not only a commercial center in French Africa policies. In Central African sub-region in particular and francophone Africa in general, Cameroon seems to play a pivot role in military operations. This strategic position seems to be demonstrated by the place of Cameroon in the French-sponsored Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP). It is in this light that Cameroon hosted a military exercise (SAWA 2006) whose origin is French but which today has a completely multilateral scope. The RECAMP SAWA 2006 concerned countries of the North such as France, the US, Japan, Canada and ECCAS countries as Cameroon, Angola, Gabon, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. The choice of ECCAS as the geopolitical entity and Cameroon as host country of this exercise further reveals the importance of both the zone and the country, and especially the prospects of an oncoming Fashoda.

In spite of dwindling French influence in Africa, their economic interests have not diminished. At the continental level, «between 1997 and 2003, the investments of private French corporations in Africa have multiplied by two».^274(*) That is to say that French influence has only decreased in some areas (development aid and political power), and in relation to other powers whose presence are better felt by the local population. In the same period when French private investment is doubling by two, Mr. Valette states that «French investment [in Cameroon] during the same period (1997-2003) multiplied by 2.5.,»^275(*) that is, Cameroon has benefited from French investment more the average of French investment in Africa. The relative increase in French private investment in Cameroon is due to the political problems they met in Cote d'Ivoire. The situation in Cote d'Ivoire where the French are being accused of supporting the rebels, a situation that led to the expropriation of French asserts, should explain some of the anti-French feelings one might observe in Central Africa. The boards crowds were carrying in 2004 in abijan titled «Chirac Go Home, Bush Welcome» reveals an African context of exasperation with France and the latter's replacement by the US.

Cameroonian writer, Mongo Beti has been insisting for over forty years that a decline in French influence in Cameroon means the end of French imperialism in the entire Central African sub-region. Most of his works such as Mission to Kala (1964) are critically admired, amusing and popular short novels on the dislocating effects of Western culture on African identity. Beti's The Story of the Madman (Charlottesville, V. A.: University of Virginia, 1994) is an attack on the postcolonial state. It is especially in his book, Rape of Cameroon that he asserts the dwindling French influence in Cameroon and consequently in the sub-region.

Even French researchers have increasingly criticized French politics in Africa. Several titles of newspapers have raised the alarm on dwindling French influence in Africa.^276(*) In fact, France has progressively lost its place in Africa since the end of the Cold War, largely because of the Françafrique and French implication in conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide. Stephen smith, writing about the consequences of French politics in Africa, concludes that «An entire section of the continent is being crushed in an identity crisis of anti-French feelings... as for France, it is but a bigger Belgium which has just returned from the African shores - too large for her.»^277(*) It is therefore possible to think that in African minds, «France/Africa is dead»^278(*) and it is time for African countries to diversify development partnership, especially when the newcomers have the means for their policies.

A greater US presence in the Central African sub-region therefore threatens the French in what can be called the last backyard of French presence in Africa. In 1997, Eric Fottorino noticed the upcoming confrontations horizons thus «[the] mastery of oil zones in Congo, Angola or in Chad prefigures confrontations that are not necessarily amicable between Washington and Paris»^279(*) with the 9/11 events and global American commitment to fight terrorists wherever they be, this confrontation is today to be greater. It is equally in the same sense that Delphine Lecoutre and Admore Mupoki Kambudzi observed that «Disappointed by a France which has promised human rights and development without really promoting them, African peoples are turning increasingly toward the US and China».^280(*)

A notable consequence of US engagement in Cameroon should be French exasperation at how Cameroon is welcoming the US. French fears are based on the same geopolitical calculations as the US: whoever controls Cameroon controls the Gulf of Guinea, and whoever controls the Gulf of Guinea controls the continent. It is not therefore with applause that the French apprehend US greater presence in Cameroon. The question one should be asking is whether the French have the means to compete with the US in its (French) `former' backyard. In other woods, how can the French continue their policies unabated in a region coveted by rivals that are by far more powerful? We might not be able to answer that question here, but it is worth asking. Madina has witnessed skirmishes of French counter attack in the cultural domain thus «in time past, the American Cultural Center was really active, but lost its opulence because of the French Cultural Center which has boosted its presence and has been realizing several artistic and cultural works».^281(*) The question we will rather ask is this, what should Cameroon do with all that, what are the stakes when a small power like Cameroon becomes the bone of contention of powerful states? Shall the fate of Thucydides' Meleans befall this small Central African state?

One of the features of post 9/11 IR, especially after the Iraq war, is the Transatlantic Divide. This divide relates to European (especially France and Germany) resistance to US unilateralism and hegemony. In this moment where the US is seeking reconciliation with her traditional allies in Europe, what role can Cameroon play? It depends on how the relations are managed. Basically, it could lead to greater confrontation (as we will see in chapter 4) or greater cooperation or a dilemma. In a realists reading of IR as essentially competitive, one would see a divide. But a liberal reading of cooperation, especially with common values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the African development bank could all make of Cameroon a subject of accord between hitherto divided allies.

Working on the implications of Western powers in the democratic process in Africa, and dealing with the case of France and the US in Cameroon, Ebolo notes that these two powers, apart from their foreign policy differences and historical models, pursue both the promotion of the liberal model and their national interests.^282(*) He however acknowledges that in spite of these stated similarities in foreign pressure for democratization, «the US commitment towards the instauration of a democratic state of law looks more stated than the role, rather ambiguous played by the French in this key country of their African backyard.»^283(*) This US commitment, expressed in declarations of the State Department and reports issued by the Yaoundé embassy are reminiscent of the ideological beliefs and values in US history. The US therefore found no remorse in supporting the opposition provided the latter would bring democracy and the rule of law. Ebolo expresses opposition support for US actions in Cameroon thus: «Opposition forces have largely cautioned the US actions [in Cameroon] at the time when they were criticizing, not without vehemence, French activism.»^284(*) Opposition criticism of French actions or inaction should be understood from the fact that the French were potentially more influential in Cameroon than the Americans.

2. Future confrontations with China?

The duel between Washington and Beijing in Central Africa could have even far-reaching implications that the confrontation with the French. The place Cameroon gives to China came to the lamplight in September 2003 when Cameroonian President, Paul Biya was received as the first as the first African president to visit the newly installed Chinese government of Hu Jintao. Chinese relations with Africa, though to be traced two centuries away, only took considerable proportions in the 1950s and 60s. Apart from what Chietigj Bajpaee calls «China's goodwill with African states» which «can be traced back to its [Chinese] support for anti-colonial struggles in the 1960s», in those years, china was interested in three main domains: fostering the principle of `One China', countering capitalists' initiatives, and countering Russian initiatives.^285(*)

The principle of One China emerged after the Chinese civil war in the 1950s, which left the Beijing government seeking to isolate Taiwan while pressurizing Africa governments to break relations with Taiwan. This Beijing tactic was going to bear fruits in UN votes from African countries. On the other hand, since China belonged to the Communist block, China supported communist regimes allover Africa, especially in Ghana, Mozambique, Ethiopia, etc. China's other engagement in Africa in the late 60s was rivalry with its communist ally - Russia. This has been reported by Princeton Lyman when he wrote that «China's other objective was to compete not only with Western influence but Russia's.»^286(*) This happened in countries like Mozambique and Angola. In those early years of Sino-African relations, Chinese financial commitments in Africa were relative and could not compete with Western donations and investment.

The new posture in Sino-African relations was only observed in the 1990s when China embarked on huge economic, military and diplomatic reforms. It was in 1995 that the China National Petroleum Corporation (C.N.P.C.) established oil exploration rights in Sudan. In the years that followed, China had to return to the continent in force because of energy needs for its growing industry. According to Lyman, «China returns to Africa in the 21^st century with not only a need for economic resources but with the cash to play the game dramatically and competitively.»^287(*) With oil interests in Algeria, Angola, Chad and Sudan and increasing stakes in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria, China has greatly increased her presence in Cameroon. With the disappearance of the communist block, there are no anti-colonial struggles, capitalists rivals nor Russian competitor; today, it is only economics and sometimes insistence on the One China principle.

As for Sino-Cameroon relations, there has been considerable growth since both countries opened diplomatic relations in 1971. In comparison to the other two rival powers (France and US), China is therefore a newcomer into the region. Though Cameroon enjoyed better relations with China than other African countries because economic policy of mix-economy, it should be noted that official Chinese visits to Cameroon were only at Vice-ministerial level until 2000. The year 2000 is strategic because it marks Chinese decisive diplomatic and economic move to engage African countries in its raw material needs. In diplomatic history, we can note that whereas between 1978 and 1999, thirteen Chinese officials visited Cameroon, since 2000, at least, a Chinese top official visits Cameroon every year. After Dai Bingguo, Minister of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee (February 2000) and Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January 2001), it was Zhu Rongji, Premier of the State Council to pay an official visit Cameroon in 2002.

Cameroonian authorities have shown interests in developing relations with China since the establishment of diplomatic relations. While President Ahmadu Ahidjo visited China twice (1972 and 1978), Paul Biya has been to Beijing at least four times (1986, 1993, 2003 and 2006).^288(*) President Biya has therefore paid more official visits to China than to the US, which gives a warning to the US on the future of relations with a country that is bent on increasing the level of cooperation with another rival power. Apart from the presidents, we should note that almost all Cameroonian top officials have been to China on official working visits.

Chinese interests in Cameroon could be studied from various perspectives, but principally from what Cameroon has as resources and the resources of the sub-region in which Cameroon is leader. The different areas which have received Chinese funding and investment include the Yaoundé Conference Center building, the Lagdo hydro-power station, the Chinese language-training center, the gynaco-obstetric hospital and multi-sport complex in Yaoundé. Apart from those, other Chinese-sponsored petit projects exist such as medical personnel (about 44), military cooperation, ten annual scholarships, road construction and medical equipments. Though these projects have appeased public opinion, several Cameroonians seem skeptical about the real intension of China in Cameroon. With trade agreements signed in 1972 and renewed in 2002, several Chinese corporations have stationed in Cameroon.^289(*) However, Chinese interests in Cameroon should be interpreted beyond Cameroonian borders. Most of the oil-rich countries where China has won contracts are either bordering Cameroon or are not too far. This is true with Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Gabon and Chad. This last country (Chad), as was formally the case with the CAR, is one of the countries still holding relations with Taiwan in Africa. China could solicit Cameroon's support given the latter's influence in the region, to have Chad renounce relations with Taiwan.

