CHAPTER 2
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Introduction
The UNSC is the most powerful organ of the U.N. It is the U.N
principal body for multilateral co-operation. As enshrined in the U.N Charter
Article 1[1], the principal purpose of the U.N is to maintain international
peace and security. The UNSC is, under this Charter provision, the custodian of
this principal purpose among the family of nations. As Sydney D. Bailey [1989:
46] argues, «The Security Council is in theory very powerful. All members
of the U.N have agreed that the Council has the `primary responsibility' for
maintaining peace and acts on their behalf, and all have undertaken to accept
and carryout its decisions». The UNSC enjoys a unique authority under
international law. Its decisions stand largely unchallenged by the World Court
or the UNGA. Its resolutions [unlike those of the UNGA] are binding on U.N
member states and, though they are not always adopted, they outline what is
acceptable conduct in international community.
The Structure of the United Nations Security
Council
The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the U.N. It is
the best known of the three Councils of the U.N. This Council consists of
fifteen members. Five of these are permanent members [The U.S, Russia
[successor of the USSR], UK, China and France], each with the right of veto on
most kinds of substantive decisions [Franz Cede, 1999:49]. The UNSC, which
originally had eleven members, became a 15-member body on 1 January 1966, with
the additional states chosen from the U.N newly admitted nations in accordance
with amendments which came into effect on 31 August 1965 to Article 23 of the
U.N Charter [Robert Canton, 1986:165]. One may observe that this was in keeping
with the spirit of universality, the idea that the U.N shall accept all nations
who agree to abide by its Charter provisions. The members are chosen by
regional groups and confirmed by the UNGA. These ten elected members, known in
Charter language as `non-permanent members,' are selected according to a
distribution formula from each of the world's major regions and are distributed
according to both Charter principles and non-Charter agreements and rules. As
Franz Cede [1999:35] argues, «five seats are attributed to the Afro-Asian
group, two for the Latino-American, two for the Western European and others
and one for the Eastern European group». The term is for
two years, with half of the number elected by the UNGA [Art. 23] each year. As
Article 23[2] stipulates «a retiring member shall not be immediately
re-elected». The principal officer of the UNSC is the President who,
rather than being elected, is appointed monthly, in rotation, according to
alphabetical order. This rule gives each UNSC member [permanent and
non-permanent] a chance to hold the Presidency.
The United Nations Security Council Modus
Operandi
Article 24 [1] of the U.N Charter stipulates that,
In order to ensure prompt effectiveness of the UN, its members
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
The UNSC, its powers and functions is by far the most
extensively regulated field within the U.N Charter. As enshrined in the
Charter, these powers and functions are embedded in Chapter V [Art. 24-32,
general provisions], Chapter VI [Art.33-38, peaceful settlement of disputes],
Chapter VII [Art. 39-51, measures with respect to threats to the peace, breach
of the peace and acts of aggression], in Chapter VIII [Art. 52-54, regional
arrangements] and Art.83 [functions of the UNSC in the trusteeship system]. It
is assumed that by virtue of having been assigned the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security to the UNSC, no other
body within the family of states and no state has comparable authority and
functions. Thus, in order to discharge these functions, the U.N Charter
assigned thereto a number of political functions and powers, which are
considered as extraordinarily far-reaching, given the traditional
résistance of states to transfer parts of their sovereignty to an
intergovernmental authority.
The U.N Charter confers authority to the UNSC and various
methods of resolving the disputes. As John Weimer [2000:40] notes,
«Chapter VI of the U.N Charter provides for peaceful settlement of
disputes which includes such methods as mediation, arbitration, conciliation or
judicial settlement». Chapter VI, Article 33 stipulates that, «The
UNSC may also ask countries to negotiate between themselves or may recommend
terms of settlement». Other frequently used methods are for the UNSC to
appoint a fact-finding mission or a commission of enquiry, or as John Wallace
[2002:32] argues, «to ask the U.N Secretary-General to extend his good
offices». In a diplomatic parlance, the UNSC would craft
what is nowadays commonly called `road map' for the resolution of the disputes.
As Peter Bacher [1994:45] notes, «actions adopted by the UNSC in terms of
Chapter VI of the U.N Charter, dealing with the specific settlement of
disputes, are purely recommendatory, they do not bear significant force».
