Naissance médiatique de l'intellectuel musulman en France (1989-2005)

B) The new face of organic Moslem intelligentsia

A certain emergent number of actors in this race with the pertaining to worship leadership. We chose here to distinguish five categories from them. The representatives of two greater federations (Mosque of Paris and UOIF) are analyzed separately, this because of their importance. As for the FNMF, third federation of size, it is not treated here for the maid and simple reason that, in spite of its good results with the two elections of CFCM, it is continuously in full crisis in its top. Thus, its successive presidents never asserted themselves like media interlocutors impossible to circumvent, unlike their colleagues of the two other federations. Concurrently to those, we will see that the creation of CFCM made it possible to clarify not only intellectuals independent collaborating in the installation of the Islam of France, but also of the emblematic personalities of local Islam. Lastly, other characters, them « Anti-CFCM », also amply benefitted from the creation of this one to sit their intellectual authority.

1) Called into question of the prevalence of the vice-chancellor of the Mosque of Paris.

Since its construction in 1922 in the fifth district of the capital, the mosque of Paris was, through its vice-chancellor, the single face of the Moslem worship of France. This historically hegemonic position, it inherits a constant stubbornness to try to federate the Moslem community around it. It is in this direction that it creates the Higher Council of the Islamic Businesses of France (CSAIF) in 1981, the National Coordination of the Moslems of France (CNMF) in 1993, and the Council Representative of the Moslems of France (CRMF) in 1994. But these « claims to represent the whole of the community, with the hussarde, that all the world did not appreciate^142(*) », appeared vain, even against-productive. Failing to impose a federation of the Moslem community around it, the Mosque of Paris had to be resigned to the principle of the open dialog of the State. By its successive vice-chancellors (Sheik Abbas until 1989 ; then Tedjini Haddam, replaced since 1992 by Dalil Boubaker), it had to accept the loss of its hegemony in a consultation by open and heterogeneous definition. This is why its current leader sees in the committed process a loss of the historical influence of his federation : « The role of the Mosque of Paris is not even evoked. However it is necessary to leave the principle that the Large Mosque of Paris is the first in France, symbolically and historically^143(*) . «

Actually, the three criteria retained by the French State more or less well (republican, French and representative Islam), the Mosque of Paris answers. The characteristic making its force is its party taken for a very liberal Islam, in perfect adequacy with the French model of secularity. If Hamza Boubakeur (1912-1995), vice-chancellor until 1982 and author of a translation of Coran which made school, remain for the press « the herald of a modern Islam taking up the challenges of rationality^144(*) ». His/her Dalil son posts as for him a speech to measure for not froisser the opinions of Average Frenchman. This close relation of Jacques Chirac, who does not notice, « in spite of the held speeches, a racism in the French population^145(*) » does not hesitate to consolidate an ambient^146(*) islamophobie in the French company while denouncing « the infiltration of certain islamist organizations^147(*) ». All that made of him, in the unison with the newspapers French general practitioners, one « good Moslem^148(*) », representing one « quiet Islam^149(*) ».

The second criterion, that of the French character, poses already more problems. The Mosque of Paris is managed since its foundation by an Algerian association, the company of the habous^150(*) and holy places of Islam. After the independence of Algeria, If Hamza Boubakeur makes transfer the seat from the latter in France. But in 1982, Algeria ends up gaining the iron arm by parachuting a new nonFrench-speaking vice-chancellor, sheik Abbas^151(*). It is only in April 1992 that France gains the part partially by imposing a French vice-chancellor, Dalil Boubaker : « A doctor replaces a doctor, but it is a French who succeeds an Algerian », Michel Kubler in the Cross is filled with enthusiasm^152(*). But, we do not delude, the Mosque of Paris remains largely subjected to the interests of the community of Algerian origin, which represents approximately half of the Moslem population in France. Dalil Boubaker has the statute of diplomat besides and is thus paid Algerian government.

