|
University Paul
Valéry- Montpellier III
Master 1 Company and Territory, Social
sciences
Mention modern and contemporary
History
Speciality Companies and religions of XVIe in XXIe
century
Birth of the Moslem intellectual in the French media
(1989-2005)
Memory presented by Tristan WALECKX
Under the direction of Mr. Michel FOURCADE
2004-2005
Thanks
I make a point of thanking Mr. Michel FOURCADE for his
availability without fault, his advised councils and his acute critical
direction.
I also thank Mr. Domenica AVON who, in full Lebanese
epopee, took time to answer my requests.
I pay homage using Mr. Amine BESSAOUD, (which I would
never have met without the indirect action of fanatics of a certain not very
advisable design of Islam) with which the exchanges on my subject was as
enthralling as enriching.
As for Mr. Robert LAZENNEC, his vision of expert of
secularity as his documentation of an exemplary diversity were to me of an
invaluable help.
Lastly, no need to recall to my friends and my family that
I know to them liking of their patience, their councils, and their some final
improvements orthographical.
« How thinkers living in Islamic context,
interdependent of the historical trajectory of countries, remained a long time
apart from the preliminary works with this reason universalisable, can be
located from the same point of view of knowledge criticizes, while respecting
the slow rate/rhythm, the many epistemological obstacles which maintain the
thought Islamic in at the same time obsolete combat and without generalizable
cognitive range? Thus for my part, I plan the task of the intellectual who
practices without concession the critical analysis, without to break the
historical solidarity imposed by his origins, his fasteners family, village,
cultural, emotional... Note that I did not say immediately, as one could expect
it, the Moslem intellectual. This qualifier attaches today to too ideologized
solidarity so that a critical intellectual, engaged for the reason
universalisable, is claimed some without inconsistency, nor
wandering. »
Mohammed Arkoun1(*)
Introduction
We propose to study the figure of the Moslem intellectual in
France during the period going from 1989 to our days. This interval of time
appears relevant for several reasons. The year 1989 is indeed a date-key in the
recent history of Islam. It is in the month of February of this year
that fatwa is launched by the ayatollah Khomeiny against the writer
Salman Rushdie, shown blasphemy for its book the Satanic
Verses2(*). With the
following school re-entry, three buckled girls are expelled of their college of
Creil. Succeeding « the Rushdie business », this
« business of the scarf » Islam propels on the media field.
Since 1990, the minister of religion Pierre Joxe launches the consultation of
the Moslems by the authorities by founding the CORIF (the Council of
Orientation and Reflection on Islam in France). These events are as many
occasions of public reactions, of, setting standpoint in prospect for the
object « Islam » by outside contributors but such interior
with this one.
With the advent of the years 1990, thus creates for itself an
economic situation extremely favorable to the birth- certainly complexes- of a
new intellectual posture, as already notes it at the time Mohammed Arkoun,
often regarded as the veteran of these Moslem intellectuals, in connection with
the consequences of the Rushdie business :
« For me, it is more than the Dreyfus business,
because it is the world conscience which is challenged. The current storm shows
that the Occident is not at all prepared to hear the voice of Islam as it is
expressed. I am explained : to react only by calling upon Voltaire,
Rousseau, the humans right, the freedom of the artist and the writer, it is to
refer to known topics and invaluable conquests of the spirit for all the men,
but you have not been able to ask all the cultures to follow the trajectory
traced for two centuries by France and Europe 3(*). «
If it is admitted that the term
« intellectual » was used in its form substantivized for
the first time at the time of the business Dreyfus4(*), it is well on this occasion
that thinkers appeared as a social group, cosignant the text I show of
Zola. In the same way, for fifteen years, the recent visibility and the new
economic situation surrounding Islam have made it possible a certain
Moslem intelligentsia to emerge at least médiatiquement in
France. Indeed, the Rushdie business in 1989, the war of the Gulf of 1991
or the problem of the scarf represents as many events calling with the
necessary coordination of the Moslems of France : the will to adopt
concerted positions appears consequently among the principal actors of the
Islamic field.
As suggests it the reflection of Mohammed Arkoun ahead-matter,
we will thus wonder along our study how the Moslem intellectual creates his
singularity to exist as tel. the intellectuals who interest us here are those
which are defined publicly as Moslems. It would be indeed absurd to proceed to
an ethnic definition of the religion and to insert in our study of the
personalities which are simply of Moslem culture or Moslem women in their
private life, although the distinction is sometimes fuzzy, certain individuals
posting publicly or not their faith according to circumstances'.
Our research is based primarily on the press and the image
that this one returns French Islamic landscape. The majority of the newspaper
industry French general practitioner having treated Islam lasting these fifteen
last years were consulted. Of course, we must admit the limits of a research
basing itself on sources with the prism sometimes deforming. But force is to
recognize that it « médiacratie » is spirit to
supplant it « intellocratie »5(*), and that, a fortiori,
the media relays of such personality are a good means of judging its impact as
an intellectual. In the same way, the question it is quite out ofit is quite
out of here to draw from the too broad consequences of a study based on limited
supports. The studied press was certainly used as source which it is necessary
to call in question, but it is not a question of a study of the press as such.
For that, a thorough analysis would be necessary6(*). We will thus be interested in the media not like
single subject but like a means of knowledge of part of the Islamic
intellectual world.
If we endeavoured to define the terms of the subject, it is
still essential to specify a certain number of concepts referring to Islam
which will be employed. Indeed, general public being not very familiar with the
subject, the majority of these concepts are very often deformed, in particular
in the media, which constitute our principal source in addition. Many terms are
used there indifferently as synonymous to describe in a binary way a reality
which is not it. Thus, the Moslem is often opposite « reformist,
modern, republican, alleviated » with the Moslem
« traditionalist, fundamentalist, integrist, obscurantist,
islamist ». Admittedly, it is impossible to quickly define in
introduction these fuzzy and fluctuating concepts, the more so as one of the
relevance of our work as a whole is to be able to express subtleties which hide
behind.
But if the precise significances of these terms will be
clarified during our matter, it is advisable all the same here to fix a
framework by evacuating some generally accepted ideas. The media conveying in
majority a vision manichéenne of Islam, it is essential to mark the
differences between all the words indicating it « good
Islam » on the one hand and it « bad Islam » in
addition.
For example, it is necessary to avoid the confusion which is
very often made in the press between reformer and modernistic. The purpose of a
Moslem reformer, by definition, is to reform the interpretation of the Koranic
text. However even salafism7(*), literally « imitation of old »,
is a theory aiming at reforming the reading of Coran. One of the interests of
our duty will be thus to show how the media transformed this definition of the
reformer to substitute that of modernistic to him.
Other side, terms employed indifferently to indicate
« Islam such as us kids » have, in the same way, of the
quite distinct significances and it is intellectually unacceptable to confuse
them. Indeed, to take an example running, the Islamism, which indicates a
theory preaching the subordination of the political and social life to the
principles of Islam, has nothing to do with the traditionalism or the
fundamentalism, which are not political ideologies. One of the interests of our
work will be thus to clarify this semantic jamming due to an excessive
simplification of the reality of Islam by the press.
Precautions also are essential concerning the use in
opposition of the concepts of Islam and Occident. This idea of confrontation,
popularized by one from now on celebrates book of Samuel Huntington8(*), raises a basic problem since it
puts face to face a religion and a geographical and cultural space. Of course,
confusion comes owing to the fact that the word « Islam »
covers actually two concepts : that of Islamic religion and that of
Islamic civilization9(*). Us
drudges thus to be explicit in order to dissociate it « culture
Islam » and it « religion Islam ».
During our readings, an assumption emerged : this period
of 1989 to our days would not mark it the birth of the Moslem intellectual in
France ? Indeed, as the sociologist Vincent Geisser underlines it, it is
quite possible that the object « Islam » is
« francized » and
« intellectualized10(*) «. Some indices enable us to believe it. It also
appeared to us that this birth would be multiform : four categories of
Moslem intellectuals would emerge on the French media scene since 1989. They
would correspond to four new fields of legitimation. These categories would
thus not be limited sociological fields, but they would translate four means
of « dubbing » intellectual good distinct. The borders
between these fields being moving, the same actor of the Moslem scene would be
likely to intervene in several of these categories. We pose the four great
fields thus following:
The intellectual Moslem avant-gardist : it is an
intellectual avant-gardist before being a Moslem intellectual. Its statute of
intellectual was acquired independently of a quite marked Islamite however.
The reforming intellectual of Islam : it is an
intellectual with the role of theologist who proposes to reform the reading of
Coran. This figure in France, although inheriting partially a long tradition
reformist, is beautiful is quite new and singular.
The intellectual representing of the Islam of
France : it is an organic, official intellectual. Its appearance is
new also since it is related to the very recent emergence of an Islam of
France.
The leader Moslem socio-policy : it is an
intellectual engaged in the social and political combat, which proposes its
membership at the oumma to explain its choices. The emergence of this
figure is closely related to the Islamic turning of the debates around
integration.
It is according to this typology that we will articulate our
work, while trying, for each category, to precisely determine the
characteristics of the individuals who are attached to it and the image that
the media return from there. It will be the occasion to show the complex
reports/ratios and the multiform interactions which occur between the French
public opinion in the broad sense and the incipient Moslem elite.
I.
the Moslem intellectual of avant-garde
The first figure of the Moslem intellectual who can be
distinguished is that of the intellectual avant-gardist. On the four categories
which we defined, this one is undoubtedly oldest. We in general find in this
field of the personalities having acquired a intellectual legitimacy in a
various- way by the means of an artistic activity or political- but whose
attachment with Islam was not the springboard towards notoriety. Their posted
faith is right one their identities. We can separate among them the converted
French and the intellectuals originating in the Moslem world. Gathered under
the same category, these two can appear opposite. Indeed, the first went from
the avant-gardism towards Islam, the seconds, on the contrary, from Islam
towards the avant-gardism. But they meet bus for each one, their avant-gardism
takes precedence over their Islamite. It is what distinguishes them from the
three other figures that we will study thereafter.
A) The French intellectual converted with Islam
Paradoxically, the French intellectual converted with Islam,
although often presented in an exotic way, even marginal, is surely the oldest
figure of the palpable Moslem intellectual in the media. He is frequently
exposed like the single possible link between the Moslem community and the
French company. Nevertheless, the representation is partial because these
converted acquired the statute of intellectual independently of their
membership of Islam. Here undoubtedly why these Moslem intellectuals tend to
see their media role restricting with the profit of what one could qualify by
contrast of « intellectual Moslems ».
1) Intellectuals before being
converted.
The converted Moslem intellectuals obtained the posture of
intellectual independently of their beliefs, them
« dubbing » being generally former to their change of
faith. Several features make these converted with the Islam of the
intellectuals avant-gardists : they are it in particular by their sphere
of activity, but also by the mystical character of their conversion like by
their attraction for the Sufism, spiritual Islamic religion connects.
Sociologiquement initially, it is among the high social
categories that conversions were primarily anchored to Islam until the
beginning of the years 1990. Among these great figures of converted, much have
a sphere of activities which makes them personalities avant-gardists. We find
there for example the choreographer Maurice Béjart (born in 1927) or
much of academics « orientalists » such Eva de Vitray
(1909-1999), Roger Garaudy (born in 1913), Michel Chodkiewicz (born in 1929)
and Eric Geoffroy. As for Vincent Monteil (1913-2005), before becoming it
« the last of the large orientalists11(*) », it is described by the press like one
« Lawrence of French Arabia12(*) ». It is true that Mansour Monteil, by its
name of conversion, former officer of the indigenous businesses, dedicates a
great admiration for the British colonel, devoting a biography in particular to
him13(*). But with the
difference of its hero, it converts with Islam in 1977 in Nouakchott
(Mauritania), making a little more coherent its attachment with the indigenous
populations and its various engagements near them.
If these converted belong socially to raised intellectual
spheres, their conversions all the more appear avant-gardists that the
spiritual justification of the choice to generally enter the oumma premium.
Maurice Béjart challenges the term besides of
« conversion », preferring that to him
of « initiation 14(*)». Also let us note that it at a these converted
there kind of attraction for the continuity of the prophetic revelation. The
philosopher Roger Garaudy, become Roger Rajah Garaudy in 1982, presents his
choice like one énième change of faith after having passed by
Catholicism and Communism. In the same way, Michel Chodkiewicz explains his
conversion like « result of a personal research started as of
adolescence (...) because Catholicism [him] did not bring satisfactory
answers15(*) ».
Eric Younès Geoffroy, today professor of islamology in Strasbourg,
lengthily attended temples Tibetans before making his profession of faith.
Islam being chronologically the last great monotheism, it is not astonishing to
find among its faithful many people being at the end of a long spiritual
search. Conversion with Islam is thus not inevitably the fruit of a
disappointment with respect to the religion or the religious culture of origin,
but rather that of the search for a revelation which is complete and total.
Besides Eva de Vitray explains thus his change of faith operated in 1950 :
« In any event, Islam obliges to recognize all the
spiritual communities, all the former prophets. Islam is the common denominator
to all the religions. One does not convert with Islam. One embraces a religion
which contains all the others16(*). »
Also let us notice that a certain number of the converted
intellectuals are researchers whose object of studies is the Moslem world or
Islam. We can thus suggest that a certain attraction for the studied object
operated in these scholars. This attraction could be political or mystical.
Roger Garaudy and Jean-Wolf Herbert (1941-2005) for example, they were allured
by the militancy pro-Arabic and the support of the Third World before
converting. Others on the other hand had a metaphysical and esthetic approach
of Islam. It is the case in particular among the specialists in the Sufism
which, in the line of intellectuals orientalists such Rene Guenon (1886-1951)
converted in 1912, embraced Islam after the study of spiritual and
philosophical texts Moslem. Michel Chodkiewicz, explaining that
« there was combination of the intellectual interest for the richness
of the Islamic tradition with the meeting of exceptional people17(*) «, devoted a work to Ibn
Arabi, large thinker soufi of Andalusia of XIIIe century18(*). The same mechanism operated
at Eva de Vitray, with whom meetings have « fact of knowing Ibn
Arabi, Rumi and other large thinkers of the Islam of the Middle
Ages 19(*)». It
is besides the auteure of forty works on this mystical branch of Islam and the
spiritual Master of the brotherhood of the dancing dervishes Rumi (XIIIe
century)20(*).
The model of converted with the Islamic religion at the end of
the years 1980 is thus that of a personality of high social category and to the
spiritual questioning and complex metaphysics. It is what makes of him an
intellectual avant-gardist. We can ask all the same to us whether, under the
posted spiritual reasons, other interests intended to start again an image can
exist. Rock Cherqaoui, author of a book on converted with Western ground Islam,
explains why « if conversion proves to be paying in this medium
[intellectual], it is that obeying the laws of the media, it grants some price
to displacements and reversals ideological and spiritual suitable to regild a
public image21(*) ».
Lastly, we can suggest a last argument consolidating the idea
of avant-gardism of these changes of faith. These conversions are indeed early
and appear in shift with an opinion still quite sensitive to the cold with
regard to a religion source of all the phantasms. It can be felt in the press
like paradoxical being presented at the same time in the form of an
intellectual and as converted at Islam. Thus, reacting to the defense of
Khomeini per Vincent Monteil, Vincent Red-headed written in the
World :
« Such a misinterpretation is not worthy of the
eminent intellectual who was Monteil. They is clean fanatics of any hair to
arbitrarily replace the justice of God. Vincent Monteil undoubtedly did not
admit it, but Vincent Mansour... alas! 22(*) »
That the change of faith is justified by spiritual, political
factors or purely materials, any harmony in any case to make these converted
intellectuals avant-gardists and into shift over their time. But, force is to
note that their media role as a Moslem intellectual is partial and even tends
to be restricted.
2) A rather restricted media role and in
breathlessness
Being, at the beginning of our period, almost the only
important figures of Moslem intellectuals in the media, these converted
avant-gardists inevitably have a role of representatives of the Moslem
community, but this role remains very limited.
Their intervention in the press makes it possible nevertheless
to present an original point of view on the topicality. Converted allured inter
alia by the support of the Third World sometimes pointed out themselves by some
overflows in their analyzes. If Jean-Wolf Abdelhalim Herbert supports the
Iranian revolution initially23(*), Roger Garaudy is condemned in 1998 for dispute of
crimes against humanity because of his book the myths founders of the
Israeli policy. In the same way, Vincent Monteil, fascinated by the
character of the Khomeiny Imam, is distinguished from the majority of the
others converted into defending this last when it launches a fatwa
condemning Salman Rushdie :
« The World devotes to «the Rushdie
business» a place which would be justified if the word were given, in an
equitable way, with the arguments of those- of which I am- which thinks that
the freedom of expression does not make it possible to defend and spread a book
whose blasphemies disturb the law and order and encourage with hatred and
racial and religious discrimination24(*). »
This intransigence of certain neophytes is also found in the
debates on the Republic and Islam. Youssouf Leclerc, former president of the
national Federation of the Moslems of France (FNMF), created initially to give
a visibility to the converted French, denounce in
1990 « the moderate ones which deforms Islam, by calling upon
Islam25(*) ».
This figure of converted intransigent A now replaced by that of Thomas Milcent,
very mediatized under the pseudonym of « Doctor Abdallah »,
become the symbol of the fight against the law prohibiting the wearing of
religious signs at the school.
But these partisans of a hard Islam constitute a minority of
the French intellectuals allured by Islam. As we saw previously, much are
attracted by the mystical values of this religion. They are thus in general
presented like the partisans of an alleviated Islam. Michel Chodkiewicz, called
« converted against the integrist ones », of which the
woman « is not buckled », explains that it is it
« vocation even » of Islam to be
« opened 26(*)». To the moment of the Rushdie business, whereas
he is a chairman of the editions of the Threshold, he brings publicly, and on
several occasions, his support for Christian Bourgeois, editor of the
Satanic Verses. With Eric Geoffroy, Michel Chodkiewicz is even solicited
to represent the currents soufis in the installation of the Islam of France in
order to counterbalance the weight of the federations considered to be too
retrograde in the consultation.
Michel Fox, with his review Islam of France, is also
a burning promoter of an easing of the Koranic message to adapt it to Western
modernity : « Time had just chosen between Islam religion,
enraciné in a secular Moslem wisdom, and the political Islam appeared at
the beginning of the XXe century27(*). » Opponent « political Islam and
Islam religion », Michel Renard estimates that « the Islam
of France cannot be exonerated from a necessary theological
clarification28(*) ». If the intellectuals converted with
Islam thus call mainly with a aggiornamento, they can only accompany
it because they are not presented as legitimate to carry out themselves a
reform which must be made interior, their statute of converted driving back
them in a posture eternally external partly with the Islamic tradition29(*). At the hour when the media
pressure requires Islam a concrete reform, they are not thus any more of the
essential interlocutors.
So the converted intellectuals are generally the object of
investigations on their choice which intrigues, as indicate it the majority of
the titles of the files which are devoted to them : « voyages
among converted30(*) », « secrecies of
converted31(*) ». Thus, the book of talks with Eva de
Vitray-Meyerovitch, starts as follows :
« Before to have even had time to reflect, the first
question which rose in us, Eva de Vitray-Meyerovitch, is as follows : how
a young woman born in the French and high aristocracy in the chocolate
éclairs it could be done Moslem ? That it occurred and why32(*) ? »
Converted thus are more solicited to explain their choice that
to express an opinion of Moslem. But this already restricted role as a Moslem
intellectual is packed still a little more owing to the fact that the changes
of faith, which were practiced formerly mainly in the elite, tend to be
popularized in the lowest fringes of the company. For Xavier Ternisien, author
of a study on the panorama of Islam in France, we passed from
« converted intellectual » with « converted
proximity33(*) ». Of course, the observation is to be
relativized, the figures given by the media on the matter being at the very
least problematic. Indeed, since 1986, the New Observer indicates the
figure to us of « two hundred and thousand French converted with
Islam34(*) ». In 1999, the World in
advertisement « fifty thousand35(*) ». It is thus
obviously complex to count converted. But this supposed breathlessness of
conversions to Islam, in particular among the French elite, is perhaps another
explanation, sociological this time, of the media obliteration of the
intellectual converted avant-gardist, leaving little by little the place to the
Moslem intellectual of Moslem origin.
The intellectual converted with Islam always had a partial
media role as a Moslem intellectual from his legitimacy acquired above all by
his avant-gardism. However its influence ceases being reduced as a skin of
sorrow for reasons which are as well media- waiting of the press and the French
company with regard to Islam changing- only sociological- converted, fewer,
being found in the lowest fringes of the companies while, we will see it, an
elite resulting from the Moslem world takes on the contrary form.
B) The intellectual avant-gardist of the Moslem world
If the posture of the converted intellectual is rather old and
tends to decline, we put forth the assumption now that well these last years
ago birth of the figure of the intellectual avant-gardist of the Moslem world.
The Rushdie business marks a true turning in the image in Occident which is
made of the Moslem intellectual.
1) Construction of this media figure to the turning of
the years 1990
Until the end of the years 1980, the portrait of the
intellectual Moslem ground life drawn up by the Western media is overall
caricatural. In order to be « adoubé » intellectual
of the Moslem world, it is inevitably necessary to be, if not advances some, at
least in shift compared to the preserving authorities. It is thus in general
politically that certain figures reach the statute of intellectual for our
Western media. These agitators are in general communist, therefore atheistic,
or islamist. To be islamist and intellectual being incompatible for the
majority of the Western thinkers, only were high with the row of intellectual
of the personalities from which the grid of thought is not very distant from
our intellectual traditions. It was thus for many the rationalist
intellectuals, like the authors Algerian Marxists Kateb Yacine (1929-1989) or
Mohammed Dib (1920-2003) for example. The media introduce artists, in
particular writers, generally Arab, but almost never Moslem. To define the
intellectual of the world arabo-Moslem, the identities of free-thinker and
agitator then are presented like essential and are bound. More generally, the
French press conveys the idea that the Moslem world is divided between people
fanatic and believing, and an enlightened elite and not believing : it is
possible to be intellectual in the Moslem world only if one is
atheistic36(*).
The death sentence of Salman Rushdie on February 14, 1989 by
the ayatollah Khomeiny constitutes an unquestionable turning. If the purpose of
this fatwa is, according to Gilles Kepel, of « to break the
comparable intellectuals37(*) », it allowed médiatiser a whole
generation of Moslem intellectuals being asserted like such. A protesting
proclamation « In the name of Islam (...), we all are of Salman
Rushdie », is immediately signed by Moslem thinkers exiled in France,
like the Algerian Mohammed Harbi, but also the Iranian Nasser Pakdaman, the
Syrian Haytham Manna, the Turk Shunsuddin Guzel, the Egyptian Lotfallah
Soliman38(*). In the same
way, of the Moslem personalities militate spontaneously within the French
Committee of defense of Salman Rushdie.