Though the Chinese are being increasingly criticized by the West for it despise and even sometimes tacit encouragement of bad governance, lack of democracy and human right abuses, African governments, including those of Central Africa are showing more interests in China. Such forums as the Asia-Africa Summit and the China-Africa Business Council, which was jointly established with the United Nations Development Program in November 2004, work to support China's private sector investment in such countries as Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. In the same vein, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum was initiated in 2000, comprising 46 of the 53 African countries. The November 2006 China-Africa Forum marked the apex of Chinese engagement in Africa and African readiness to `diversify partnership'.

Writing on Sino-US competition in Africa, Chietigj Bajpaee acknowledges that «the competition to secure energy resources on the world stage could fuel their already shaky relationship.»^290(*) He then concludes that «Africa is likely to emerge as a volatile stage of Sino-US energy competition», because of «a plethora of internal crises ranging from poverty to poor governance and civil war».^291(*) The three important spots on the world stage where this competition is taking place are Iran, Sudan and the Gulf of Guinea. In these regions, US exasperation at Chinese disdain for human rights and the sole desire to secure energy resources in conflict-ridden states by offering aid or arms-for-oil could heighten instability in the region. This situation is worsened by the fact that African states have been drawn to China by its non-interventionist, non-ideological approach in conducting relations. The fear that China might leave Africa worst off is also made by the press. Writing on «The «Chinese Tsunami» that Threatens to Swamp Africa», Basildon Peta wondered how the world would Make Poverty History when nothing is done about the Chinese tsunami vulnerable developing states suffering from the impact of Peking's bad policies.^292(*)

In the face of all these challenges, Lyman states that «the United States does have to recognize that the United States, and the western nations altogether, cannot consider Africa any more their chasse gardé as the French once considered Francophone Africa.» Chinese bit for oil and market is rapidly out-weighing the West. There, Lyman concludes that «there is a new strategic framework operating on the continent and it demands new ways of operating.»^293(*) Lyman proposes three challenging ideas; 1. the impetus must come from Africans themselves with the US providing more fund for democracy, good governance and civil-society building; 2. the second opening Western markets for African goods; 3. US engaging China on African issues given that China wants to be respected as a world power.

Section 3: Protected by the colossus: What stakes for Cameroon in the present state of affairs?

This question is important for Cameroon first, then for the foreign powers interested in the sub-region. It is interesting to see what benefits there are for a country to be protected by the colossus - the hyper US power. An important question toward the end of this study is what becomes of Cameroon in this environment of quest for virgin territory and resources in Central Africa. The issue of how Cameroon sees itself and perceives others takes us to the study of other poles of attraction in the Gulf of Guinea such as Gabon, DRC Congo and Angola; examine how Cameroon can benefit from the present state of relations, as well as the future of Cameroon US relations. The impact of a greater American presence in the sub-region, and the consequent power tussle among countries of this part of the world are difficult to evaluate. US engagement will provoke not only a more muscular commitment by Central African countries for leadership positions, but it will also lead to a somewhat `race for alignment'.^294(*)

1. Cameroon and other poles of attraction in the sub-region.

Though as seen in the preceding chapter, Cameroon is a de facto leader and consequent ally of great powers in the sub-region, this position is coveted by some, detested and resented by other countries in the sub-region. The most out-spoken of all these competitors to hegemony is Gabon. Besides Gabon is the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. This situation has two possible explanations; the general tendency of power politics among nations or the hegemonic hubris inherent in all states,^295(*) the fear of a powerful neighbor, and on the other hand Cameroon's inefficiency in playing its leadership role there by creating a power vacuum which other countries want to fill.

Talking about Gabonese leadership pretensions in the sub-region, «Gabon has always shown its leadership ambitions, Awoumou says, that but it is not qualified to bear such a responsibility".^296(*) These ambitions are explained by the fact that Gabon has the highest rate of human index and that until recently; it produced the highest quantity of petroleum. Apart from that, Gabon is usually described as a relay for French policy and influence in Central Africa, and that it has built an alliance system with Congo (Brazzaville). Not only that, Gabon is seen to receive more international personalities, such as presidents, prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, especially of Chine, US, France and Latin American countries. To consolidate these diplomatic advantages, Gabonese President, Omar Bongo, is personally involved in several diplomatic issues such as conflict resolutions, famine and disease at the continental level.^297(*) For the past few years, Gabonese alliance with Congo Brazzaville appears to be a constant factor in asserting its appetite for a leadership position. Both countries share several historical, cultural, economic and geopolitical similarities, which President Bongo hopes to rely on, especially that president Bongo has the main mediator on Congolese conflicts.

Writing on the `Cameroon-Gabon couple' as an engine for Central Africa, Awoumou refutes Gabonese capacity to lead the sub-regional bodies (CEMAC/ECCAS) with several reasons. He states emphatically that «Libreville is disqualified [from leading the sub-region] because it does not adhere to regional integration projects, preferring simple cooperation and diplomatic activism.»^298(*) Gabon seems to block community initiatives such as freedom of movement, the right to establishment, and is not enthusiastic paying of its dues (retaining more than 60%). Though these actions in disfavor of integration initiatives cannot by themselves disqualify Gabon as a regional leader (even aligning with Congo),^299(*) they add to more convincing factors. They are geographic, demographic and politico-economic factors. Geographically, Gabon has a surface area of 267 667 km², while Cameroon has 475 442 km² while a low population density of eight inhabitants/km², makes the country difficult to secure. Demographically, both Gabon and Congo amount to only five million in the 29 million total for CEMAC. That population deficiency handicaps Gabon's power ambitions. From an economic and political perspective, Gabonese economy is in recession due to a reduction in oil production (the principal element in the country's GNP), while Congo is in a reconstruction process after many years of conflict. On the other hand, Cameroon is not as easily influenced by the other countries in the sub-region as Gabon.^300(*)

Gabon is not however the only contestant to Cameroonian hegemony in the sub-region. A more serious candidate is Angola. With increasing oil production and the third attraction to US investments in sub-Saharan Africa, Angola poses a more serious threat to Cameroonian ambitions to lead the region, especially from a US perspective. If one of the measures of power is military capacity, Angola stands to beat Cameroon with 2.5% of GDP for military issues while Cameroon runs 1.5%. apart from that, Angolan experience in civil war, though giving it a bad position because of the need to build stability, gives the Angolans betters possibilities in military issues than Cameroon, especially than Angola participated actively in DR Congo civil war form 1998 to 2004.

What will happen when the DRC will become politically stabilized? It is possible to posit that the DRC will weild more power that Cameroon for several reasons. First, it has access to the sea as Cameroon does and would service Rwanda and Burundi. Secondly, it has more resources than Cameroon, which if exploited in the best way would propel its economic power. Third, it has a larger population with a historical capacity to influence the region, as was the case in the early days of colonization. More over, the DRC was the Western ally during the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa (apart from South Africa). With former President Mumbutu, the US channeled funds to combat communism and promote capitalism in Central and East Africa. Most scientific works published about US Cold War policies towards Africa stress the role played by DRC.^301(*) It is therefore likely that with the present competition of foreign powers in the DRC (between South Africa, the EU and America), Cameroon comes to lose its privileged position.

There has also been a leadership tussle between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea since the latter become an oil exporting country with enormous resources. According to Chouala, the 2004 diplomatic crisis that erupted between the two countries was essentially a leadership crisis. For him, the struggle is to `capture' US strategic presence.^302(*) Chouala further explains that by accusing Cameroon of harboring mercenaries, Equatorial Guinea was trying to discredit Cameroon as a country which supports mercenaries/terrorists, and thereby receive support fron the US. Alluding to the general context of power struggle in the sub-region, Chouala concludes that

In this international crusade against Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea is more or less discretely supported by continental powers which are targeting the oil riches of this country, and who relate Yaoundé's withdrawal with an increase in their own influence. That is certainly the case with South Africa, which is seeking to have a foothold in Equato-Guinean oil wells.^303(*)

This clash of powers in the sub-region is not only with South Africa, but, especially, with Nigeria, such that the coming of the US only exacerbates this clash.

2. How can Cameroon benefit from the present state of relations?

From the facts presented above, historically, Cameroon is in its best relations with the US, but from a geopolitical perspective, much still has to be done. Other African countries such as Kenya, Morocco and Egypt are in far better situations with the US. It is important for researcher and politicians to see what stakes and what way forward for Cameroon, what attitude to adopt. Cameroon stands to lose by adopting a confrontational posture since she has no rival ambitions. She needs not even adopt a legalistic or philosophical standpoint since that will not pay either. The only thing is for Cameroon to ally with the strong, plan relations with the US in a way that she can obtain the best out of the relationship. Cameroon must however be careful to raise the fury of US enemies. «The maximum amount of force can and should be used as quickly as possible for psychological impact--to demonstrate that the empire cannot be challenged with impunity,» as Bellamy Foster wrote warning about confrontations with America, «....imperial strategy focuses on preventing the emergence of powerful, hostile challengers to the empire: by war if necessary, but by imperial assimilation if possible.»^304(*) Cameroon is not therefore emerging as a challenger to the US for obvious reasons, but as a partner, a regional ally, assimilated into the empire.

It will be interesting to begin by asking a constructivist question; how did Cameroon respond to 9/11. Apart from joining other African governments to condemn the attacks, the Cameroonian government followed suit to sign the UN international convention against terrorism. Cameroonian reaction was important because as President Bush put it, "On September the 11th, we resolved that we would go on the offense against our enemies, and we would not distinguish between the terrorists and those who harbor or support them.» Apart from an insignificant section (probably fundamentalist) of the 20% Muslim population of Cameroon that continued to pour invectives on the US government, the Cameroonian people overwhelmingly condemned the attacks, expressed sympathy and support for the American people. This sympathy generally corroborates with the penchant for the American dream inhabiting young Cameroonians.^305(*) On the other hand, Cameroonian government, as other sub-Saharan African countries, gave support for different international conventions against terrorism. Within Cameroon, security was reinforced around the US Embassy and embassy personnel and to Americans in Cameroon in general. Then, the US message was `they that are not for are against us', and Cameroon needed not be against Americans. Cameroonian support was equally seen through the wit with which Cameroon managed her position as chair of the Security Council in the debates preceding the Iraq War. President Biya's visit to Washington the day before the Iraq War was launched was interpreted not only as endorsement for that war in particular, but as Cameroonian alignment with America in general.