The vice-chancellor of the Mosque of Paris, if he is indeed a lawyer of an alleviated Islam, thus more or less put himself in conformity with the requirement of French nationality. On the other hand, it is a criterion which it pains to fill : that of the representativeness. The historical window of French Islam is in a recurring way shown to represent « the Islam of in top », completely crossed « the Islam of in bottom ». Franck Fregosi, sociologist, point of the finger « cleavages between an avoided Parisian Islam of all the republican virtues (liberal, modern, French...) and a affublé basic Islam of all the defects (fundamentalist, sectarian, radical...)^153(*) ». Dalil Boubaker indeed was characterized by its awkwardnesses, not to say its contempt, with regard to the Moslem base. For Abderrahmane Dahmane, president of the Council of the Moslem democrats, «this man responsible for the more cuisante is demolished modern Islam^154(*) ». Its judgment of « the Islam of excited of the suburbs^155(*) » indeed was very badly received on the ground, consolidating the image of « cockle vacuum^156(*) » of the Mosque of Paris, which would not have any audience on the ground.

A problem arises then : the three criteria required by the French State are compatible ? To look at the choices of various actors of the Islam of France, the idea emerges that there is discrepancy between the choice of moderation and that of the representativeness. As of the Rushdie business, took shape the requirement to combine the satisfaction of its base all while not froissant the French State : « careful wait-and-see policy of Sheik Abbas, vice-chancellor of the mosque of Paris, enracine (...) with the aim of be maintained a balance between tendencies and to perpetuate a position of interlocutor », explains then Vincent Hugeux in the Cross^157(*). Certain observers estimate as of 1989 which it is because the reaction of the vice-chancellor of the mosque of Paris to the book of Salman Rushdie was too soft that other radical bunches, like the Voice of Islam, were legitimated by their more intransigent standpoint, but also closer to those of the Moslem base.

Which assessment then to draw from the role of the Mosque of Paris, and in particular of its vice-chancellor, taking into account the composition of the Islam of France ? No one cannot dispute that its historical supremacy was shaken. Because even if Dalil Boubaker is, since 2003, president of CFCM, it was not elected but named at this station. Moreover, the Mosque of Paris seemed large losing elections of CFCM, underlining a little more contrast between its notoriety near the political and media circles and its unpopularity at the base. It is indeed holding them of an Islam much more marked which seems the winners of this birth of an Islam of France.

2) A legitimation of the bearded ones ?

If he is large winners declared with the race with the French pertaining to worship leadership, they are well them « bearded of the UOIF », as the press is accustomed to name them. The characteristics of the leaders of this federation, a nebula created in 1983 and which gathers some two hundred associations of variable size, are strictly opposed to those of the Mosque of Paris. The representativeness, gap of the Mosque of Paris, seems assured to the partisans this more radical Islam.

That is enough it to return this federation, taking as a starting point the the Egyptian Moslem Brothers, legitimate in the pertaining to worship representation ? Indeed, whatever the direction which the consultation of the Islam of France takes, the idea is propagated that « the bearded ones make their way »^158(*). Since 1990, Abdallah Ben Mansour, president founder of the UOIF, fact part of the CORIF of Pierre Joxe. The dialog between the State and this organization is thus former to CFCM. The very widespread idea according to which it would have been « adoubée » by Nicolas Sarkozy is thus false^159(*). It does not remain about it less than the process of organization of the Islam of France, based on the broadest possible discussions, is shown in a repetitive way to support the islamist ones. But if the consultation of the partisans of a political Islam- which is, that one wants it or not, a reading of Islam- is legitimate, it is on the other hand astonishing that other tendencies of Islamism, as the AEIF (Association of the Islamic Students of France) does not make counterweight with the center the consultation, as Xavier Ternisien explains it : «   At present, the danger is not to have introduced the UOIF into the representation of Islam. It is rather not to have caused to him a competition resulting from the same mobility^160(*). «

However, the UOIF multiplied the efforts these last years to appear like an organization of most frequentable. Fouad Alaoui, vice-president of CFCM, for example tried to found a dialog with the Jewish community^161(*), signs considerable for which wants to seem a sizeable Moslem interlocutor : « the UOIF knows that a public dialog with the Jews is worth patent of respectability^162(*). »

Another example, in 2005, the 22e meets Moslems of France of Le Bourget, annual ceremony orchestrated by the UOIF, is the first which does not separate men and women in the assistance^163(*). But the event which is used as ideal scene for the UOIF in order to post its republicanism is the business of the hostages in 2004. Beseeching the kidnappers to release the two officially removed French journalists counteracts French the law about it known as « scarf » of March 15, 2004, the UOIF was forced of « to choose its camp » under the media and diplomatic pressure, as Jean Daniel in the New Observer explains it :