Admittedly, the majority of the images which remain of this
Rushdie business are those of Moslems expressing in block against the
blasphématoire author. But reality was not so simple, as Emilie Rene
underlines it, auteure of a study on the business :
« One of the important effects of the Rushdie
business thus indeed was, as opposed to what supposes the argument culturalist,
to make particularly visible the deep differences in points of view which
exist, not as well between the cultures Western and Moslem woman as within the
latter39(*). »
If before 1989, the Lebanese poet Abbas Baydoun underlines,
« intellectuals [had] given up with the only monks the care to treat
all that relates to the religion and the history of Islam40(*) », the Rushdie
business constitutes a single opportunity for the these-last to reinvest the
Islamic field, setting up for the first time a barrier with the intervention
without limits of the oulémas41(*), in particular in the artistic field. The standpoint
concerning the Satanic Verses was thus the occasion for a certain
number of thinkers often representing an Islam moderate and repressed to make
hear their unmatched voice and to form an outline again standard of
Moslem intelligentsia. In 1993, « hundred Arab and Moslem
intellectuals for the freedom of expression » sign together the book
For Rushdie, which illustrates well a will on behalf of personalities, of
which some are asserted believing, to leave the shade and to condemn the
religious censure :
« Thus, withdrawing oneself from silence, the
indifference and division, a group one- set up would be tempted to say a
possible community- endorsing, beyond any reserve, the defense of freedoms of
creation and expression, the refusal of the death sentence and the
obscurantism, and a safety with Salman Rushdie42(*). »
This emergence of the at the same time anti-islamist and
Moslem intellectual is helped when Salman Rushdie asserts his Islamite. At the
beginning of the business, this last, born in Bombay in 1947 in a Moslem
family, posts her atheism : « I cross in any god (...) to say
the things more simply : I am not Moslem 43(*). » A few months
later, it explains in Times its conversion : « I found
my own way in a intellectual comprehension of the religion, and the religion
always was for me Islam 44(*). » This choice is included/understood with
difficulty because it breaks the binary diagram (believing people/atheistic
elite) described above. Many supports for Rushdie are declared surprised, even
being wary with regard to this decision which would prove that « the
religious terrorists apparently gained the part45(*) ». « He embraced the fanatic
religion of those which are believed in right to kill a novelist because of
what he writes », then explains Arnold Wesker, member of the
committee of support of the writer46(*).
With the risk to appear paradoxical, the Rushdie business thus
marks the break of a binary system (fanatic people/atheistic elite) and
replaces it by a triangular diagram (fanatic people /atheistic elite
or « moderately » Moslem). This new table, hardly less
rigid than the precedent, devotes the birth of a new media figure of Moslem
intellectual avant-gardist. Consequently, it appears possible to be at the same
time provocative and Moslem, to be persecuted by the islamist ones in spite of
its faith. How this image it developed these fifteen last years ?
2) Evolution of this figure of the moderate Moslem
intellectual
Although incomplete, there is thus emergence of the
intellectual avant-gardist of the Moslem and Moslem world
with the Rushdie business. This one has a so resounding echo that writers, like
the Nobel Prize 1988 Naguib Mahfouz (born in 1911), whose book the Wire of
Médina47(*)
had been put at the Index before the Satanic Verses, acquire a new
visibility. The majority of these intellectuals avant-gardists, of Moslem
confession, moderated and combatant the extremism, illustrate regularly the
files of newspapers dealing with the religious censure in the Moslem world.
Others « Rushdie businesses », with the
media repercussion certainly more limited but having their importance, occur
regularly during years 1990. In 1992, the Al-Azhar oulémas condemn Farag
Foda for its thought considered to be too laic. It is assassinated a few days
afterwards. In the same way, a wave of attacks begin with death from the
journalist Tahar Djaout falls down on the Algerian intellectuals since 1993.
Naguib Mahfouz itself is stabbed in 1994 but survives its wounds. There is thus
a prolonged image of the moderate Moslem intellectual persecuted in his country
for its judged ideas progressists from a Western point of view.
And like these intellectuals « are not prophets in
their country where one is rather afraid of those which
«think»48(*)», much of Moslem personalities oppressed in
their country of origin exiled oneself in France. We can quote among them in
particular them « new Algerian intellectuals » :
Mohammed Sifaoui, journalist with Marianne, Latifa Ben Mansour,
novelist, Hassan Zerrouky, journalist with Humanity or Slimane
Zeghidour, from now on chronicler on TV5. They now seeming privileged witnesses
of Islamism, having fought it in spite of their Islamite. In the field,
Mohammed Sifaoui showed the most prolific analyst, in particular publishing
sick France of Islamism49(*), Lettre to islamist of France and
Navarre50(*), My
brothers assassins51(*), and On the traces of Bin Laden52(*). But the other
Algerian intellectuals become specialists be integrist are not in
remainder : if Slimane Zeghidour, more known under the pseudonym of
Saladin draftsman, had the appearance of a islamologist in the veil and the
banner53(*), Hassan
Zerrouky delivers also her investigation into islamist nebula54(*). As for Latifa Ben Mansour, it
is from now on more essay writer that novelist, having delivered to it-also a
panel of studies on the dangers of the religious extremism, like the lies
of integrist55(*)
and Brothers Moslem, wild brothers56(*). To retain the example of the latter, a portrait,
published in the World, a change of consideration on behalf of a
certain French press illustrates : it is possible to be intellectual
Arabic and Moslem :
« Of its family culture, fight émancipatrice
of its people and this release which in theory the access to knowledge brings,
Latifa Ben Mansour preserved the Moslem faith and the taste of the freedom -
which is not incompatible - like its pride of Algerian57(*). «
If we can speak about birth of the intellectual of the Moslem
world avant-gardist, it is thus because there is a certain coherence in this
social group, in particular around the combat against the religious integrism.
For example, last year, it is well with the call of a committee of Moslem
intellectuals carried out by the writer Mauritanian Beddy Ould Ebnou that had
been organized, in Paris, a demonstration of support for the French hostages
removed in Iraq. Once again, it is adhesion with a collective demonstration
which is the best proof of the existence of this sociological group.
There is thus, since 1989, a certain turning in the way of
introducing the intellectuals agitators of the Arab world, who tend to supplant
the French converted in the role of intellectuals Moslem avant-gardists.
Nevertheless, all these intellectuals, although affirmed Moslems, did not
acquire notoriety by the assertion of their Islamite. Slimane Zeghidour,
affirms that « it is necessary to react, be indignant, according
to universal criteria and not in the name of national, ethnic or religious
solidarity58(*) ». Moreover, Latifa Ben Mansour points
finger well the paradox between this desire not to be let lock up in an Islamic
identity and the refusal to leave the categorization of Moslems to the only
extremists :
«Well lived Islam is serene, peaceful, by no means
aggressive, interdependent, partagor. Like says it the proverb, happy people do
not have history. This Islam, you will never see it in the hysterical and
sterile claim; it is in work, the reflection and causes the respect.
Unfortunately, one does not see these people on the plates of television, one
does not hear them with the radio. Moreover, these people do not like to be
designated by their religion, but by the whole of the parameters which
constitute them and which make they human beings59(*). »
The qualification of Moslem is thus more one invention media
that the result of a posted goal on behalf of the interested parties :
« Indeed, I have realized for a few years that I did
not speak any more in my proper name of citizen responsible for my acts and my
standpoint which can certainly disturb, but which engages only me, I also
realized that I am not regarded as subject of my stating but like belonging to
a community, not Algerian, (.), but MOSLEM60(*). »
The birth of the Moslem intellectual avant-gardist resulting
from the Arab world is also difficult because of the perpetuation of the
traditional image of the combatant of the Islamism which is inevitably
atheistic. The Rushdie business has indeed in this field shown its limits, as
the skepticisms expressed with regard to its posted faith prove it. The case of
Talisma Nasreen is also eloquent. Often presented like « a Rushdie
news », she says herself openly « very, very
atheist » : « I never declared that I regretted my
remarks, like Salman Rushdie61(*). » More recently still, the example of
Chattord Djavann, nonMoslem Iranian novelist, auteure of a lampoon against the
veil, show us that the case Rushdie was not completely meaning. Whereas this
one lives hidden since more than fifteen years, it declares in 2004 :
« It would be necessary that the free-thinkers of
Moslem origin dare to speak for désacraliser Islam and Coran. The
Islamic dignitaries would be thus gradually obliged to admit that individuals
of Moslem culture can be agnostic or atheistic, that the intellectuals of
Moslem origin are free to criticize Islam and Coran or to free themselves some
without incurring the charges of blasphemy or sacrilege62(*). »
From 1989 thus, the French media start to introduce
avant-gardists of the Moslem world like Moslems. But it is a
reduced image. The faith of these intellectuals is more one private business
that a real identity. Often taken refuge political, carrying a repressed Islam,
they tend to disappear with the profit from leaders resulting from the European
context.
Concurrently to this type of intellectuals, another category
emerges, that of the reformers of Islam. Although inheriting a long tradition
reformist, these new intellectuals profit from an economic situation which
enables them to really appear on the scene
« médiatico-intellectual » French.
II. The reforming intellectual
of Islam
As we have just studied it, the coordination of a certain
number of events to the turning of the years 1990 is the occasion to adopt a
new intellectual posture. Thinkers start in France to have the advisability of
expressing themselves and of reacting as Moslems. They must thus show their
singularity compared to the intellectual « Westerner »,
historically rocked by the humans right, while marking their compatibility with
a grid of considered thought dialectically opposed to their. This adequacy to
be shown between the traditions Islamic and jacobine thus passes by a duty of
pedagogy, of explanation of the text, even of interpretation : here how
was born a new category of « mediacrats » Moslem :
reformers of Islam. The majority of these intellectuals are not theologists in
a strict sense term, but they assigned a role of hermeneutics of the Koranic
text in order to adapt it to the current context. That it is about the question
of the Islamic scarf, the Rushdie business or islamist terrorism, all the
pretexts are good to launch what many names Islam a aggiornamento.
With regard to the Republic and principles born of the Western history,
singularity and compatibility of Islam thus form a dialectical couple which try
to satisfy the Moslem reformers.
A) A new intellectual field ?
This new type of Moslem intellectual makes irruption in the
media with the new visibility of questions of domestic policy (business of the
veil) and external (terrorism, war of the Gulf, Rushdie business) related to
Islam. But it is legitimate to wonder whether the reforming intellectual of
Islam is a new figure of Moslem intellectual. Indeed, there is a tradition
reformist in Islam. For example, as of VIIIe century, the current mutazilite
affirms the theory of Coran created, opposed to that of incréé
Coran, thus making it possible to underline the historicity of the revelation.
But this school of thought is quickly rejected and it is definitively
prohibited since 1017. Moreover, the difficulty of definition of arises what is
a reform. For illustration, ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703-1792), father of the
wahhabism, very rigorous version of Islam, wanted to be itself a large reformer
insofar as it proposed new grids of reading and interpretation, therefore
attempts at reform of Islam. As we suggested in introduction, the press thus
tended to make concepts of reformism and modernism of the synonyms which they
are however not.
Actually, the new reforming intellectuals are presented partly
in the form of heirs to the movement reformist of Nahda, which goes
from the end of XIXe at the beginning of the XXe centuries. This movement
of reform, which tries to reconcile Islam and rationality, was initiated by
several figures like the Indian Sayyed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), Persan Aldine
Jamal Al-Afghani (1839-1897) and especially the Egyptian Mohammed Abduh
(1848-1905). The heritage of this last then was the subject of a controversy
between the Syrian Rachid Rida (1865-1935) and the Egyptian Ali Abderraziq
(1888-1966). From a matrix reformist commune, will be born two
branches very distinct from interpretation from the fact that must be the
adaptation of Islam with modernity : islamist reformism on the one hand
and reformism criticize on the other hand. If, since 1925, Ali Abderraziq goes
very far in reformism criticizes, by denouncing the illegitimacy of the system
of the caliphate and by declaring the separation of the temporal powers and
religious in its work the Islam and the Bases of the capacity63(*), work of Rachid
Rida Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) will inspire, founder in 1928 of the
Moslem Brothers, stamps Islamism, i.e. of political Islam.
Actually, certain current cleavages are explained by this
conflict of historiographic and doctrinal interpretations surrounding the
heritage of this early reformism. For the critical reformists, Rachid Rida has,
according to words' of Rachid Benzine, « deviated » the
thought of Mohammed Abduh by making it pass from one « reformism
progressist with a reformism traditionalist64(*) ». In the same way, Mohammed Arkoun
distinguishes two periods in modern Islam : first of all,
Nahda65(*), i.e.
awakening of the Islamic lights, then Thawra66(*), the time of decline
and the islamist deviance. On the other hand, Tariq Ramadan, which is asserted
also reforming modernistic, claims on its side that Hassan Al-Banna, in fact
her grandfather, are the heir-at-law to the ideas developed by Aldine Jamal
Al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh, and Rachid Rida67(*). For him, it is well Ali Abderraziq who would have
produced a thought truncated by « colonial pressure68(*) ».
At all events, it is interesting to note that the strong
opposition, between the two principal schools of reformers claiming in a place
on the contemporary French intellectual scene, has a remote historical
explanation. Nevertheless, we will see it thereafter, the press clearly sliced
for the support for the critical branch of Moslem reformism.
To be accepted in the club very snuffed of
« reformers of Islam » in the French media landscape, it is
thus necessary to claim old figures reformists, but not of all. Thus, Tariq
Ramadan explains :
« It would be liked that I disavow my grandfather,
Hassan Al-Banna, or that «I acknowledg» my total adhesion with his
thought. Either I am «an intellectual lit», or «a
obscurantist», implied like my grandfather. Simple, but especially
simplistic equation: not, I as many do not disavow my filiation with a man who
resisted colonizations English and to Zionist, who founded 2.000 schools, 500
social centers, co-operatives of development, and which forever, all the
serious studies prove it, active terrorist attacks69(*). »
Historical filiation thus has its importance among new
reforming intellectuals of Islam. But they do not want to be simply heirs to a
current of thought, they also claim to exceed this heritage. There is thus on
their premises a certain will to dissociate itself, as at the lexical level the
title assumed suggests it of « new thinkers of Islam » by
Rachid Benzine70(*) :
« The project in which I fit is not a project of
reform of Islam nor to adapt Islam to modernity. It is a question of thinking
Islam with the cognitive tools of today and of making occur a modernity which
is endogenous at the companies known as Moslem71(*). »
If this néo-category of emergent intellectuals intends
to exceed the strict framework of the reform of their aïeux, it is also
different from it by the fact that the reformers of Nahda were
primarily soufis and that they sought to be modelled on Western modernity. On
their side, the new contemporary thinkers claim to be useful themselves of the
tools of modernity while trying not inevitably not to copy the Occident.
Moreover, the new visibility which is offered to them makes incontestably that
it is about a intellectual field new good since one waits from now on them
« results ». Indeed, even if it is not always explicit, the
media contributed to invent the category of « new thinkers of
Islam » for instrumentaliser this reform, to solve contemporary
material problems. This awaited theological reform is not an end in itself but
the purpose of it is to adapt Islam to its new context, in particular in its
points of hang with Western civilization.
B) Portrait of these new reforming intellectuals
Our subject concerning the image returned by the press, it
acts to treat in this part the figures which, among those which claim in a
place of reformer, reached this statute in « landscape French
médiatico-intellectual ». They are thus primarily rationalist
and liberal reformers, heirs mainly to critical reformism, gathered around the
concept of « new thinker » forged by Rachid Benzine. This
new class of intellectuals, impromptu renovating of the Koranic text by an
economic situation the there encouraging one, have a double culture :
Islamic and Western. The apparent heterogeneity of the courses masks it a real
uniformity of the new interpretation of Coran proposed ?
1) Various courses ?
At first sight, these néo-reformers of the Islam, whose
list here is not claimed exhaustive, have few joint things. Chronologically, we
can notice that Mohammed Talbi (1921) and Mohammed Arkoun (1928) are to
some extent the precursors, elder new thinkers. The others were born in the
decades 1940 and 1950: Fatima Mernissi (1940), Abdelmajid Charfi (1942), Nasr
Abou-Zeid (1943), Youssef Seddik (1943), Abdul Karim Soroush (1945), Abdou
Filali-Ansary (1946), Abdelwahab Meddeb (1946), Malek Chebel (1953), and Farid
Esack (1957). Federator of the group, Rachid Benzine (1971) is the youngest
child. Some other figures, like the Pakistani Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988), died
but tend to being presented in a retroactive way like posthumous figures of
this new Moslem reformism.
Geographically, these intellectuals seem reformers
« interior » of Islam by their birth. The near total come
from colonized in the past Moslem countries. The Maghrebian countries are
largely represented, and it « school of Tunis of the
interpretation » is with the point of the movement (Mohammed Talbi,
Abdelmajid Charfi, Mohammed Charfi, Youssef Seddik, Abdelwahab Meddeb, Fethi
Benslama,) : « Tunisia is today one of the grounds of Islam
where are made hear the most voices which call some with a new approach of the
religious phenomenon72(*). »
But Algeria also produced its thinkers (Mohammed Arkoun, Malek
Chebel), just like Morocco (Abdou Filali-Ansary, Fatima Mernissi, Rachid
Benzine) or Egypt (Nasr Hamid Abou-Zeid). The others come from different
geographical spheres but have as a common point to have lived their childhood
within a community of religious culture Islamic, like Abdul Karim Soroush
(Iran) or Farid Esack (minority indo-Pakistani of South Africa).
Other figures provide an important professional work for a
liberal reform of Islam and have more or less a profile corresponding to that
of the new thinkers. But their visibility in the press, in particular because
of the barrier of the language, is completely unimportant in France and they
cannot thus be compared to this new caste of media intellectuals73(*).
If they thus resemble each other little by their origins,
these reformers present an unquestionable analogy in their intellectual course.
Many of these characters leave their native land to go to study in Occident.
Nasr Abou-Zeid leaves to study in the United States in Philadelphia, while
others like Fazlur Rahman and Abdoul Karim Soroush are found in England.
But France is also a large hearth of training of these new
thinkers. According to Mohammed Mestiri, president of the French office of the
IIIT (International Institute of the Islamic Thought), « UNESCO
classifies France in second position, after the United States, in the capacity
to accommodate the exile of the Moslem knowledge74(*) ». For this reason
Jamel-Eddine Bencheikh goes even until affirming that « modern Islam
will be born in France », since « in this country, it is
perfectly possible to choose forms of social, economic life and policy which do
not contravene basically the inspiration of prophetic preaching75(*) ». Thus, the great
figures of this new caste of Moslem intellectuals, like Mohammed Arkoun,
Mohammed Talbi, Fethi Benslama, Malek Chebel, or Abdelwahab Meddeb, followed
studies in the Hexagon. Without disavowing their faith, all these thinkers, who
were in contact with Western university methodology, decide whereas the
knowledge of the social sciences must guide their reform of Islam.
Perhaps if, for these reformers, the aggionarmento of
Islam will come to France, it is on the other hand inconceivable for them that
it comes from French researcher. For Mohammed Arkoun, the Western
researcher inevitably sees his thought skewed by his subjectivity, whether it
is positive or negative :
« I know more than one islamologist, «friend of
Islam and Arabs», who prefers to be made the cantor of the official
ideologies, of the «size» of Islam, rather than to contribute to the
necessary combat of modernization of the Islamic thought. There are also those
which disparage Islam systematically and force the Moslem intellectuals
criticize to harden their own combat against the hegemonic model of the
Occident76(*). »
The French intellectual, it was converted, if it can help to
diffuse the reform, cannot be itself a reformer of Islam. It is the case of
Michel Renard, with his Review Islam of France, which is not regarded
as tel. Indeed, it is not only with Islam but in the Moslem world as a whole
which one asks to reform. However, as Malek Chebel explains it, «there is
of valid criticism only if it is, essentially, a self-criticism77(*). »
If the standard portrait of the reformer of Islam is thus a
personality resulting from the Moslem world of which part of the intellectual
formation proceeded in Occident, another characteristic also should be
added : the media reformer inevitably was at one time of his life
confronted with preserving oulémas. Fazlur Rahman and Abdoul Karim
Soroush have, under the threat, due respectively to leave Pakistan and Iran
definitively to join the United States, whereas Nasr Abou-Zeid is declared
apostate by university Al-Azhar in 1995 for its Critique book of the
religious speech78(*), and it is consequently constrained to exile itself
in the Netherlands. In Morocco, Fatima Mernissi saw itself prohibiting to
publish his modernistic test, the political Harem79(*). As for the Tunisian historian
Abdelmajid Charfi, it is censured as soon as it treats in a critical way of the
relationship between science and Islam80(*).
The group of reformers of the Islam which is constituted also
has this of remarkable which it gathers of the intellectuals who assign a role
of interpretation without being a theologist with the organic direction of the
term. « I specify that I am a historian and not a
faqîh81(*). I
do not make a statement in the name of Islam because I do not have mandate to
make it nor to here are affirm what he says on such or such
question », explains Mohammed Talbi thus82(*). On the other hand, if they
did not receive all a training in theology, they claim indeed to make
evolve/move the interpretation of the Koranic text by explaining its context.
Coran which has, for these believing intellectuals, a dimension at the same
time « history » and « transcendantale83(*) », can thus be
analyzed with the critical tools of Western modernity all while not neglecting
the sacral aspect of the message.
These intellectuals thus have the same idea of the reform. It
must according to them be carried out at the same time inside Islam- made by
people of culture and Islamic religion- and outside this one- by the use of the
tools of Western modernity.
2) A uniform
reform ?
It is, as we saw, possible to detect a certain resemblance of
the courses of these intellectuals whose fundamental common point is the
statute of mid- intellectual Islamic, mid- Western : « These new
thinkers are distinguished from other intellectuals by the fact that they
acquired a good knowledge of the Islamic inheritance and that they confront it
with the data of the social sciences- history, sociology, anthropology,
linguistics, semiotics, hermeneutics... », explains Rachid
Benzine84(*).
That is found in the type of ijtihad85(*) which is preached, even if, of
course, their ideas and convictions are not identical. The thought of these
reformists wants to be a decorated Moslem thought of the tools of knowledge
developed in Occident. Thus Mohammed Talbi, for example, takes care well to
stress that it is « at the same time, historian and Moslem86(*) », thus confronting
two presumedly paradoxical terms. It is not anything else that wants to render
comprehensible Rachid Benzine when it explains why, for the new thinkers of
Islam, « to believe in the eternal relevance of the Koranic text does
not want to say for believing as much in a timeless text87(*) ». It is a divine
message transmitted in a human cultural context.
Thus, although, as Nasr Hamid Abou-Zeid affirms
it, « Coran [that is to say] a linguistic text, a historical
text and a cultural product88(*) », the new thinkers refuse to call into
question the dogma of the ijaz89(*) : Coran is imitable as an Arab text,
but it is not it as a fruit of a divine revelation containing a divine
knowledge. Its superiority thus lies in its contents rather than in its
style.
Subtlety thus lies in coherence in the fact of regarding the
message of Coran as an at the same time cultural product and of divine nature.