Cameroon's reaction to the events of 9/11 revealed that the U ni t ed States is a «C ity on a Hill» and as such holds extr ao r dinar y sy mbolic significance. Many Cameroonians, as other peoples around the world look to the United States as a place where achievement trumps ascription, where religious and cultural diversity is tolerated, where economic opportunity is available to all, and where the positive achievements of modernity have reached their apogee. For others, how- ever, the United States embodies the evils of globalization, the gross disparity in wealth and power between the West and the developing world, and the reckless use of military force. Surely we knew this already: around the world, McDonald's restaurants are routinely sacked when angry crowds gather to demonstrate against some perceived American wrong. But September 11 brought home with renewed force the importance of the United States as symbol. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon represented more than American economic and military dominance. They also symbolized the global economic, military, and cultural ascendancy of the West, and the comparative marginalization of much of the rest of the world. As the terrorists of September 11 knew and many others have since learned, to attack the symbols is to strike at the heart of power. Here again, brute geopolitical facts give way to questions of perspective, of interpretation, of geography--and of ideology. If one's geographic perspective is from the margins and one's interpretive schema reflects this position, how does one respond to Western pre-eminence differently than if one is at home in the core?

Cameroon has reasons aligning with the US. There are political, military, economic, and trade imperatives for Cameroon. Politically, Cameroon needs American support to ensure its security in the Gulf of Guinea against threats from its powerful neighbor, Nigeria,^306(*) but also from other countries in the sub-region. The need is even stronger today with fears of a spillover of the Darfur war into Cameroonian territory. Within Cameroonian territory, Cameroon needs to check possible insurrections from the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), as well infiltrations of fundamentalist Muslims from northern Nigeria. In the same vein, Cameroon needs US military training and equipments to modernize its army and make it more response-able. Cameroon could benefit from the over $100 million set aside by the Bush Administration for the fight against terrorism in Africa. That will help reinforce border control, police services and exchange of information between the US and Cameroon, potentially dismantling Al-Qaeda networks in the region. Economically, it is in Cameroon's interest to reap the most from US international development funds (the Millennium Challenge Account, funds against HIV/AIDS, Bird Flu, etc.) and debt cancellation. Finally, Cameroon is at the point today of wooing investors. The US, since the end of the Cold War, has been investing heavily (at least in comparison with the past) in Africa, and that increase has accelerated since 2001. Aligning with the US will help Cameroon attract large chunk of this foreign direct investment (FDI).

There is a fair consensus and consistency on Africa's priorities, defined in part by the unavoidable challenges of HIV/AIDS, poverty and conflicts.^307(*) The plague of disease and poverty to Cameroonian people put them before unprecedented challenges. In isolations, Cameroon will not meet these challenges, it requires the engagement of all partners especially that the US is the biggest single donor for both poverty reduction funds and funds to fight HIV/AIDS.

Nevertheless, for Cameroon to reap adequately from these funds, political reforms have to be initiated. In spite of the intensification of relations as seen throughout this paper, the US still insist on the need to effect political reforms, institute the rule of law and accelerate the democratization process. Cameroon cannot ignore US calls for democratization because of the place it occupies in American policy-makers and because of the several lobbying groups in the US that insist that Cameroon must democratize. In American thought, the progress so far has been good but insufficient. After all, are the issues of human rights and good governance just for the Americans, the French and the Commonwealth? Are they not for Cameroonians primarily?

From a sub-regional perspective, the absence of a sub-regional power that takes up its leadership role is an invitation to Cameroonian authorities to play their `natural' role. Cameroon's leadership role is not necessarily to «oppose the appetites the sub-region induces»^308(*), but to define interests, defend them and create a consensus within the countries of the sub-region and between them and coveting super-powers. Studying the question of leadership within the GG, Awoumou proposes the following model;

The GG can adopt a strategy for the promotion and defense of its interests in two ways; one that focuses on Central Africa as a specific identity with the CEMAC as a reference framework for integration under the leadership of the Cameroon-Chad couple. The other way would be the creation of a sub-entity led by an Abuja-Yaoundé-Luanda axis within the framework of redefined ambitions for the Commission of the Gulf of Guinea.^309(*)

He explains that Cameroon must appear `going it alone' in the sub-region because of the hegemonic fears which such a move will raise in the other countries. In any case, both ways put Cameroon at a prime position. Apart from that, it is not impossible for Cameroon to go it all alone in Central Africa, given that other countries do so in their sub-regions (Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa, South Africa in Southern Africa, etc.). It will likely depend on the charisma with which Cameroon will steer the affairs of the region.

3. What future for Cameroon US relations? Challenges of an emerging Central African country?

We need to understand what Cameroon stands to gain from greater cooperation with the US. However, there are several challenges facing Cameroon in this present state of matters. The first series of challenges have been treated above, but there are negative impacts, for which Cameroon must carter. One of the foremost challenges is the place the fight against terrorism should occupy in Cameroonian foreign policy. Cameroon will not afford to make the fight against terrorism a foreign policy priority. Though the US would put pressure in this direction, as it has been doing concerning the Iraq War (insisting that Cameroon should denounce terrorism there and declared its solidarity with Iraqi people), it will be unwise for Cameroonian authorities to go that far because of three reasons. Africa and the United States are both integral to the new international order. They have developed an interdependent relationship. They both need each other as markets, and the United States needs such critical African natural resources as petroleum and the continent's partnership in the fight against international terrorism. Africa needs US development assistance in all areas, its technological know-how, and its technological assets.^310(*) The first is that Cameroon's foreign policy priorities are the fight against diseases and poverty. The fight against terrorism, important as it is, cannot constitute policy priorities because terrorist threats are not as serious in Cameroon as in other countries.

On the other hands, Cameroon has relations with the Islamic world to manage. Not that the Islamic world is pro-terrorism, but that the conception, definition and operations of the term are conceived differently from the American perspective. Cameroon is a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, enjoying good relations with a majority of those countries. Apart from that, too much insistence on the fight against terrorism, and aligning with the US could attract the fury of Islamic fundamentalists, which will be dangerous to Cameroonian security and image around the world. There is consequently a need to strike a balance between both interests and avoid the extremes.

The third reason, which has not only to do with the fight against terrorism, but the broad pro-Americanism in Cameroon's foreign policy, and noticeable from the Security Council debates over the Iraq war in 2003, is relations with France. Cameroon should lose mind of relations with France, a particularly difficult and jealous partner as far as the US is concerned. It is understandable in French parlance these days that France is not receiving the attention her reputation and status merits from a country like Cameroon.

How can Cameroon tackle all these challenges? Cameroon must constitute think tanks or policy planning staffs (permanent or ad hoc), especially in relation to the US. In the US, Haas asserts that «The rise of modern think tanks parallels the rise of the United States to global leadership».311(*) Think tanks are a distinctively American phenomenon, operating as an independent policy research institutions shaping both domestic and foreign policies. According to Haass, «Of the many influences on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the most important and least appreciated.»312(*) This role can also apply to Cameroon, especially in its dealing with America, and in the prospects of greater Cameroon engagement in the sub-region. Haass identifies five ways by which think tanks affect US policy formulation:

by generating original ideas and options for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for employment in government, by offering venues for high-level discussions, by educating U.S. citizens about the world, and by supplementing official efforts to mediate and resolve conflict.313(*)

Instituting think tanks for Cameroonian foreign policy in general and Cameroon Us policy in particular will provide the advantages Haass put forward above, though such institutions might to wield as much power and funds as US think tanks would do. A last convincing role and advantage of think tanks advanced by Haass is that, «Unencumbered by official positions, think tank scholars can afford to give candid assessments of pressing global challenges and the quality of government responses.»314(*) In other words, they play the role of autonomous foreign policy analysts.

Another pertinent issue is the formulation of a US foreign policy goal. Faced with an unavoidable, powerful and interesting partner, Cameroon must clearly define the goals of its policy in political, economic, social, cultural and strategic terms. Knowing the concept of selective engagement, Cameroon has to convince US policy-makers of the need to engage with Cameroon. The level of US investment in Cameroon today is quite high, but it needs to stand at its maximum. America must not perceived as a far away country, but as a strategic partner with whom formidable projects could be initiated. Engaging political dialogue, for instance through the many American corporations in Cameroon such as EXIM Bank, while presenting potential investment sectors, will largely boast US investment in Cameroon. Such a dialogue will define responsibilities for both the US and Cameroon, focused on three pillars. One is debt relief, or debt consolidation. Another is fair trade. And the third is an increase, a significant increase, of aid, exactly to tap into these changes which are coming, to tap resources which can make a huge impact in changing the conditions of people in Cameroon.^315(*)

GENERAL CONCLUSION

At the end of this paper, it is worth asking which came first for the Americans in their foreign policy towards Central Africa: promotion (imposition) of democracy or the protection of strategic (oil and military) interests. We now know that Americans of all political persuasions, Republicans or Democrats, believe profoundly that it is their right and duty, indeed their destiny, to promote freedom and democracy in the world. In fact, since independence, exporting democracy has always been their purpose. It is a noble and powerful impulse, one not casually to be ridiculed or dismissed. But their success requires that this impulse be balanced against, and where necessary, circumscribed by other interests that the United States must necessarily pursue, more mundane ones like security, order and prosperity. In fact, Owen Harries writes that «For these represent not merely legitimate competing claims but the preconditions for a lasting extension of democracy.»^316(*) It is another thing altogether if democracy is good for oil, if dictators are not better allies.

It is another question altogether if America is succeeding in implanting democracy in Central Africa. From the definition of democracy given in chapter 2, it will be difficult to say yes. To take just two of the elements of democracy - liberalism and political transition, it may be said that Central African states are still far from being democratic. There is no liberal democracy in the region, nor is there liberalism that could be a favourable environment for democracy. On the second element, democratic regime change, it remains that America still has to effect such a change in the region. In fact, the region has the longest presidents in power, have organized everything but free and fair elections. President Bongo of Gabon has been there for close to 40 years, President Biya for 25, President Obiang Ngeuma for 28, President Derby came in through a military coup and has been there for 18 years. The CAR has gone from one military regime to another, while the DR Congo is still coming out of war, as Burundi and Rwanda. Even President Dos Santos of Angola has been there for close to 20 years, having come in through a coup. At the US embassy in Yaoundé, officials affirm clearly that the US has done much for democracy in Cameroon, and that the advances today, including the relative stability, is thanks to the US.