« The Moslem French gained here with glare their patent of republicanism, i.e., also, of secularity. Then, the institutions which incarnated by the French Council of the Moslem Worship, which were very discussed because of the radicalism of some their representatives, these legal institutions have from now on a legitimacy^164(*). »

Nevertheless media enthusiasm is partial and is turned over even sometimes against the representatives of the UOIF. « Tactical armistice or peace of the brave men ? », Claude Askolovitch in this same newspaper questions^165(*). The situation of the UOIF is thus paradoxical since the federation forever as much décriée only since it makes an effort « to standardize ». It is the famous fear of « double game » : the leaders of the UOIF made less fear by posting their intransigence than while trying to outline a more modern speech. Thus, these « firemen flamers^166(*) », with « secret ambitions^167(*) », are anything else only « Masters tacticians^168(*) ". Simple shell or revealing lapse, letters UOIF besides is sometimes wrongfully presented as being the initial ones « Union of the Islamist Organizations of France^169(*) «. The attempt at standardization of the radical leaders is thus perceived with mistrust as being a strategy of infiltration :

« The leaders of the UOIF have clear objectives and a strategy of conquest (...), the UOIF wanted to make France a back base: a place where islamist militants could find refuge and where one tries to modify the glance which the public opinion carries on their countries of origin^170(*) ».

Following the example image of the duplicity of Tariq Ramadan which is conveyed, the press calls mainly with not proud with misleading appearances of the members of the UOIF :

« Cordial, voluble, raising cross costume and beard cut, holder of a political DEA of sciences, Lhaj Thami Breze incarnates well the federation which it chairs and which claims to promote a «modern» Islam, ready to adapt to the French company, while nourishing theological references fundamentalist, drawn in particular to the source of the Egyptian Moslem Brothers, and money of the Gulf^171(*). »

The federation, through its some faces, like Fouad Alaoui, Lhaj Thami Breze, Farid Abdelkrim, thus succeeded in creating a place of interlocutor impossible to circumvent of the authorities. Nevertheless its attempts to fill gaps as regards republican spirit prove for the moment against-productive. The more so as this orientation can appear dangerous in-house. In an organization which always privileged an Islam rather close to Islam to in bottom, this standardization of the speech can leave skeptic. How the situation it will develop in the future ? Already take shape the premises of a scission within the federation between « pragmatic » (Fouad Alaoui, Lhaj Thami Breze) and them « orthodoxe » (Farid Abdelkrim), fearing that the UOIF becomes, following the example Mosque of Paris, one « cockle without heart^172(*) «.

3) Emergence news independent personalities

Several individuals were selected to represent an opinion independent on Islam of France in the installation of this one. Some did not benefit from this role of interface with the authorities to acquire a new intellectual visibility. For example, Michel Chodkiewicz seldom prevails himself of his statute of personality qualified within CFCM. On the other hand, the consultation made it possible certain individuals to emerge or rebound on the media scene as semi-autonomous personalities. They have a tangent position thus. They want to be at the same time independent, but are associated the process of consultation all the same. Among those, the most obvious example is that of Soheib Bencheikh, wire of Sheik Abbas, become the true one « pet of the media^173(*) ».

Soheib Bencheikh was born on December 20, 1961 in Djeddah in Saudi Arabia. It is graduate university Al-Azhar of Cairo and doctor of religious sciences of the practical School of the high studies. Appointed mufti of Marseilles in 1995 by Dalil Boubaker, it defends a very modern Islam, rather distant from that taught in the mosques. Stating itself to fit in the current reformist, engaged for a return to the text and its second reading with waitings of today, it chose a mode of legitimation distinct from the reforming intellectuals studied previously, although it shares a design of the religion very close to those :

« Any attempt to reform Islam- and the Moslem right in particular- thus passes by a work of desacralization, by a second reading of the texts in the light of the modern intelligence, by the search of an orientation, a curve as one would say in mathematics, to allow to the Moslem of good food his Islam today. If this desacralization is not done, it is the secularization or the laicization which will follow, under the worst conditions. The secularization of the company in Christian Europe did not await the council the Vatican II. Islam is not different in this respect: or it goes with its century, or it remains with the margin of the modern society. «^174(*)

Criticizing initially « the principle and methods of the consultation on the organization of the Moslem worship in France^175(*) », Soheib Bencheikh chooses to return inside while finding the compromise of « critical support^176(*) » with this one. Like all the personalities independent of the consultation, it makes figure of counterweight against the federations and large mosques considered to be too radical. It does not hesitate to condemn some of his colleagues, by qualifying the UOIF « of fundamentalist anteroom of the most radical Islamism^177(*) ».