Since nature transcendantale of the transmitter is not called into question, it
is well the receiver of the message which is analyzed scientifically through
the study of the context of the Revelation. The new thinkers thus raise the
problems of the relationship between the Islamic faith and the reason while
trying to reconcile both. It is this delicate nuance which gives sound
« air of family » with all the new thinkers of Islam. She
can be synthesized by this thought of Mohammed Talbi :
« The renovating ones I am, do not reject the
contribution of the social sciences like the history, sociology or
anthropology. But if they are attached to best modern world, freedom, justice,
the tolerance, they adhere at the same time to the entirety of the message of
Coran which they read in adequacy with our time. On the other hand, for the
islamologists and these intellectuals whom I call «desislamized»,
Coran is a human creation, a completely desacralized cultural text of which
they reduce the approach to the only social sciences. Their thought is
sizeable, but it is not a believing thought90(*). »
The balance is delicate thus between the will to dissociate
Western thought and the need to borrow some of its scientific tools :
« It would be necessary that the Moslems cease confusing the
political dispute with the Occident and the indebted projections of knowledge
primarily in this same Occident », explains Mohammed Arkoun91(*). It is true that the grid of
thought adopted by the new thinkers, in spite of a posted prudence, appears
very rationalist, with the risk to curl the caricature of positivism sometimes.
While distinguishing what can be analyzed scientifically, the new thinkers make
return Islam in a Western interpretative diagram. For example, whereas Fethi
Benslama carries out a psychoanalytical study of Coran92(*), the anthropologist Malek
Chebel analyzes the place of the individual- concept in the center of European
humanistic philosophy- in the Islamic religion93(*). One of the twenty-seven proposals of its
Proclamation for Islam of the Lights consists even with « to
affirm the superiority of the reason on any other form of thought and
belief94(*) ».
This will to mainly analyze Coran with the tools resulting from the Western
history is found among all other new thinkers, like the philosopher Youssef
Seddik, who étydue the hellenistic influence on the Koranic
text95(*), or Abdelmajid
Charfi, which reflected much on the historicity of the divine message96(*).
The very rationalist vision of these reformers, in spite of
some points of divergence, is thus rather homogeneous. It is legitimate that it
can be disputed by reforms wanting to be more endogenous with Islam and less
influenced by grids of thoughts close to those present in Occident. If Rachid
Benzine tries to evacuate a semantic confusion not by introducing a new caste
« reformers », but of « thinkers » of
Islam, force is to note that this nuance of vocabulary is not retained by the
French press. Only are presented like potential reformers of the history those
which, we saw it, preach a vision positivist of Islam. The French public
opinion, whose French media are at the same time the reflection and the engine,
with the characteristic to await Islam an evolution similar to that which could
occur in its own Christian ground history. The references to outstanding
historical events are frequent. « Islam did not know 1789
yet97(*) », us
are said. Thus copying the future ideal of Islam on the past of Christianity,
the reformers, representatives of « the Islam of the
lights98(*) », are waited in a Messianic way like
« Galileo99(*) » of « Erasme100(*) », of
« Luther101(*) », of « Descartes102(*) », or of
« Spinoza103(*) » of Islam. Yes, Islam must make sound
« The Vatican II104(*) » !
However, it is only part of the Moslem reformers which returns
in this preconceived mould. This is why they are almost always the same actors
who illustrate the files of intellectuals claiming to modernize the
interpretation of Islam. To leave in particular the book of Rachid Benzine,
the new thinkers of Islam, the globality of the media speech accepted only
one caste of « good reformers »: «New thinkers of
Islam » in the New Observer105(*), « The renovating
ones of Islam » in the World of the religions106(*), them « new
thinkers and old critics » in the Barber Magazine107(*). The intellectuals who
form part of it defend a reform, we saw it, very reconciling with the universal
principles developed in Occident. In the challenge of the adaptation of Islam
to Western modernity, they privilege, according to data's which we previously
provided, the criterion of compatibility to that of singularity. For them, the
reform must tend towards a universalism by correction of certain Western
modernistic ideas.
C) Role of these intellectuals in the media
1) A prestigious but closed caste
The accepted reformers as such thus preach a not very
heterogeneous reform, considering a aggiornamento Islam such as
Christianity knew. But of other intellectuals reject this will to want to copy
closely or by far on Islamic civilization what it occurred in the Christian
era. It is the case of Tariq Ramadan, which is in favor of an Islam
« integralist », i.e. it rather draws its ethical and moral
principles in the religion than in other universal principles considered to be
illegitimate bus supposed « Westerners ». Thinking that it
is the Islamic reason which must mitigate the imperfections of modernity born
in the world extra-Moslem, it does not cease denouncing the vision
« simplistic and always occidentalo-centered108(*) » that one can
detect among new thinkers :
« To be heard, the Western Moslems will have to be
armed with Islamic solids knowledge, to show of a rigor and a courage proving
with their co-religionists that they speak well about the interior, that they
are not the promoters of one «new emptied Islam» of its
substance which would like, in the name of «the universality of our
values», to impose a single model of companies109(*) ».
However this kind of reform is not admissible as such by the
majority of the French media. In addition to being doctrinarily close to the
ideas to the Moslem Brothers, this idea of reislamisation not only appears to
put in danger our French model of secularity in what it promotes an including
vision of the religion, but it disputes a certain Western universalism finally
seldom called into question. This type of reformers is not indicated besides
like such by the newspapers in general.
The example of Tariq Ramadan is extremely interesting because
this same character passed from the statute of « good
reformer » with that of undesirable interlocutor. Having first of all
the image of a Moslem avant-gardist in his ideas on Islam, it is the object of
eulogistic comments. When in 1995, it is interdict of stay in France, the
New Observer is indignant at the treatment reserved for this
« brilliant intellectual110(*) ».
Not having surely the same design of the concept of modernism
as this last, the press quickly rejected its reform like while not being one.
The problem of Tariq Ramadan, it is that it is, from the media point of view,
one « bad reformer » disguised in « good
reformer » : «[Tariq Ramadan] the mouth of employment
does not have. Islamist which carries waistcoats of pussies, speaks with the
Swiss accent and plays with an art consumed of its the dark seduction Eastern
one », described Christophe Ayad in Release111(*). Here come time thus for the
media to discover « the true face of Tariq Ramadan112(*) ». That which was
still in 2001 one « Moslem theologist «reformist»113(*) » for the New
Observer becomes later one « Genevese preacher114(*) », one
« islamist carrier pigeon115(*) », « a Swiss commoner,
simple part-time lecturer of islamology at the university of
Freiburg116(*) » for this same newspaper.
That one agrees or not with the reform of Tariq Ramadan is
perfectly comprehensible117(*). That one disputes it as an intellectual for the
simple reason which one does not share its ideas is another history. Indeed, in
the great majority of the articles relating to it, it is not the contents of
the reform which is discussed but well quality of intellectual who is denied
with the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna. Because of its standpoint distinct from
those from « new thinkers of Islam », this one becomes one
« disputed intellectual118(*) », « «the emir» of the
French-speaking Moslem Brothers119(*) », even one « intellectual
villain120(*) ». « In fact, Mr. Ramadan is not
an intellectual, at best a preacher », explains Esther
Benbassa121(*). In the
same way, Caroline Fourest, auteure of a book with load against Tariq Ramadan,
extend on her difficulty of supporting a thesis obtained « without
honors nor congratulations » and the goal was « of being
able to prevail itself of a scientific guarantee122(*) » :
« One often presented it as professor of university. Actually, (...)
he was only a one modest professor of college of Saussure123(*) »
Being diverted its theses, which would deserve discussions,
the majority of the media are interested in its presupposed tactical. One lends
then to « Tariq brother », « this intellectual
crafty one, champion all categories of the double language, and which go, of
plate in plate of television, to pose, hand on the heart, with the large
reformer124(*) », a strategy of infiltration. The
vocabulary conspirationnist employed in the titles relating to it are
eloquent : « The mystery Tariq Ramadan125(*) »,
« Theology with the service of a political strategy126(*) »,
« Tariq Ramadan, its family, her networks, her ideology127(*) », « the
enigmatic one128(*) ».
The entry of Islam in the modern era suggested by Tariq
Ramadan thus even not is not discussed bus presumedly dangerous in its base. By
preoccupation with a clearness, even of simplicity, a certain French press thus
largely reduced the stake of the reformers of Islam to a debate Manichean
instead of questioning the relevance of another reform of Islam. It is not
besides astonishing to note that other intellectuals, of this same mobility,
preaching a maximalist vision, even adding up, of Islam, remain completely
absent from media general practitioners. To think modernity differently than
the new thinkers of Islam médiatiquement is médiatiquement
rejected. Thus, the work of Mohammed Hamidullah (1908-2002), near to the Moslem
Brothers, author of more than 2000 articles translated in a score of languages
and forty books, remained little known general public. Its ideas are now taken
up by Mohammed Mestiri, with tavers the IIIT, but it is him also large absent
from media.
Lastly, if the place of reformer of the Islam prestigious and
is coveted, it briefly should be noted on the other hand that some which, by
their work, could be full member for it, reject this label. Thus, Adel Rifaat
and Bahgat Elnadi, which publish under the pseudonym of Mahmoud Hussein, reject
this label of « Moslem intellectuals », that
it « one sticks today to all that thinks in Arabic129(*) » .
The modernistic place of theologist is thus not given to
everyone : the applicant must obey the some criteria studied above. These
« new thinkers » all have the same idea of the reform, it
is a question of modernizing Islam with the means brought by Western modernity
and not the reverse. Knowing that they were born to answer certain launched
challenges with Islam in its points of hangs contemporary, how those can bring
solutions ?
2) Reformers : the solution with the contemporary
problems ?
« For all these intellectuals, it is necessary to
leave the ideological and practical use of the texts- the text like
pretext », explains Rachid Benzine130(*). However, it should be recalled that the
instrumentalisation of the religion is intrinsically one of the reasons to be
new thinkers of Islam. We saw it, if this new caste of Moslem intellectuals
appeared in the French press, it is because the economic situation made that
the public opinion awaits Islam which it answers a certain number of new
questions. The media role of the reforming intellectuals is thus broader than
purely theological. It is especially a question for them of showing how these
Koranic hermeneutics can help to face a certain number of contemporary
challenges. It is besides by underlining this that Catherine Farhi, of the
New Observer, delivers her definition of the reformer :
« Is truly reforming that which tries to read again
the texts founders of Islam, especially Coran, with the eyes of a man of
XXIè century and which approaches truths problems arising with Islam
today, which are inter alia: the opening in the world and the acceptance of
others- thus removal of the statute of dhimma, which is that of the
not-Moslems, Jews and Christians, in country of Islam-; freedom of conscience-
thus questioning of the death penalty for the apostasy-; equality of the sexes-
thus the refusal of repudiation and the less rights granted to the woman as
regards heritage.
It is those which attack these problems to try to combine
Islam and modernity that I would call reformers131(*). »
It is consequently of the fear of one supposed confrontation
between civilizations Moslem and Western that one forces Islam to reform
interior, this so that it is put in adequacy with a certain number of
principles universalists :
« It for a long time was known but the attack of New
York served as revealing. Many Moslems were afraid to betray their religion or
simply their identity by publicly criticizing excesses or the crimes of their
co-religionists, but this time, too it too is. They refuse to be recognized in
this image of hatred which Bin Laden incarnates. Now, party should be taken.
Against fanaticism, against violence and thus, if one wants to go at the end of
the reasoning, against a deviating reading of Islam. (...) Today, of the
Moslem thinkers question themselves, call with a self-criticism and open a a
long time cold debate, that of the coexistence between Islam and modernity. It
is revolving which should not be underestimated132(*). «
The speech of these very snuffed reformers of the media is
indeed reassuring as well at the political level as geopolitical. On the
interior level, the new thinkers of Islam develop a vision which flatters its
Western audience. Even if French secularity is sometimes considered to be too
strict, « wanting to mould people in the Jacobinism133(*) », there is a
broad consensus around the major problems between Islam and
République : the media reformers are for example against the port
of the veil. On the external level, the new thinkers present a speech which
exceeds it « shock of civilizations ». Antiquated practices
considered to be present in the Moslem world (excision, lapidation...) are
condemned with strength, just like is Islamism. Ghaleb Bencheikh, former
presenter of the emission « Islam » on France 2, in a a
little simplistic way this very liberal vision of Islam synthesizes, rejecting
all that could appear regressive with the Western eyes like not being
Islamic134(*).
To be effective, still it is necessary that this reform
criticizes is diffused. The proliferation these last years of Moslem reviews is
an obvious sign of the dynamism of the contemporary Islamic thought. Among
those, we can quote Islam of France, created in 1997 by Said Branine
and Michel Renard, as well as Médina, founded one year later by
Hakim El-Ghissassi. As for the quarterly review Prologs, it
is launched by Abdou Filali-Ansary. Its announced objective is it
« restoration in the contemporary arabo-Islamic thought, (...)
so that the Moslem religious thought draws up an alive interior relationship
with modern ethics, that of the democracy and the humans right135(*) . «
If the reform must, to diffuse itself, to reach the scientific
community, it is effective only if it touches the civil companies. For this
reason Abdelmajid Charfi, for example, develops its Arabic remarks. Even if
that makes it less visible at the media level to France, its thought has more
chance to be effective by reaching unilingual readers. To have the broadest
possible impact, other media are also used. For example, in Cultures of Islam,
emission diffused on the waves of France Culture, Abdelwahab Meddeb preaches
for true a ijtihad.
The reform suggested by these new thinkers has thus as a more
or less explicit objective to solve considerable current problems. But can it
be really effective on the Moslem populations in spite of the fact that it
appears accessible only to one minority from believing privileged by their
knowledge from the Western modern culture ? Indeed, certain researchers
like do not believe that theology criticizes will have any effect to adapt
Islam to modernity, what explains Olivier Roy :
« It is an error to believe that the practice
changes when the doctrines changed. It is the reverse which occurs. It is as if
one said that without Protestantism, Catholicism would have been unable less
adaptation to modernity. To apply to Islam this caricature of the history
interns with Western Christianity does not have a direction. The changes will
not be done on bases cultural or theological- seek the «good
Moslem»...- which do not correspond to the religious request
today136(*). »
This is the evolution of the theology which will induce a
change in the companies where this is the changes of the companies which will
involve a new theology ? For Jean-Louis Schlegel also, the answer is
clear :
« Rather than of the intangible principles of the
Islam of the theologists (and the Western researchers), it would be necessary
to start from this lived Islam to the daily newspaper, of the innumerable
compromises which it already operated and which he operates the every day with
the modern societies where he saw, and where he did not see so badly that one
would like to make it believe137(*) ».
Although the committed reform is the fruit of a reflection
being spread out over greater historical duration, these last years truly saw
setting up a very new médiatico-intellectual group : that of the
new thinker of Islam. This media figure obeys certain strict criteria and thus
excludes the other intellectuals, of which those, like Tariq Ramadan, which
want to make Islam modern by Islamizing modernity. Always in parallel, the
fact that France supports the constitution of an Islam gallican for this period
creates a new field in the same way : that the organic Moslem
intellectual.
III.
The intellectual representing of the Islam of France
We saw that the French media taken in their globality tend to
copy the image of a desired evolution of Islam on « our »
proper Western history. They were until inventing a new clan of the perfect
Moslem reforming intellectual. Parallel to this one, years 1990 mark the birth
of a category of organic intellectuals of the Islamic religion, there still by
establishing bridges and obvious points of comparison with the history of
Christianity or the Judaism in France. Islam being a religion without Church,
one should be created « Islam gallican », it with what
harness themselves several « Napoleon of Islam138(*) ». Nevertheless,
with the image of the difficult birth of an Islam of France, the childbirth of
these official Moslem intellectuals is quite complex. We will thus study in
this part how a new place of legitimation of organic Moslem intellectuals is
constituted, before drawing an early assessment from the forces of this very
new French Islamic landscape. Lastly, the third point will make it possible to
ask to us whether the role of these intellectuals is broader than purely
organic.
A) A new place of intellectual legitimation
1) Short history of the installation of the Islam of
France
To pass from an Islam to France to an Islam of France is not
easy matter to achieve. The Islamic community becomes aware in the years 1980
of the need for organizing the Moslem worship in the Hexagon. Certain
difficulties appear indeed for the choice of the date of the Ramadan, the
market of the meat halal, the recruitment of the Imams, the teaching
of Arabic, or the management of the places of prayers. The process started by
the minister of religion Pierre Joxe in 1989 launches really the impulse which
leads finally to the election of the French Council of the Moslem Worship
(CFCM) in 2003. But the way was not without bumps.
From November 1989 to March 1990, fifteen personalities are
joined together on the initiative of Pierre Joxe within the CORIF (the Council
of Reflection on Islam in France). This process of consultation is stopped by
the return of the right-hand side to the capacity in 1993. Charles Pasqua,
arrived Beauvau place, is pressed again on the Mosque of Paris. Dalil Boubaker,
its vice-chancellor, then becomes the privileged interlocutor of the
authorities, while the process of creation of representative Islam of France is
in sleep for a few years. In November 1999, it is Jean-Pierre
Chevènement who starts again a very broad consultation (7 made fun
federations, 5 large and 6 personalities). Its efforts are relayed by Daniel
Vaillant and lead to the first election of the French Council of the Moslem
Worship (CFCM) under the era Nicolas Sarkozy in April 2003.
In fifteen years thus, a long way is traversed in the
introduction of an Islam of France. And the process remains unfinished :
CFCM pains to secure a real legitimacy, its great projects still remaining with
the state of outlines. On the form, CFCM undergoes crisis on crisis and
frequently records the resignation of its most influential members. On the
bottom, it is not able to take a lead in all the subjects which belong to its
field of attribution. In spite of this still partial birth, how this new Islam
of France it created a new posture of intellectual legitimation ?
2) A complex market : the law of supply
and
Thanks to the process of installation of an Islam of France,
that which becomes privileged interlocutor of the State gains of credibility.
The stake is to become an intellectual playing the part of bridge between the
Republic and the Moslem community. With the creation of the Council of the wise
Moslems on November 6, 1989, fifteen Moslems have, according to words' of
Michel Kubler in the Cross, the occasion to add a line to their
« calling card139(*) ». The place is thus coveted, the market
is complex : supply is precise, multiple.
The offer of the French State presents three
requirements : the Republic claims of this future emissary of the Moslem
community that it is at the same time French, republican and representative.
The first requirement of the successive ministers of religion is thus of
« gallicaniser », of « to francize »
Islam. Each interlocutor maintains in general the more or less constant
relations with countries of the Moslem world, like Algeria for the close
relations of the Mosque of Paris, Morocco for those of the FNMF (National
Federation of the Moslems of France) or Saudi Arabia for those of the UOIF
(Union of the Organization Islamic of France). To erase these foreign fights of
influence, the State will endeavor to choose French representatives. The Moslem
Institute of the Mosque of Paris is the symbol of the fight carried out by
France, which manages to impose a French vice-chancellor at his head only in
1992. In the absence of being able to completely cut its interlocutors of the
pressures from abroad, the French State thus will endeavor to destroy the
potential influences external of those by combining them and thus by
neutralizing them.
The second claim of the State is that the future one
representing Islam of France shows white republican matter leg.
« Declaration of intent relating to the rights and obligations of
faithful of the Moslem worship », that Jean-Pierre Chevènement
imposes on his interlocutors like precondition to any negotiation, is
illustrates it example. Will thus be supported, as far as possible, the
interlocutors carrying possible Islam less threatening for the great principles
of the French Republic.
French and republican thus, the candidate must also be
representative. Upon the departure of the dialog, Pierre Joxe announces his
concern of encouraging the people who have one « experiment of
ground » : « Essence, for me, is to be able to dialog
with people who will inform me by a first hand experiment on the concrete
Islam, lived daily in France by hundreds of thousands from men and women,
French and abroad140(*). » Not question thus for the potential
Moslem intellectual of representing an Islam too distant from that practiced at
its base.
As for the request of the Moslem leaders, it is heterogeneous
but adapts to the offer of the State. It is advisable to distinguish three
types from « solicitants of legitimacy ». There are first
of all the leaders of federations : the Mosque of Paris (of Sheik Abbas to
Doctor Boubakeur), the UOIF ( Abdallah Ben Mansour, Lhaj Thami Breze,
Fouad Alaoui, or Farid Abdelkrim), the FNMF (Youssouf Leclerc, Mohammed
Bechari, Abdallah Boussouf), other leaders of federations being more in
withdrawal (Tabligh for example). This trio of federations constitutes the most
natural partners for the authorities, a privilege which was disputed besides by
one « face of refusal against the band of the three141(*) ». The
vice-chancellors of the large mosques intend indeed also to be made hear (Kamel
Katbane of the Large Mosque of Lyon, Khalil Merroun of the Large
Mosque of Evry, Amar Lasfar of the Large Mosque of Lille). Lastly, a third
type of actor, the independent intellectual, i.e. not belonging officially
neither to the federations, nor with the large mosques, supplements this panel
of candidates. It acts inter alia converted Michel Chodkiewicz and Eric
Geoffroy, of the sheik alawi Khaled Bentounès, the anthropologist Dounia
Bouzar, or of the mufti of Marseilles Soheib Bencheikh.
The installation of the Islam of France thus creates a new
field for the Moslem intellectual : that of interface with the
authorities. Heterogeneous actors answer variously the criteria required by the
State. Which is thus the portrait of the French Islamic landscape which emerges
from this complex play ?
B) The new face of organic Moslem intelligentsia
A certain emergent number of actors in this race with the
pertaining to worship leadership. We chose here to distinguish five categories
from them. The representatives of two greater federations (Mosque of Paris and
UOIF) are analyzed separately, this because of their importance. As for the
FNMF, third federation of size, it is not treated here for the maid and simple
reason that, in spite of its good results with the two elections of CFCM, it is
continuously in full crisis in its top. Thus, its successive presidents never
asserted themselves like media interlocutors impossible to circumvent, unlike
their colleagues of the two other federations. Concurrently to those, we will
see that the creation of CFCM made it possible to clarify not only
intellectuals independent collaborating in the installation of the Islam of
France, but also of the emblematic personalities of local Islam. Lastly, other
characters, them « Anti-CFCM », also amply benefitted from
the creation of this one to sit their intellectual authority.
1) Called into question of the prevalence of the
vice-chancellor of the Mosque of Paris.
Since its construction in 1922 in the fifth district of the
capital, the mosque of Paris was, through its vice-chancellor, the single face
of the Moslem worship of France. This historically hegemonic position, it
inherits a constant stubbornness to try to federate the Moslem community around
it. It is in this direction that it creates the Higher Council of the Islamic
Businesses of France (CSAIF) in 1981, the National Coordination of the Moslems
of France (CNMF) in 1993, and the Council Representative of the Moslems of
France (CRMF) in 1994. But these « claims to represent the whole of
the community, with the hussarde, that all the world did not
appreciate142(*) », appeared vain, even against-productive.