However, US success in the region also requires an awareness of the intractability of a world that does not exist merely in order to satisfy American expectations, a world that, for the most part, cannot satisfy those expectations in the foreseeable future. The same questions that have been asked about the Middle East could be asked of Central Africa: is it possible to democratize Central Africa; is it even necessary to do so? As Owen noted, «While determination and purposefulness are important ingredients in any effective policy, the attempt to force history in the direction of democracy by an exercise of will is likely to produce more unintended than intended consequences.»^317(*) The organization of elections in all countries of the sub-region could be interpreted as an indication of the possibility of instituting democracy, but successful promotion of democracy calls for restraint and patience. The examples of `democratically elected' regimes in Iran and Palestine have lessons to teach on the dangers of what Fareed Zakaria calls the rise of `illiberal democracy'. It would be necessary for America to work towards liberalism as a precondition for democracy, for it is democracy that will justify and preserve strategic interests.

One of the difficulties encountered in this study is the complex nature of managing theories and methods in international relations. It has been clear that particular facts could be read from several theories, using different methods. The handling of three theories in the study of Cameroon US relations has been instrumental in enlarging the debate of whether Cameroon is at all important to the US and how the US policy maker sees such an importance, if any. At the end, it appears plausible that different departments in the US administration see Cameroon with particular lenses - interdependence, realism and/or liberalism. Or better still; they see Cameroon through the realist lens in association with either interdependence or liberalism. The National Security Council and the Department of Defense would be predominantly realists, while the State Department and Congress would be interdependent/liberalists.

As for our hypothetical assertion that the US has post 9/11 geopolitical and strategic interests in Cameroon, which have greatly modified their perception, it has been discovered that this is only true to some extent. First geopolitical interests are quite vast and inter-related with several other interests. Secondly, the geopolitical interests are potentially pre-9/11, only receiving new impulses after that date. In that sense, 9/11 as an event is not as important as the interpretation and especially the revelation thereof as far as US perception of Cameroon is concerned. From analysis of our data, it appears that the US had it as a project a long time before 9/11 to improve relations with Cameroon for strategic purposes. One could therefore think that the area became a geopolitical priority before 11 September 2001. At a meeting in 2000 on Africa's energy potential, oil companies told the Congress sub-committee on Africa just that. The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS), a think-tank set up in Jerusalem in 1984, played an important part in the meeting.^318(*)

Our findings have been quite revealing of the depth of changes since the tragic events of 9/11. If the United States took a ten-year "holiday from history" from the end of the Cold War until the terrorist attack of September 11, as Charles Krauthammer observed,^319(*) post 9/11 was a time of grand strategy. In chapter one, we saw that the history of US-Cameroon relations and the geopolitical factors within Cameroon have largely influenced changes observable since 9/11. In chapter 2, it was clear, that the reasons for a greater US presence in Cameroon might be found more in the economic and strategic interests of the Gulf of Guinea and the leadership role Cameroon plays or can play there. To measure real increase in relations, we assessed practical and symbolic changes such as visits and public diplomacy in the third chapter with the result that there has been a net growth in the quality and quantity of such features. With that in mind, it was then our task to measure the implications of this intensification of Cameroon-US relations on other rival powers such as France and China, and on regional contesters to Cameroon's leadership such as Gabon and Angola. That gave us enough material to assess what Cameroon stand to gain and/or lose in this state of affairs.

The objectives of US Foreign policies in Cameroon are generally designed to help protect American national interests, national security, economic prosperity, and ideological goals (democracy). The fundamental purpose of America's foreign policy has not changed in more than two centuries. It is primarily to protect American citizens, territory, livelihood and values as well as American allies. But the making of American foreign policy has changed because the world has changed. Threats have changed, so have resources, friends, enemies and strategies. There is move towards mutual dependence and mutual vulnerability, such that hitherto regions of benign neglect such as Central Africa now have strategic importance.

1. Will the US produce a policy paper for Cameroon?

It keeps bothering us whether the US will produce a policy paper for Cameroon as it does for other regional hub-countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Kenya. Following the growing importance of specific countries, the State Department formulate policies papers defining what the US intends to achieve in those countries. When no such papers exist, policy papers are formulated for entire regions. There is a Central African desk at the Department of State, but not a Cameroonian desk.

For the US to produce a policy paper for Cameroon, Cameroon must be ready to merit such a paper by playing a more assertive role in the sub-region. But what appears from our paper is that Cameroonian leadership potential in the sub-region is for the moment under-rated, under-exploited, under-asserted and unproductive. Cameroon has not made enough use of its military, economic, political, demographic and technological power to unite the region and spur development and stability. Cameroon has looked more like what John Quincy Adams famously described the US to be, «[America] ...goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.»^320(*)

However, it appears that though Cameroon is not doing enough in its leadership role in the sub-regions' integration, and that there are rival powers such as Gabon, Angola and DR Congo, none of these countries is likely to replace Cameroon in the foreseeable future. If the US is to produce a policy paper for any country in the sub-region, it is going to be Cameroon. The United States, with the United Nations and allies if and as feasible, should assume the role of the "nonpaternalistic nation builder," whose primary responsibility is to provide security, to prevent civil war or anarchy, and then fund development projects while increasing private investment.^321(*)

2. Suggestions and recommendations for further studies

The United States is the epicentre of global transformation: if the United States would never be the same again after September 11, such reasoning implies, neither would the rest of the world. The purpose of the new deployments is both to reduce the U.S. military «footprint» in countries where the U.S. military presence has become a political burden for host governments such as in Saudi Arabia. Cameroon does not need an American military base, but should accept if America wants to use its territory for transitional purposes. This is because, even in the absence of legitimacy, the most common response to Western pre- eminence, at least at the level of international relations, is accommodation: most of the world has tried to come to terms, either willingly or grudgingly, with the contemporary global order.

It is not just a question of satisfying the West and the international financial institutions that govern the world economy, but building the future through liberal democratic principles and institutions. This accommodation is important in understanding how to deal with the new shape of geopolitical issues in the Gulf of Guinea. Taking steps not to provoke traditional partners like France is important. In all, Cameroon must develop proactive, offensive, not just defensive policies as she deals with all these powers. Particularly with China, it will be important to think in the long term, for what profit is there to have cheap goods today if we remain poor?

For America, as already stated above, Cameroon needs to define specific policies as to what it wants to achieve. In reality, there are several channels for American funds to flow to Cameroon, but that requires careful planning by Cameroonian authorities. With the success of the American school of Yaoundé, Cameroon should consider engaging the US in a soft-power strategy for the creation of an American university in Cameroon.

For further studies, researchers have several issues raised in this study but not addressed adequately. Among these, we could cite the following;

1. How did Cameroonians perceive 9/11 and has that changed their perception of the US?

2. What are the implications of the Iraq war on Cameroon-US relations?

3. What future for American democratic mission in Africa? Or is it possible to democratize Central Africa?

4. What should be Cameroon's foreign policy after attainment of the HPIC initiative?

5. It is possible to study the practice of Balance of Power in Central Africa, while assessing the weight of foreign powers.

6. What is the nature and reach of Indian foreign policy toward Africa?

7. What are the challenges of a greater Chinese presence in Africa?

8. Is AGOA able to spur development in Africa in its present form? The same question could be asked of the MCA.

9. How do Cameroonians perceive the IRC in particular and US public diplomacy in Cameroon in general?

* ¹The Cameroonian government obtained military aid to fight UPC (armed opposition guerillas) militants, the latter being accused, though not without reason, of belonging to the communist camp.

* ² W. Easterly (1996) «Why Is Africa Marginal in the World Economy?» In: G Maasdrop,

(ed), Can South and Southern Africa Become Globally Competitive Economies?, New York:

St Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 19-30.

* ³ Owen Harris, «Taking on Utopia», Lecture 2, Boyer Lectures, November 23, 2003.

* ⁴ On how 9/11 was perceived around the world, see two critical books, Eric Hershberg and Kevin W. Moore, (ed) Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from around the World. New York: New Press, 2002; Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer, (ed) Understanding September 11, New York: New Press, 2002.

* ⁵ See the text of the symposium organized by the African American Institute in Washington, DC on «Is Africa important to the US? Perspectives from the Bush administration», April 24, 2002.

* ⁶ Pentagon spokesperson, Lieutenant Joe Carpenter declared on September 6, 2006, during a press briefing after the appointment of a military commander for Africa

* ⁷ We will discuss these issues later, but the Franco-American confrontation has been underscored in several publications by CEAN (Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire) on its webpage ( www.cean.u-bordeaux.fr , accessed on 15/11/2006) : Escandell C. P., «Les nouvelles tensions France-Etats-Unis dans le pré-carré africain»; Guichaoua A., «Les `nouvelles' politiques africaines de la France et des États-Unis vis-à-vis de l'Afrique centrale et orientale ("Afrique des Grands Lacs" et République démocratique du Congo-Zaïre)» ; Atlan C. et Lauseig J., «Les Approches Françaises et Américaines du Maintien de la Paix en Afrique»

* ⁸ Reported by Ndjock Bapah G., La Régionalisation de la Sécurité Collective : Le cas de L'Afrique Centrale. Mémoire de DESS. Yaoundé, Institut des relations internationales du Cameroun, 2001, p. 166.

* ⁹ Jean Emmanuel Pondi, «Washington et Londres dans le Bourbier iraqien: Analyses des Contours et des Conséquences d'une Victoire à la Pyrrhus?» in Une Lecture Africaine de la Guerre en Iraq, Jean Emmanuel Pondi (ed), Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2004, p. 17.

* ¹⁰ The point here is that 9/11 means little to Africans after their own 9/11 was just regretted and nothing more. So, why pursue the terrorists right to Iraq? This point is highly debatable.

* ¹¹ Pondi, op. cit. pp. 17-19.

* ¹² This refers to a somewhat territory for games or great power rivalry, in the nature as the Great Games of the 19^th century in the Asian Minor.

* ¹³ Mvomo Ela, «Pétrostrategie et appels d'empire dans le Golfe de Guinée», Enjeux No. 22, pp 7-11, January-March 2005 p. 7.