Officially independent, Soheib Bencheikh is however very close to the Mosque of Paris. It is thus not astonishing that its profile is similar to the portrait of Dalil Boubaker mentioned above. Thus, it has the appearance of a large mufti, in favor «of an Islam of progress, opening and civilization^178(*)», « recognized by the State but not the whole of its community »^179(*), and which tries with insistence to federate the community around him. In addition to these characteristics, Soheib Bencheikh has the perfect predispositions of the media star. It is besides for Marianne anything else only one « tendron with theology rebels », « good sheik, good kind^180(*) » !

The media irruption of the large mufti of Marseilles east thus due to its modernity as well in the content as in the form. Perfect counterweight of the traditionalists, it is incontestably him which occupies the majority of the media field of the qualified personalities of CFCM. There is thus little place beside Soheib Bencheikh... unless putting in margin consultation ?

4) Legitimation in margin, even against the consultation 

The birth of CFCM creates a place of intellectual legitimacy. But the dispute of the consultation is also a field abundantly used and relatively carrier. It was already shown how much Soheib Bencheikh benefits from its at the same time internal and detached posture CFCM. In out of the ordinary of the review Quoted, Franck Fregosi describes how the field of « Anti-CFCM » is coveted^181(*). There are not only those which resigned of the council, but also those which were always presented in the combat against this one.

CFCM, in spite of its youth, knew a great number of resignations. Almost all its components already used of the blackmail to the resignation. The departures of two women were particularly media : those of Betoule Fekkar-Lambiotte and Dounia Bouzar. If Bétoule Fekkar-Lambiotte throws sponge « to defend republican Islam », showing Nicolas Sarkozy to privilege « a perfectly retrograde Islam^182(*) », Dounia Bouzar explains as for it which CFCM is worried only by its own elections, occulting the discussions in depth. The anthropologist who, for Nicolas Sarkozy, « has the ideal profile to make like Islam with all the French^183(*) », particularly gained in legitimacy while taking part then by leaving CFCM. It from now on is indeed accepted like intellectual with whole share in spite of a thought a priori less reconciling that that of Soheib Bencheikh for example^184(*). The legitimacy of these two outgoing women is from now on double. They not only tried to take an active part in the representation of the Moslem worship, but while resigning about it, they are placed in a posture of superiority with regard to the Council which them « deserve » not.

In parallel, a certain number of Moslem persons in charge made to consultation on the Islam of France their war-horse. They are mainly the representatives of the federations of young Moslems, like the Union of Young Moslems (UJM), the CJM (Collective of the Young Moslems) and EMF (Student Moslems of France). They in general reproach the not-representation of the Islam of the young beurs, i.e. immigrants of the second or third generation, within CFCM. Thus, Yamin Makri, spokesman of the CMF (Collective of the Moslems of France), estimate that it feels « too much French for [] there recognizing^185(*) ». These some activists in general chose, contrary to the participants of CFCM, the crenel of the fight within association of « young Moslems », thus refusing to take part in an institutionalized organization, by dependant definition^186(*). On the other hand, another type of actor amply benefitted from the installation of an Islam of France while taking part in it. They are the representatives « Islam of in bottom ».

5) New visibility of local Islam

As we saw previously, the consultation aims to represent concrete Islam. It thus constitutes for representatives of local Islam the advisability of acquiring a media legitimacy. Thanks to the organization of the Moslem worship, it « Islam of the cellars », source of all the fears, is on the way to disappear. For example, Mamadou Daffé, first of all labelled « islamist » by the General Information^187(*) and « too much Moslem to be French^188(*) » by the press, becomes little by little one of these new media stars of local Islam.