Failing to impose a federation of the Moslem community around it, the Mosque of
Paris had to be resigned to the principle of the open dialog of the
State. By its successive vice-chancellors (Sheik Abbas until 1989 ;
then Tedjini Haddam, replaced since 1992 by Dalil Boubaker), it had to accept
the loss of its hegemony in a consultation by open and heterogeneous
definition. This is why its current leader sees in the committed process a loss
of the historical influence of his federation : « The role of
the Mosque of Paris is not even evoked. However it is necessary to leave the
principle that the Large Mosque of Paris is the first in France, symbolically
and historically143(*) . «
Actually, the three criteria retained by the French State more
or less well (republican, French and representative Islam), the Mosque of Paris
answers. The characteristic making its force is its party taken for a very
liberal Islam, in perfect adequacy with the French model of secularity. If
Hamza Boubakeur (1912-1995), vice-chancellor until 1982 and author of a
translation of Coran which made school, remain for the press « the
herald of a modern Islam taking up the challenges of rationality144(*) ». His/her Dalil
son posts as for him a speech to measure for not froisser the opinions of
Average Frenchman. This close relation of Jacques Chirac, who does not notice,
« in spite of the held speeches, a racism in the French
population145(*) » does not hesitate to consolidate an
ambient146(*)
islamophobie in the French company while denouncing « the
infiltration of certain islamist organizations147(*) ». All that made
of him, in the unison with the newspapers French general practitioners, one
« good Moslem148(*) », representing one « quiet
Islam149(*) ».
The second criterion, that of the French character, poses
already more problems. The Mosque of Paris is managed since its foundation by
an Algerian association, the company of the habous150(*) and holy places of Islam.
After the independence of Algeria, If Hamza Boubakeur makes transfer the seat
from the latter in France. But in 1982, Algeria ends up gaining the iron arm by
parachuting a new nonFrench-speaking vice-chancellor, sheik Abbas151(*). It is only in April 1992
that France gains the part partially by imposing a French vice-chancellor,
Dalil Boubaker : « A doctor replaces a doctor, but it is a
French who succeeds an Algerian », Michel Kubler in the Cross is
filled with enthusiasm152(*). But, we do not delude, the Mosque of Paris remains
largely subjected to the interests of the community of Algerian origin, which
represents approximately half of the Moslem population in France. Dalil
Boubaker has the statute of diplomat besides and is thus paid Algerian
government.
The vice-chancellor of the Mosque of Paris, if he is indeed a
lawyer of an alleviated Islam, thus more or less put himself in conformity with
the requirement of French nationality. On the other hand, it is a criterion
which it pains to fill : that of the representativeness. The historical
window of French Islam is in a recurring way shown to represent « the
Islam of in top », completely crossed « the Islam of in
bottom ». Franck Fregosi, sociologist, point of the finger
« cleavages between an avoided Parisian Islam of all the republican
virtues (liberal, modern, French...) and a affublé basic Islam of all
the defects (fundamentalist, sectarian, radical...)153(*) ». Dalil Boubaker
indeed was characterized by its awkwardnesses, not to say its contempt, with
regard to the Moslem base. For Abderrahmane Dahmane, president of the Council
of the Moslem democrats, «this man responsible for the more cuisante is
demolished modern Islam154(*) ». Its judgment of « the Islam
of excited of the suburbs155(*) » indeed was very badly received on the
ground, consolidating the image of « cockle vacuum156(*) » of the Mosque of
Paris, which would not have any audience on the ground.
A problem arises then : the three criteria required by
the French State are compatible ? To look at the choices of various actors
of the Islam of France, the idea emerges that there is discrepancy between the
choice of moderation and that of the representativeness. As of the Rushdie
business, took shape the requirement to combine the satisfaction of its base
all while not froissant the French State : « careful
wait-and-see policy of Sheik Abbas, vice-chancellor of the mosque of Paris,
enracine (...) with the aim of be maintained a balance between tendencies and
to perpetuate a position of interlocutor », explains then Vincent
Hugeux in the Cross157(*). Certain observers estimate as of 1989
which it is because the reaction of the vice-chancellor of the mosque of Paris
to the book of Salman Rushdie was too soft that other radical bunches, like the
Voice of Islam, were legitimated by their more intransigent standpoint, but
also closer to those of the Moslem base.
Which assessment then to draw from the role of the Mosque of
Paris, and in particular of its vice-chancellor, taking into account the
composition of the Islam of France ? No one cannot dispute that its
historical supremacy was shaken. Because even if Dalil Boubaker is, since 2003,
president of CFCM, it was not elected but named at this station. Moreover, the
Mosque of Paris seemed large losing elections of CFCM, underlining a little
more contrast between its notoriety near the political and media circles and
its unpopularity at the base. It is indeed holding them of an Islam much more
marked which seems the winners of this birth of an Islam of France.
2) A legitimation of the bearded
ones ?
If he is large winners declared with the race with the French
pertaining to worship leadership, they are well them « bearded of the
UOIF », as the press is accustomed to name them. The characteristics
of the leaders of this federation, a nebula created in 1983 and which gathers
some two hundred associations of variable size, are strictly opposed to those
of the Mosque of Paris. The representativeness, gap of the Mosque of Paris,
seems assured to the partisans this more radical Islam.
That is enough it to return this federation, taking as a
starting point the the Egyptian Moslem Brothers, legitimate in the pertaining
to worship representation ? Indeed, whatever the direction which the
consultation of the Islam of France takes, the idea is propagated that
« the bearded ones make their way »158(*). Since 1990, Abdallah Ben
Mansour, president founder of the UOIF, fact part of the CORIF of Pierre Joxe.
The dialog between the State and this organization is thus former to CFCM. The
very widespread idea according to which it would have been
« adoubée » by Nicolas Sarkozy is thus
false159(*). It does not
remain about it less than the process of organization of the Islam of France,
based on the broadest possible discussions, is shown in a repetitive way to
support the islamist ones. But if the consultation of the partisans of a
political Islam- which is, that one wants it or not, a reading of Islam- is
legitimate, it is on the other hand astonishing that other tendencies of
Islamism, as the AEIF (Association of the Islamic Students of France) does not
make counterweight with the center the consultation, as Xavier Ternisien
explains it : « At present, the danger is not to have
introduced the UOIF into the representation of Islam. It is rather not to have
caused to him a competition resulting from the same mobility160(*). «
However, the UOIF multiplied the efforts these last years to
appear like an organization of most frequentable. Fouad Alaoui, vice-president
of CFCM, for example tried to found a dialog with the Jewish
community161(*), signs
considerable for which wants to seem a sizeable Moslem interlocutor :
« the UOIF knows that a public dialog with the Jews is worth patent
of respectability162(*). »
Another example, in 2005, the 22e meets Moslems of France of
Le Bourget, annual ceremony orchestrated by the UOIF, is the first which does
not separate men and women in the assistance163(*). But the event which is used as ideal scene for the
UOIF in order to post its republicanism is the business of the hostages in
2004. Beseeching the kidnappers to release the two officially removed French
journalists counteracts French the law about it known as
« scarf » of March 15, 2004, the UOIF was forced of
« to choose its camp » under the media and diplomatic
pressure, as Jean Daniel in the New Observer explains it :
« The Moslem French gained here with glare their
patent of republicanism, i.e., also, of secularity. Then, the institutions
which incarnated by the French Council of the Moslem Worship, which were very
discussed because of the radicalism of some their representatives, these legal
institutions have from now on a legitimacy164(*). »
Nevertheless media enthusiasm is partial and is turned over
even sometimes against the representatives of the UOIF. « Tactical
armistice or peace of the brave men ? », Claude Askolovitch in
this same newspaper questions165(*). The situation of the UOIF is thus paradoxical since
the federation forever as much décriée only since it makes an
effort « to standardize ». It is the famous fear of
« double game » : the leaders of the UOIF made less
fear by posting their intransigence than while trying to outline a more modern
speech. Thus, these « firemen flamers166(*) », with
« secret ambitions167(*) », are anything else only
« Masters tacticians168(*) ". Simple shell or revealing lapse, letters UOIF
besides is sometimes wrongfully presented as being the initial
ones « Union of the Islamist Organizations of
France169(*) «. The
attempt at standardization of the radical leaders is thus perceived with
mistrust as being a strategy of infiltration :
« The leaders of the UOIF have clear objectives and
a strategy of conquest (...), the UOIF wanted to make France a back base: a
place where islamist militants could find refuge and where one tries to modify
the glance which the public opinion carries on their countries of
origin170(*) ».
Following the example image of the duplicity of Tariq Ramadan
which is conveyed, the press calls mainly with not proud with misleading
appearances of the members of the UOIF :
« Cordial, voluble, raising cross costume and beard
cut, holder of a political DEA of sciences, Lhaj Thami Breze incarnates well
the federation which it chairs and which claims to promote a «modern»
Islam, ready to adapt to the French company, while nourishing theological
references fundamentalist, drawn in particular to the source of the Egyptian
Moslem Brothers, and money of the Gulf171(*). »
The federation, through its some faces, like Fouad Alaoui,
Lhaj Thami Breze, Farid Abdelkrim, thus succeeded in creating a place of
interlocutor impossible to circumvent of the authorities. Nevertheless its
attempts to fill gaps as regards republican spirit prove for the moment
against-productive. The more so as this orientation can appear dangerous
in-house. In an organization which always privileged an Islam rather close to
Islam to in bottom, this standardization of the speech can leave skeptic.
How the situation it will develop in the future ? Already take shape the
premises of a scission within the federation between
« pragmatic » (Fouad Alaoui, Lhaj Thami Breze) and them
« orthodoxe » (Farid Abdelkrim), fearing that the UOIF
becomes, following the example Mosque of Paris, one
« cockle without heart172(*) «.
3) Emergence news independent
personalities
Several individuals were selected to represent an opinion
independent on Islam of France in the installation of this one. Some did not
benefit from this role of interface with the authorities to acquire a new
intellectual visibility. For example, Michel Chodkiewicz seldom prevails
himself of his statute of personality qualified within CFCM. On the other hand,
the consultation made it possible certain individuals to emerge or rebound on
the media scene as semi-autonomous personalities. They have a tangent position
thus. They want to be at the same time independent, but are associated the
process of consultation all the same. Among those, the most obvious example is
that of Soheib Bencheikh, wire of Sheik Abbas, become the true one
« pet of the media173(*) ».
Soheib Bencheikh was born on December 20, 1961 in Djeddah in
Saudi Arabia. It is graduate university Al-Azhar of Cairo and doctor of
religious sciences of the practical School of the high studies. Appointed mufti
of Marseilles in 1995 by Dalil Boubaker, it defends a very modern Islam, rather
distant from that taught in the mosques. Stating itself to fit in the current
reformist, engaged for a return to the text and its second reading with
waitings of today, it chose a mode of legitimation distinct from the reforming
intellectuals studied previously, although it shares a design of the religion
very close to those :
« Any attempt to reform Islam- and the Moslem right
in particular- thus passes by a work of desacralization, by a second reading of
the texts in the light of the modern intelligence, by the search of an
orientation, a curve as one would say in mathematics, to allow to the Moslem of
good food his Islam today. If this desacralization is not done, it is the
secularization or the laicization which will follow, under the worst
conditions. The secularization of the company in Christian Europe did not await
the council the Vatican II. Islam is not different in this respect: or it goes
with its century, or it remains with the margin of the modern society.
«174(*)
Criticizing initially « the principle and methods of
the consultation on the organization of the Moslem worship in France175(*) », Soheib
Bencheikh chooses to return inside while finding the compromise of
« critical support176(*) » with this one. Like all the
personalities independent of the consultation, it makes figure of counterweight
against the federations and large mosques considered to be too radical. It does
not hesitate to condemn some of his colleagues, by qualifying the UOIF
« of fundamentalist anteroom of the most radical Islamism177(*) ».
Officially independent, Soheib Bencheikh is however very close
to the Mosque of Paris. It is thus not astonishing that its profile is similar
to the portrait of Dalil Boubaker mentioned above. Thus, it has the appearance
of a large mufti, in favor «of an Islam of progress, opening and
civilization178(*)», « recognized by the State but not
the whole of its community »179(*), and which tries with insistence to federate the
community around him. In addition to these characteristics, Soheib Bencheikh
has the perfect predispositions of the media star. It is besides for
Marianne anything else only one « tendron with theology
rebels », « good sheik, good kind180(*) » !
The media irruption of the large mufti of Marseilles east thus
due to its modernity as well in the content as in the form. Perfect
counterweight of the traditionalists, it is incontestably him which occupies
the majority of the media field of the qualified personalities of CFCM. There
is thus little place beside Soheib Bencheikh... unless putting in margin
consultation ?
4) Legitimation in margin, even against the
consultation
The birth of CFCM creates a place of intellectual legitimacy.
But the dispute of the consultation is also a field abundantly used and
relatively carrier. It was already shown how much Soheib Bencheikh benefits
from its at the same time internal and detached posture CFCM. In out of the
ordinary of the review Quoted, Franck Fregosi describes how the field
of « Anti-CFCM » is coveted181(*). There are not only those
which resigned of the council, but also those which were always presented in
the combat against this one.
CFCM, in spite of its youth, knew a great number of
resignations. Almost all its components already used of the blackmail to the
resignation. The departures of two women were particularly media : those
of Betoule Fekkar-Lambiotte and Dounia Bouzar. If Bétoule
Fekkar-Lambiotte throws sponge « to defend republican
Islam », showing Nicolas Sarkozy to privilege « a perfectly
retrograde Islam182(*) », Dounia Bouzar explains as for it which
CFCM is worried only by its own elections, occulting the discussions in depth.
The anthropologist who, for Nicolas Sarkozy, « has the ideal profile
to make like Islam with all the French183(*) », particularly gained in legitimacy while
taking part then by leaving CFCM. It from now on is indeed accepted like
intellectual with whole share in spite of a thought a priori less
reconciling that that of Soheib Bencheikh for example184(*). The legitimacy of these two
outgoing women is from now on double. They not only tried to take an active
part in the representation of the Moslem worship, but while resigning about it,
they are placed in a posture of superiority with regard to the Council which
them « deserve » not.
In parallel, a certain number of Moslem persons in charge made
to consultation on the Islam of France their war-horse. They are mainly the
representatives of the federations of young Moslems, like the Union of Young
Moslems (UJM), the CJM (Collective of the Young Moslems) and EMF (Student
Moslems of France). They in general reproach the not-representation of the
Islam of the young beurs, i.e. immigrants of the second or third generation,
within CFCM. Thus, Yamin Makri, spokesman of the CMF (Collective of the Moslems
of France), estimate that it feels « too much French for []
there recognizing185(*) ». These some activists in general chose,
contrary to the participants of CFCM, the crenel of the fight within
association of « young Moslems », thus refusing to take
part in an institutionalized organization, by dependant definition186(*). On the other hand, another
type of actor amply benefitted from the installation of an Islam of France
while taking part in it. They are the representatives « Islam of
in bottom ».
5) New visibility of local Islam
As we saw previously, the consultation aims to represent
concrete Islam. It thus constitutes for representatives of local Islam the
advisability of acquiring a media legitimacy. Thanks to the organization of the
Moslem worship, it « Islam of the cellars », source of
all the fears, is on the way to disappear. For example, Mamadou Daffé,
first of all labelled « islamist » by the General
Information187(*) and
« too much Moslem to be French188(*) » by the press, becomes little by little
one of these new media stars of local Islam.
The birth of their image in the press thus makes it possible
to diffuse less common designs of Islam, not being able to be shown to ignore
realities of the Moslem base, while exceeding binary cleavage between an Islam
of in moderate top and an Islam of in radical bottom. Tareq Oubrou, Imam of
Bordeaux, thus could make known its original theory of « fiqh of
minority », which is an adaptation of the Moslems to their minority
situation in dar Al-harb189(*). Even if it seems like conservative on many points,
private morals or the place of the women, the dynamics of legitimation of local
Islam, created by the birth of a representative Islam of France, contributed to
make its theses, if not admissible, at least audible. That creates a certain
intellectual emulation in the theorization of Islam. Thus, Leila Babès,
intellectual committed for an Islam of the Lights, agreed to confront his point
of view with this last in a book of talks190(*) :
« I remain without catch on a community which
functions like an organization of mass. But I want to create bridges with it,
and this is why I did not make this book only, but with a man of religion
recognized in order to cause the debate191(*). «.
A dialog, although unequal, is beautiful was born well, as
this critic of the book of Marion Festraëts shows it, appeared in the
Express train :
« Holding of the scientific of the texts and savage
criticism militant of freedom to think, Leïla Babès pushes the
monk, man of opening resulting from a line traditionalist, in his cuttings off,
the met vis-a-vis contradictions of a spirituality difficult to dissociate from
the historical context of its revelation192(*). »
The consultation of the Islam of France by the French State
thus constitutes an amazing chance for some personalities really representative
of lived Islam which can thus leave the shade. If all kinds of intellectuals
thus emerged from the birth of an Islam of France, how they use this role of
organic Moslem intellectual ?
C) The widening of the role of these intellectuals
The principal mission of these intellectuals certified by the
State is first of all that which is officially assigned to them, namely the
organization of the Moslem worship. For example, since 1990, the CORIF decides
for the first time collégialement of a common date of
Ramadan. Since its installation, CFCM works on certain significant
files : all the great challenges which arise for the Moslems today like
the formation of the Imams, the pilgrimage in Mecque, the month of Ramadan, the
celebration of the religious festivals, the meat halal, the financing
of the places of worship or the Moslem chaplaincy in prison are evoked. CFCM
can thus continue an installation of an Islam of France remained incomplete.
Playing on the fuzzy border between worship and culture, the
members of the Council want to be more than one simple consistory. They reject
the idea of one « Moslem CRIF » at their sides. For
example, CFCM gives an opinion regularly against « the cultural
islamophobie ». Thus, in 2003, reacting to the remarks of the
leader-writer of the Point Claude Imbert, the Council hardly installed
publishes an in particular stipulating text :
« The French council of the Moslem worship was set
up by the law, within the framework of the republican play. He did not think so
quickly of being confronted with the claim of the islamophobie. Anxious to
fulfill its mission fully, CFCM will require other associations like, to be
entitled to act as justice within the framework them procedures making it
possible to fight the incentives with hatred or religious discrimination.
Because in democracy, the last word should not be allocated to the
agitators193(*). »
The organic Moslem intellectuals were also quickly constrained
to express their points of view on problems of company involved in Islam, like
the Islamic scarf. These opinions are not besides in unison. The voices diverge
between the president from CFCM, Dalil Boubaker, estimating that the port of
the veil « is not a fundamental rule of our religion194(*) » and Fouad
Alaoui, which affirms that it is one « regulation195(*) ». But majority of
these official representatives of the Moslem worship, except those which keep a
certain independence in spite of their statute, like Soheib Bencheikh for
example, condemn the principle of a law196(*). Even most moderate are opposed to it, like Dalil
Boubaker, protesting which it «could be felt by [its] religious community
like a suspicion197(*)». In spite of this majority opposition, it
should all the same be recalled that the opinion of CFCM remains purely
« advisory ».
If CFCM is thus requested for interior problems posed by
Islam, it is especially on the international level that the organic
intellectuals, thanks to their symbolic system places of representative of the
French Moslem community, showed themselves more linked and most credible. They
are supposed, in the event of problems of terrorism, to exempt some words of
appeasing. A paramount role, estimates Fouad Alaoui, which judges the shortly
after September 11 that « the attacks showed how much it was
important, from a symbolic system point of view, that a representative
authority can come to a conclusion about important events198(*) ».
The consulted interlocutors did not await besides the final
installation of CFCM to decide with one voice. At the beginning of the American
intervention in Iraq of 2003, provisional Commission of organization of the
consultation on Islam (Comor) puts for example officially agreement to
congratulate the pacifist position on the French diplomacy and calls the
faithful ones to « to express their emotion in calms and
dignity199(*) ». Also, as we saw previously, the taking
of hostages of the two French journalists in Baghdad at at the end of 2004
corresponds to another great test on the international level of CFCM. This last
then sends on the spot a delegation made up of Fouad Alaoui (UOIF), Abdallah
Zekri (Mosque of Paris) and of Mohammed Bechari (FNMF) in order to intercede
near the Iraqi kidnappers. This geopolitical role, although implicit, is indeed
fundamental for the members of the Islam of France.
Forts of their position of official members of Moslem
intelligentsia, these interlocutors of the State could widen their role
with many fields of competence. With the multiplication of the media events
having a direct relationship or not with Islam since 1989, the representatives
of what is spirit to become the Islam of France emerged like new intellectual
voices. Some figures seemed being impossible to circumvent in any dialog
concerning of near or by far the Islamic religion.
Nevertheless, their position remains fragile. The
constitution of the Islam of France east still in building site. The fights of
influences inside the Council are considerable and can quickly make rock the
delicate balance of this French Islamic landscape. Recent blocking by the UOIF
of the nomination of Moulay el-Hassan el-Alaoui Talibi at the post of
Moslem general chaplain of the prisons200(*), as well as the difficulty in organizing elections
in times and without disputes, are only examples among others of confusion and
combat fratricidal which reign within the Islam of France. Besides Dounia
Bouzar explains its resignation like the consequence owing to the fact that
CFCM « speak only about elections [interns], instead of analyzing
what wants to say to be Moslem in a laic company201(*). « Even if the Council
is only at its beginnings, all that is not very good for the public image of
these very new organic intellectuals.
Moreover, contrary to what was awaited, CFCM is not however
the single interlocutor in certain subjects returning naturally in its field of
attribution. The file of the formation of the Imams is a striking
example : the meeting of the committee of experts around the International
Institute of the Islamic Thought (IIIT) and Mohammed Mestiri can seem an
attempt by the ministry for the interior, to circumvent CFCM202(*). It is thus the proof that
the latter, although official authority of Islam by definition, did not sit its
authority completely yet.
If the organic Moslem intellectuals pain to answer all the
contemporary challenges of Islam, safety will come it from the civil
company and of a new type of Moslem intellectual : the leader
socio-policy ?
IV.
The leader Moslem socio-policy
The last category of Moslem intellectuals which emerges on the
French media scene is that of the Moslem leader to the head of the social and
political fights. There still, the date of 1989 seems revolving major, the
first « business of the veil » having created a scission
within associations antiracists and feminists. Since this date, we attend
with a new cleavage and a certain centering of the traditional social debates,
relating to integration in particular, around the religious problems. We will
initially study this evolution noted before analyzing there how this one
allowed still the creation of a new category of intellectuals, intellectuals
who in common have the point with the three other types clarified previously to
be able to be qualified Moslem intellectuals, but who are characterized some by
their process of legitimation. Lastly, we will be able in a third point to
observe that it is carried out in parallel, since about fifteen years, one
« Islamization » relative of the French political life,
these new politicians or top-civils servant defined as Islamic contributing to
the birth médiatiquement visible of a Moslem
intelligentsia.
With) The Islamic turning of the social fights
The observation of the religious turning of the social fights
on behalf of the movements resulting from immigration rests on a certain number
of presupposed largely relayed by the media. According to the image abundantly
spread by the French press, the laic movements of Beurs failed in their mission
of integration in the years 1980, in particular because of the lapse of memory
of the religious problems. For this reason one attends a reislamisation of the
suburbs since 1990. Admittedly, this vision is not unanimous and is sometimes
disputed203(*). But
failing to have the historical retreat necessary to consider reality social of
such an evolution, we can affirm without encumber that the Islamic turning of
the social fights is indeed a media reality. In the same way, it is undeniable
that the principal associative leaders of years 1980 are led the following
decade to reconsider their engagement in particular around the problems of
Islam.
