THE ROOT OF DIVISION: CIVIL WAR
The divisions between the different Angolan liberation
movements were demonstrated by their inability to form a united front. It
showed itself most clearly when in the early 1970s they started to fight one
another. Savimbi always called for a united front: «Angolans [are] tired
of the liberation movements' petty differences [...] the FNLA, the MPLA and
UNITA [have] to work together to speed up the decolonisation process [...]There
is a great and urgent need for us to unite...The time for accusations and
counter-accusations is gone [...]We want to prepare the ground for talks with
the Portuguese so that we go to meet them not as rivals but as equals»
(qtd. in Bridgland 112-3). An analysis of the distinct ethno-regional origins
from which each movement took its shape, an examination of each one's
ideological vision and the external influences working upon each of them may be
helpful in understanding the roots of the division and conflict that was so
obvious between the three movements.
Savimbi along with many other Ovimbundu was once part of the
northerners' FNLA despite his unhappiness over the mass killing that FNLA had
carried out in which many Ovimbundu contract labourers on the coffee
plantations were slaughtered. However, not until Savimbi noticed that most of
the executive posts were held, not merely by members of Holden Roberto's own
Bakongo tribe, but even by his own family, did Savimbi form a distinct unit
known as the `Opposing Group' which was the seed for the future UNITA
(Bridgland 58). So, the Bakongobased FNLA and the creation of the `Opposing
Group' anticipated the division and conflict which later on came to
characterize FNLA-UNITA relationships. Moreover, when the USA called for the
two movements to unite, Savimbi's response was that «[...] the FNLA were
not a card to be played [...]» (qtd. in Bridgland 266). Furthermore, as
Birmingham puts it, «[...] north and south were never able to collaborate
effectively in a grand political strategy» (141).
Savimbi left FNLA with people like Tony Fernandes, a
mestiço, N'Zau Puna, from one of the royal families of
Cabinda's Woyo tribe and Ernesto Mulato, a Kikongo. These people became
Savimbi's long-term comrades in the fight against the Portuguese, and later,
against the MPLA and its Soviet and Cuban allies. John Stockell, who had been
appointed chief of the CIA's Task Force in Angola, after traveling with Roberto
to different FNLA bases and having noticed how FNLA had entrenched itself among
the Bakongo tribe, observed that «UNITA was an organization of different
caliber [having more pluralistic representation] than FNLA» (qtd. in
Bridgland 15). Nevertheless, Stockell's impression did not seem to mirror the
reality because this movement was also entrenched among the Ovimbundu, who felt
they had been marginalized by the mestiços and the Creole
elites. Moreover, its leadership was overwhelmingly Ovimbundu, a rare exception
being the party's vice-president, António Dembo, who was Bakongo.
Despite drawing its support from the assimilated Mbundu-Luanda
middle class, the mestiços, the Creole elites and the white
intellectuals, including Pepetela himself, MPLA seems to have been able to
aspire to a greater pluralism than its rivals as was shown by the September
1992 first multiparty elections. Like UNITA, MPLA swept the September polls on
its `home turf.' But, unlike UNITA, the MPLA attracted support from other areas
where the Mbundu presence is limited, winning 77 per cent of the parliamentary
vote and 72 per cent of the presidential vote (Hodges 27). A great number of
urban Ovimbundu in both highland towns and coastal cities failed to support
UNITA and a national urban pattern of voting for the MPLA could in consequence
be observed. Therefore, as Anthony Pereira argues, «it is thus difficult
to deny that the 1992 elections revealed a strong cross-ethnic support for the
MPLA» (qtd. in Hodges 27). But this does not seem to reflect the real
situation on the ground. In its campaign, the MPLA revived the early
postcolonial ideology of equating itself with the `people' and so implying that
all those who did not support the party were already disqualified from taking
advantage of the new political order. Because of this, also considering
Savimbi' s poor electioneering campaign, people turned back to the `devil they
knew', the MPLA, in order to safeguard their rights.
Savimbi and Roberto often found it difficult to work with MPLA
because of the mestiço, Creole and white elements in its
leadership whom they considered as a `non-Africa.' As Birmingham puts it,
«Jonas Savimbi revived his challenge to the [MPLA] regime by accusing it
of being in the pocket of foreigners [...] staffed by whites [and] excessively
parochial in its ethnic preference for Mbundu citizens» (151). In
addition, in 1960 Roberto met Savimbi in Fribourg, asking him to join his
movement on the pretext that the MPLA was controlled by
mestiços and Roberto himself
was unconditionally for the blacks (Bridgland 45). Savimbi
explained later the racist motives that barred possible unity: «it was
very difficult at that time for blacks to understand why mestiços
should be leading a liberation movement to fight the Portuguese. It was
not clear to us that mestiços were suffering in Angola; [for
us] they were privileged people» (qtd. in Bridgland 46). But the
mestiços leadership had opened a wound which had long and
painful consequences for any possible postcolonial reconciliation and
reconstruction. As I have shown, the distinct ethnoregional origin from which
each movement took its shape contributed to the division among the three
movements and each one's ideology would widen it still further.