Nevertheless, their political consideration remains vital. This is because
constant disregard of these recommendations might constitute arbitrariness,
impropriety or even illegality. In addition, decisions adopted under Chapter VI
of the Charter can influence situations as they express the opinion of the
international community. However, when these recommendations fail to soothe the
conflict and there is a concomitant threat to international peace and security,
the UNSC invokes its power under Chapter VII.
According to Michael Akehurst [1982:174], «under Chapter
VII, once the UNSC has resolved that a particular dispute or situation involves
a threat to the peace or action of aggression, the way is open to take further
measures». Such measures may however be preceded by provisional action
taken to prevent the aggravation of the situation. This action provided for by
Article 40 of the Charter, is without prejudice to the rights or claims of the
parties, and is intended as a provisional measure to stabilize crisis
situation. The call for the withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, such
as in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] on 31 August 1998, calls for
ceasefires in Middle East in 1969 and 1973 are few examples of action taken by
the UNSC under this U.N Charter provision [Anald Chopra, 2001:41].
The adoption of provisional measures by the UNSC often has an
effect ranging far beyond the confines of a purely temporary action. This
provisional measure may induce a calmer atmosphere leading to negotiations.
These measures may set in train moves to settle the dispute upon the basis laid
down in the UNSC resolutions, which called for the provisional measures. The
action adopted by the UNSC, once it has decided that there exists with regard
to a situation a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,
may fall into either two categories. As Charles Kegley [1998:57] notes,
«It may amount to the application of measures not involving the use of
armed forces under Article 41 such as the disruption of economic relations or
the severance of diplomatic relations and complete or partial interruption of
economic relations». In addition, the UNSC may call for the «use of
such force» as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security under Article 42 [Charles
Kegley, 1998:57]. The UNSC may feel that measures short of
armed force as prescribed under Article 41 have been or would be inadequate. In
such scenario as John Merrills [1998:45] puts it, it may take «such action
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security».
Military action is clearly the ultimum remedium for
the UNSC and may only be undertaken if the UNSC considers that measures not
involving the use of armed force would be inadequate or have proved to be
toothless. These measures aim to weaken the capacities of hostile regimes to
pursue aggressive military, domestic and foreign policies. The U.N Charter
Article 42 also provides that such action may extend to demonstrations,
blockades and other armed operations by members of the U.N. Under Chapter VII,
decisions taken such as economic sanctions are binding on U.N members. It is
under the U.N Charter, Chapter VII which enabled the UNSC to impose general
trade sanctions on Iraq in 1990, but since then it has preferred imposing more
`targeted' sanctions such as arms embargoes, travel bans, restrictions on
diplomatic relations, and bans on key commodities, such as petroleum and
diamonds in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and the Iraq oil for
food programme.
Apart from its political functions, the UNSC in cooperation
with the UNGA also assumes internal functions within the organization. The UNSC
has a right to initiative under the U.N Charter by making recommendations to
the UNGA concerning admission of new members [Art.4], suspension of membership
[Art.5], the expelling of members [Art.6], and election of the U.N Secretary
General [Art. 97] [Duska Anastasijevic, 2000:28]. In addition, the UNSC plays a
role in the election of members of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] and
of the members of the two tribunals it established for the former Yugoslavia in
The Hague [Netherlands] and Rwanda in Arusha [Tanzania].
The Role of Veto Power in the Management of International
Politics
One of the most distinctive features of the UNSC is that it is
the only U.N organ in which there is a formal rule of unanimity or `right of
veto'. The UNSC is part parliament and part secret diplomatic conclave. As Yves
Beigbeder [1994:18] asserts, «the Charter declares that decisions of the
Council shall be by the affirmative vote of nine members and that, except for
procedural
matters, the votes shall include the concurring votes of the
permanent members». The one exception to this Charter rule is that in
decision relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, a party to a dispute
shall abstain from voting [Art. 27[3]]. Thus, if nine or more of the 15 members
vote in favor of a proposal but one of the five permanent members votes `no',
the proposal will be nullified. The UNSC can veto virtually any decision
including the proposals by the UNGA as a whole. A closer analysis however,
reveals that there is no reference in the U.N Charter to the «right of
veto». What is called the «right of veto» is intrinsically
linked to permanent membership. Article 27 [3] of the U.N Charter merely calls
for the «concurring votes» of the permanent members when the UNSC
takes substantive decision.