The event detonator which launches the scission of the
movement bor is the first business of the veil in 1989. If associations laic
antiracists had more or less avoided the religious problems at their
beginnings, they are consequently obliged to confront itself with it. Within
associations of young immigrants, creates for itself first line of fracture
between « pro-scarves » and
« anti-scarves ». Harlem Desire, president of S.O.S-Racism
and emblematic figure of the walk of Beurs, are one of the first to condemn the
exclusion of the buckled girls. With the media racing, the standpoint of
association appears as a questioning of the French model of republican
integration to the profit of a Community integration of Anglo-Saxon
type :
« The persons in charge for association had not
provided that the debate would become such extensive and would focus the
interests of as many politicians, journalists and intellectuals nor that the
general tonality of the debate in the press would be clearly against the port
of the scarf and the position of S.O.S. Whereas the arguments of S.O.S
indicated that the goal to reach was integration by the school
of «immigrant of second generation» and thus raised of a
realistic concern of education «laic and republican» of the whole of
the pupils, association seemed defendant more or less the «right to the
difference» of the immigrants204(*) ».
The eternal controversy between
« integrationists » and
« assimilationnists » centers itself consequently
symbolically around a sign of a religious nature. The premises of a binary
debate between the partisans of a tolerant attitude take shape thus- laxist
will say some- with regard to Islam and holding them of a firm secularity.
But the other event which has the appearance of a new data and
which causes new divisions at the charismatic figures of associations of
defense of the immigrants is the war of the Gulf. There still, S.O.S-Racism
goes to counter-current of the majority opinion by condemning the armed
intervention in Iraq. This standpoint improves its image in the suburbs but
moves away it much from its old supports. Pierre-Andre Taguieff for example,
who had been a large support of S.O.S-Racism a long time205(*), takes his distances after
the war and attacks then « the antiracism differentialist206(*) ».
At the beginning of the years 1990, the quasi unanimous
benevolence of media elite with regard to the movements antiracists is thus
broken. And the true line of fracture, which very often hides behind the
problems of the right to the difference, is clearly around the attitude to
adopt vis-a-vis Islam. This religious turning of the question of integration is
also obvious at the feminist movements. Forced to come to a conclusion about
the veil, some preach firmness, others call upon the freedom of choice. Emerge
then slowly a line of « neofeminists »207(*), preaching a laic Moslem
feminism from now on which incarnated by the movement NPNS (Neither Subjected
Whores Nor), which turns into to veil its war-horse and Islam the principal
enemy of the equality between men and women. In 2003, the newspaper the
World publishes a platform under the title
« «Laïcardes», since feminists208(*) ». A whole
symbol : the two problems are from now on dependant.
The example of Vénissieux, in the Lyons periphery,
illustrates perfectly in the media all this evolution of the suburbs whose
inhabitants slip of a combat laic antiracist to a strategy of integration
taking of account the religion. In 1983, it is of its district of Minguettes
that share celebrates it walk of Beurs. Two decades later, this city makes
speak about it only to report the drifts of the Imam salafist Abdelkader
Bouziane209(*). If the
Western public saw with sympathy the walk of Beurs, the city of Gaules is
quickly indicated like « center of gravity of islamist
nebula210(*) »
at the beginning of the years 1990. This local example shows well that, if the
problem of integration were considered under a social angle or
« ethnic » benevolent in the years 1980, the following
decade sees being much less formed a reading of the social problems through a
religious prism condescending. This evolution is even palpable in the way in
which the State and the local communities changed strategy vis-a-vis the
question of integration :
« The way in which the authorities treated
integration of the immigrants, then beurs and maintaining Moslems also
contributed to set up this identity in data in the field sociopolitic. To name
the population resulting in particular from the Maghreb, one thus passed from
his social characteristic, «immigrant», with his ethnic
characteristic, «bor», and finally with his religious characteristic,
«Moslem» (...) finally the identities thus produced by the speech
come from there to be lived by the individuals designated like
obviousnesses211(*) ».
By a semantic slip, the press characterizes from now on the
young people in search of integration by the qualifier ethno-monk
of «arabo-Moslem », thus binding two quite distinct types
of identities however. This is a real reflection of the evolution of the
company or a pure fabrication « sociologico-media » ?
At all events, as Michel Wieviorka underlines it, « by calculate the
existence of a communautarism arabo-Moslem, one risks well to create it and
encourage it212(*) . «
If the religious turning of the social fights is
médiatiquement obvious, which is the incidence on the positioning of the
leaders of these movements ? The answers vis-a-vis the new data having
varied according to the people, associations of suburbs then more or less burst
but a new figure, that of the Moslem intellectual destroyer of the social
injustices is born in parallel.
B) The emergence of the figure of the Moslem combatant of the
social injustices
Mainly around the question of the veil thus, the problems of
Islam are established with the center of the debates on integration. The
landscape of the leaders of the movements fighting for integration is seen
consequently considerably modified according to this new data. On the one hand,
new associations appear which are defined before just like Islamic, asserting
to be able to succeed where the old movements of claims citizens failed. In
addition, these last by rebound are obliged to reposition itself compared to
the Koranic religion. From these new data emergent of new figures of Moslem
intellectual : the reference to an Islam, was it laic, becomes
carrying.
1) A new figure : the leader of the
reislamisation
Since the turning of the years 1990 and the proven
breathlessness of the popularity of associations traditional antiracists, some
religious associations try to be engulfed in the breach, being based on the
idea that a certain number of young Moslems present a will to be different from
the attitude of their parents by more strongly asserting their faith, this in
order to renegotiate their insertion in French public
space. Leaders of these substitutes to the social action of the
years 1980 emergent then to form a new media figure : the intellectual
preacher.
Among these activists, there is of them one which truly
exceeded all the others médiatiquement, it acts of Tariq Ramadan. It is
the emblem of the Moslem leader who acquired one will have some thanks to his
work of reislamisation of the young immigrants or wire of immigrants whose
social integration failed. « The big brother of Beurs lost, the
mystical subcontractor of the social action213(*) », positions clearly for a new type of
integration, considering that the republican model with the Frenchwoman is a
failure. Tariq Ramadan claims without complex, unlike the laic associations
more or less torn on the subject, a right to the difference and a Community
integration in rupture with the hexagonal tradition :
« The passion in the Eighties for a
standard integration S.O.S-Racism or the company known as pluriculturelle seems
to mark time (...) It could be well that the best «integrated» Moslem
is not that which practices less his religion or which gets dressed like
everyone and which one does not measure the interior tensions and tearings.
Quite to the contrary, that to which one gave the means of building a
personality «of the interior» will be better capable to adapt to its
specific environment214(*). »
The associative activity in favor of the young people of
foreign origin makes it possible Tariq Ramadan to weave a intellectual network
some. Since 1992, it creates the movement of the Moslems and Musulmanes of
Switzerland. It approaches during years 1990 the Moslem federation of the UOIF
(Union of the Islamic organizations of France), but more especially of
associations of young Moslems, like the UJM (Union of the young Moslems), very
active in the Lyons suburbs. Its work of preacher on the ground, in particular
in this area, enables him to weave relationships to personalities of other
confessions profiting then from a considerable media visibility, like the
father Christian Delorme, celebrates it « priest of
Minguettes ». Tariq Ramadan also profits from fasteners in the laic
mediums which in particular enabled him to belong to the commission
« Islam and secularity » within the League of the teaching
of 1995 to 2000.
We can put forth the assumption that the charge of double
speech against Tariq Ramadan is partly explained by the fact why it actually
plays on two tables : that, as we saw partly II, of the Moslem reformer,
but also on that of the guide of an integration by the religion. It is because
it publicly appears in these two different roles that its speech appears often
adapted to its audience, as proves it its ambiguous bonds with the movement of
the Moslem Brothers : « Tariq Ramadan prefers to make
forget his/her grandfather when he wants to be made pass in particular
vis-a-vis the journalists, like a Moslem intellectual. But when it is found in
front of the young people of the suburbs, it wants to convince that he is the
worthy heir to Al Banna215(*) . «
If Tariq Ramadan has two speeches well, it is because it is
based on two distinct intellectual postures. We can also suppose that a certain
skepticism of the public opinion with regard to the figure of the intellectual
leader of the reislamisation, comes owing to the fact that such a Moslem social
accompaniment necessarily makes think of the strategy the islamist ones in the
Maghreb.
But this comprehensible mistrust, geared down by a media din
out of the commun run, paradoxically made it possible Tariq Ramadan to create a
place, certainly disputed, but impossible to circumvent in the French
intellectual field. Because the media finally do not cease reproaching him a
mediatization of which they are in the beginning, and which they multiply a
such vicious circle. At the same time omnipresent and décrié by
the traditional press, Tariq Ramadan also finds its safety media on Internet,
which reinforces its image of champion besides of « Moslems of in
bottom » defending the base vis-a-vis the media and Moslem elites of
which it however forms part. The cyberjournal Oumma216(*) is its principal relay. It
is on this site, founded in 1999, that Tariq Ramadan publishes its very
polemical Critique article of (new) intellectual Community217(*) in October 2003, after the
large French newspapers refused to publish it in their pages.
Concurrently to this « Tariq brother »
invading, There thus remain logically only little place in the field of the
Moslem intellectual helping the young people to be integrated by a larger
respect of the Islamic tradition. Hassan Hiquioussen, who is in North what
Tariq Ramadan represents with the Lyons area and which could have stolen the
high-speed motorboat to him, is surely less skilful than its Swiss counterpart
and definitively put themselves out of the play
« médiatico-intellectual » by remarks openly
anti-semites218(*).
Moreover, the majority of the preachers work at the local level and do not have
vocation to become strong media icons. It does not remain about it less than
some start to understand perhaps that the cumbersome figure of Tariq Ramadan
makes them shade. Here why emblematic association UJM decided to return Yamin
Makri, marked to undoubtedly be too close to the Swiss intellectual219(*).
If the Islamization of the debates on integration allowed to
the media irruption new Moslem actors, certain old figures of the traditional
social movements were reconverted as Moslem intellectuals of also new type.
2) ex-Beurs become Moslem
The former leaders of the associative movements resulting from
Maghrebian immigration carry out, during the Nineties, of the different choices
vis-a-vis the new problems which are proposed to them. Some dispute the Islamic
turning of their combat by affirming their atheism and their refusal to be
locked up in a Moslem identity. It is for example the case of Malek Boutih, the
former president of S.O.S Racism, which is even described as
« islamophobe220(*) » by the sociologist Vincent Geisser.
Others make the opposite way. It is about the strategy chosen
inter alia by Mouloud Aounit, secretary-general of the MRAP (Movement against
racism and for the friendship between the people) since 1989, which makes a
priority of the fight against the islamophobie, « behind which the
hatred of the populations arabo-Moslem women is dissimulated221(*) ». The last public
exits of this last, to defend of the buckled girls or to claim meat
halal in the school canteens underline this change of concerns. This
choice is perceived overall with skepticism by the press, which judges that
« the MRAP is connected from now on less with the fight antiracist
that with the integrist combat222(*) ». It is true that the call to the
penalization of the blasphemy by this association is a new data since the
islamophobie is not strictly speaking a form of racism but well the
criticism of a religion. And it is behind this subtle distinction between the
phobia of a religion and the phobia of the population which is identified there
(or that one stigmatizes by this means) that a deep cleavage hides which shakes
associations fighting for the integration of the young immigrants.
Because the majority of the stars antiracists of years 1980
chose a different option well. Ni publicly atheistic like Malek Boutih, nor
destroyers of the islamophobie like Mouloud Aounit, much of personalities
propose the fact that they are Moslem, but this in order to better show than
their faith is not incompatible with a republican integration. These laic
Moslems thus carry out at the same time an acceptance of the new religious
problems- since they are presented from now on in the form of Moslems- and a
negation of this one- since they are presented in the form of a republican
above all. In order to reorientate their combat, these ex-Beurs converted with
the Moslem citizenship then choose to found laic movements of Moslems.
The year 2003 is particularly profitable in the field. It is
on May 26 of this year which Tokia Saïfi, Rachid Kaci and Amo Ferhati
create the French Council of the Laic Moslems (CFML). Fifteen days earlier, the
contractor Yazid Sabeg launches Laic Convention for the equal rights and the
participation of the Moslems of France (KEY). As for Aziz Sahiri, who in A
« enough which one all the time speaks about islamist, and never of
the Moslems citizens223(*) «, he becomes at the same time president of the
very new Movement of the laic Moslems of France (MMLF). In October 2003, it is
with the turn of the Council of the Moslem democrats of France (CDMF) to be
born under the crook of a principal adviser of education, Abderrahmane Dahmane.
This movement, although it autoproclame not «laic», also forms part
of republican mobility.
However these laic Moslems are often old movement bor of years
1980 reconverted. We had evoked the case of the Lyons suburbs previously. There
still, the figure of Djida Tazdaït president in Lyon of movement JALB
(Young Arabic of Lyon and its suburbs), is revealing. This one was a true icon
of the movement bor of the years 1980, taking part in particular in a media
hunger strike in 1986 to protest against the Pasqua laws. But the JALB finishes
by completely being marginalized in the department of the Rhone by the
competition of its Islamic counterpart, the Union of the Young Moslems (UJM),
which is born in 1987. Conscious of the evolution, Djida Tazdaït was thus
let convince of the need for acting as a Moslem citizen and militates from now
on within the CFML. Its objective first is not formulated any more like the
attempt to integrate the young immigrants into the French company, but to show
that « the majority of the Moslems of this country only think of
adapting their way of life to the republican rules224(*) ». In the same
way, Rachid Kaci was member of France More, while Tokia Saïfi and Amo
Ferhati, old « walkers », were engaged within association
citizen « Space Intégration » in the years 1980.
Asserting a laic Islam, this Maghrebian
intelligentsia, become publicly Moslem more by need that by choice, has
multiplied the petitions for a few years, which multiplies by ten its
visibility. « Call of May 2003 », written by the
MMLF, is signed by « Moslem intellectuals opposed to the legitimation
of the veil225(*) » . February 16, 2004 it is with the
turn of « Proclamation of freedoms », of the trade unionist
Tewfik Al, to be initialed by some six hundreds « women, men, of
Moslem culture, believing, agnostic or atheistic226(*) «. This proclamation,
from now on made up in association, seeks to become «a true place of
reflection around the Islam, perceived like a geopolitical and cultural whole
as much as monk227(*)». It thus tries also to build bridges with the
liberal reformers resulting from the world arabo-Moslem. For this reason the
renovating ones of Islam228(*), like the psychoanalyst Fethi Benslama or the
anthropologist Malek Chebel, often find recipients of these engagements of laic
Moslems.
This « beurgeoisy » laic partly
constituted itself in order to make counterweight with the organic
Moslem intelligentsia born from the consultation on the Islam of France
organized by the authorities Wishing to create the equivalent of one
« Moslem CRIF », the laic Moslems thus think of minimizing
the weight of CFCM. But while giving to any person « of Moslem
origin » an identity label globalisante, is there no blow a risk
of « ethnicisation » of the religion, as Vincent
Geisser notes it ?
« When the ministry for the interior supports the
emergence of an authority representative of the worship like CFCM, it limits
the Moslem community to its smaller expression : a community reduced to
believing and practice. While when an association claims to represent laic
Islam, the basic unit is not any more the practicing Moslem, it is any person
of origin arabo-Moslem woman229(*) ».
Criticisms are sharp including within the Moslem community
known as moderated, as the reaction of Amar Dib, sociologist and national
president shows it of « Club Convergences ».
« Those and those which, suddenly, are presented in
the form of Moslems, whereas yesterday they did not want to intend to speak
about this label, would like they to say to us that Islam is a danger to the
Republic and that they only could protect us from the danger230(*) ? »
Although seeking to fight against the prevalence of the
religions, the initiatives of these laic Moslem intellectuals contribute to sow
a little more confusion by giving a character including to a religious
identity. So much so that all person « of Moslem origin »
which criticizes CFCM is seen sticking the label of « laic
Moslem ». This way, even Malek Boutih, which however posted its
atheism many times, is sometimes compared to one « laic
Moslem »231(*). Curiously, by a conceptual confusion, they to some
extent contribute to create a communautarism which they exècrent.
Paradox which even makes say to Rachid Kaci, a few months after having created
the Movement of the Laic Moslems of France, which « one makes very to
marginalize part of the French population, the French of Maghrebian origin, by
obliging those to be determined like Moslems and not like citizens232(*) « !
It does not remain about it less than the existence of this
new caste of republican Moslems rather appears reassuring for an opinion
skeptic with regard to Islam and than it is largely voted by plebiscite per
many French newspapers. Hanane Harrath explains even how this one is a media
construction intended to reassure transitory fears of the French company :
« Name [laic Moslems], according to them, is not any
more one end nor the result of an identity claim on a religious basis, it is
only transitory. It is operational only because it makes it possible to assume
the glance of the other and then to exceed it : statute of looked at
which undergoes, one would pass thus to that of looked at which
assumes to arrive at looked at which exceeds 233(*) »
If the evolution of the debates on integration led to the
reconversion of much Beurs of the years 1980 as laic Moslems in the years 1990,
a very similar evolution is noted in the feminist movements. There is well
since 1989 and the first business of the veil of new figures which appear,
asserting to fight in the name of a new feminism, Moslem feminism.
3) « neofeminists »
Moslem
It is also around the religious problems that the feminist
movement is divided. A figure of Moslem feminist appears for better showing
than Islam is compatible with all republican engagements, including feminism.
Some personalities, like Nadia Amiri, enquiring in sociology with the EHESS
(School of the high studies in social sciences) and old leading of association
France More, from now on vice-president of the Committee Secularity Republic of
Paris, defend this characteristic of republican Moslem feminism.
But large gaining media crenel are incontestably the persons
in charge for movement NPNS (Neither Subjected Whores Nor). Surfant at the
beginning of the years 2000 on some media scandals concerning the suburbs like
the return of the problem of the scarf and especially that of
« revolving »234(*), association organizes, following the example walk
of Beurs of 1983, one « go of the women for the equality and against
the ghettos » from February to March 2003. It tries to dissociate
traditional feminism. Under the slogan « Co-education, Equality,
Secularity besides», the leaders of NPNS organize their own
demonstration at the time of the Day of the Woman 2005 in order to avoid being
confused with the traditional feminists, and especially, « because
there is no more urgent combat for the emancipation of the women than that of
the fight against all the forms of integrism and obscurantism235(*) ».
In twenty years, Fadela Amara thus passed from the statute of
simple militant of S.O.S-Racism to the symbol by definition of the Moslem
feminist by taking the head of NPNS. That which is defined as
« practicing Moslem woman », but for which the veil is
« a tool of oppression imposed by the patriarchal companies236(*) », part of its
efforts devoted sees by obtaining the Price of the Book Policy 2004237(*). As for the other figurehead
of NPNS, which sometimes shares with tension the leadership of the
collective238(*), it is
about Loubna Méliane, which is also a vice-president of
S.O.S-Racism.
Opposite, some rare icons, Saida Kada, person in charge for
association WOMAN (French Women and committed Moslem women), seem to try to
prove that one can be a buckled feminist. Because as Dounia Bouzar
explains it, Co-auteure with it work One veiled, the other
not239(*) :
« The women of Moslem reference are especially
assigned in preset places : one gives them the choice between the
stereotype of the subjected Moslem woman who will be reduced to inferiority and
the stereotype of the «Western» woman modern who, to acquire her
freedom, her autonomy, should break with any religious reference240(*) . «
Indeed, if it is true that it « one hears only the
voices of the most radical Moslems, however fewer than the moderate
ones 241(*)»,
as underline it two journalists of the Express train besides surely
partly responsible, these extremists find themselves in the two poles of a
debate presented like binary. Between these two sliced choices, are moderated
positionings, but inevitably less media, like that of the spokesman of the
collective « A school for all-your », Hamida Ben Sadia,
which is not buckled but whose vision of feminism recommends that the woman is
free to carry or not the scarf, including in the public places. But the latter
not returning neither in the box of the veiled feminist, nor in that of the
non-fogging feminist, his speech remained marginal in the press.
For the only question of the scarf, the problems are
complex : to be opposed to the law does not mean for example not that one
adheres to the principle regulation. But the majority of the media carried out
an exceptional simplification of the controversy, prolonging this aspect
Manichean of the debate intra-Moslems in all the fields subjected to
discussions.
4) Multiple figures for a binary
debate
Among this elite which emerged from the associative world
fighting for integration, a certain number of media cleavages curling the
caricature were born and seem to be rigidified. We find on a side a pole of
integrist intransigent- Moslems for some- which fight the islamophobie like an
ordinary racism. Other, côtoient plethoras of laic Moslems- secularists
for their adversaries- described even as « Moslems
islamophobes242(*) » by Vincent Geisser, sociologist clearly
posted in support of the other tendency. The two camps are opposed
systematically on all the contemporary debates having a direct bond or not with
the problems of Islam.
The distortion is born, we saw it, around the question of the
Islamic scarf. For the laic Moslems having signed « Call of
May », the judgment of the veil is clear :
« The current surrealist debate on the Islamic
scarf, true standard of political Islamism, the calling into question of French
secularity, should not make lose sight of the fact that it acts there, for
France and the French, to refuse and resist the establishment on our territory
of a dangerous, perverse ideology and especially mortal for the
Republic243(*). »
The Moslem leaders who chose the combat of the defense of the
Islamic religion, like Mouloud Aounit, denounce as for them a qualified
legislation of liberticide : « A law prohibiting the religious
signs, in the current context of islamophobie, seems a law of exception with
regard to the only Islamic religion 244(*). « Behind the problem of the veil, it is indeed
the question of the cultural relativism which is factor of cleavage. For
Vincent Geisser , « in the idea of the islamophobes [laic
Moslems], this girl [buckled] contradicted universalism, a desire «to
carry light» (...). They consider that French of culture or
Islamic religion is still carrying on the one hand inferiority of which they
should be helped to be delivered245(*) ".
This camp compares to some extent republican universalism to
racism feeding sedentary paranoia and rejects a supposed assimilation
colonialist. If cleavage appeared with the veil, it is unceasingly revived, in
particular with the problem of the Middle East. Thus, them « laic
Moslems » are shown, as the remarks of Mouloud Aounit illustrate it,
of « ethniciser » racism, condemning the fact that one
makes anti-semitism « a virus arabo-Moslem246(*) ». Fadela Amara,
figure of much of laic Moslem feminism is regularly made treat « of
Arab enjuivée247(*) ».
We can also note that, a such vicious circle, the speech of
each one is radicalized with time. The example of Tariq Ramadan is obvious.
That one even which affirms in 2001 « that the anti-semitism is
unacceptable and indefensible248(*) » sign a text in 2003 which takes again
all the old stereotypes anti-semites249(*). In the same way, if it calls in 2001 with
« to fight against the feeling of victimization which colonizes
many spirits among the Moslem French citizens and in particular among most
marginalized250(*) », it chooses four years later to invest
the field of mémorielles frustrations by signing it call
« We are the natives of the Republic ! »251(*).