Influenced by Mao Tse-tung, Savimbi promoted peasant socialism
over the Soviet-style MarxistLeninism of the MPLA. In addition, UNITA advocated
a political program that blended democratic and socialist elements with a
respect for private property and enterprise (Copson 87). They also defended the
position that democracy should be adapted to African conditions, that is, by
emphasizing consensus and using proportional representation to empower ethnic
groups, clans and classes (Copson 87-8). However, the sincerity of UNITA's
commitment to all this was increasingly questioned by the 1980s when
allegations of intolerance and human rights' abuses were blurring the
credibility of the movement. Critics of the party's policy were tortured and
killed in Savimbi's presence and these stories became irrefutable when in 1989
UNITA's highranking dissenters such as Tony Fernandes and N'Zau Puna disclosed
how over the years Savimbi had thoroughly purged any party member seen as a
dissenter (Russell 102).
From its inception, the MPLA was Marxist and after gaining
power adopted Marxism-Leninism
as its official ideology. Moreover, it
adopted a de jure one-party state, nationalized the economy
and through a Soviet-inspired system, called for a centrally
planned economy. Unlike UNITA and FNLA, the MPLA always had a weak link with
the social base in its home `turf.' However, the 1977 coup attempt led to
radical changes. It was intended to overthrow Neto's regime which was led by
Nito Alves, a vigorous MPLA commander who had his ears close to the mass
support but was left out as a member of the inner circle in the regime. That
is, from aspiring to be a mass movement seeking support from its home base, the
MPLA converted itself into a self-selected elite movement mendaciously calling
itself a `vanguard party' in the Leninist mould. So, in its first congress, the
MPLA was renamed the MPLA/PT (Kaure 25). UNITA and FNLA presented themselves as
anti-Marxist, apostles of capitalism and the free market thus attracting
support from Western countries, most notably the USA, and as I have said,
MPLA's ideology became a key factor dividing the three movements. As for FNLA's
ideology, beside its `tribal anachronism,' racial contempt and Anti-Marxist
stand, very little is known about it. Nevertheless, by playing the racial card,
and thereby opening a whole box of repressed colonial neuro ses, both UNITA and
FNLA lit the fuse of a bomb which made it difficult for unity and
reconciliation to take place.
The Soviet-Western block Cold War made the external influences
on Angolan politics more important than they normally would have been to the
extent that none of the movements was willing to seek a compromise but strove
to defeat each other. America and Russia in particular supplied weapons to the
three movements before and even after independence. There were 50, 000 Cuban
ground troops fighting alongside MPLA and Russia had spent $400 million to arm
the MPLA and its Cuban allies (Birmingham 148). Fearing the installation of an
outpost `evil empire' of the Soviet Union in Angola, US President Ronald
Reagan, with the slogan `Africa has
a right to be free,' pushed for the collapse of the
Russian-backed and Cuban-protected MPLA's state. By the mid-eighties US
military aid to UNITA peaked at about $60 million a year (Russell 110).
However, not until the Russian economy began to shrink and with the USA
favouring a new approach (i.e. «no democracy, no cooperation» (Copson
172)) did MPLA and UNITA realize that they could not defeat each other
militarily. Their only choice was to push towards peace accords.
The Bicesse accords were signed in May 1991 by President
José E. dos Santos (who replaced Neto after his death) and Savimbi. But
the depth of mistrust, which led to a developing mutual suspicion with each
movement assuming that the other was bent on absolute power, intensified by the
UN' s failure to back the accords, led to the collapse of these Bicesse
accords. Issa Diallo, the UN's special envoy, even said, «UNITA [violated]
the Accord during the day and the MPLA during the night» (qtd. in Messiant
103). Furthermore, while a budget of $430 million and 10,000 UN personnel was
allocated for the Namibian peace accords, Angola was allocated only $132
million and barely a thousand personnel (Russell 116). Considering the
magnitude of the task which was supposed to be carried out, which was more
complex in Angola than Namibia, the resources allocated were hopelessly
inadequate. With Savimbi's refusal to accept the election results which gave
victory to the MPLA (53.7 per cent) and Dos Santos (49.6 per cent) and the
MPLA's unwillingness to make any concessions, the war resumed. This only ended
when Savimbi was shot dead by the government army on 22 February 2002 and an
agreement was reached with the remnants of UNITA.
In 2003, Isaias Samakuva was elected as the man to replace
Savimbi. GURN was formed with the three and other movements serving in it.