The model on which the U.N was built has been proved to be too
ambitious. The U.N Charter had been drafted on the assumption that the victors
of the WWII would continue to co-operate as they did during the hostilities.
Paradoxically, from the beginning, the U.N had been unable to function as
designed. The working of the UNSC, a body designed to ensure the strong beat of
the heart of the U.N Charter and its collective security provisions has over
the years attracted widespread criticism. Instead of fostering co-operation, it
became apparent in the early days of the U.N that the Post-War differences that
had developed between the U.S and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[USSR] significantly limited the ability of the UNSC to take action. As Arnold
Chopra [2001:42] argues, «The superpowers were inevitably on opposite
sides of most issues and the U.S controlled the votes in the council». The
USSR's interests being frequently threatened, and because of its conspicuous
minority position in the UNSC, it was left with the veto as its sole weapon
within the U.N machinery to thwart any action it considered injurious to its
interests.
Since the U.N originated from a coalition of victorious
wartime allies, the organization faced for roughly several decades questioning
on how those «converted» to the antifascist side of peace might be
admitted to the club [Yves Beigbeder 1984:45]. Over the years, vetoes have been
cast to block the admission of member states as well as nominations for the U.N
Secretary General. As John T. Rourke [2002:34] argues, «Despite all 14
other UNSC members having supported Boutros Boutros Ghali, the U.S veto ended
his tenure as the U.N Secretary General». As the Cold -War evolved, within
an economically and ideologically diametrically opposed world, the U.S
and the USSR approached this issue of new U.N membership, not
from the viewpoint of who sided with whom during the WWII, but rather who sided
with whom in the Cold-War. Thus, the U.S ensured that USSR allies applying for
membership were denied the required UNSC majority. On the USSR side, in a bid
to keep out Western- sponsored applicants, it used its veto recurrently [Robert
Canton 1986:38]. In the early days of the U.N as James Barry [2003] argues,
«The USSR Commissar and later Minister for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav
Molotov said `no' so many times that he was known as
`Mr Veto'.» Vyacheslav Molotov regularly rejected bids
for new membership because of the U.S refusal to admit the Soviet republics.
This state of affairs led in 1955 to a compromise deal which resulted in the
admission of sixteen members of the U.N. As Charles Kegley [1985:128] asserts,
«This compromise between the superpowers allowed the great powers to
support a politically balanced package of applicants, including pro-Easterners,
pro-Westerners, and neutrals». The compromise deal opened the floodgates,
and, by 1980, the U.N had more than 150 members, roughly three times the
original number.
It is apparent that the U.S and USSR would probably not have
accepted the creation of the U.N without the veto power. This is because some
exceptional privileges denied to Great Powers in the days of the League of
Nations or in other security associations, the veto represents that right which
was prerequisite of all sovereign states in the pre-U. N world, the right not
to be overruled by other members. As Michael Roskin [1993:362] argues,
Stalin at Yalta in 1945 insisted on the veto provision,
Churchill and Roosevelt went along. Stalin felt [correctly] that the USSR would
be so outnumbered by non-Communist countries that it would suffer permanent
condemnation. On the same basis, Stalin got the bizarre provision giving
three UNGA votes to the USSR, whose constituent «republics»
of Ukraine and Beloroussia were counted as U.N members.
One may observe that since the UNSC was originally intended to
deal with most critical issues of national interests, and because these Great
Powers hold the preponderance of means for the enforcement, such an arrangement
may be considered a necessary departure from the complete abandonment of
unanimity. Though it is impossible to escape the fact that the primary purpose
of the veto is not to foster co-operation but to prevent action, the use of
veto is often in contradiction to the literal terms of the U.N Charter and has
been manipulated for national interests. The veto strangles the UNSC and
prevents a broad consensus from guiding its work
across a wide range of issues surrounding global politics. This
device however, in international politics helps Great Powers to make sure that
their vital interests are not surrendered.
According to Adam Roberts [2000:41], «There was
discontent when the U.S and Britain systematically blocked council action to
impose economic sanctions on South Africa during the 1980s». Leland
Goodrich [1999:60] notes that, «There was dissatisfaction when France and
Britain blocked action on Suez in 1956; when the U.S refused action on Vietnam
in the 1960s, 70s and when the USSR prevented action on Afghanistan in the
1980s». Today, the opposition is conspicuous because the UNSC, rather than
failing to act, is now acting in ways that often seem motivated by geopolitical
interests of permanent members. Currently, there has been sign that Russia and
China are willing to veto any resolution punishing Iran because of its drive to
control the nuclear fuel-cycle. Expressing the role of veto in the U.N system,
Daniel Sheever [1999:59] notes that, «No important action can be
undertaken by the U.N with any reasonable prospect of success in the face of
U.S opposition. Conversely, if the U.S gives full support to a proposal, its
chances of being adopted must be considered very high, unless of course the
veto operates».