This call without surprise is condemned besides by the laic
Moslems, who judge it « communautarist » and
« victimisant » :
« The work of memory must be done, but that should
not take part in identity construction (...). Those which want to make us
assume the posture of the native voluntarily ignore the history. They
instrumentalisent the past to put at bottom freedom and the equality, the
values of what they dare to call «chauvinism universalist». Who does
not see that while calling with this moral rising of «colonized» they
prepare, for the girls, the compost of a kind of «personal statute»,
to take again the expression of Leïla Sebbar ? It is played the
legalization of the multiculturalism. And the dams which protect us name
co-education and secularity252(*). »
More than ever, members resulting from
« beurgeoisy » seem summoned to choose a camp, even if it
means to accept the drifts of this one, this preventing the introduction of a
healthy and plural debate. Since 1989, Djida Tazdaït, emblem bor,
declared: « since the Rushdie business, one summons us to position us
like «goods» or «bad» Moslems253(*). » Force is to
note that this binary birth of the Moslem intellectual engaged in the life of
the city made only be accentuated during these last about fifteen years. The
Maghrebian elite of years 1980 was thus divided into two in a caricatural way,
between a camp marked national-republican of islamophobie and a camp
« differentialist » supposed islamist. In spite of the
toughening of the debates, whatever the crenel which was selected, the Islamic
reference in any case became almost a way obliged for any militant of
Maghrebian origin in the years 1990. This Islamization of the associative
leaders has it a repercussion in the French political life ?
C) Moslems in policy : religious guarantee or republican
equality ?
In 2003, Nicolas Sarkozy notices that «there are 5 to 6
million Moslems in France, from which 2 million is likely to vote254(*) ». There still,
the Minister of Interior Department makes an amalgam by making Moslem adjective
an including identity, since all the immigrants resulting from the Moslem world
are not Moslem faith255(*). But this is revealing of a true change of
perception and treatment of the problems of integration, including on the most
level of the Republic. Whereas one held there is to stick little the favors of
a vote bor, it is well now a Moslem community, even arabo-Moslem woman, who is
politically courted. Since the Islamic turning of the social question of
integration, certain politicians are supposed Moslem, thus being used as
guarantee. Indeed, the figures which we have just studied are not simply
leaders of ground. Their charisma being politically interesting, a certain
number joined the rows of the parties. Concurrently to that, some recently
named top-civils servant were introduced like Moslems. We will then question
the legitimacy of this qualifier.
1) The political instrumentalisation of the
associative leaders
The instrumentalisation of the associative leaders cannot be
described strictly speaking as « political recovery » since
the majority of these movements are intrinsically of pure political creations
(S.O.S Racism always was near to the socialist Party, while France More was
created by the line to be used as counterweight). But the political parties
benefit in any case from will have acquired by the leaders of these movements.
Since 1989, whereas the Islamic turning of the debates on immigration hardly
starts, of many French young people of Maghrebian origin engage in policy at
the time of the local elections : « for the first time, a
significant number of them (more than six hundreds, it seems) had arised on
electoral rolls256(*) ".
But from now on, for reasons already evoked, it is more a Moslem vote which a
vote bor which is requested. Thus, the FCCM (Forum of the citizens of Moslem
culture), created by Hakim El-Ghissassi, is the illustration of the will to
create a kind of Moslem lobby257(*). But what happenhappen does Moslems engaged inside
even of parties?
The movement bor of the years 1980 having been primarily
supported by the left, the majority of the Maghrebian political figures of this
time are on this side of the political chess-board. It is not thus astonishing
to find a certain number of laic Moslems within the socialist Party the
following decade (Fadela Amara, Loubna Méliane). But like the Islamic
turning of the social fights is based on a supposed failure of the policy of
integration of the years 1980, the tradition « left-beur »
of the Mitterrand years is partly broken at some of these associative leaders
reconverted as laic Moslems. Thus, the presence of Rachid Kaci, Abderrahmane
Dahmane, Tokya Saïfi, or Amo Ferhati, within UMP testifies to some
« ideological droitisation concerning certain French elites of
Maghrebian origin disappointed by «great the multicultural project»
of the socialist left258(*) ».
If part of « beurgeoisy » reconverted
Moslem thus found itself in the traditional parties of the political
chess-board, we can also detect that there exists well at its sides an alliance
« red-green » on behalf of certain Moslem charismatic
figures. It is the case of Tariq Ramadan, whose relations with the
altermondialists mediums start rather early. It had launched as of the years
1980 an association of assistance to the Third World, « Co-operation
blow of hand ». What does not prevent the media from presenting its
bonds with the extreme left like the fruit of a tactic « new
islamo-gauchist "259(*).
Thus, the newspapers seem to be astonished by the logical- presence within
sight of its course- of Tariq Ramadan to the European social Forum in
2003 : «Infiltration or strategic alliance ? 260(*) », wonders then
Claude Askolovitch in the New Observer. Hamida Ben Sadia affirms in
any case that « these Moslem associations, it is the JOC- Christian
working Jeunesse- of tomorrow! The left will have to take into account
them261(*) ».
Lastly, only Mohammed Latrèche breaks the taboo of the
creation of a denominational political party, by melting the Party of the
Moslems of France (PMF) in 1997, in order to « to release the Moslems
of the influence of the PS », that it qualifies « sionized
party262(*) ».
But its speech is so outrageous that there remains very marginal. Even Tariq
Ramadan makes figure of moderate at its sides. And it clearly makes a point of
being distinguished from this mobility with which it shares certain points of
agreements, in particular on the veil :
«One sees radical and sectarian groups today trying to
benefit from the dissatisfaction with the Moslems. Moslem associations or
parties which did not hesitate to join movements of extreme right-hand side, to
support the Saddam Hussein tyrant, to develop radical theses, assert a seizure
by capitalizing the wounded emotion of the Moslems. They make a strictly Moslem
deal of it and are satisfied to feed the feeling victimaire. It cannot be a
question of making common cause with this type of opportunism263(*).»
Extreme left with the extreme right-hand side, the political
chess-board as a whole recovers implicitly during years 1990 the guarantee of
these recent figures of Moslem intelligentsia. This new political
visibility on behalf of Moslem charismatic figures contributes without any
doubt to the birth of the Moslem intellectual. But that part of the politicians
are posted or see indicated as Moslem it in agreement with the republican
ideals is that all- these policies- claim to defend ?
2) The question of the Moslem high-civils
servant
Since the years 1990, one could notice that a certain number
of appointed high-civils servant were originating in the Maghreb. One finds
there for illustration the prefect Aïssa Dermouche, the vice-chancellor of
academy Ali Bencheneb, and even the minister Tokya Saïfi. But with the new
religious problems become impossible to circumvent in any treatment of the
question of integration, the debate on positive discrimination is him also
transformed into a discussion on the religious communautarism.
For Ali Bencheneb, the things are clear. Questioned by the
World, it explains : « Me, I am a vice-chancellor ;
yes, Moslem, perhaps. Moslem vice-chancellor, certainly not264(*) ». There would be
thus a separation between the public political office-- and the religious
conviction of a private nature. But when Nicolas Sarkozy announces on November
20, 2003 out of France 2 the nomination of one « Moslem
prefect », it makes steal in glare this fragile balance. The minister
was then quickly taken again by a vast majority of the media class like by the
Head of the State, which prefers speech of « prefect resulting from
immigration265(*) ».
There are two reasons with such a drift which, although
quickly choked, has to re-appear. On the one hand, certain people tend to make
Islam an ethnic identity. For Nicolas Sarkozy indeed, « Moslem is not
a religious criterion. For me, the term nominates all the persons resulting
from Maghrebian, Turkish immigration or of Black Africa, even if they are
atheistic. Because one is Moslem as one is Jewish: in the glance of the
other266(*). «In
addition, there is a tendency in the local councillors to delegate the
questions of law and order, formerly filled by movements laic beurs, with
Moslem associations. By instrumentalisant the religion like factor of social
peace, one politicizes it and one makes credible an Islamization of the life
political French.
Nevertheless, of right-hand side like left, the majority of
the intellectuals, associative and elected persons in charge, except some
exceptions like Yazid Sabeg267(*), judge for the moment that the appointment of a
high-civil servant according to his religion is incompatible with the
republican values of equality between all the citizens. In the current state of
the things, Aïssa Dermouche is thus one « prefect »
and not one « Moslem prefect ». However the question of
positive discrimination is not definitively distinct. And if a design similar
to the affirmative action with American triumphs into same as long as
the tendency continues to define the qualifier of Moslem like an identity
including religion, culture, and ethnic origin, it will not be more completely
absurd of speaking about « Moslem top-civils servant ».
There thus was well these last years the creation of a new
posture of the politically committed Moslem intellectual. Even if this
evolution is condemned and refused by some, others begin politically by posting
from now on their Islamite publicly.
Conclusion
After a study revealed by the World in 2001, Franck
Fregosi, sociologist of Islam at the Robert-Schuman university of Strasbourg
and researcher at CNRS, draw the following conclusions :
«It was thought up to now that the social rise
almost inevitably involved a detachment of the religion. However, which reveals
this survey, it is the progressive emergence of a future Moslem elite in
France. With wrong way of a certain simplifying speech, according to which the
Moslems of France could be integrated only while renonçant into their
faith, the investigation shows that it is perfectly possible to be integrated
into the French company and respectful Moslem regulations268(*). »
Our work, which tried shown media quadruple birth of the
Moslem intellectual since about fifteen years, is perhaps a modest illustration
of this analysis. It is certainly necessary to underline the limits of such a
classification which, not only is far from tight, but to be milked in addition
period too close to us to be able to affirm that it will remain relevant in the
duration. In the same way, categorization in fields can appear brutal and
consolidates a vision probably a little machiavelic of the Moslem elite.
Although there is one « media market of the Moslem
intellectual », it should not obviously be thought that all is matter
with calculations and especially not to forget that the majority of the
intellectuals evoked previously are it, let us make their this credit, by
conviction.
It is well with the new mediatization as of 1989 of subjects
relating to directly or not Islam that journalists undertake to seek one
« Moslem opinion » on quite precise topics. As Thomas
Deltombe in connection with the Rushdie business explains it, the media world
is not prepared to address itself to this new type of speakers :
« Pressed knowledge what the «Islamic community» in France
thinks, the journalists is not worried to know if such «a community»
really exists nor to study possible contours of them269(*).» Consequently, it is
on a virtual and moving reality, holding more media construction, that rests
since his birth the Moslem intellectual who wants to be representative.
Always it is that as of its origin, media Moslem intellectual
French A for role to express itself on subjects
« Moslems », of the problems implying more or less directly
Islam. Is not this in contradiction with the vocation universalist of the
intellectual ? If he wants to remain, the Moslem intellectual will have to
thus leave what Houari Bouïssa, historian of the ideas, name it
« ghettoisation of the thought270(*) ». It would be necessary that this
intellectual figure clarifies the scientific community in fields other than
specifically Islamic. What one for example would have retained of the
philosopher protesting Paul Ricoeur, recently disappeared, if it had been
confined to treat only questions specific to Protestantism ?
But it is perhaps time to return to the interrogation caused
by the reflection of Mohammed Arkoun ahead-matter. If the Moslem intellectual
is spirit to be born as such in the French media since roughly
speaking the Rushdie business, we cannot deny that this birth is partial.
Indeed, this category of intellectual could appear because it proposed a manner
of new thought, distinct, ready to compete with a relative universalism
presumedly higher bus founded by the Occident. Thus, Mohammed Arkoun did not
hesitate at the beginning of the years 1990 to raise the controversy
violently :
« It would also be necessary that a serious debate
is established in Occident on the legitimacy of a brutal disqualification of a
whole culture, of a whole religion starting from postulates with
philosophical claim which did not undergo, in Occident even, all the tests of a
intellectual validation, or the tests of a cultural effectiveness when they are
transferred to other historical, religious and psychosocial contexts271(*). »
However what notes one if one tries to draw the assessment
from the four categories which we differentiated here ? First of all, the
first, that of the intellectual Moslem avant-gardist, are by definition a
figure partial since the individuals who make it up do not post their faith
like identity first, even less like patent of notoriety. Concerning the
category of the official intellectuals, in addition to the problems inherent in
the organic statute of intellectual, in opposition to the critical
intellectual, we saw how much it had evil to found its legitimacy.
The two other categories clarified here, respectively the
reformers and the actors of the social and political world, also pose a
problem. As we saw, the personalities which defend a too singular point of view
compared to « well-to think » Western are marginalized and
see their statute of often disputed intellectual. To gain their gallons of
Moslem intellectual, the latter are unceasingly obliged to give pledges
of republicanism, of moderation with regard to their culture presented
like dialectically opposed to that of the Occident, with the detriment of the
singularity, essential component of their existence.
The Moslem intellectual would be he thus still-born
child ? Without being prophet, that appears not very conceivable. On the
contrary, the strength and new visibility of the debates within the Moslem
community during the time going of 1989 with today mark doubtless a historical
turning. That does not prevent us from raising the limits even contradictions
of this statute. If the Moslem intellectual must be distinguished from the
Western intellectual to exist, it should not be different from it either too
much, with the risk to see itself disputing its posture of intellectual.
Contrary, with too much approaching « politically
correct », the Moslem intellectual thought can quickly be diluted in
the intellectual rest of the world. Perpetuation in the future or not of the
figure of the Moslem intellectual will actually depend on the following
essential question : France is it lends to accept the cultural relativism,
including in the intellectual field ?
Index of quoted names
Abdelkrim, Farid, 49, 57
Abderraziq, Ali, 27, 28
Abduh, Muhamad, 27, 28
Abou-Zeid, Nasr, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35
Al-Afghani, Aldine Jamal, 28
Alaoui, Fouad, 49, 55, 57, 64, 65
Al-Banna, Hassan, 27, 28, 29
Al, Tewfik, 77, 78
Al-Wahhab, Ibn Abd, 27
Amara, Fadela, 32, 81, 83, 84, 86,
Amiri, Nadia, 77, 80
Aounit, Mouloud, 75, 76, 83, 100
Arkoun, Mohammed, 3, 4, 5, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 92, 93
Babès, Leila, 62, 77
Bechari, Mohammed, 49, 65
Béjart, Maurice, 11, 12
Ben Sadia, Hamida, 81, 87
Bencheikh, Ghaleb, 43, 44
Bencheikh, Jamel-Eddine, 32
Bencheikh, Soheib, 37, 50, 58, 59, 60, 64, 73, 77
Bencheneb, Ali, 88
Benslama, Fethi, 31, 32, 36, 77, 78
Ben Mansour, Abdallah, 9, 55
Ben Mansour, Latifa, 22, 23, 24
Bentounès, Khaled, 50
Benzine, Rachid, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 42
Boubakor, Dalil, 47, 49, 52, 53, 58, 59, 64
Boubakor, If Hamza, 52
Boussouf, Abdallah, 49
Boutih, Malek, 75, 76, 79
Bouzar, Dounia, 50, 60, 65, 81
Bouziane, Abdelkader, 70
Breze, Lhaj Thami, 49, 57
Charfi, Abdelmajid, 31, 33, 36, 44
Charfi, Mohammed, 31
Chebel, Malek, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 77, 78
Chevènement, Jean-Pierre, 47, 49
Chodkiewicz, Michel, 11, 12, 13, 15, 50, 58
Daffé, Mamadou, 61
Dahmane, Abderrhamane, 53, 76, 86
Dermouche, Aïssa, 88, 89
Desire, Harlem, 68
Djaout, Tahar, 22
Djavann, Chahdortt, 24
Dib, Amar, 78
El-Ghissassi, Hakim, 44, 86
Esack, Farid, 30, 31
Fekkar-Lambiotte, Bétoule, 60, 77
Ferhati, Amo, 76, 77, 86
Filali-Ansary, Abdou, 30, 31, 44
Foda, Foda, 21
Garaudy, Roger, 11, 12, 13, 15
Geisser, Vincent, 8, 75, 78, 82, 83, 87
Geoffroy, Eric, 11, 12, 16, 50
Guenon, Rene, 13
Haddam, Tedjini, 51
Hamidullah, Mohammed, 41
Harbi, Mohamed19, 77
Herbert, Jean-Wolf, 13, 14, 15
Hiquioussen, Hassan, 74
Hussein, Mahmoud, 42
Joxe, Pierre, 4, 47, 49, 55
Kaci, Rachid, 76, 77, 79, 86
Kada, Saïda, 60, 81
Katbane, Kamel, 50
Khomeiny, Ruhollah, 4, 15, 19
Lasfar, Amar, 50
Latrèche, Mohammed, 87
Leclerc, Youssouf, 15, 49
Mahfouz, Naguib, 21, 22
Makri, Yamin, 61, 75
Meddeb, Abdelwahab, 30, 31, 32, 37, 44
Méliane, Loubna, 81, 86
Mernissi, Fatima, 30, 31, 33
Merroun, Khalil, 50
Mestiri, Mohammed, 32, 41, 66
Milcent, Thomas, 15
Monteil, Vincent, 11, 14, 15
Nasreen, Talisma, 24
Oubrou, Tareq, 62
Pasqua, Charles, 47, 52, 77
Rahman, Fazlur, 30, 32, 33
Ramadan, Tariq, 6, 28, 29, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 57, 60, 72, 73,
74, 83, 87, 88
Fox, Michel, 16, 33, 44, 77
Wrinkled, Rachid, 27, 28
Rushdie, Salman, 4, 5, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 54, 84,
91, 92, 93,
Sabeg, Yazid, 76, 89
Sahiri, Aziz, 76, 77
Saïfi, Tokia, 76, 77, 86, 88
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 46, 47, 55, 59, 60, 85, 88, 89
Seddik, Youssef, 30, 31, 36
Sifaoui, Mohammed, 22, 77
Soroush, Abdoul Karim, 30, 31, 32, 33
Talbi, Mohammed, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 43
Tazdaït, Djida, 77, 84
Vitray (of), Eva, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17
Zeghidour, Slimane, 22, 23
Zerrouky, Hassan, 22, 77
Contents
Thanks
2
Introduction
4
I. the Moslem intellectual of avant-garde
10
A) The French intellectual converted with Islam
10
1) Intellectuals before being converted.
11
2) A rather restricted media role and in
breathlessness
14
B) The intellectual avant-gardist of the Moslem
world
18
1) Construction of this media figure to the turning
of the years 1990
18
2) Evolution of this figure of the moderate Moslem
intellectual
21
II. The reforming intellectual of Islam
26
A) A new intellectual field ?
26
B) Portrait of these new reforming
intellectuals
30
1) Various courses ?
30
2) A uniform reform ?
34
C) Role of these intellectuals in the media
38
1) A prestigious but closed caste
38
2) Reformers : the solution with the
contemporary problems ?
42
III. The intellectual representing of the Islam of
France
46
A) A new place of intellectual legitimation
47
1) Short history of the installation of the Islam
of France
47
2) A complex market : the law of supply
and
48
B) The new face of organic Moslem
intelligentsia
50
1) Called into question of the prevalence of the
vice-chancellor of the Mosque of Paris.
51
2) A legitimation of the bearded ones ?
54
3) Emergence news independent personalities
58
4) Legitimation in margin, even against the
consultation
60
5) New visibility of local Islam
61
C) The widening of the role of these
intellectuals
63
IV. The leader Moslem socio-policy
67
A) The Islamic turning of the social fights
67
B) The emergence of the figure of the Moslem
combatant of the social injustices
71
1) A new figure : the leader of the
reislamisation
72
2) ex-Beurs become Moslem
75
3) « neofeminists » Moslem
80
4) Multiple figures for a binary debate
82
C) Moslems in policy : religious guarantee or
republican equality ?
85
1) The political instrumentalisation of the
associative leaders
86
2) The question of the Moslem high-civils
servant
88
Conclusion
91
Index of quoted names
95
Bibliography
98
Bibliography
I) SOURCES
A) Significant works of Moslem
intellectuals
- BENCHEIKH Ghaleb, Then, it is what Islam ? ,
Presses of the Rebirth, Paris, 2001, 105 p.
- Rachid BENZINE, new thinkers of Islam, Albin Michel,
2004, 289 p.
- CHEBEL, Expresses for an Islam from the Lights,
Hachette, 2004, 215 p.
- FILALI-ANSARY Abdou, To reform Islam, the Discovery,
2003, 284 p.
- MEDDEB Abdelwahab (discussion with Small Philippe),
Vis-a-vis Islam , Textual, Paris, 2004, 216 p.
- For Rushdie, the Discovery, 1993, 307 p.
- Tariq RAMADAN & GRESH Alain, Islam in question,
Southern Acts, 2002, 341 p.
- Tariq RAMADAN, Moslems of Occident and future of
Islam, Sindbad, 2003, 383 p.
- TALBI Mohammed, Plea for a modern Islam, Editions of
the paddle, 2004 (1ère edition : 1998), 195 p.
B) Articles of press concerning of the
intellectuals Moslems in the broad sense
1) Platforms of Moslem intellectuals
- AMARA Fadela, « Me, girl of immigrants, for the
equality and secularity », Release, 2/3/2005.
- AOUNIT Mouloud, « The damage of the
islamophobie », the Barber, 18/10/2003.
- AOUNIT Mouloud, « True challenges of
secularity », Marianne, 27/10/2003.
- AOUNIT Mouloud, « Racism, collective
wound », Release, 21/5/2004.
- ARKOUN Mohammed, « Islam and Europe : mortal
amnesia », the World, 14/12/2001.
- BEN MANSOUR Latifa, « A fatwa counters the massacres
in Algeria », the World, 12/11/1990.
- BENCHEIKH Soheib, « Secularity, all
secularity », the New Observer, 22/2/1996.
- BENCHEIKH Jamel-Eddine, « Modern Islam will be born
in France », the New Observer, 22/2/1996.
- BOUZAR Dounia, « It is easier of essentialiser
Islam », Oumma, 16/12/2003.
- EL-GHISSASSI Hakim, « Beurs or the painful training
of the realpolitik », the World, 20/2/2004.
- EL-GHISSASSI Hakim, « Yes with an occidentalized
Islam », Release, 7/9/2004.
- MAKRI Yamin, « Direction and
coherence », Oumma, 27/5/2005.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « Islam of France : let us
test ! », the World, 21/8/2000.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « To be Moslem, to be
heard », the World, 6/11/2000.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « To condemn and resist
together », the World, 30/10/2001.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « Exist there an Islamic
anti-semitism ? », the World, 23/12/2001.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « The revival will come from
Occident », the New Observer, 21/2/2002.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « Critical of (new) intellectual
Community », Oumma, 3/10/2003.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « Anti-semitism and
communautarism : abscesses to be burst », the World,
29/10/2003.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « Which double speech ? Which
debate ? », Release, 25/11/2003.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « The trap of the
communautarism », Release, 13/1/2004.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « For an open
secularity », the World, 13/10/2004.
- Tariq RAMADAN, « For a moratorium on the application
of the charia in the Moslem world », the World,
31/3/2005.
- Michel FOX, « Political Islam or Islam
religion », Release, 2/10/2001.