UNITA's parliamentarians who were elected in the 1992 polls took their seats in
the National Assembly. The elections for the legislatives were scheduled for 5
September 2008 and for president, a year after. However, on the eve of the
polls, Samakuva affirmed in an interview by the Portuguese Newspaper,
Agência Lusa, that «alguns sentem-se mais angolanos do que
os outros [some people feel themselves to be more Angolan than others]»
(qtd. in Angonoticias 1). Samakuva went on to say that «é
costume ainda falar dos angolanos e os da UNITA, como se os angolanos da UNITA
não fossem angolanos [it is often said `the Angolans and those of
UNITA,' as if the Angolans in UNITA were not Angolans at all]» (qtd in
Angonoticias 1). Thus, remarks Samakuva, the country has still a long
way to go in order to complete its national identity - «o país tem
um longo caminho para completar a sua identidade nacional» (qtd. in
Angonocias 1).
Samakuva's affirmations take us back to reflect on the
situation of the southerners, the northerners and that of the
mestiços, Creoles and whites. There were, and there still are,
assumptions among many Kimbundu people from Luanda and its Creole elites that
people from central and southern Angola are comparatively backward. The account
of Savimbi and Neto's encounter in the mid-sixties may be of great help in
understanding the extent of this marginalization. During his studies in
Portugal, Savimbi met Neto, who was already working for Angola's popular
uprising. Savimbi was impressed by Neto's quiet strength and determination;
however, Neto' s mistake was to despise Savimbi' s origin and this contributes
to the growth of an epic enmity between the young Ovimbundu and many Mbundu
people as well as the city-based Creoles. As Neto put it, when Savimbi told him
that he was from the south, «it was impossible
that a militant as bright and brave as [Savimbi] could have
emerged from the south: surely his family originally came from the north?»
(qtd. in Bridgland 41). He goes on to say, «[people] from central and
southern Angola [...] do not get involved in the liberation movement. Maybe
it's the effect on them of the missionaries [who] don't want us to see clearly
[...] That is why I do not believe that someone like you [Savimbi] who is
participating in the struggle can be from the south» (qtd. in Bridgland
41-2).
After the 1978 Angola-DRC peace accords, a new generation of
northern Angolans who were born in DRC returned `home.' The returnees were not
only the children of those who had fled the country in 1961, but also the
grandchildren of black commercial entrepreneurs and artisans from Angola who
had served the Belgians over decades. Since the returnees were educated in
Kinshasa, most of them spoke French and therefore were treated as foreigners by
the proud and clannish people of Luanda. Furthermore, they were also treated as
strangers and with no old family networks to protect them; they clung to each
other, thereby generating envy and suspicion among the natives of Luanda. Like
the Ovimbundu, these returning exiles, also called `Zairotas,' are considered
as lesser Angolans.
The mestiços were Creole elites, who were
Portuguese-speaking and often, but not always, of mixed race, Catholic or
Protestant and urban-based. People like Roberto and Savimbi despised them, and
the latter in his xenophobic, racist and ethnic rhetoric called them the
`bastard' children (qtd. in Birmingham 162). Furthermore, they look on them as
`non-Africans' and therefore disconnected from the `real' Africa. The whites
who consider themselves Angolans received a
similar treatment. The 1974 census revealed that the number of
whites living in Angola was 335 000 of which twenty per cent were `native born'
(Bender 227-8).
In the novel, Pepetela's character, Theory, is one such
example of someone who is despised for his white and black origins because
white people consider him black and black people, white; and so he is haunted
by the problem of self-identity. Thus, Samakuva's claims about an authentic
identity do not merely refer to UNITA supporters but also others. Through
Fearless, Mayombe offers us some of the ingredients needed for the
changes to occur: «constant practical confrontation [...] to communicate
[and] to face each other» (79). By so doing, says Fearless, «Another
generation and the Angolan will be a new man» (151) because Theory will be
accepted as a `true' Angolan «[he will] no longer have a colour, [he will
be] totally accepted» (26).
Samakuva's remarks stress the importance of recovering
indigenous identities, which because of migration and urbanization cannot be
traced easily. That is why Fearless says, «we [...] have already forgotten
our roots and the village we came from» (8). So, Samakuva's claims do not
accurately reflect ethnic history and in fact even the conflict was rarely
characterized by outbursts of inter-communal violence or acts of ethnic
cleansing. When the war resumed in 1992-3, there were two outbursts of ethnic
violence in Luanda, which call for some attention. The first one was led by the
MPLA's supporters and aimed at driving UNITA members out of the city. All
Ovimbundu were presumed to be UNITA supporters and became the victims of a
cruel genocide. An estimated 6, 000 people were slaughtered (Hodges 28). The
second outburst was known as Sexta-feira Sangrenta [Friday Bloodshed].
This violence was followed by the government's claim that DRC was aiding UNITA
attacks in the north. As a result, there were some attacks
against the northern Bakongo and forty people were killed
(Hodges 28). So, these two events pointed to a fracturing along ethnic lines
and people's political differences. That this could happen highlights the need
for a recognition and strong emphasis on the basic humanity of every human
being, black, white or mestiços.
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