* ¹⁴ ibid, p7.

* ¹⁵ ibid, p. 7.

* ¹⁶ ibid, p. 8.

* ¹⁷ This reading of empire must be distinguished from Ferguson's Empire by invitation, which refers to a situation whereby a weak state calls for a stronger state for protection and possible annexation.

* ¹⁸ Yves Alexandre Chouala, «La Crise Diplomatique de mars 2004 Entre le Cameroun et la Guinée Equatoriale : Fondements, Enjeux et Perspectives», Bordeaux, GRAPS/CEAN-IEP, 2004, p. 3.

* ¹⁹ Les Cahiers de Mutation, Vol 23, Yaounde, South Media Corporation, July 2004.

* ²⁰ Nkot Fabien, «Objet ou sujet de l'Histoire», in Les Cahiers de Mutation, op. cit, p. 2.

* ²¹ NJOCK, La Regionalisation de la Securité Collective : Le cas de L'Afriaue Centrale, 2001, p. 2 

* ²² Ibid, p. 118.

* ²³Ebolo Martin Dieudonné, L'Implication des Puissances Occidentales Dans le Processus de Démocratisation en Afrique : Analyse des actions Américaines et Françaises au Cameroun Th, 3^e Cycle, IRIC, 1997. p. 293

* ²⁴ Ibid, p. 295.

* ²⁵ Ibid, p. 294.

* ²⁶ Yves Lacoste, Dictionnaire de géopolitique, Paris, PUF, 1993.

* ²⁷ Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, 2002, pp. 50-51.

* ²⁸ Ibid, 51.

* ²⁹ In a 1992 article in International Organization 2, Spring 1992 (later followed up by a book, Social Theory of International Politics (1999)), p. 46.

* ³⁰ Griffiths and O'Callaghan, op. cit, 51. It is important to state that this game could be played either as realist or idealists or both.

* ³¹ Jackson and Sorenson, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches 2^nd Ed. 2003 p. 241

* ³² Jackson and Sorenson, op. cit. p. 241.

* ³³ WhiteB.P., «Decision-Making Analysis» in Trevor Taylor (ed), Approaches and Theories in International Relations, London: Longman, 1984, p. 141.

* ³⁴ On an analysis of the `high - low' continuum in politics, and the hard-power soft-power dichotomy, see Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe (eds), Introduction to International Relations. Power and Justice. 1986, pp. 4-6.

* ³⁵ Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, 2002. p. 166.

* ³⁶ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newman, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations 1998. P. 44

* ³⁷ Ibid p. 98

* ³⁸ ibid. p. 99

* ³⁹ ibid. p. 137

* ⁴⁰ Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories, http://au.altavista.com/IRtheories.htlm , (Last up-dated on 5 August 2006)

* ⁴¹

* ⁴² Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, op. cit. p. 51.

* ⁴³ Quoted by Donald K. Steinberg, Foreign Policy Post-September 11: Learning the Right Lessons», State Department, electronic distribution, February 27, 2003.

* ⁴⁴ Idem.

* ⁴⁵ Clemens, Jr., Dynamics of international relations, 1998, p. 19.

* ⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 20.

* ⁴⁷ Idem.

* ⁴⁸Kupchan, op. cit, p. 104. He explains that global integration breeds so much interdependence that Americans have more say in Malaysia's economy than the country's tax-paying, voting citizens.

Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories, http://au.altavista.com/, (Last up-dated on 5 August 2006).

* ⁴⁹ For further reading on post 9/11 theories in IR studies, see: Études internationals, Volume 35, No 4, December 2004. «La théorie internationale face au 11 septembre et ses conséquences. Perspectives libérales et critiques», online at http://www.erudit.org/revue/ei/2004/v35/n4/010483ar.html ; Dario Battistella, «Le réalisme refute», Études internationals, Volume 35, No 4, December 2004 ; Sean Kay «Globalization, Power, and Security», Security Dialogue vol. 35, no. 1, March 2004; Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Yale H. FERGUSON, «Illusions of Superpower», Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 11, n^o 2, December 2003, pp. 21-36 ; Yale H. FERGUSON et Richard MANSBACH, «Of Empires Old and New», Paper presented at the annual meeting of the British Association of International studies, Birmingham, P 15-17 December 2003; John IKENBERRY, «Illusions of Empire. Defining the New American Order», Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, n^o 2, March/April 2004, pp. 144-154 and especially Niall FERGUSSON, «Hegemony or Empire», Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, n^o 5, September/October 2003, pp. 154-161; http://www.oup.co.uk/best.textbooks/politics/jacksonsorensen2e/; http://faculty.adams.edu/%7Elmcenteno/interrelreadings.htm;

* ⁵⁰ Owen Harris, «Civilisations and Cultures - Clashing or Merging?», Lecture 4: Boyer Lectures, 7 December 2003

* ⁵¹ Chouala Y. A., Désordre et Ordre dans l'Afrique Centrale. Thèse de Doctorat en Relations internationales. Yaoundé, Institut des relations internationales du Cameroun, 1999, p. 2.

* ⁵² Birmingham D., Martin P.M., History of Central Africa, Vol I. New York: Longman, 1983, p.8.

* ⁵³ Chouala Y.A., op. cit, p.4.

* ⁵⁴ Chouala Y.A., op. cit, p.5.

* ⁵⁵ Chouala Y.A., Op cit., p.175.

* ⁵⁶ Chouala, op. cit. p. 176.

* ⁵⁷ See CIA Factbook, last updated on September 7, 2006.

* ⁵⁸ Dobson W. J., «The day nothing much changed», Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct, 2006 p. 22

* ⁵⁹ J. Dobson, op. cit. p. 25.

* ⁶⁰ Harvard University Press, 2004

* ⁶¹ Ibid, p. 2

* ⁶² This idea he borrows from Vann Woodward, an eminent student of American history who specialized in the relationship between security and American character in the height of the Cold War.

* ⁶³ ibid p. 9

* ⁶⁴ The treaty was negotiated under President James Madison, establishing peace between the US and the British forces

* ⁶⁵ While in the Middle East, people were saying `America has got what it deserves', in Africa, people were saying `They can now understand our suffering', while Europeans and Asians were murmuring `If that happens to America, how much of us?'. For further reading, consult US Social Science Research Council of articles on 9/11 at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/index.htm

* ⁶⁶ Kupchan, The End of the American Era, 2003, p. 161.

* ⁶⁷ Idem.

* ⁶⁸ Though the US has really never been completely independent from Europe.

* ⁶⁹ Kupchan, op. cit, p.163.

* ⁷⁰ Kupchan, op, cit, 163

* ⁷¹ Ibid, citing Hamilton, Federalist 6, in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, London: Penguin Books, 1989, p. 106.

* ⁷² Idem, p. 164, citing Jay, Federalist 4, in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, op. cit. p. 97.

* ⁷³ Idem, p. 164, citing text in Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 145.

* ⁷⁴ See Baroness Crosby, The U.S. - the Role of World Leader: a decent respect to the opinions of mankind 2003, p. 3.

* ⁷⁵ Baroness Williams, op. cit. p.5. We must note that though Baroness is writing from America, he is of Latin American descent.

* ⁷⁶ See international affairs expert Owen Harries present the 2003 Boyer Lectures on «Benign or Imperial? Reflections on American Hegemony» at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/boyers

* ⁷⁷ See Biloa Tang, «Le MINREX dans la Politique Étrangère du Cameroun. Une analyse á la Lumière des Politique Publique», Mem de DESS, IRIC, Yaounde, 2000 p. 7.

* ⁷⁸ Goldstein, International Relations, 5^th Ed, Boston: Longman, 2003, p. 155.

* ⁷⁹Biloa Tang, op. cit. p.19

* ⁸⁰ See Atanga Simplice, Le Processus de Prise de Décision de Politique Étrangère au Cameroun, 1991, Th de 3e cycle, UYII, IRIC,

* ⁸¹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977, p. 23.

* ⁸² James Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs, New York: Nichols, p. 1.

* ⁸³ E.J. Keller, «Africa and the United States; Meeting the Challenges of Globalization in Donald» Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (eds), Africa - US Relations. Strategic Encounters, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006 p.3.

* ⁸⁴ Idem.

* ⁸⁵ James Dao, «In Quietly Courting Africa, U.S. Likes the Dowry: Oil», New York Times, Thursday, September 19, 2002

* ⁸⁶ Walter Russell Mead is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and his article is «God's Country?» appearing in Foreign Affairs, HYPERLINK "" September/October 2006, obtainable at HYPERLINK "" www.foreignaffairs.org/mead_reading.

* ⁸⁷ Mead, op, cit.

* ⁸⁸ The phrase "Manifest Destiny" was first used primarily by Jackson Democrats in the 1840s to promote the annexation of much of what is now the Western United States (the Oregon Territory, the Texas Annexation, and the Mexican Cession). The term was revived in the 1890s, this time with Republican supporters, as a theoretical justification for U.S. expansion outside of North America. The term fell out of usage by U.S. policy makers early in the 20th century, but it could be argued that aspects of Manifest Destiny, particularly the belief in an American "mission" to promote and defend democracy throughout the world, continued to have an influence on American political ideology. Wilsonian and Cartesian idealism largely carries components of Manifest Destiny, so does post 9/11.

* ⁸⁹ Deutchoua Xavie, in Les Cahiers de la Mutations, op, cit. p. 15.

* ⁹⁰ Idem.

* ⁹¹ For an in-depth analysis of US imperialism, both proclaimed and denied, from independence to present day, see Niall Ferguson's two books; Colossus; The Price of America's Empire, 2004 and Empire; The Rise and Demise of British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, New York; Penguin, 2003.

* ⁹² Critics of American foreign policy argue that US anti-colonization was a way of expressing envy over European possessions.

* ⁹³ Ferguson, Colossus; The Price of America's Empire, 2004, p. 42.

* ⁹⁴ This accord was facilitated by the fact that Cameroon was a League of Nations Mandate, therefore exempted from the colonial pact of protectionism.

* ⁹⁵ It is reported by Deutchoua, op. cit. idem.

* ⁹⁶ Deutchoua, idem.

* ⁹⁷ This paradox undermined the public esteem built in Cameroonians for close to a century, especially that the US supported the nationalist party in the case of Togo where the nationalists were not cloth in red.