The birth of their image in the press thus makes it possible to diffuse less common designs of Islam, not being able to be shown to ignore realities of the Moslem base, while exceeding binary cleavage between an Islam of in moderate top and an Islam of in radical bottom. Tareq Oubrou, Imam of Bordeaux, thus could make known its original theory of « fiqh of minority », which is an adaptation of the Moslems to their minority situation in dar Al-harb^189(*). Even if it seems like conservative on many points, private morals or the place of the women, the dynamics of legitimation of local Islam, created by the birth of a representative Islam of France, contributed to make its theses, if not admissible, at least audible. That creates a certain intellectual emulation in the theorization of Islam. Thus, Leila Babès, intellectual committed for an Islam of the Lights, agreed to confront his point of view with this last in a book of talks^190(*) :

« I remain without catch on a community which functions like an organization of mass. But I want to create bridges with it, and this is why I did not make this book only, but with a man of religion recognized in order to cause the debate^191(*). «^.

A dialog, although unequal, is beautiful was born well, as this critic of the book of Marion Festraëts shows it, appeared in the Express train :

« Holding of the scientific of the texts and savage criticism militant of freedom to think, Leïla Babès pushes the monk, man of opening resulting from a line traditionalist, in his cuttings off, the met vis-a-vis contradictions of a spirituality difficult to dissociate from the historical context of its revelation^192(*). »

The consultation of the Islam of France by the French State thus constitutes an amazing chance for some personalities really representative of lived Islam which can thus leave the shade. If all kinds of intellectuals thus emerged from the birth of an Islam of France, how they use this role of organic Moslem intellectual ?

* ¹⁴² Michel Kubler, «  A disputed charter of the Moslem worship  », the Cross, 13/12/1994.

* ¹⁴³ Bernard Gorce, «  Islam and Republic are challenged and sought  », the Cross, 8/12/1999.

* ¹⁴⁴Id, «  Al word for a modern world  », the Cross, 8/1/1995.

* ¹⁴⁵ Id, «  Dalil Boubaker in shift for Islam  », the Cross, 5/3/1997.

* ¹⁴⁶ The word is here to hear with the purely etymological direction. Built starting from the Greek phobos (= «  fear  »), it indicates more one fear of Islam that a true reasoned hatred. 

* ¹⁴⁷ Xavier Ternisien, «  Moslems of France, between identity assertion and concerns  », the World, 13/5/2002.

* ¹⁴⁸ Michel Kubler, «  «Good» Moslems of Charles Pasqua  », the Cross, 12/1/1995.

* ¹⁴⁹ Jean Bourdarias, «  Islam in France  : the time of the dialog  », the Barber, 25/3/1990.

* ¹⁵⁰ = «  religious goods  ».

* ¹⁵¹ Henri Tincq, «  Seventy years of controversies  », the World, 8/2/1992.

* ¹⁵² Michel Kubler, «  Dr. Boubakeur with the bedside of the mosque  », the Cross, 14/4/1992.

* ¹⁵³ Franck Fregosi, «  Islam of in top against Islam of in bottom  », the Barber, 31/10/2002.

* ¹⁵⁴ Ali Laïdi, «  Boubakor or the failure of moderate  », New Observer, 26/6/2003.

* ¹⁵⁵ Maintenance granted to the newspaper 20 minutes, brought back by Xavier Ternisien, «  A maintenance on the Islam granted by Dalil Boubaker causes a general outcry among Moslems  », the World, 23/10/2002.

* ¹⁵⁶ Farid Aichoune & Etchegoin Marie-France, «  Battle for a minaret  », the New Observer, 21/03/1989.

* ¹⁵⁷ Vincent Hugeux, «  Stakes of a sentence  », the Cross, 1/3/1989.

* ¹⁵⁸ Guillaume Malaurie, «  The bearded ones make their way  », The Event of Thursday, 22/4/1993.

* ¹⁵⁹ Cf Xavier Ternisien, «  Inquire into these Moslems who worry the Islam of France  », the World, 13/2/2002.

* ¹⁶⁰ Xavier Ternisien, «  Sarkozy and the Islam of France  », the World, 16/1/2003.

* ¹⁶¹ Jean-Pierre Elkabbach joins together on June 13, 2004 on Europe1 Roger Cuckierman and Fouad Alaoui, which explains why «  the anti-semitism is condemnable by Islam and the Moslems  ».

* ¹⁶² Claude Askolovitch, «  Jews and Moslems join again the dialog  », the New Observer, 16/9/2004.

* ¹⁶³ Xavier Ternisien, «  To Le Bourget, the Moslems gave signs of union and moderation  », the World, 29/3/2005.