- RUSHDIE Salman, « In all good faith »,
Release, 8/2/1990.
- RUSHDIE Salman, « A victory and a
defeat », Release, 11/2/1993.
- RUSHDIE Salman, « The last hostage »,
the New Observer, 16/10/2003.
2) Portraits of Moslem intellectuals
- ABOU ZEID Nasr, portrait by Catherine Farhi, « The
martyr of modernity », the New Observer, 4/7/2002.
- BEJART Maurice, portrait by Rosita Bushel, « Maurice
Béjart, 50 years of childhood », the World,
27/11/2004.
- BENCHENEB Ali, portrait by Luc Bronner, « A
vice-chancellor like the others », the World, 29/1/2004.
- BENCHEIKH Soheib, portrait by Daniel Licht, « In the
name of Al and of Marianne », Release, 3/2/1998.
- BEN MANSOUR Latifa, « Felt identity »,
the World, 12/11/1990.
- BENTOUNES Khaled, portrait by Henri Tincq, « Khaled
Bentounès, «low in God» of the Sufism, the World,
4/8/2001.
- BOUBAKEUR Dalil, portrait by
Ali Laidi,
« Boubakor or the failure of moderate », the New
Observer, 26/06/2003.
- BOUZAR Dounia, portrait by Claire Chartier, « Free
Moslem woman », the Express train, 17/1/2005.
- CHEBEL Malek, portrait by Robert Maggiori, Release,
1/6/1995.
- DAFFE Mamadou, portrait by Claude Weill, « Too much
Moslem to be French », the New Observer, 20/11/1997.
- GARAUDY, portrait by Philippe Videlier, « Zones of
shade and assembled blow », The diplomatic World, June
1996.
- LATRECHE Mohammed, portrait by Thomas Calinon & Catherine
Coroller, « Latrèche, the infréquentable lawyer of the
veil », Release, 15/1/2004.
- LATRECHE Mohammed, portrait by Xavier Ternisien,
« Latrèche, the organizing disorder of the procession for the
veil », the World, 19/1/2004.
- MEDDEB Abdelwahab, portrait by Christian Jambet, «Of which
disease Islam it is struck ? », Marianne, 1/4/2002.
- MEDDEB Abdelwahab, portrait by Jean-Christophe Ploquin,
« Abdelwahhab Meddeb with the bedside of a sick
Islam », the Cross, 10/9/2002.
- MONTEIL Vincent, portrait by Nicole Zand, « Lawrence
and Monteil of Arabia », the World, 31/7/1987.
- MONTEIL Vincent, portrait by Sadek Sellam, « Vincent
Mansour Monteil (1913-2005), the last of the large French
orientalists », Oumma, 14/3/2005.
- RAMADAN, portrait of Xavier Ternisien, « Tariq
Ramadan the enigmatic one », the World, 29/9/2000.
- RAMADAN, portrait of Martine Gozlan, « The mystery
Tariq Ramadan », Marianne, 9/9/2002.
- RAMADAN, portrait by Christophe Ayad, « The language
of Aladdin », Release, 8/7/2003.
- Tariq RAMADAN, portrait by Claude Askolovitch,
« Cumbersome Mr. Ramadan », the New Observer,
9/10/2003.
- RAMADAN, portrait by Xavier Ternisien, « Tariq
Ramadan, its family, her networks, her ideology », the
World, 22/12/2003
- RAMADAN, portrait by Antoine Menusier, « Theology
with the service of a political strategy », the Barber
Magazine, 31/1/2004
- RAMADAN, portrait by Serge Raffy, « The true face of
Tariq Ramadan », the New Observer, 29/1/2004
- RAMADAN, portrait by Christophe Ayad and Olivier Bertrand,
« Cross-country preacher », Release, 5/2/2004
- RUSHDIE Salman, portrait by Marie Guichoux, « An
invisible man », Release, 20/6/1991
- RUSHDIE Salman, portrait by Josyane Savigeau, « A
banished writer of his work », the World, 20/3/1993
- SEDDIK Youssef, portrait by Catherine Bédarida,
« Youssef Seddik, Coran with open book », the
World, 2/10/2002
3) Talks of importance granted by Moslem intellectuals to
the press
- ALAOUI Fouad, discussion with Xavier Ternisien, the
World, 4/5/2002
- AMARA Fadela, discussion with Claire Chartier,
the Express
train, 11/12/2003
- AMIRI Nadia, maintenance with Undermined Kaci,
Humanity, 6/2/2004
- ARKOUN Mohammed, discussion with Catherine David, the New
Observer, 7/2/1986
- ARKOUN Mohammed, discussion with Henri Tincq, the
World, 15/3/1989
- ARKOUN Mohammed, discussion with Henri Tincq, the
World, 5/5/1992
- ARKOUN Mohammed, discussion with Jean-Christophe Ploquin and
Michel Kubler, the Cross, 1/6/1993
- ARKOUN Mohammed, discussion with
Jean-Paul
Chagnollaud,
Bassma
Kodmani-Darwish and
Abderrahim
Lamchichi, Mediterranean Junctions, autumn 1994
- ARKOUN Mohammed, discussion with Djénane
Kareh-Tager, Current events of the religions, April 2003
- BABES Leila, discussion with Djénane Kareh-Tager,
Topicality of the religions, n° 3, March 1999
- BABES Leila, discussion with Isabelle De Gaulmyn, the
Cross, 30/5/2002
- BABES, discussion with Besma Lahouri & Eric Conan, the
Express train, 18/9/2003.
- BENCHEIKH Soheib, discussion with Bernard Gorce, the
Cross, 30/1/1998
- BENCHEIKH Soheib, discussion with Henri Tincq, the
World, 9/12/1999
- BENCHEIKH Soheib, discussion with Henri Tincq, the
World, 20/11/2001
- BENTOUNES Khaled, discussion with Henri Tincq, the
World, 4/8/2001
- Rachid BENZINE, discussion with Martine de Sauto, the
Cross, 13/2/2004
- BOUBAKEUR Dalil, discussion with Michel Kubler, the
Cross, 15/4/1992
- BOUBAKEUR Dalil, discussion with Michel Kubler, the
Cross, 18/8/1994
- CHARFI Mohammed, discussion with Catherine Farhi, the New
Observer, 4/7/2002
- CHODKIEWICZ Michel, discussion with Claire Brière,
the New Observer , 7/2/1986
- HADDAM Tedjini, discussion with Henri Tincq, the
World, 24/10/1989
- MEDDEB Abdelwahab, discussion with Nicolas Truong, the
World of education, January 2004
- NASREEN Talislam, discussion with Jean-Michel Demetz, the
Express train, 17/2/1994
- Tariq RAMADAN, discussion with Bernard Gorce, the
Cross, 18/11/1995
- TALBI Mohammed, discussion with Serge Lafitte,
Writings, 3rd quarter 2004
4) Articles concerning the Moslem intellectuals by
sociological group
. Intellectuals avant-gardists
- BRIERE Claire, « The secrecy of
converted », the New Observer, 7/2/1986
- TINCQ Henri, « The business of the satanic Verses. A
bad blow for Islam in France », the World, 23/2/1989
- TINCQ Henri, « Moslems of France and the Rushdie
business », the World, 20/3/1989
- GAUDEMAR Antoine, « Salam Salman »,
Release, 7/10/1993
- PERONCEL-HUGOZ Jean-Pierre, « Intellectuals in search
of identity », the World, 20/5/1994
- TINCQ Henri, « Travel among converted with Islam
«, the World, 9/12/1999
- SALAUN Tnagui, « The pasionaria of Egyptian
feminism », the Express train, 26/7/2001
. Reforming intellectuals
- KEPEL Gilles, « «Prologs» with a
contemporary Arab thought », the World, 16/1/1998
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Islam can it be criticized like
any religion ? », the World, 23/4/2001
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Integrism, fundamentalism and
fanaticism : the flamewar », the World, 08/10/2001
- Lorraine NIGHTINGALE, « Coran,
opens ! », the World, 1/12/2001
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Coran in
question », the World, 7/9/2001
- MAGGIORI Robert, « Broken down Freud of
Coran », Release, 17/10/2002
- SAUTO Martine, « Ways of a modern
Islam », the Cross, 20/2/2003
- KAREH-TAGER Djénane, « Islam according to
September 11 », Current events of the religions, April
2003
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Beyond the opposition between
integrist and moderate », the World, 1/7/2003
- File « The renovating ones of Islam »,
The World of the religions, September-October 2003
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Which third way between official
Islam and Islamism ? », the World, 14/11/2003
- MENUSIER Antoine, « New thinkers and old
critics », the Barber Magazine, 31/1/2004
- TINCQ Henri, « One « Reform » of
Islam is possible », the World, 30/4/2004
. Organic intellectuals
- ETIENNE Bruno, « For a French Islam »,
the Express train, 12/5/1989
- BOURDARIAS Jean, « Islam in France : the time of
the dialog », the Barber, 25/3/1990
- MALAURIE Guillaume, « French Islam : the bearded
ones make their way », The Event of Thursday, 22/4/1993
- TINCQ Henri, a fragmented community which has evil to organize
itself, 13/10/1994
- KUBLER Round loaf, « The improbable unit of the
Moslems of France », the Cross, 27/12/1994
- WEILL Claude, « What wants the
Moslems », the New Observer, 22/2/1996
- GORCE Bernard, « Islam and Republic are challenged
and sought », the Cross, 8/12/1999
- FREGOSI Franck, « Islam of in top against Islam of in
bottom », the Barber, 31/10/2002
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Inquire into these Moslems who
worry the Islam of France », the World, 13/12/2002
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Sarkozy and the Islam of
France », the World, 16/1/2003
- TRIBALAT Michele, « The French Council of the Moslem
worship, for what to make ? », the Cross, 28/3/2003
- ETIENNE Bruno, « For one
« gallicanisation » of Islam », the
Cross, 28/3/2003
- LAHOURI Besma & CONAN Eric, « Secularity
vis-a-vis Islam », the Express train, 18/9/2003
- ASKOLOVITCH Claude, « Islam and Republic: weddings of
August », the New Observer, 2/9/2004
- DANIEL Jean, « The message of French
Islam », the New Observer, 2/9/2004
- THILAY Boris & JACQUELINE Rémy, «the hidden
face of the UOIF », the Express train, 2/5/2005
.Leaders sociopolitic
- FINKIELKRAUT Alain, « In connection with the
antiracism », the World, 14/11/1989
- MALAURIE Guillaume Malaurie & STEHLI Jean-Sebastien,
« France, ground of Islam », the Express train,
12/5/1989
- LICHT Daniel « Coran and the voter registration
card », Release, 22/12/2001
- CHAMBON Frederic, « The identity search of these
young Lyoneses turned towards Islam », the World,
12/2/2003
- TERNISIEN Xavier & BRONNER Luc, « The bad debate
of the communautarism », the World, 12/4/2003
- MMLF, «the Call of May », the Barber,
12/5/2003
- TERNISIEN Xavier, « Moslem elites in the search of a
laic representation », the World, 21/5/2003
- THIOLAY Boris, « Twenty years after the Walk of the
beurs », the Express train, 20/11/2003
- AESCHIMANN Eric, « Positive discrimination, an
alternative ? », Release, 4/12/2003
- The VALIANT Luc, « Anti-roots »,
Release, 8/12/2003
- BEZAT Jean-Michel, « Sarkozy, the Moslem prefect and
the philosopher », the World, 18/12/2003
- Tewfik WENT, « To find the force of an alive
secularity », Release, 16/2/2004
- DIVIDED INTO VOLUMES Ludovic, « New challenges of the
MRAP », Humanity, 6/12/2004
- CHARTIER Claire, « Laic Moslems but »,
the Express train, 13/12/2004.
- KESSOUS Moustapha, « Long drift of
Vénissieux », the World, 14/1/2005
- « We are the natives of the
Republic ! », Oumma, 18/1/2005
- DANIEL Jean, « Damnés of the
Republic », the New Observer, 10/3/2005
II) STUDIES
A) STUDIES ON ISLAM
1) On Islam in general
- Arts & Life, except series,
« Islam », 1992, 127 p.
- LEWIS Bernard & SCHNAPPER Domenica (to dir.), Moslems
in Europe, Southern Acts, 1992, 222 p.
- TERNISIEN Xavier, France of the mosques, Albin Michel,
2004 (1ère edition : 2002), 303 p.
- ZARKA Yves-Charles (to dir.), Quoted, out of the
ordinary, PUF, 2004, 733 p.
2) On the mediatization of Islam
- DELTOMBE Thomas, « Islam with the mirror of
television », The Diplomatic World, March 2004
- GEISSER Vincent, the news islamophobie, the Discovery,
2003, 122 p.
3) On various types of Moslem intellectuals
- AVON Domenica, « An answer it «Islam
reformist» of Tariq Ramadan, Nunc, Editions of Corlevour, Clichy,
October 2003
- CHERQAOUI Rocher, From one faith to another :
conversions with Islam into Occident, Threshold, 1986, 215 p.
- FOUREST Caroline, Tariq Brother. Speech, strategy and
method from Tariq Ramadan, Grasset, 2004, 450 p.
- JUHEM Philippe, S.O.S-Racism, history of a mobilization
« apolitical ». Contribution to an analysis of the
transformations of the political representations after 1981, Thesis of
political science, University Paris X (to dir. Bernard Lacroix), 1998, 725
p.
- RENE Emilie, « The Rushdie business. World protest
and community of interpretation », Books of the CERI,
1997
- ZEMOURI Aziz, Is necessary it to make conceal Tariq
Ramadan ? , The Archipelago, Paris, 2005, 383 p.
B) ON THE INTELLECTUALS IN GENERAL
- LEMIEUX Emmanuel, intellectual Capacity, new networks,
Denoël, 2003, 756 p.
- ORY Pascal & SIRINELLI Jean-François,
intellectuals in France. Dreyfus business with us days , Perrin, 2004
(1ère edition : 1987), 435 p.
* 1 Maintenance with
Mohammed Arkoun with
Jean-Paul
Chagnollaud,
Bassma
Kodmani-Darwish and
Abderrahim
Lamchichi, « The Islamic fact: «Towards a new space of
intelligibility» », Mediterranean Junctions,
autumn 1994.
* 2 Salman Rushdie,
Satanic Verses (translated from English), Christian Bourgeois, 1989, 700
p.
* 3 Maintenance of Mohammed
Arkoun with Henri Tincq, the World, 15/3/1989.
* 4 Pascal Ory &
Jean-François Sirinelli, intellectuals in France. Dreyfus business
with us days, Perrin, 2004 (1ère edition : 1987), pp. 8-9.
* 5 Cf Emmanuel
Lemieux, intellectual Capacity, new networks, Denoël, 2003, 756
p.
* 6 Although the media vision of
Islam is overall unilateral, certain journalists of weight go regularly to
counter-current of the majority opinion. For example, in spite of its media
lynching, Tariq Ramadan found a support of size in the person of Xavier
Ternisien, journalist at the heading « Religion » of
the World.
* 7 Of salaf =
« ancestor ».
* 8 Samuel Huntington, the
Shock of Civilizations (translated from English), Odile Jacob, 1997,
402 p.
* 9 Contrary, there are for
example two distinct concepts to indicate the Christian religion (Christianity)
and Christian civilization (Christendom).
* 10 Vincent Geisser, the
Islamophobie News, the Discovery, 2003, p. 29.
* 11 Sadek Sellam, «
Vincent Mansour Monteil (1913-2005), the last of the large French
orientalists », Oumma, 14/3/2005.
* 12 Nicole Zand, «
Lawrence and Monteil of Arabia », the World, 31/7/1987.
* 13 Vincent Monteil,
Lawrence of Arabia, the fatal greyhound (1888-1935), Hatchet, 1987, 332 p.
* 14 Rosita Bushel,
« Maurice Béjart, 50 years of childhood », the
World, 27/11/2004.
* 15 Claire Brière,
« One converted against the integrist ones », the New
Observer, 7/2/1986.
* 16 Cherqaoui rock, From
one faith to another : conversions with Islam into Occident,
Threshold, 1986, p. 20.
* 17 Claire Brière,
« One converted against the integrist ones », COp
cit.
* 18 Michel Chodkiewicz,
the seal of the saints, prophecy and holiness in the doctrines from Ibn
Arabi, Gallimard, 1986, 231 p.
* 19 Henri Tincq, «
The Al ways are impenetrable », the World, 15/1/1990.
* 20 It is the auteure in
particular of an Anthology of the Sufism, (Albin Michel), 360 p.
* 21 Cherqaoui rock,
From one faith to another : conversions with Islam into
Occident, COp cit., p. 189.
* 22 Red-headed Vincent,
« Verses, answer to Vincent Mansour Monteil », the
World, 5/4/1989.
* 23 Cf Herbert
Jean-Wolf, « The mobilizing force of a spirituality
», The Diplomatic World, September 1984.
* 24 Vincent Monteil,
« Biblical arguments, verses », the World,
23/3/1989.
* 25 Henri Tincq, «
The Al ways are impenetrable », the World, 15/1/1990.
* 26 Claire Brière,
« One converted against the integrist ones », COp
cit.
* 27 Michel Fox, «
Political Islam or Islam religion », Release, 2/10/2001.
* 28 Ibid
* 29 Cf left II.
* 30 Henri Tincq, «
Travel among converted with Islam «, the World, 8/12/1999.
* 31 Claire
Brière., « The secrecy of converted »,
the New Observer, 7/2/1986.
* 32 Eva de Vitray-Meyerovitch
(Discussions with Rachel and Jean-Pierre Cartier), Islam, the other
face, Albin Michel, 1995 (1ère edition : 1991), p. 11.
* 33 Xavier Ternisien,
France of the mosques, Albin Michel, 2002, p194.
* 34 Claire Brière,
« One converted against the integrist ones », COp
cit.
* 35 Henri Tincq, «
Travel among converted with Islam «, COp cit.
* 36 As illustration, a drawing
of Plantu, the Express train, 16/8/1993, puts in scene crowd attending
a prayer. Among them, only one does not request and reads the newspaper.
« I see of them one which thinks ! «, a monk exclaims by
pointing of an index synonymous with fatwa the intellectual
non-believer.
* 37 Chantal of Cap,
« The large disintegrator », the New Observer,
23/3/1989.
* 38 Anonymous article,
«Satanic Verses. The intellectuals mobilize themselves in France and
abroad », the World, 24/2/1989.
* 39 Emilie Rene, «
The Rushdie business. World protest and community of interpretation
», Books of the CERI, 1997.
* 40 Antoine de Gaudemar,
« Salam Salman », Release, 7/10/1993.
* 41 = «
scientists », term appointing the guaranteeing theologists of the
Islamic tradition in Islam sunnite.
* 42 Editors, «
Preface », in For Rushdie, the Discovery, 1993, pp. 11-12.
* 43 Salman Rushdie,
« In all good faith », Release, 8/2/1990.
* 44 Marie Guichoux,
« An invisible man », Release, 20/6/1991.
* 45 Domenica Dhombres,
« The writer Salman Rushdie will go soon to Egypt »,
the World, 21/1/1992.
* 46 Arnold Wesker, quoted by
Marie Guichoux, « An invisible man », Release,
20/6/1991.
* 47 Naguib Mahfouz, trad
Jean-Patrick Guillaume, Wire of Médina, Southern Acts, 1999,
528 p.
* 48 Jean-Pierre
Péroncel-Hugoz, « Intellectuals in search of identity
», the World, 20/5/1994.
* 49 Mohammed Sifaoui, sick
France of Islamism, Seek-Midday, 2002, 240 p.
* 50 Id., Letter
with islamist of France and Navarre, Seek-Midday, 2004, 120 p.
* 51 Id., My
brothers assassins, Seek-Midday, 2003, 176 p.
* 52 Id., On the
traces from Bin Laden, Seek-Midday, 2004, 192 p.
* 53 Slimane Zeghidour, the
Veil and the Banner, Hatchet, 1990, 156 p.
* 54 Hassan Zerrouky,
islamist nebula, Number 1, 2002, 372 p.
* 55 Latifa Ben Mansour,
lies of integrist, Rock, 2004, 262 p.
* 56 Id., Brothers
Moslem, wild brothers, Ramsay, 2002, 266 p.
* 57 Andre Laurens,
« Felt identity », the World, 12/11/1990.
* 58 Forum with Slimane
Zeghidour of the 17/9/2004, available on the site nouvelobs.com.
* 59 Maintenance Besma Lahouri
& Eric Conan with Latifa Ben Mansour, «well lived Islam is serene,
peaceful, by no means aggressive», the Express train, 18/9/2003.
* 60 Latifa Ben Mansour,
lies of integrist, COp cit., pp. 11-12.
* 61 Talisma Nasreen,
« Atheist and layman, like Voltaire », the World
2, 26/2/2005.
* 62 Chahdortt Djavann,
« Secularity, guarantor of the national unit », the
Barber, 6/1/2004.
* 63 Ali Abderraziq
The Islam and bases of the capacity (translated from Arabic), the
Discovery, 1994 (1ère edition : 1925 ), 177 p.
* 64 Rachid Benzine, new
thinkers of Islam, Albin Michel, 2004, p. 50.
* 65 = «
rebirth ».
* 66 = «
revolution ».
* 67 Cf Dried up
Ramadan, With the sources of the Moslem revival. From Al-Afghani with
Hassan Al-Banna, one century of Islamic reformism, Bayard, 1998, 479 p.
* 68 Is Aziz Zemmouri,
Necessary to make conceal Tariq Ramadan? , The Archipelago, Paris, 2005,
pp. 291-297.
* 69 Tariq Ramadan,
« To be Moslem, to be heard », the World,
5/11/2000.
* 70 This denomination comes
from the title of the work of Rachid Benzine, the new thinkers of Islam,
op.cit. , a book which presents the majority of the Moslem intellectuals
accepted like reformers by the French press.
* 71 Rachid Benzine,
« Reflection for an Islam of XXIe century », intervention
with the Meetings of Tangier, the 23 to February 27, 2005, diffused on France
Culture the 15/8/2005.
* 72 Rachid Benzine, new
thinkers of Islam, Albin Michel, 2004, p. 215.
* 73 Among these intellectuals
of the shade, we can inter alia quoting the Tunisian linguist Moncef
Benabdeljalil, the Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi, the Indian thinker
Asghar Ali Engineer, Malaysian Amina Wadud, the South-African Imam Ebrahim
Moosa, or the Sudanese lawyer Abdullahi Year-Na' im.
* 74 Maintenance with Amara
Bamba with Mohammed Mestiri, Saphirnet, 19/5/2003.
* 75 Jamel Eddine Bencheikh,
« Modern Islam will be born in France », the New
Observer, 22/2/1996.
* 76 Maintenance with Henri
Tincq with Mohammed Arkoun, the World, 5/5/1992.
* 77 Malek Chebel,
Expresses for an Islam of the Lights, Hachette, 2004, p. 19.
* 78 Nasr Abou-Zeid,
Criticizes religious speech, Actes Southern, 1999, 220 p.
* 79 Fatima Mernissi, the
political Harem, Albin Michel, 1987, 293 p.
