Opportunités d'investissement, Gouvernement d'entreprise et Choix du type et de la maturité de la dette

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Annexe 1 : Statistiques descriptives et Test de Student

Statistiques de groupe
		OPINVEST		N	Moyenne			Ecart-type			Erreur standard moyenne
ADMXET		>= 1,00		30	,6200			,22058			,04027
		< 1,00		30	,4697			,25170			,04595
STOCKOP		>= 1,00		30	,83			,379			,069
		< 1,00		30	,53			,507			,093
ENDETT		>= 1,00		30	,3880			,23539			,04298
		< 1,00		30	,5820			,29939			,05466
DCT		>= 1,00		30	,4367			,26301			,04802
		< 1,00		30	,2230			,16238			,02965
DBLT		>= 1,00		30	,3327			,24634			,04497
		< 1,00		30	,1927			,15662			,02860
DO		>= 1,00		30	,1170			,21078			,03848
		< 1,00		30	,4993			,19167			,03499
TAILLE		>= 1,00		30	6,9860			2,61651			,47771
		< 1,00		30	8,0953			3,40033			,62081
RENT		>= 1,00		30	,1487			,06745			,01232
		< 1,00		30	,1110			,05863			,01070
Test d'échantillons indépendants
			Test de Levene sur l'égalité des variances				Test-t pour égalité des moyennes
			F			Sig.	t		ddl	Sig. (bilatérale)		Différence moyenne	Différence écart-type		Intervalle de confiance 95% de la différence
															Inférieure	Supérieure
ADMXET	Hypothèse de variances égales		,956			,332	2,460		58	,017		,1503	,06110		,02802	,27265
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						2,460		57,018	,017		,1503	,06110		,02798	,27269
STOCKOP	Hypothèse de variances égales		22,338			,000	2,594		58	,012		,30	,116		,069	,531
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						2,594		53,680	,012		,30	,116		,068	,532
ENDETT	Hypothèse de variances égales		1,938			,169	-2,790		58	,007		-,1940	,06953		-,33319	-,05481
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						-2,790		54,941	,007		-,1940	,06953		-,33335	-,05465
DCT	Hypothèse de variances égales		10,854			,002	3,786		58	,000		,2137	,05643		,10070	,32663
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						3,786		48,303	,000		,2137	,05643		,10022	,32711
DBLT	Hypothèse de variances égales		8,138			,006	2,627		58	,011		,1400	,05330		,03332	,24668
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						2,627		49,153	,011		,1400	,05330		,03291	,24709
DO	Hypothèse de variances égales		,015			,902	-7,350		58	,000		-,3823	,05201		-,48645	-,27821
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						-7,350		57,484	,000		-,3823	,05201		-,48647	-,27819
TAILLE	Hypothèse de variances égales		,267			,608	-1,416		58	,162		-1,1093	,78333		-2,67735	,45868
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						-1,416		54,428	,162		-1,1093	,78333		-2,67954	,46087
RENT	Hypothèse de variances égales		,198			,658	2,309		58	,025		,0377	,01632		,00501	,07033
	Hypothèse de variances inégales						2,309		56,895	,025		,0377	,01632		,00499	,07034

Annexe 2 : La corrélation de Pearson

Corrélations
		ADMXET	STOCKOP	ENDETT	DCT	DBLT	DO	TAILLE	RENT	OPINVEST
ADMXET	Corrélation de Pearson	1	,298(*)	-,155	,040	,091	-,225	,065	,160	,268(*)
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,	,021	,237	,759	,491	,085	,619	,222	,039
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
STOCKOP	Corrélation de Pearson	,298(*)	1	-,292(*)	,159	,142	-,297(*)	-,070	,351(**)	,423(**)
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,021	,	,024	,224	,279	,021	,597	,006	,001
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
ENDETT	Corrélation de Pearson	-,155	-,292(*)	1	-,385(**)	-,214	,440(**)	,317(*)	-,086	-,483(**)
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,237	,024	,	,002	,101	,000	,014	,511	,000
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
DCT	Corrélation de Pearson	,040	,159	-,385(**)	1	-,192	-,531(**)	-,212	,350(**)	,439(**)
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,759	,224	,002	,	,142	,000	,104	,006	,000
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
DBLT	Corrélation de Pearson	,091	,142	-,214	-,192	1	-,518(**)	-,208	,010	,354(**)
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,491	,279	,101	,142	,	,000	,111	,937	,005
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
DO	Corrélation de Pearson	-,225	-,297(*)	,440(**)	-,531(**)	-,518(**)	1	,355(**)	-,384(**)	-,648(**)
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,085	,021	,000	,000	,000	,	,005	,002	,000
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
TAILLE	Corrélation de Pearson	,065	-,070	,317(*)	-,212	-,208	,355(**)	1	,026	-,241
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,619	,597	,014	,104	,111	,005	,	,844	,064
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
RENT	Corrélation de Pearson	,160	,351(**)	-,086	,350(**)	,010	-,384(**)	,026	1	,270(*)
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,222	,006	,511	,006	,937	,002	,844	,	,037
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
OPINVEST	Corrélation de Pearson	,268(*)	,423(**)	-,483(**)	,439(**)	,354(**)	-,648(**)	-,241	,270(*)	1
	Sig. (bilatérale)	,039	,001	,000	,000	,005	,000	,064	,037	,
	N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
* La corrélation est significative au niveau 0.05 (bilatéral).
** La corrélation est significative au niveau 0.01 (bilatéral).