As Michael Roskin [1993:63] observes, «In speeches and
corridor conversations, diplomats often point out that four out of the five
permanent members are «European» [a concept that includes the U.S].
He adds that «Four out of five are `industrialized' countries. The
four-fifths of humankind that live in the poor countries of the global South,
they say, have only one voice, namely, China». The Chinese role in
representing Third World Countries founds expression in President Robert G.
Mugabe's speech, during his state visit to China where he implored to the
Chinese leaders that Britain wanted to use the U.N Special Envoy for Zimbabwe,
Anna Tibaijuka's report to put Harare on the UNSC agenda, but expressed hope
that China a staunch ally since the days of the liberation struggle would use
its veto to thwart such action. In Beijing, the Zimbabwe President said,
China, as a member of the United Nations and the Security
Council, we appeal to you to act in defense of innocent people and nations in
the Third World. My country at the moment is being brought into an arena of
international publicity unnecessarily [Southern Times July 31, 2005].
This goes hand in hand with John Huggins' [1988:41] comment
that,« It became the practice to use the veto more broadly both to stop
the possibility of any sanction directed against permanent members, even to
stop a mere critical resolution directed against an ally.» As John Sigler
[2002:67] puts it «The U.S use of veto has traditionally been tied to
Israel with the U.S vetoing anything critical of the Israel at the Security
Council». In September 2003, the U.S vetoed a resolution drafted by Syria
that denounced Israel's threat to remove the then Palestinian Leader Yasser
Arafat. Washington said the resolution was `flawed' because it did not include
a robust condemnation of acts of terrorism by Palestinian militant groups
[Ayala Maya 2005]. In 2002 the U.S blocked a draft resolution criticizing the
killing by Israel forces and several employees and the destruction of the World
Food Programme [WFP] warehouse in the West Bank [John Sigler, 2002:67]. These
few examples illustrate how relations of the veto-wielding permanent members
inter se etch the paths global events will take. The veto power was
deliberately inserted in the U.N Charter by the Great Powers and universally
accepted by the others as an automatic switch off, to prevent the UNSC from
becoming involved in a great power showdown. Considering the end of the
Cold-War, the less used veto now serves as Christian Brocker [2000:42] argues,
«To prevent an ad hoc UNSC majority from ganging up on one of its
permanent members, such as China for its human rights record. In addition, it
forces the majority to consider minority positions in its resolutions, such as
softening the sanctions against Libya for its failure to turn over those wanted
for the airline bombings». In the Libyan case, it is when the sanctions
were softened, China [and other members] abstained, allowing the resolution to
pass.
Notwithstanding the obstacles caused by veto to the UNSC work,
one may observe that its resolutions, passed by consensus have shown that the
UNSC through multilateralism as exemplified by the 1990 U.N action against
Iraq, can serve as a sharp tool and strong shield in the world's common
endeavors to achieve international peace and security. During the 1990 action
against Iraq, the UNSC was acting as had been originally intended and
sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct. In addition, from an international
relations perspective, the veto system kept the U.N alive longer than the
League of Nations. Without it, one or several of the Great Powers would
otherwise have either not joined it in the first place or else deserted it. The
veto saved the U.N from damaging conflicts pitting directly its major members
and from
involvement in impossible missions. The veto in the UNSC can
be likened to a fuse in a house wiring system. If the system overheats, better
to have a fuse blown [a veto] than the house blazing up. Thus the veto has
become a safety valve that prevents the UNSC from undertaking commitments in
the political field, which it lacks the power to execute.
The United Nations Security Council Peacekeeping efforts
in Africa and its Weaknesses
The area most commonly associated with the U.N efforts to
uphold international peace and security is that of peacekeeping. This is thus
often regarded as synonymous with the activities of the U.N, particularly those
of the UNSC. Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa was by no means free from
surrogate conflicts generated by the Cold-War superpower rivalry. The end of
the Cold-War led to a dramatically increased demand for U.N action in Africa.