* 80 Catherine Simon,
« The State and Islam under the wing of the censure
», the World, 18/10/1996.
* 81 = «
specialist in jurisprudence ».
* 82 Mohammed Talbi, Plea
for a modern Islam, Editions of the Paddle, 2004 (1ère
edition : 1998), p105.
* 83 Ibid, p75.
* 84 Rachid Benzine,
« Research orientations », The World of the
Religions, September-October 2003
* 85 = « effort of
interpretation ».
* 86 Mohammed Talbi, Plea
for a modern Islam, op.cit., p106.
* 87 Rachid Benzine,
« An Islamic modernity », in the New Observer, out of
the ordinary, « New thinkers of Islam », April/May
2004.
* 88 Rachid Benzine, new
thinkers of Islam, Albin Michel, 2004, p. 181.
* 89 = «
inimitability of the revealed Book ».
* 90 Maintenance of Serge
Lafitte with Mohammed Talbi, Writings, July 2004.
* 91 Mohammed Arkoun,
« An Islam of the Lights », in the New Observer, out
of the ordinary, « New thinkers of Islam »,
April/May 2004.
* 92 Fethi Benslama,
the psychoanalysis the Islam proof, Flammarion, 2004, 334 p.
* 93 Malek Chebel, the
Subject in Islam, Threshold, 2002, 294 p.
* 94 Id.,
Expresses for an Islam of the Lights, Hachette, 2004, p 29-36.
* 95 Youssef Seddik, We
never read Coran, the Paddle, 2004, 298 p.
* 96 Abdelmajid Charfi,
Islam between the message and the history (translated from Arabic), Albin
Michel, 2004, 230 p.
* 97 Edgar Weber and Kader
Jelali, Islam in France or holy peace, Harmattan, 1992, p. 180.
* 98 Mohammed Arkoun,
« An Islam of the lights », in the New Observer, out
of the ordinary, op.cit.
* 99 Antoine Menusier,
« New thinkers and old critics », the Barber
Magazine, 31/1/2004.
* 100 Guy Sorman, «
Coran and poverty in division », the Barber, 29/9/2001.
* 101 Henri Tincq,
« A «reform» in Islam is possible », the
World, 30/4/2004.
* 102 Qualifier employed
by the political economist Gilles Kepel to indicate Nasr Abou Zeid, quoted by
Ursula Gauthier, « Islam counters modernity ?
», the New Observer, 11/9/2003.
* 103 Maintenance with
Patricia Briel with Abdelwahab Meddeb, Time, 20/3/2004.
* 104 Bernard Gorce,
« Discussion with Soheib Bencheikh », the Cross,
30/1/1998.
* 105 The New Observer,
out of the ordinary, op.cit.
* 106 « The
renovating ones of Islam », The World of the religions,
September-October 2003.
* 107 Antoine Menusier,
« New thinkers and old critics », op.cit.
* 108 Is Aziz Zemmouri,
Necessary to make conceal Tariq Ramadan? , The Archipelago, Paris, 2005,
p. 245.
* 109 Tariq Ramadan,
« The revival will come from Occident », the New
Observer, 21/2/2002.
* 110 Claude-François
Julien, « The business Ramadan », the New
Observer, 22/2/1996.
* 111 Christophe Ayad,
« The language of Aladdin », Release, 8/7/2003.
* 112 Serge Raffy,
« The true face of Tariq Ramadan », the New
Observer, 29/1/2004.
* 113 Josette Combined &
Claude Weill, « Islam : the time of self-criticism
», the New Observer, 4/10/2001.
* 114 Claude Askolovitch,
«encumbering It Mr. Ramadan », the New Observer,
9/10/2003.
* 115 Serge Raffy,
« The true face of Tariq Ramadan », COp cit.
* 116 Ibid
* 117 Cf Aziz
Zemmouri, Is necessary it to make conceal Tariq Ramadan, op.cit., p
143 : Tariq Ramadan itself finds « legitimate » to
see itself opposing one « critical reading » with which
it is « in dissension », referring to a rare answer
« on the bottom » which was opposite to him :
Domenica Avon, « An answer it «Islam reformist» of
Tariq Ramadan, Nunc, Editions of Corlevour, Clichy, October 2003.
* 118 Remi Barroux and Xavier
Ternisien, « Tariq Ramadan, disputed intellectual, in one day old
the high-speed motorboat », The World, 16/11/2003.
* 119 Alexandre Adler,
« Epistle with Tariq Ramadan », the Barber,
16/10/2003.
* 120 Bernard Kouchner on RTL,
brought back on nouvelobs.com, 31/10/2003.
* 121 Esther Benbassa,
« Tariq Ramadan and Islam « slackness » of
Turkey », the World, 20/11/2003.
* 122 Caroline Fourest,
Tariq Brother. Speech, strategy and method of Tariq Ramadan, Grasset,
2004, pp. 28-29.
* 123Ibid, p. 66
* 124 Bernard Henry Levy,
« The other face of Tariq Ramadan », the World,
1/11/2003.
* 125 Martine Gozlan,
« The mystery Tariq Ramadan », Marianne,
9/9/2002.
* 126 Antoine Menuisier,
« Theology with the service of a political strategy
», the Barber Magazine, 31/1/2004
* 127 Xavier Ternisien,
« Tariq Ramadan, its family, her networks, her ideology
», the World, 23/12/2003.
* 128 Id.,
« Tariq Ramadan, the enigmatic one », the World,
29/9/2000.
* 129 Pascal Galinier,
« De Marx with Mahomet... », the World,
2/3/2005.
* 130 Rachid Benzine,
« Research orientations », The World of the
Religions, September-October 2003
* 131
Catherine Farhi, « To see
Coran with the eyes of XXIe century », the New Observer,
4/7/2002.
* 132 Josette Combined,
« Islam : the time of self-criticism », the New
Observer, 4/10/2001.
* 133 Mohammed Talbi, Plea
for a modern Islam, Editions of the Paddle, 2004 (1ère
edition : 1998), p73.
* 134 Cf Ghaleb
Bencheikh, Then, it is what Islam ? , Presses of the Rebirth,
Paris, 2001, 105 p.
* 135 Gilles Kepel,
« «Prologs» with a contemporary Arab thought
», the World, 16/1/1998.
* 136 Maintenance with Henri
Tincq with Olivier Roy, in the World of the religions, September 2003.
* 137 Jean-Louis Schlegel,
« The anti-Islamic fable », Otherwise, December
1987.
* 138 Xavier Ternisien,
« Sarkozy and the Islam of France », the World,
16/1/2003.
* 139 Michel Kubler,
« Fifteen wise for an Islam in France », the
Cross, 20/3/1990.
* 140 Maintenance with
Henri Tincq with Pierre Joxe, the World, 17/3/1990.
* 141 Xavier Ternisien,
«Agreement on the composition of the future Council of the Moslem
Worship », the World, 21/12/2002.
* 142 Michel Kubler,
« A disputed charter of the Moslem worship », the
Cross, 13/12/1994.
* 143 Bernard Gorce,
« Islam and Republic are challenged and sought », the
Cross, 8/12/1999.
* 144Id,
« Al word for a modern world », the Cross,
8/1/1995.
* 145 Id,
« Dalil Boubaker in shift for Islam », the
Cross, 5/3/1997.
* 146 The word is here to
hear with the purely etymological direction. Built starting from the Greek
phobos (= « fear »), it indicates more one fear of
Islam that a true reasoned hatred.
* 147 Xavier Ternisien,
« Moslems of France, between identity assertion and concerns
», the World, 13/5/2002.
* 148 Michel Kubler,
« «Good» Moslems of Charles Pasqua », the
Cross, 12/1/1995.
* 149 Jean Bourdarias,
« Islam in France : the time of the dialog »,
the Barber, 25/3/1990.
* 150 = «
religious goods ».
* 151 Henri Tincq,
« Seventy years of controversies », the World,
8/2/1992.
* 152 Michel Kubler,
« Dr. Boubakeur with the bedside of the mosque », the
Cross, 14/4/1992.
* 153 Franck Fregosi,
« Islam of in top against Islam of in bottom », the
Barber, 31/10/2002.
* 154 Ali Laïdi,
« Boubakor or the failure of moderate », New
Observer, 26/6/2003.
* 155 Maintenance granted
to the newspaper 20 minutes, brought back by Xavier Ternisien,
« A maintenance on the Islam granted by Dalil Boubaker causes a
general outcry among Moslems », the World, 23/10/2002.
* 156 Farid Aichoune &
Etchegoin Marie-France, « Battle for a minaret », the
New Observer, 21/03/1989.
* 157 Vincent Hugeux,
« Stakes of a sentence », the Cross, 1/3/1989.
* 158 Guillaume Malaurie,
« The bearded ones make their way », The Event of
Thursday, 22/4/1993.
* 159 Cf Xavier
Ternisien, « Inquire into these Moslems who worry the Islam of
France », the World, 13/2/2002.
* 160 Xavier Ternisien,
« Sarkozy and the Islam of France », the World,
16/1/2003.
* 161 Jean-Pierre Elkabbach
joins together on June 13, 2004 on Europe1 Roger Cuckierman and Fouad Alaoui,
which explains why « the anti-semitism is condemnable by Islam and
the Moslems ».
* 162 Claude Askolovitch,
« Jews and Moslems join again the dialog », the New
Observer, 16/9/2004.
* 163 Xavier Ternisien,
« To Le Bourget, the Moslems gave signs of union and
moderation », the World, 29/3/2005.
* 164 Jean Daniel,
« The message of French Islam », the New
Observer, 2/9/2004.
* 165Claude Askolovitch,
« Islam and Republic, weddings of August », the New
Observer, 2/9/2004.
* 166 Gilbert Charles,
Claire Chartier, Vincent Hugeux, Besma Lahouri, Alain Louyot, Eric Furrier,
Jean-Marie Pontaut & Delphine Saubaber, « Lessons of a
test », the Express train, 6/9/2004.
* 167 Fiametta Venner,
tender offers on the Islam of France, ambitions secret of the UOIF,
Calmann-Levy, 2004, 241 p.
* 168 Claude Askolovitch,
« Islam and Republic, weddings of August », COp
cit.
* 169 Cf article
not signed, « The UOIF aims at reinforcing the communautarism
in France », the Barber, 17/6/2003.
* 170 Rémy
Jacqueline & Boris Thiolay, « The hidden face of the UOIF
», the Express train, 2/5/2005.
* 171 Besma Lahoury &
Boris Thiolay, « Money of Islam in France », the
Express train, 21/11/2002.
* 172 Xavier Ternisien,
« The annual Meeting of the Moslems of France opens on bottom of
discord », the World, 26/3/2005.
* 173 Portrait of Soheib
Bencheikh by AFP, 4/5/2002.
* 174Maintenance with Henri
Tincq with Soheib Bencheikh, the World, 20/11/2001.
* 175 Josette Combined,
« The true face of French Islam », the New
Observer, 21/2/2002.
* 176 Xavier Ternisien,
« Moslem personalities denounce the way in which Nicolas Sarkozy
organizes the Islam of France », the World, 12/12/2002.
* 177 Jean-Marie
Guénois, « French Islam remains divided », the
Cross, 12/12/2002.
* 178 Elie Marshal,
« A center of studies of Islam in gestation », the
Barber, 21/5/1998.
* 179 Maintenance with
Delphine Saubaber with Soheib Bencheikh, the Express train, 9/4/1998.
* 180 Daniel Licht,
« In the name of Al and of Marianne », Release,
3/2/1998.
* 181 Franck Fregosi,
« Which organization of Islam in the Republic :
institutionalization and/or instrumentalisation ? », in (dir.
Yves-Charles Zarka), Quoted, out of the ordinary,
« Islam in France », PUF, 2004, pp. 101-105.
* 182 Anonymous article,
« Bétoule Fekkar-Lambiotte announced its resignation of the
Consultation on the Moslem worship », the World,
9/2/2003.
* 183 Xavier Ternisien,
« Dounia Bouzar, Moslem woman of France », the
World, 28/1/2005.
* 184 It is indeed one of
rare the intellectual recognized Moslem women as such who refuse for example to
stigmatize the port with the veil (cf Dounia Bouzar & Saïda
Kada, One veiled, the other not, Albin Michel, 2003, 200 p.), or of
diaboliser Tariq Ramadan (cf Dounia Bouzar, the Islam of the
suburbs, Syros, Paris, 2001, 181 p.).
* 185 Maintenance with
Xavier Ternisien with Yamin Makri, the World, 22/12/2002.
* 186 Cf left IV.
Just like these « young Moslems », we will see that
« laic Moslems » will be useful themselves of a anti-CFCM
speech to create a place media.
* 187 Josette Combined,
« The true face of French Islam », the New
Observer, 21/2/2002.
* 188 Claude Weill,
« Too much Moslem to be French », the New
Observer, 20/11/1997.
* 189 = « ground
not-Moslem woman ».
* 190 Leila
Babès, Al Law, law of the men, Albin Michel, 2002, 360 p.
* 191 Maintenance with
Islabelle de Gaulmyn with Leila Babès, the Cross, 30/5/2002.
* 192 Marion
Festraëts, « The sociologist and the monk », the
Express train, 16/5/2002.
* 193 Official statement of
the 5/11/2003 CFCM.
* 194 Michel Kubler,
« To raise the misunderstanding islamo-French », the
Cross, 15/4/1992.
* 195 Catherine Coroller,
« Secularity : the hardly buckled speech of the UOIF
», Release, 11/10/2003.
* 196 Bernard Jouanno, Martine
de Sauto and Nicolas Senèze, « The veil links Christian and
Moslem but divides the Jewish community », the Cross,
28/11/2003.
* 197 Josette Combined
& Carole Barjon, « Veil : a law, but which ?
», the New Observer, 20/11/2003.
* 198 Xavier Ternisien,
« Pressed by the attacks, the Moslems prepare to elect their
representatives », the World, 13/10/2001.
* 199 Xavier
Ternisien., « The Moslem representatives call with
«calms» and «dignity» », the World,
22/3/2003.
* 200 Cf Xavier
Ternisien, « The UOIF is sulky the French Council of the Moslem
worship », the World, 10/5/2005.
* 201 Claire Chartier,
« Free Moslem woman », the Express train,
17/1/2005.
* 202 Only two members of
CFCM belong to this « committee the wise ones ».
* 203 Cf in
particular Antoine Sfeir, « To be Maghrebian in France »,
in, Books of the East, 3rd quarter 2003, which affirms that the
integration of the Maghrebian community, which counts nearly 800.000 senior
executive, function better than it claim the majority of the speeches
« victimisants ». Cf also the study of Sylvain
Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, Report/ratio with the policy of the French
resulting from immigration, June 2005, available on
http://www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr/publications/enquetes/rapp_fi.pdf,
which denies the existence of a phenomenon of reislamisation at the immigrant
populations.
* 204 Philippe Juhem,
S.O.S-Racism, history of a mobilization « apolitical ».
Contribution to an analysis of the transformations of the political
representations after 1981, Thesis of political science, University Paris
X (to dir. Bernard Lacroix), 1998, p. 51.
* 205 It had taken part in
« brain-pals », structure of sponsorship of
association.
* 206 Bertrand Legendre,
« Postmodern racism », the World, 12/3/1993.
* 207 Term borrowed from Jean
Daniel, « Damnés of the Republic », the New
Observer, 10/3/2005.
* 208 Anne Vigerie & Anne
Zelensky, ««Laïcardes», since feminists »,
the World, 30/5/2003.
* 209 See in particular
Mustapha Kessous, « Long drift of Vénissieux
», the World, 14/1/2005.
* 210 Jacques Giraddon,
Vincent Hugeux & Sylviane Stein, « The Islamist ones
», the Express train, 29/4/1993.
* 211 Hanane Harrath,
« Moslems and citizens like the others », in the New
Observer, out of the ordinary, « New thinkers of Islam
», April/May 2004.
* 212 Luc Bronner & Xavier
Ternisien, « The bad debate of the communautarism »,
the World, 12/4/2003.
* 213 Cynthia Fleury &
Emmanuel Lemieux, « The infiltration of Tariq Ramadan
», Release, 19/11/2003.
* 214 Tariq Ramadan,
« For an open secularity », the World,
13/10/2004.
* 215 Soheib Bencheikh,
« Preface », in Lionel Favrot, Tariq revealed
Ramadan, Editions Lyon Mag', 2003, p. 41.
* 216 http://www.oumma.com.
* 217 Tariq Ramadan,
« Critical of (new) intellectual Community »,
Oumma, 3/10/2003.
* 218 Cf
Cécilia Gabizon, « The preacher high-speed motorboat of the
suburbs professes a virulent anti-semitism », the Barber,
28/10/2004.
* 219 Cf Xavier
Ternisien, « Associations of young Moslems take their distances with
Tariq Ramadan », the World, 24/5/2005.
* 220 Vincent Geisser, the
Islamophobie News, the Discovery, 2003, p. 102.
* 221 « Claude Imbert the islamophobe »,
press release of the MRAP, October 24, 2003.
* 222 Jacqueline Remy,
« Mrap skids », the Express train, 24/1/2005.
* 223 Claire Chartier,
« Laic Moslems but », the Express train,
13/12/2004.
* 224 Dispatch AFP,
« Pro-veil counters pro-law: «silent majority» of the
Moslems courted », 19/1/2004.
* 225 MMLF, «the Call of
May », the Barber, 12/5/2003 : text signed inter alia
by Nadia Amiri, Leila Babès, Soheib Bencheikh, Malek Chebel,
Bétoule Fekkar-Lambiotte, Rachid Kaci, Michel Fox, Aziz Sahiri, Mohammed
Sifaoui, Djida Tazdait.
* 226 Tewfik Al, «
To find the force of an alive secularity », Release,
16/2/2004 : text signed inter alia by Nadi Amiri, Jamel Eddine Bencheikh,
Fethi Benslama, Mohammed Harbi, Kébir Jbil, Michel Fox, Hassan Zerrouky.
* 227 Tewfik Al, quoted by
Claire Chartier, « Laic Moslems but », the Express
train, 13/12/2004.
* 228 Cf left II.
* 229 Maintenance with Xavier
Ternisien with Vincent Geisser, the World, T21/5/2003.
* 230 Xavier Ternisien,
« Moslem elites in the search of a laic representation
», the World, 21/5/2003.
* 231 Cf Gilbert
Charles, Claire Chartier, Vincent Hugeux, Besma Lahouri, Alain Louyot, Eric
Furrier, Jean-Marie Pontaut, Delphine Saubaber, « Lessons of a
test », the Express train, 6/9/2004.
* 232 Eric Conan and Besma
Lahouri, « Secularity vis-a-vis Islam », the Express
train, 18/9/2003.
* 233 Hanane Harrath,
« Moslems and citizens like the others », in the New
Observer out of the ordinary, « New thinkers of Islam
», April-May 2004.
* 234 Cf Laurent
Mucchielli, the scandal of « revolving », The
Discovery, 2005, which explains how new feminist movements benefitted from the
purely media construction of a wave of collective rapes.
* 235 « The Call
for a new feminist combat », available on the site of NPNS :
http://www.niputesnisoumises.com.
* 236 Fadela Amara quoted by
Jean-Pierre Thibaudat, « Veil : undulations around a law
», Release, 8/12/2003.
* 237 Fadela Amara &
Sylvia Zappi, Neither whores, nor subjected , The Discovery,
2003, 172 p.
* 238 Cf
Stéphanie Hammer, « Movements of mood », the
Point, 2/1/2004.
* 239 Saida Kada &
Dounia Bouzar, One veiled, the other not, Albin Michel, 2003, 216 p.
* 240 Dounia Bouzar,
« It is easier of essentialiser Islam », Oumma,
16/12/2003.
* 241 Besma Lahouri & Eric
Conan, « Secularity vis-a-vis Islam », the Express
train, 18/9/2003.
* 242 Vincent Geisser, the
Islamophobie News, the Discovery, 2003, pp. 95-112.
* 243 MMLF, «the Call of
May », the Barber, 12/5/2003 .
* 244 Mouloud Aounit,
« True challenges of secularity », Marianne,
27/10/2003.
* 245 Maintenance with Amara
Bamba with Vincent Geisser, Saphirnet, 5/1/2004.
* 246 Mouloud Aounit,
« Racism, collective wound », Release,
21/5/2004.
* 247 Claude Askolovich,
« Anti-semitism : the Palestinian pretext »,
the New Observer, 9/6/2004.
* 248 Tariq Ramadan,
« Exist there an Islamic anti-semitism ? », the
World, 24/12/2001.
* 249 Tariq Ramadan,
« Critical of (new) intellectual Community », COp
cit.
* 250 Id.,
« Exist there an Islamic anti-semitism ? », COp
cit.
* 251 « We
are the natives of the Republic ! », Oumma,
18/1/2005.
* 252 Fadela Amara,
« Me, girl of immigrants, for the equality and secularity
», Release, 2/3/2005.
* 253 Maintenance with
Sylviane Stein with Djida Tazdaït, the Express train, 27/10/1989.
* 254 Gilbert Charles &
Besma Lahouri, « Truths figures of Islam in France »,
the Express train, 4/12/2003.
* 255 Cf once again
study of Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, Report/ratio with policy of
French resulting from immigration, COp cit., which shows that
there exists well, contrary to the generally accepted ideas, a process of
« exit of the religion » at the French Moslems,
phenomenon comparable with that observed in other religious communities of the
Hexagon.
* 256 Robert Plate,
« The elected officials beurs blow their first candle
», the World, 21/3/1990.
* 257 Cf Daniel
Licht, « Coran and the voter registration card »,
Release, 22/12/2001.
* 258 Vincent Geisser, the
Islamophobie News, the Discovery, 2003, p101.
* 259 Cf Claude
Askolovitch, « gauchists. of Al », the New
Observer, 22/10/2004.
* 260 Claude Askolovitch,
« Cumbersome Mr. Ramadan », the New Observer,
9/10/2003.
* 261 Xavier Ternisien,
« The historical alliance of the Islamic scarves with the red
flags », the World, 6/2/2004.
* 262 Ugo Rankl, «
Spokesman of the Moslems », the Point, 24/5/2002.
* 263 Tariq Ramadan,
« The trap of the communautarism », Release,
14/1/2004.
* 264 Luc Bronner,
« A vice-chancellor like the others », the
World, 29/1/2004.
* 265 Josette Combined,
« Pride of the Dermouche prefect », the New
Observer, 22/1/2004.
* 266 Eric Aeschimann,
« Positive discrimination, an alternative ? »,
Release, 4/12/2003.
* 267 Cf Maintenance
with Etienne Gernelle and Patrick Bonazza with Yazid Sabeg, the Point,
14/10/2004.
* 268 Maintenance with Xavier
Ternisien with Franck Fregosi, the World, 5/10/2001.
* 269 Thomas Deltombe,
« Islam with the mirror of television », The
Diplomatic World, March 2004.
* 270 Houari Bouissa,
« For a definition of the Moslem intellectual »,
Oumma, 12/2/2005.
* 271 Mohammed Arkoun,
« Return to the Rushdie business », in For
Rushdie, the Discovery, 1993
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