* ⁹⁸ What comes to mind here is former president Ahidjo's speech during the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 where he condemned foreign powers support for South Africa and Rhodesia.

* ⁹⁹ This does not mean that there are no differences between the French and the Americans regarding French policies in general and African policies in particular. However, in spite of such differences, the US still referred to or concerted with France in French (but also Belgian Spanish and Portuguese) African affairs in some sort of `control by proxy'.

* ¹⁰⁰ However, it must be noted that in issues of vital interest to the US, especially relating to global balance of power and communist threats, the US would over-ride French views.

* ¹⁰¹ Truman expressed this theory clearly during the Korean War. "We are fighting in Korea," Truman proclaimed in fall 1952, "so we don't have to fight in Wichita, or in Chicago, or in New Orleans, or on San Francisco Bay." The world was then divided into two competing camps, drawing the Third World nations into its destructive wake as the domino theory took on new vigor. For details on this theory, see Thomas G. Patterson, J. Garry Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations: Volume 2: A History Since 1895, Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.

* ¹⁰² Pondi, op. cit. p. 19.

* ¹⁰³ Reported by Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol II, 5^th Ed, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000, p. 607.

* ¹⁰⁴ Reported by Merril and Paterson, op. cit. p. 608.

* ¹⁰⁵ Ibid, pp. 609-610.

* ¹⁰⁶ Merril and Paterson, op. cit. p. 609.

* ¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 610.

* ¹⁰⁸ Jeune Afrique No. 1525 of the 30^th year, March 26, 1990.

* ¹⁰⁹ Mbembe, A., «Traditions de l'autoritarisme et problèmes de gouvernement en Afrique subsaharienne» in Africa Development, 17(1), 1992, pp. 37-64.

* ¹¹⁰ Sindjoun, L., «La culture démocratique en Afrique subsaharienne: comment rencontrer l'arlésienne de la légende africaniste» no date, at http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/427-2.pdf. For Larry Diamond, see DIAMOND, L., «Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy» in Boulder, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, pp. 1-33.

* ¹¹¹ Quantin P. «Sub-Saharan Democratic Transitions as Political Crisis (1990-1994)» Centre d'Etudes d'Afrique Noire, 1997.

* ¹¹² Mbile, Cameroon Political Story, 1999, p. 335.

* ¹¹³Reported by N.N. Mbile, op. cit, p. 334

* ¹¹⁴See his interview in Les Cahiers de Mutation, op. cit. p. 13.

* ¹¹⁵ This resignation is described by Mbile (op. cit 337) as motivated by an SDF victory. A copy of the resignation letter is obtainable with the post electoral report by the US election agency National Democratic Institute.

* ¹¹⁶ Mbile, op. cit. p. 336.

* ¹¹⁷ On the NDI report and Cameroonian reaction, read An Assessment of the October 11, 1992 Election in Cameroon, Washington: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1993. The report includes preliminary releases, Cameroonian government critique, the SDF report and the final NDI report. We should note that the composition of NDI delegation and its world wide experience made the report quite credible for both national and international public opinion, though Cameroonian democracy was quite young at the time. US reactions relied principally on this report. Read the report online on NDI website.

* 118Owen Harries, Lecture 3: «A Democratic World», in Boyer Lectures, 30 November 2003 at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/boyers/

* ¹¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Cameroon, March 1996 Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Central African Affairs.

* ¹²⁰ Daniel Bach, Luc Sindjoun, « Ordre et Désordre en Afrique », 1997, www.polis.sciencepobordeaux.fr, accessed on Nov. 25, 2006.

* ¹²¹ Owen Harris, «A Democratic World», op, cit.

* ¹²² Quantin, op. cit, no page.

* ¹²³ Statement of R. Niels Marquardt, Ambassador-designate to the Republics of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2004. //usinfo.state.gov\xarchives\xmlview.html

* ¹²⁴ Quantin, op, cit. for further reading on this phenomenon, see O'Donnel G. and Schmitter P., Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

* ¹²⁵ These events include: December 2003 - Nigeria hands over 32 villages to Cameroon as part of the 2002 ICJ border deal. In January 2004 both countries agree to mount joint border patrols. September 2004 - Nigeria fails to meet a deadline to hand over Bakassi. June 2006 - Nigeria agrees to withdraw its troops from the Bakassi peninsula to settle its long-running border dispute with Cameroon. The breakthrough comes at a UN-mediated summit. 2006 August - A ceremony marks the transfer of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon after Nigeria completes its troop withdrawal from the area.

* ¹²⁶ Marquardt N., op, cit.

* ¹²⁷ J.F. Valette, Cameroon Tribune, Monday 11/09/2006 p.5

* ¹²⁸ Marc Gilbert, «The World in Miniature': Cameroon in World History as seen through Documents, Film, Literature and Photographs», History Cooperative database, University of Illinois, 2004, at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/WorldHistoryConnected Vol 2 No 1, consulted September 24th, 2006.

* ¹²⁹ Cameroon Tribune, n°7312/3601, March 21, 2001, p4. Citing Simo Bobda,  Madina, «La Problématique de la diffusion de l'Anglais au Cameroun» Yaoundé, IRIC, 2006, relates this phenomenon thus: «Most English speaking schools in the cities are increasingly flooded by francophone pupils and students (...) francophone parents (...) insist on giving their children the best of Anglo-Saxon education.» P83.

* ¹³⁰ Article 1, paragraph 3 of the 18 January 1996 Constitution »The Republic of Cameroon adopts English and French as official languages of equal value»

* ¹³¹ The process of the spread of English in Cameroon and its implications have been studied by Madina (La Problématique de la diffusion de l'Anglais au Cameroun) cited above. Apart from cataloguing the different domains of the spread of English, she accounts for this spread to growing community of English speakers around the world, Cameroon's adhesion to the Commonwealth, influences of greater American presence and engagement, as well as prestige.

* ¹³² Jean Marie le Breton,  »Réflexions Anglophiles sur la Géopolitique de l'Anglais», in Hérodote, Langue et Territoires, No. 105, Paris: La Découverte, Fall 2002, pp 14-22.

* ¹³³ Madina, op, cit. p43

* ¹³⁴ Ibid, p83

* ¹³⁵ This idea was expressed by Commonwealth Scribe, Mc Kenon in a recent (2006) interview after a visit to Cameroon.

* ¹³⁶ http://us-africa.tripod.com/cameroon.html

* ¹³⁷ According to international law, Cameroon has been a colony only to Germany. Under France and Britain, Cameroon has been first a mandate (divided between East and West) from 1919 to 1945 and then a Trusteeship territory from 1945 to 1960-61.

* ¹³⁸ Marc Gilbert, idem

* ¹³⁹ Last updated October 2006 at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/cameroon.html .

* ¹⁴⁰ The Bakassi conflict was resolved thanks to the efforts of the UN and US, France, Britain and Germany. US involvement in this conflict could be interpreted as intended to have Cameroon regain the oil-rich island so that American firms can secure contracts of exploration and exploitation. Preference for Cameroon could equally be understood from the fact that Nigeria is an OPEC member and would be less-malleable.

* ¹⁴¹ Statement of R. Niels Marquardt, Ambassador-designate to the Republics of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2004. //usinfo.state.gov\xarchives\xmlview.html

* ¹⁴² Goldstein, op, cit. p413

* ¹⁴³ On the notion of tragedy of the commons as related to the environment, see Garerett Hardin, «The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162, December 16, 1968: 1243-48.

* ¹⁴⁴ Jendayi E. Frazer was speaking during the Central African tour of February 2006, the Yaoundé stop-over.

* ¹⁴⁵See Washington File July 27.

* ¹⁴⁶ Washington File July 27

* ¹⁴⁷ The US-Africa Foundation maintains a website at http://us-africa.tripod.com/cameroon.html

* ¹⁴⁸ Awoumou, C. D. G., «Le Golfe de Guinée face aux convoitises», in CODESRIA Annual Meeting on Re-thinking African Development : Beyond the Stalemate, Alternatives,  Maputo, December 2005, p. 5.

* ¹⁴⁹ The Limbe harbor, formally called Victoria, is famous for the role it played both during the slave trade and European colonization of the Cameroons, as well as nearby lands. We should also note that minor ports exist in Cameroon in places such as Tiko and Kribi. The Kribi sea port serves presently as the outlet for Chadian oil through the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project.

* ¹⁵⁰ Colonel Daniel Smith, US Army expert in military affairs, «Des forces de projection ciblée.
Disposer de troupes sur place», 25 November 2004 voltairenet.org

* ¹⁵¹ Fukuyama F., «The End of History?» The National Interest, Summer 1989. Once the competitors to liberal democracy and capitalism are conquered, there will be neither a great war nor revolution. Different forms of nationalism, religious fanaticisms, etc. are but minor skirmishes within the American liberal system.

* ¹⁵² Huntington S. P., « The Clash of Civilizations?» Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. According to Huntington, history had not ended but its features had changed. Conflicts were no more going to be between territorial states such as America and Russia, but between the great civilizations of the world (Judeo-Christian, Islamo-Arab-African and Hindus-Confucian).

* ¹⁵³ Donald K. Steinberg, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, State Department, «Foreign Policy Post-September 11: Learning the Right Lessons», Remarks to Town Hall Meeting, Dixie State College, St. George, Utah, February 27, 2003

* ¹⁵⁴ See Greg Behrman, author, The Invisible People: the History of U.S. Policy Toward HIV and AIDS, speaking during a Darryl G. Behrman Lecture on Africa Policy: The African Agenda. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y. May 10, 2005

* ¹⁵⁵ Moises Naim, op. cit.

* ¹⁵⁶ Mrs. Frazer is Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs but was then White House Advisor on Africa for the National Security Council and was speaking at a symposium organized by The African American Institute in Washington, DC on April 24, 2002 on «Is Africa important to the US? Perspectives from the Bush administration»

* ¹⁵⁷ See the paper she presents at the symposium organized by The African American Institute, op, cit.

* ¹⁵⁸ Ndjock Bapah Guillaume,  «La Régionalisation de la Sécurité Collective : Le cas de L'Afrique Centrale», DESS Thesis, Yaoundé: IRIC, 2001 p. 118.

* ¹⁵⁹ See La Lettre du Continent, N° 450, July 2004, p. 3

* ¹⁶⁰ Steinberg D. K., op, cit.

