D. Competitor projects of Antwerp and Rotterdam
Projects of creation of heavy axes reserved for the routing of
freight exist already abroad and aim at improving technically and commercially
the methods the pre one and post-routing of the ports of the Benelux countries.
They obviously seek them also to make more competitive the evacuation of the
containers maritime and to thus push back the depth of the hinterland of the
wearing of Antwerp and Rotterdam. Two projects are proposed of which that of
Rotterdam which was signed by the Dutch government :
The Dutch authorities for their part drew up a railway project of
line dedicated to freight, like the GCP in France, called it « Betuwe
Lijn ». Long of 160 km, Betuwe Lijn will be apparently suited to
procedures of exploitation innovating for a European railroad : long and
heavy trains posting a weight with the axle of 35 tons with the American
northern technique of the double stack (two superimposed containers). Conceived
like an artery of massive evacuation by shuttles of the terminals of Maasvlakte
in Arnhem (the most Western extension of the wearing of Rotterdam) towards the
distribution networks road, river and railway European starting from the German
border, the project envisages a two-track line with a capacity of ten trains
per hour in each direction for a block speed of 120 km/h. A project which can
make dream Le Havre. The line is the first stage of an axis which should be
prolonged to the Swiss border according to agreements' taken between the Dutch
and German governments. Startup waited in 2004.
This project revêt a cardinal importance for the first
European port because the railroad has for the very weak moment only one share
of the terrestrial service road of Rotterdam (4,5% in 1997) but the port
quickly became aware of the stake of the railway tool under system of shuttles
to intensify flows of containers towards the back-country and to answer thus
effectively the massification of the maritime transport. Currently under the
threat of the railway congestion, Rotterdam will be able to thus accompany the
expansion by the rail and envisages from 2005-2006 to quintuple the capacity of
the infrastructures.
This project was adopted among the 14 projects of priority
infrastructures of transport defined by Brussels in the Council European of
Essen in 1994 and will be entirely financed by the European Union.
On their side, the Belgians who also included/understood the
stake of the rail push one « old project » competitor,
serving Rhur and it « blue banana », of a capital stake for
the wearing of Antwerp : it was about « The steel
Rhine » or « Ljzeren Rijn », the rehabilitation
of an existing way since the mouth from the Scheldt in Antwerp in direction of
Germany (Mönchengladbach) and which would be used according to same
principles' as those of Betuwe Lijn (trains blocks by shuttles).
The existence of this way reduces thus considerably the cost of
adjustment of the infrastructure which would rise of 300 million to a billion
francs (according to electrification or not) against 74 billion for Betuwe
Lijn !
This project is thus a formidable opportunity for the Belgian
port which could quickly compete with the terrestrial service road of the
competitor ports and in particular that of Rotterdam.
However, the Belgian project crosses part of the Dutch territory
before reaching Germany. The latter have it thus « chance »
to be able to block the eminently dangerous Belgian project for the project of
Rotterdam.
Talks are currently engaged between the two parts to find an area
of agreement.
Competition between the ports is played well ground there.
CONCLUSION
The rationalization of the maritime transport conferred an
importance increased on the organization and the effectiveness of the
operations with ground where the interior service road and the harbor passage
alone represent more half of the total cost of the chain of transport.
The competitiveness of the maritime transport is played ground
today, and the competitiveness of the harbor places which endeavor each one to
attract the armaments, depends from now on very closely on the performances of
the networks and the offer of terrestrial services.
If the nautical performances of accessibility are essential with
the reception of the ship, they are not enough any more to determine the
choices of stopover of the ship and the wearing of transit for the goods. The
characteristics of productivity, frequency and massification of the terrestrial
vectors of transport became differential criteria justifying the final choice
of the armaments. It is the attractivity with respect to the armaments which
conditions the future development.
Port 2000 appears obvious to face competition insofar as the port
needs new stations with quay likely to accommodate largest carries containers,
at the same time for quantitative and qualitative reasons (reduction of the
duration of the stopovers and massification of the traffic). Also, its
realization must intervene before the traffics are not durably stabilized on
other European ports.
The project is not only maritime and relates to also the
integration of the whole of the devices of terrestrial service road. This is
why the port native of Le Havre wishes to develop at the same time the quality
of its terrestrial service road, on the level of the road transport which
constitutes the first means of transport for the pre one and the post-routing
of the goods which forward by the port on a back-country largely concentrated
on the Paris area, on the level of the river transport which could contribute
even if it is limited to the Island of France, with the massification of the
routings, but more especially on the level of the infrastructures of rail-bound
transport which would make it possible in Le Havre to profit from a service
road developing the assets and advantages of the rail-bound transport, namely
transport of containers about long distances. This one would allow the harbor
place, in a context favorable to the generalization and the harmonization of
the rail-bound transport on a European scale thanks to the installation of the
freeways (TERFF) and freightways, to deepen its hinterland.
With the quality of the terrestrial service road must be added
the extension with the hinterland in which the port can offer to the
ship-owners the best conditions of terrestrial routing at the best price, in
short the best cost ratio/effectiveness.
For that Le Havre must have an infrastructure ready to reinforce
these elements of competitiveness, which makes it possible to optimize the
reduction of the times of routing and the costs.
The great railway skirting of the Paris basin would be a
formidable advisability to improve the fluidity of the traffic towards the east
of France and the Central Europe and to reach the great European industrial
centers turned towards the world economy. But one should not forget only if the
goodwill of the port is almost exclusively French today (more than 90%), its
share of market of 30% is not satisfactory especially in zones particularly and
geographically with its range like south-east in more served by the ports of
north. A competitive access in time as in price is of primary importance to
guarantee to take a leadership uncontested in south-east and a significant
share of the market towards Italy. The loan of the axis the Harbor-Mantes
remains essential for commercial competitiveness in these zones. The passage by
the northern By-pass represents really a diversion of route with lengthenings
of course from 20 to 40% which it is not easily conceivable to see compensated
by the quality of the routing.
It is however essential to invest massively for the modernization
of this axis. The observation of the geographical situation of the Amiens
section/Chalons in fact nevertheless the link lack a strategic axis of interest
in the western relations is or western south is (the United Kingdom, France,
Central Europe). The adjustment of this fast route doubling the north-eastern
artery is thus of the general interest of the national network and even more of
the European network.
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