Daily, the sobering news of wars in Somalia, The DRC, Liberia, Ivory Coast,
Sudan, and a host of other countries assaults a common sense of humanity. While
the role of the UNSC in a number of African conflicts has been commendable,
this claim has been challenged by John Hawkins [2003:62] who observes that
«Assertions that the U.N Security Council is seriously engaged in African
affairs are supported by claims that 70 percent of the Council's work is
devoted to African affairs». However, he laments that «Although
Africa is host to the vast majority of conflicts in the world, it would appear
that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by
the U.N Security Council and its key members».
Chronicling the history of peacekeeping in Africa, Thomas
Weiss [1995:67] argues that, «The U.N peacekeeping can be said to have
commenced early in Africa with successful placement of the United Nations
Emergency Force [UNEFI] to supervise the peace process in the 1956 Suez
crisis». This was following an unsuccessful Anglo-French attempt to
frustrate the Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal.
However, as Theo Neethling [2000:34] observes, «Historically, Africa first
experienced U.N operations per se in the Belgian Congo in the early 1960s. This
was the first time that a U.N force was deployed in Africa». In 1960,
under Resolution 143, the UNSC established the U.N Operation in the Congo
[ONUC]. Initially there was a danger that ONUC would not be able to fulfill its
mandate, as there was very little cooperation on the part of Katangese
leadership.
The situation deteriorated to such an extent that there was
effectively no peace to keep. Consequently, peacekeeping gave way to more
forceful methods. It is following Lumumba's request, that the U.N Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjöld invoked Article 99 of the U.N Charter and
informed the UNSC that the events in the Congo were a «threat to
international peace and security» [Theo Neethling, 2000:34]. The UNSC
reacted to the warnings and adopted Resolution 143 on 14 July 1960 which
authorized the Secretary General to provide the Congolese Government with
«...such military assistance as may be necessary» and ONUC was
established to assist the Congolese Government to maintain law and order [John
Merrils, 1998:69]. The U.N operation was one of the largest undertaken by the
U.N comprising at its peak strength, nearly 20,000 troops. As Theo Neethling
[2000:34] points out, «Apart from being one of the most complicated of all
peacekeeping operations, it cost the U.N dearly in terms of finances and lives
including that of the U.N Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld». By the
end of December 1962, Tschombe [The Secessionist Movement leader] renounced his
goal of making Katanga an independent state. With the authority of the
Congolese Government extended over the whole Congo territory, the ONUC mandate
had been successfully fulfilled and operation ended on 30 June 1964 [Stephen
Hill, 1996:38]. The major thrust in intervening in Congo debacle was to
temporarily fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of colonial power
thereby giving the newly independent state time to develop its own political,
economic and geographical cohesion.
Following this Congo crisis, there have been many U.N
engagements in different regions of the continent. Beginning with operations in
Namibia and Angola in 1989, and extending during the 1990s to Somalia,
Mozambique, Rwanda and Liberia. In most of the cases, operations have been
established amidst political turmoil. The civil administration broken down and
state authority had often collapsed following bitter intra-state conflict. In
addition, some of the states were ungovernable for many years. In all cases,
law and order were affected in one way or the other. Under such conditions,
though with difficulties and sometimes unsuccessfully, there was need to
re-establish the necessary authority to enable a return to good governance and
stability. Somalian crisis is an example, which underlines this argument. In
1992-1993, Somalia became the tragic proving ground for the U.N peacekeeping
operations machinery of the post Cold-War history. Commenting on the Somalian
fiasco, John Debarti [1998:51] argues that, «observers
saw as an opportunity to establish the new role of United
Nations, an opportunity that would finally allow implementation of several
Charter obligations.» This is because strategic, moral, civic, financial,
and political issues that had been under wraps since WWII spilled into the open
in Somalia. The experience of Somalia was, however, one of the major indicators
of the UNSC incapacity to sustain the post Cold-War events. The situation as it
developed was, in its essence unexampled and involved not civil war or
non-international armed conflict in the normal sense but rather a governmental
collapse so absolute that the status of Somalia as a state was potentially
called into question [Thomas Weiss, 1995:58]. It became clear that the
international community was unprepared to deal with most of these issues when
the Cold-War rules were unsuitable for such eventuality.