* ¹⁶¹ See the analysis of Colonel Daniel Smith, op, cit.

* ¹⁶² Ms. T heresa Whelan is Director of the Office of African Affairs, Office of the Secr etar y of Defense. She was speaking during The African American Institute symposium, op, cit

* ¹⁶³ See Jim Lobe, «Pentagon's `Footprint' Growing in Africa», Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, May 12, 2003, Web location: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305africa.html

* ¹⁶⁴ For a broad view of this policies and their implications on Africa, see the Round Table conference organized by Politique Africaine on September 28, 2001, «La politique africaine des États-Unis après le 11 septembre 2001» with the participation of Peter Schraeder, Roland Marchal, Justin V aïsse.

* ¹⁶⁵ Ms. T heresa Whelan, op, cit

* ¹⁶⁶ Walter H. Kansteiner was then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and was speaking during the symposium organized by The African American Institute in Washington, DC on April 24, 2002 on «Is Africa important to the US? Perspectives from the Bush administration»

* ¹⁶⁷ J endayi Fr azer, idem.

* ¹⁶⁸ Goldstein, op. Cit. P. 102

* ¹⁶⁹ Goldstein, op, cit. P. 102

* ¹⁷⁰ Goldstein, idem.

* ¹⁷¹ John Kerry, May 27, 2004 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Kerry/html

* ¹⁷² Martin D. , Les Etats Unis ont-ils Une Politique Africaine?, Politiqu e Africaine, paris, 1998, p. 6.

* ¹⁷³ Nye, Jr. «The Decline of America's Soft Power», Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2004.

* ¹⁷⁴ Moisés Naím, «Seven Surprises One Year Later», Foreign Policy, September/October 2002.

* ¹⁷⁵ See Salih Booker, William Minter, and Ann-Louise Colgan, «Africa Policy Outlook 2003,» Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2003.

* ¹⁷⁶Barkan D. «Moi's Kenya», Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, 2004

* ¹⁷⁷ Walter H. Kansteiner, op, cit.

* ¹⁷⁸ Salih Booker, William Minter, and Ann-Louise Colgan, «Africa Policy Outlook 2003,» Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2003.

* ¹⁷⁹ Awoumou, op, cit. p4

* ¹⁸⁰ idem

* ¹⁸¹ Both views have been reported by Jean-Christophe Servant, «The new Gulf oil states» Le Monde diplomatique, January 2003, electronic edition.

* ¹⁸² Toure, paper presented at the CODESRIA 11th General Assembly in Maputo, Mozambique, 6-10 December 2005, on the Theme: «Rethinking African Development: Beyond Impasse, Towards Alternatives», p8.

* ¹⁸³ Toure, op,cit. p9

* ¹⁸⁴ Jean-Christophe Servant, «The new Gulf oil states», op, cit.

* ¹⁸⁵ Idem

* ¹⁸⁶ Harris notes that `A great deal of statistical work by social scientists has produced strong evidence that the transition to stable, democracy correlates closely with wealth.' in «A Democratic World», op, cit.

* ¹⁸⁷ She was speaking during the February 2006 visit to Cameroon.

* ¹⁸⁸ Larry Diamond argues that economic success in Africa is impossible without political reform and offers a number of interesting and perhaps controversial policy recommendations to alter the incentives facing African leaders and increase the costs associated with non-democratic rule. Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes argue that uneven progress toward economic reform may have negative consequences for satisfaction with democracy, concluding that the survival of democracy in Africa faces serious challenges: endemic corruption, the trend toward the regionalization of conflict, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. See these arguments in Gyimah-Boadi (ed) Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004. However, several examples in Asia show that democracy is not necessarily a pre-requisite for development. In Africa, countries such as Benin, Mali, etc., which have acceptable democratic institutions, are not necessarily developed.

* ¹⁸⁹ Ms. T heresa Whelan, op, cit.

* ¹⁹⁰ Severine Rugumamu, «Africa Peacekeeping» in Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (eds) op, cit. p24.

* ¹⁹¹ Princeton N. Lyman, «A Strategic Approach to Terrorism», in Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (eds) op, cit. p49.

* ¹⁹² See Owen Harries, «A Democratic World», op, cit.

* ¹⁹³ This notion has been adequately explained by Harris Owen, «A Democratic World», op, cit.

* ¹⁹⁴ For further information, see CRS Report RS21168, The Peace Corps: Current Issues, by Curt Tarnoff

* ¹⁹⁵ Her remarks were made in 2002.

* ¹⁹⁶ White House. (2002) The national security strategy of the United States. Washington (D. C.): White House. Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. For a detailed discussion on the strategic implications of HIV/AIDS, see Feldbaum H, Lee K, Patel P (2006) The National Security Implications of HIV/AIDS. PLoS Med 3(6): e171 doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0030171

* ¹⁹⁷ Cameroon is one of the rare countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the US has installed a Center for Disease Control - CDC, a research structure that is working on a possible vaccine for HIV/AIDS with a center in Limbe and another in Yaoundé.

* ¹⁹⁸ Scott Evertz is Director of the White House Office on National AIDS Policy and was speaking during the symposium organized by The African American Institute in Washington, DC on April 24, 2002 on «Is Africa important to the US? Perspectives from the Bush administration»

* ¹⁹⁹ Idem.

* ²⁰⁰ Owen Harris, «A Democratic World», op, cit.

* ²⁰¹ Owona Nguini, M. E., «Le Cameroun doit assurer son leadership», Mutations, N° 1111, Thursday, March 18, 2004

* ²⁰² A copy of the speech is obtainable on-line at the State Department Website at http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/products/washfile.html

* ²⁰³ «WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF CAMEROON», Statement by U.S. Ambassador Linnet Deily, July 18, 2001 in Washington DC.

* ²⁰⁴ See CIA World Factbook, last updated in November 2006 at www.cia.gov.org

* ²⁰⁵ Awoumou, op, cit. p5

* ²⁰⁶ For further reading on these kinds of support, see Chouala, « La Crise Diplomatique de Mars 2004 Entre le Cameroun et la Guinée Equatoriale : Fondements, Enjeux et Perspectives», op, cit. p2

* ²⁰⁷ Owen Harries, «A Democratic World», op, cit.

* ²⁰⁸ Our introductory definition of Central Africa and ECCAS holds here.

* ²⁰⁹ Chouala, « La Crise Diplomatique de Mars 2004 Entre le Cameroun et la Guinée Équatoriale : Fondements, Enjeux et Perspectives», op, cit. p7

* ²¹⁰ Idem.

* ²¹¹ See La Lettre du Continent, N° 450, July 2004, p. 3. According to the report, Sao Tome and Principe is thought to be too narrow for a military base and should be used just for a listening station for US oil corporations present if the Gulf.

* ²¹² Ndjock Bapah G. op, cit. p1

* ²¹³ Ibid, p2.

* ²¹⁴ Several meetings held in Yaoundé among which was an organization meeting of the UNPCCIPS-CA held in Yaoundé in July 1992. There was then a Non-Aggression Pact signed in Yaoundé 08/07/1996 for ECCAS. But most especially was the Yaoundé Declaration on Peace, Security and Stability in Central Africa. On the invitation of President Paul Biya, acting president of the United Nations Permanent Consultative Council on the Issues of Peace and Security in Central Africa (UNPCCIPS-CA), Heads of States and Governments gathered in Yaoundé on 25-26 February 1999 to examine the socio-political situation of the sub-region reported by CT, Friday February 26 1999.

* ²¹⁵ Chouala, op, cit. p7

* ²¹⁶ Chouala, op, cit. p8

* ²¹⁷ Cameroon Tribune, Wednesday October 04, 2006. p.11.

* ²¹⁸ State of relations, MINREX, 2004.

* ²¹⁹ Two years after, USAID was integrated into the State Department and the director rose to the rank of Under-Secretary. This has permitted the agency to fund development projects in countries without opening an office.

* ²²⁰ The whole text of this declaration is obtainable from both the State and Transportation Departments web pages.

* ²²¹ Takaam, «American Way of Life», in Les Cahiers de Mutation, op. cit. p.3.

* ²²² Idem.

* ²²³ Thierry Gervais Gango, «L'autre Match France/USA», in Les Cahiers de Mutation, op. cit. p. 7.

* ²²⁴ Idem

* ²²⁵ Idem.

* ²²⁶ Jules Romauld Nkonlak, «La Porte des Etoiles», in Les Cahiers de Mutation, op. cit, p. 6.

* ²²⁷ Madina, op, cit. p74

* ²²⁸ The distinctions about the different channels of US assistance are detailed by Ted Dagne, «Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues», Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress, July 28, 2006

* ²²⁹ For details on the stakes of the election for Cameroon as well as Cameroon's lobby for votes, see Ndzesop, I., «Cameroon's Battle for Posts in International Organizations; the Cases of Mme Elisabeth Tankeu and Theodore Nkodo», Internship paper, Yaoundé: IRIC, 2005.

* ²³⁰ La Nation No. 48, 06/06/2005, p. 04.

* ²³¹ See B rottem's report at Foreign Policy in Focus, A Think Tank Without Borders, July 2, 2004 at the webpage http://ww w .fpi f .org/commentary/2004/0407gamble.html

* ²³² Ted Dagne, «Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues», op, cit.

* ²³³ Joe Dinga Pefok, «AES Sonel Lands FCFA 170-Billion Loan», The Post (Buea) January 30, 2007, Posted to the web January 30, 2007, at http://www.allAfrica.com/cameroon/energy.htlm

* ²³⁴ The Post, idem.

* ²³⁵ See full speech at the State Department's web site at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm

* ²³⁶ See Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, January 18, 2006 at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/3797.htm

* ²³⁷ Ndzesop, I., «The Case for a Databank at the Career Management Unit of MINREX - Cameroon», unpublished Internship paper, Yaoundé: IRIC, 2006, p8

* ²³⁸ James Dao, «In Quietly Courting Africa, U.S. Likes the Dowry: Oil», op, cit.

* ²³⁹ There are three American corners in Cameroon: Bertoua Municipal Library, Garoua Municipal Library and Buea University.

* ²⁴⁰ Opened in 2004 by Ambassador Marquardt

* ²⁴¹ See Madina, op, cit. p76

* ²⁴² This usually done through the inter-library association called ASPID (Association pour la Promotion de l'Information Documentaire), whose creation is of US design and which donates tones of books to libraries.