* ¹⁶⁴ Jean Daniel, «  The message of French Islam  », the New Observer, 2/9/2004.

* ¹⁶⁵Claude Askolovitch, «  Islam and Republic, weddings of August  », the New Observer, 2/9/2004.

* ¹⁶⁶ Gilbert Charles, Claire Chartier, Vincent Hugeux, Besma Lahouri, Alain Louyot, Eric Furrier, Jean-Marie Pontaut & Delphine Saubaber, «  Lessons of a test  », the Express train, 6/9/2004.

* ¹⁶⁷ Fiametta Venner, tender offers on the Islam of France, ambitions secret of the UOIF, Calmann-Levy, 2004, 241 p.

* ¹⁶⁸ Claude Askolovitch, «  Islam and Republic, weddings of August  », COp cit.

* ¹⁶⁹ Cf article not signed,  «  The UOIF aims at reinforcing the communautarism in France  », the Barber, 17/6/2003.

* ¹⁷⁰ Rémy Jacqueline & Boris Thiolay, «  The hidden face of the UOIF  », the Express train, 2/5/2005.

* ¹⁷¹ Besma Lahoury & Boris Thiolay, «  Money of Islam in France  », the Express train, 21/11/2002.

* ¹⁷² Xavier Ternisien, «  The annual Meeting of the Moslems of France opens on bottom of discord  », the World, 26/3/2005.

* ¹⁷³ Portrait of Soheib Bencheikh by AFP, 4/5/2002. 

* ¹⁷⁴Maintenance with Henri Tincq with Soheib Bencheikh, the World, 20/11/2001.

* ¹⁷⁵ Josette Combined, «  The true face of French Islam  », the New Observer, 21/2/2002.

* ¹⁷⁶ Xavier Ternisien, «  Moslem personalities denounce the way in which Nicolas Sarkozy organizes the Islam of France  », the World, 12/12/2002.

* ¹⁷⁷ Jean-Marie Guénois, «  French Islam remains divided  », the Cross, 12/12/2002.

* ¹⁷⁸ Elie Marshal, «  A center of studies of Islam in gestation  », the Barber, 21/5/1998.

* ¹⁷⁹ Maintenance with Delphine Saubaber with Soheib Bencheikh, the Express train, 9/4/1998.

* ¹⁸⁰ Daniel Licht, «  In the name of Al and of Marianne  », Release, 3/2/1998.

* ¹⁸¹ Franck Fregosi, «  Which organization of Islam in the Republic  : institutionalization and/or instrumentalisation  ?  », in (dir. Yves-Charles Zarka), Quoted, out of the ordinary, «  Islam in France  », PUF, 2004, pp. 101-105.

* ¹⁸² Anonymous article, «  Bétoule Fekkar-Lambiotte announced its resignation of the Consultation on the Moslem worship  », the World, 9/2/2003. 

* ¹⁸³  Xavier Ternisien, «  Dounia Bouzar, Moslem woman of France  », the World, 28/1/2005.

* ¹⁸⁴ It is indeed one of rare the intellectual recognized Moslem women as such who refuse for example to stigmatize the port with the veil (cf Dounia Bouzar & Saïda Kada, One veiled, the other not, Albin Michel, 2003, 200 p.), or of diaboliser Tariq Ramadan (cf Dounia Bouzar, the Islam of the suburbs, Syros, Paris, 2001, 181 p.).

* ¹⁸⁵ Maintenance with Xavier Ternisien with Yamin Makri, the World, 22/12/2002.

* ¹⁸⁶ Cf left IV. Just like these «  young Moslems  », we will see that «  laic Moslems  » will be useful themselves of a anti-CFCM speech to create a place  media.

* ¹⁸⁷ Josette Combined, «  The true face of French Islam  », the New Observer, 21/2/2002.

* ¹⁸⁸  Claude Weill, «  Too much Moslem to be French  », the New Observer, 20/11/1997.

* ¹⁸⁹ = «  ground not-Moslem woman  ».

* ¹⁹⁰ Leila Babès, Al Law, law of the men, Albin Michel, 2002, 360 p.

* ¹⁹¹ Maintenance with Islabelle de Gaulmyn with Leila Babès, the Cross, 30/5/2002.

* ¹⁹² Marion Festraëts, «  The sociologist and the monk  », the Express train, 16/5/2002.