In a bid to create conditions for the `uninterrupted delivery
of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia, Stephen Hill [1996:136]
notes that, «The Secretary General informed the UNSC in November 1992 of
certain options which the organization had in order to create conducive
environment». The use of force under U.N command or a force of a
multi-national coalition with Chapter VII enforcement mandate was proposed. It
is when the U.S offered 28 000 troops to act as part of a U.N force to
safeguard food and medical supplies that the Secretary General was quick to
react. Thomas Weiss [1995:58] argues that, «In early December 1992,
Operation Restore Hope was launched by the U.S led UN Task force [UNITAF]
comprising of 30 000 troops, 28 0000 of which were American».
Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 794, the force was mandated
through Chapter VII of the U.N Charter to use `all necessary means to establish
as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia'. However, as Stephen Hill [1996:137] asserts, «right from the
early days of the UNITAF operation, disagreements between the U.N Secretariat
and the Bush administration were evident». It is when UNITAF turned over
its operation to the second U.N Operation in Somalia [UNISOM II] on 3 May 1993,
claims of success were hotly disputed. By the end of UNITAF's mandate, `the
consensus within the aid community' was that it had failed to create anything
resembling a `secure environment for humanitarian relief operations' [Stephen
Hill, 1996:138]. It is soon after the UNOSOMII took over approximately one
month later on 5 June, as Ingrid Lehman [1999:45] puts it, «24 Pakistani
peacekeepers were killed in an ambush while inspecting an arms dump belonging
to Aideed». In the
escalating spiral of violence which followed, UNOSOM II was to
embroil itself in an intractable conflict leading to President Clinton's
televised 7 October statement that `all American troops' would be withdrawn by
March 1994 [Stephen M. Hill, 1996:137]. The major causes were, firstly, the gap
between the operation's stated objectives and its actual activities. Secondly,
were the problems created by UNOSOMII's command and control structure, and
thirdly, there were divisions among the states which contributed
contingents.
Commenting on the 3 October catastrophic event, Stephen Hill
[1996:139] notes that, «The UNSOMII troops sent to apprehend suspected
members of Aideed's `war cabinet', which was meeting at the Olympic Hotel in
South Mogadishu, the U.S special forces found themselves ensnared in a
battle». The battle left 18 U.S soldiers dead, 78 injuries and the
abduction of a U.S helicopter pilot and a Nigerian peacekeeper. Compounding
unrest over the high number killed, televised images of chanting Somalis
dragging a U.S soldier's body throughout the streets of Mogadishu, and pictures
of a distressed helicopter pilot held hostage resulted in the immediate
collapse of `domestic support for the Somali Operation' [John Debarti,
1998:48]. This led to the U.S administration announcing of a complete
withdrawal by March 1994. The failures of UNOSOM II can be attributed to the
fact that this operation failed to take account of local culture and
traditions. It attempted to isolate one of fourteen warlords and personalized a
conflict in a culture which did not understand the concept of individual
responsibility. In its attempts to capture one individual it killed numerous
civilians, including important local elders, and turned a whole nation against
it. This crisis, which impacted negatively to the entire U.N peacekeeping
machinery, became a precursor of the 1994 Rwandese worst catastrophic event in
the 20th century.
The outbreak of conflict in Rwanda between Government forces
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] in 1993 finally led to the U.N
involvement in the long running crisis. As Theo Neethling [2000:45] asserts,
«A U.N.Observer mission, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
[UNOMUR] was established following the adoption of Resolution 812 on 12 March
1993». Its chief mission was to monitor the flow of military supplies into
the troubled region and was headquartered in Kabale [Uganda]. In 1993,
negotiations between the warring parties led to Arusha Accords which contained
agreement upon a ceasefire and preparations for elections and inter-communal
integration of the armed forces. The quest for the implementation
of these Accords, led to the establishment of a U.N Assistance
Mission, UNAMIR II, [John Hawkins, 2003:49]. Despite some setbacks, progress
seemed to be being made and UNAMIRII's mandate was renewed in 1994. Theo
Neethling [2003:50] notes that, «This relatively hopeful prospect was
shattered by the death of Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira and Juvenal
Habyarimana of Rwanda when the plane in which they were traveling was shot down
on 6 April 1994». According to Linus Malu [2002:68], «This set off a
wave of massacres, in which the Prime Minister, other Ministers and UNAMIRII
peacekeepers were among the first victims». This event led to an outbreak
of civil war in Rwanda involving the `genocidal' mass slaughters with which the
name of the country has become synonymous at the end of the 20th
century.