* ²⁴³ Most of the novels and ordinary text books have been removed and free internet services provided for researchers and students, while the two primary domains of US interest - democracy and free trade, are the main subjects of written materials.

* ²⁴⁴ See Madina, op, cit. p77

* ²⁴⁵ Madina, op, cit. pp 65-70.

* ²⁴⁶ On how the BBC spreads English in Cameroon alongside British culture, see Madina, op, cit. p74.

* ²⁴⁷ Leif Brottem, «The World Bank's Great Gamble in Central Africa,» (Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 2, 2004).

* ²⁴⁸ Constant R. Sabang, «Sur un Timide air AGOA», in Les Cahiers de Mutation, op. cit. p.10.

* ²⁴⁹ Idem.

* ²⁵⁰ On the challenges hegemons have faced in history see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New-York: Randon House, 1987, Owen Harris, «Challengers», Lecture 5, Boyer Lectures, 14 December 2003.

* ²⁵¹ Awoumou, op, cit. p4.

* ²⁵² Awoumou, op, cit. p3.

* ²⁵³John Bellamy Foster, «Naked Imperialism», Monthly Review, Volume 57, Number 4, 2005

* ²⁵⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Choice, Dominion or Leadership. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004. p2

* ²⁵⁵ Ibid, p19

* ²⁵⁶ Ibid, p224.

* ²⁵⁷ Ibid, p 17

* ²⁵⁸ John Bellamy Foster, «A Warning to Africa: The New U.S. Imperial Grand Strategy», Monthly Review, Volume 58, Number 2, June 2006

* ²⁵⁹ John Bellamy Foster, idem

* ²⁶⁰ Idem

* ²⁶¹ Bellamy, Naked Imperialism. The U.S. Pursuit of Global Dominance, Chicago: Monthly Review Press, 2006.

* ²⁶² Naill Ferguson, Colossus. The Price of America's Empire, New York: Penguin Press, 2004, pp6-7. He argues for example that `hegemony means more than mere leadership, but less than outright empire' (p9).

* ²⁶³ Ibid, p5. See also Sebastian Mallaby, «Reluctant Imperialist» in Foreign Affairs, September 2002, p6

* ²⁶⁴ Ferguson, op, cit. pp11-12.

* ²⁶⁵ Ibid, p12. He borrows this term from Geir Lundestad, The American `Empire' and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective, Oxford: OUP, 1990.

* ²⁶⁶ Ibid, p169.

* ²⁶⁷ Ferguson, op, cit, p170.

* ²⁶⁸ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ July/August 2006 FOREIGN POLICY and the Center for American Progress teamed up to survey more than 100 of America's top foreign-policy experts and get their assessment of how the United States is fighting the Global War on Terror.

* ²⁶⁹ Theresa Whelan, op, cit.

* ²⁷⁰ Defense nationale, January 2001, p. 98

* ²⁷¹ In the early days of WWII, German troops rapidly occupied France, forcing de Gaulle to take refuge in London, from where he organized several counter-attacks from the ports of Liverpool.

* ²⁷² see Nitcheu B., «Campagne Militaire Française au Cameroun :Chronique d'un génocide annoncé», London, 17 August 2000. obtainable from www.ogres.0rg

* ²⁷³ J.F. Valette, Cameroon Tribune, Monday 11/09/2006 p.4.

* ²⁷⁴ J.F. Valette, op, cit. p5

* ²⁷⁵ Idem

* ²⁷⁶ See for example «The fall of the French empire», The Wall Street Journal, New York, May 25 1997; «La France lâche l'Afrique», Jeune Afrique, no 2098, Paris, March 27 - April 2 2001; «Paris is overwhelmed», `Africa is tired of France, Le Figaro, Paris, April 28, 2005; François-Xavier Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République, Paris: Stock, 1998.

* ²⁷⁷ Stephen Smith, «France-Afrique, l'adieu aux ex-neocolonies», Le Debat, Paris, Gallimard, Nov-Dec, 2005 p 3. Though the paper argues from a general African perspective, it however focuses on Central Africa, especially Rwanda. An increasing number of French writers have criticized French role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, among whom are, François-Xavier Verschave, Jean-Paul Gouteux, Mehdi Ba - Rwanda 1994, Un Genocide Français, Paris, l'Esprit Frappeur, 1997

* ²⁷⁸ Stephen Smith, op, cit. p5.

* ²⁷⁹ Eric Fottorino, «L'Ultime Reve américain» - the Ultimate American dream, L'Autre Afrique no. 7, July 1997, p. 31

* ²⁸⁰ Delphine Lecoutre and Admore Mupoki Kambudzi, «Vers un divorce entre Paris et le continent Africain?», Monde Diplomatique, June 2006 pp6-7

* ²⁸¹ Madina, op, cit. p75

* ²⁸² Ebolo Martin Dieudonné «L'Implication des Puissances Occidentales Dans le Processus de Démocratisation en Afrique : Analyse des actions Américaines et Françaises au Cameroun» Th, 3^e Cycle, Yaoundé: IRIC, 1997 p293

* ²⁸³ Idem

* ²⁸⁴ Ibid, p294

* ²⁸⁵ Chietigj Bajpaee, «Sino-US Energy Competition in Africa», in Power and Interest News Report, October 7, 2005 available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ or http://www.pinr.com

* ²⁸⁶ Princeton Lyman, «China's Rising Role in Africa», Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2005

* ²⁸⁷ Idem.

* ²⁸⁸ On a recapitulation of Cameroon China relations, see «China and Cameroon: Bilateral Relations» at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn accessed on 2007-01-31 06:16:23    

* ²⁸⁹ Some of these corporations include China Geological Engineering Group Co. and China Hydro-power Foreign Project Co.

* ²⁹⁰ Chietigj Bajpaee, op, cit.

* ²⁹¹ Idem.

* ²⁹² Basildon Peta, «The `Chinese Tsunami' that Threatens to Swamp Africa», Independent, April 25, 2005

* ²⁹³ Princeton Lyman, «China's Rising Role in Africa», op, cit.

* ²⁹⁴ Aligning with great powers leads to power multiplication, economic facilities and leadership asserting.

* ²⁹⁵ This hubris is motivated by security threats, as Thucydides noted about the Peloponnesian War, `what made war inevitable was the power of Athens and the fear that created in Sparta'.

* ²⁹⁶ Awoumou, - C. D. G. «Le Couple Cameroun-Gabon : Moteur de l'Afrique Centrale?», Enjeux N°17, October-December 2003, p.5.

* ²⁹⁷ The Gabonese authorities, especially the President himself, have been active in peace negotiations in CAR, DR Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, etc. This is precisely the f role a sub-regional ally would play.

* ²⁹⁸ Awoumou, op, cit, 5-10

* ²⁹⁹ Note however that Gabon is not as absent on the sub-regional scene as Awoumou seems to explain. Gabon, for instance holds the post of governor of the sub-regional financial body (BEAC), stock exchange market and executive director of the Gulf of Guinea Commission.

* ³⁰⁰ On this Cameroonian attitude, see Chouala Y. A., «La Crise Diplomatique de Mars 2004 entre le Cameroun et la Guinée Équatoriale : Fondements, Enjeux et Perspectives», GRAPS / CEAN-IEP, 2005.

* ³⁰¹ See Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Africa,Super-Power Peacekeeping in a Troubled Continent, New York: St. Martin's Press, LLC, 2000, Karl p. Magyar (ed), US Interests and Policies in Africa, Transition to a New Era, New York: St. Martin's Press, LLC, 2000, Peter J Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa. Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, Cambridge: CUP, 1994. And finally, P Duignan and L.H. Gann, The US and Africa. A History, Syndicate of Press of the University of Cambridge, 1884.

* ³⁰² Chouala, « La Crise Diplomatique de Mars 2004 Entre le Cameroun et la Guinée Équatoriale : Fondements, Enjeux et Perspectives», op, cit. p8

* ³⁰³ Idem.

* ³⁰⁴ John Bellamy Foster, «A Warning to Africa: The New U.S. Imperial Grand Strategy», Monthly Review, June 2006.

* ³⁰⁵ A general pro-American feeling in Cameroonians can be explained by the fact that American policies in the sub-region has not been as out-spoken as the French, the fact that France is the former colonizer, and finally for the fact that Cameroonians know too little about America, except from films (cinema) and magazines.

* ³⁰⁶ Nigeria has always posed security threats for Cameroon, aligning at one time with the CAR, waded off in extremis at other times by French menaces. This situation became worst with the Bakassi question. After Nigerian refusal to withdraw its troops following the ICJ 2002 ruling, Cameroon needed the support of the international community to put pressure on Nigeria.

* ³⁰⁷ In January 2006, Africa Action released "Africa Policy for a New Era: Ending Segregation in U.S. Foreign Relations" This report (available at http://www.africaaction.org/featdocs/afr2003.htm) reflects and summarizes this emerging consensus, and provides formulations of positive directions for policy towards Africa.

* ³⁰⁸ Awoumou, « Le Golfe de Guinée face aux convoitises», op, cit. p6 

* ³⁰⁹ Awoumou, ibid, p8

* ³¹⁰ E.J. Keller

* ³¹¹ Richard N. Haass, «Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker's Perspective», Policy Outlook, US State Department, November 1, 2002. This article was written for electronic distribution. Haass is Director, Policy Planning Staff at the State Department.

* ³¹² Idem.

* ³¹³ Haass, idem.

* ³¹⁴ Idem.

* ³¹⁵ These ideas were clearly expressed by Graca Machel, during the Darryl G. Behrman Lecture on Africa Policy: The African Agenda, op, cit.

* ³¹⁶ Owen Harries, «A World of Democracy» in Boyers Lectures, Lecture 3, 2003 at http://www.abc.net/rn/boyerlectures/stories/2003/987627.htm

* ³¹⁷ Owen, idem.

* ³¹⁸ IASPS has close links with the Likud party, a longstanding advocate of reducing dependence on Saudi oil, and US neo-conservative forces. See Jean-Christophe Servant, «The new Gulf oil states», op, cit.

* ³¹⁹ Quoted by Harris Owen, «Taking on Utopia», op, cit.

* ³²⁰ Quoted by Owen Harries, «Challengers», Lecture 5, Boyer Lectures, 14 December 2003

* ³²¹ Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building, New York: Princeton University Press, 2004.