The response of the U.N and its member states to this
situation is flattered by a description as merely inadequate. UNAMIRII having
by this stage virtually wound down, at the request of Rwanda, the UNSC
terminated its mandate in 1996. Apart from its rather unimportant and
ineffective humanitarian endeavors, the record of the UNSC in Rwanda must be
reckoned one not only of unmitigated failure but also of scandalous unconcern.
Explaining the unwillingness of Great Powers to intervene in Rwandese tragedy,
the Canadian General, Romeo Dallaire, the then Commander of the UNAMIR II
contends that, «instead of recommending sending troops to Rwanda,
a nation's officer came to me and said, `They wouldn't send them
because there are no strategic interest, no strategic resources'. He adds that,
«In fact, they said, the only thing that's there are humans», [John
Sigler, 2002:98]. Nevertheless, despite this UNSC remarkable failure, it is
imperative to note that the only positive result was the subsequent
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] by the
UNSC Resolution 955 of 1994, which has made a contribution both to dealing with
the aftermath of actually or virtually genocidal conflict. It is after this
unsuccessful mission in Rwanda that a series of crises erupted in the former
Zaire [now DRC], which ended the Mobutu regime in 1997, followed by the 1998
DRC civil war.
The war in the DRC which broke out on the 2nd of
August 1998 in Eastern border town of Goma was regarded by some scholars and
historians as the `First Africa's Modern War' [Christian Blocker, 2000:42].
This results from the fact that six countries, namely, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda,
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia committed their troops to the embattled
country. Within weeks after the 2nd of August, the
rebels had seized large territory of the country. As Anthony Obinale [2003:69]
argues, «Within few weeks, the Angolan army recaptured several towns in
the South-West, and a rebel push towards Kinshasa was turned back with help
from Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops». However, the rebels
maintained their grip on the eastern regions. The rebel movement, the Congolese
Rally for Democracy [RCD], was supported by Rwanda and Uganda. In a bid to
peacefully resolve the crisis, the UNSC under Article 41 of the U.N Charter
called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, and urged states
not to interfere in the country's internal affairs [Christian Blocker,
2000:43].
As Tiambiao Zhou [2002:56] notes, «Efforts by the U.N
Secretary General, the OAU and the South African Development Community [SADC]
led on July 10, 1999 to the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement». This agreement
was signed by the DRC, along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
The agreement provided for an end of hostilities and for the holding of an
inter-Congolese dialogue. Anthony Obinale [2003:69] points out that, «The
UNSC in August authorized the deployment of 90 U.N military liaison officers to
strategic areas in the country and to the capitals of the signatory states to
help implement the agreement». In an effort to maintain liaison with the
parties, assist in implementing the agreement and monitor security conditions,
the UNSC in November 1999, established the United Nations Mission in the DRC
[MONUC]. In its quest for monitoring implementation of the cease-fire, support
disarmament and demobilization, in February 2000, the UNSC expanded the size
and mandate of the mission [Tiambiao Zhou, 2002:57]. The continuing hostilities
by militias and foreign armed groups in the Eastern part of the DRC, and the
threat they posed to the holding of elections in the country, led to the UNSC
on the 28th October 2005, under resolution 8541 extending the U.N
Mission in DRC until 30 September 2006. In addition, the UNSC authorized an
increase of 300 personnel in its military strength [John Kalima, 2005:4].
Though continued fighting has currently prevented full deployment and limited
the functioning of the military observers in the field, especially in Ituri
region, the country has became relatively peaceful after the signing of the
April 1, 2003 Sun-City [South Africa] Accords. The general elections are slated
to start in March and culminate in the Presidential contest on April 29,
2006.
In the post Cold-War period, the UNSC has made great strides
in resolving conflicts in Africa. Peacekeeping operations have emerged as
relevant and successful means of resolving longstanding and seemingly complex
conflicts on the continent in the post Cold-War milieu. The willingness of the
U.N to commit itself to the largest and most costly peacekeeping operations in
Africa has been commendable. Nevertheless, the UNSC's inability to timeously or
not to respond to conflict has been questioned. In many cases, the UNSC was
able to find a threat to the peace, but the finding was not always a prompt
one. The Darfur [Sudan] crisis, Sierra Leone civil war, the Rwandese crisis and
Somalia, are few examples which show lack of steadiness in the UNSC's practice
with regards to the finding of a threat to the peace on African continent.
However, it is imperative to note that besides planning, lack of sufficient
personnel as well as equipment, the most serious emerging problem for the U.N
at the end of the 1980s was the dearth of peacekeeping funds. Hence as the U.N
peacekeeping enterprise dwindled, the U.N started promoting regional approach
to peacekeeping under Article 52 and 53 of the U.N Charter.
The African Contribution Towards International Peace
and Security under Article 52 and 53 of the United Nations Charter
In the early 1990s, the UNSC launched an unprecedented number
of peacekeeping operations, including highly ambitious and very costly missions
in Bosnia, Somalia and Cambodia. By the mid-90s, political and financial
support for peacekeeping operations had waned, especially in the U.S. This
period, troop contributing countries' support shriveled as the U.N fell behind
in its payments and military challenges in civil war situations grew. As the
U.N peacekeeping looked unpromising, peacekeeping operations by regional
organizations became a necessity.
The U.N Charter framework recognizes the importance of
regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security.
According to Hilaire McCoubrey [2000:34], Article 52[1] of the U.N Charter
stipulates that,
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that such arrangement or agencies and their activities are
consistent with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations.
The U.N Charter, Article 52[3] stipulates that, «The
Security Council shall encourage the pacific settlement of local disputes
through such regional arrangements or agencies». It is these Charter
provisions that form the basis for regional peacekeeping. In addition, regional
organizations may conduct peacekeeping operations as long as those operations
are in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N Charter. In case
of enforcement measure or measures without the consent of the parties to the
conflict, those measures have to be authorized by the UNSC [Art.53 [1]]. The
U.N has conducted a number of peacekeeping operations together with regional
agencies. Franz Cede [1999:78] argues that, «As stated in the
«Supplement to An Agenda for Peace» [U.N.Doc.A/50/60-S/1995/1],
certain guiding principles can be identified for such operations». In a
parallel mission the U.N can have a leading role and be supported by regional
organization. It is under these guiding principles that in Liberia the U.N only
supported the Eastern Community Monitoring Group [ECOMOG].
Considering the U.N Charter provisions, it is patently clear
that regional security organizations, such as ECOMOG and the SADC, are ipso
facto legitimate. The key provision for the present purpose is article
53[1] of the U.N Charter which stipulates that, «The Security Council
shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for
enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council». Thus, all measures taken by the
regional arrangements in maintaining international peace and security shall at
all times be duly reported to the UNSC. It is under this Charter framework that
in a bid to compliment the U.N's efforts in area of peace and security,
different regional organizations have been established in line with this peace
support paradigm.
The Economic Community Monitoring Group
African regional and sub-regional organizations emphasize that
any peace support or peace enforcement action must, as international law
requires, be undertaken in accordance with U.N norms and specifically within
the legal framework of Chapter VII and VIII of the U.N Charter. ECOMOG is a
`non-standing' force consisting of land, sea and air components, that was set
up
by the sixteen-member states of the Economic Community of West
African States [ECOWAS] to deal with the security problem that followed the
collapse of the formal structure in the Republic of Liberia in 1990 [Franz
Cede, 1999:3]. The establishment of ECOMOG was essentially sequel to the
request of former Liberian President Samuel Doe for ECOWAS intervention. It is
after a total breakdown of law and order, that the force intervened and
successfully restored an atmosphere that permitted the reinstatement of a
functional state structure in Liberia. As John Sigler [2002:69] argues,
The first major conflict resolution agreement executed under
the auspices of ECOWAS was the 1989 Protocol on Mutual Defense Assistance
signed in Freetown, Sierra Leone, which provides for a non-standing military
force for the purpose of mutual military assistance to members of the community
attacked by external aggressors.
This protocol provides for collective response when external
forces attack a member state and when such attack is likely to endanger the
peace and security of other member states. In pursuance of peace in its area of
jurisdiction, Derek Ingram [2000:47] notes that, «ECOMOG forced armed
groups to accept negotiations that, in most cases, led to cease-fire, and it
has been tasked to monitor and enforce the provisions of cease-fire».
Nevertheless, because the factions that signed these cease-fire agreements do
not so in good faith, violations have been rampant. As Briget Moix [2001:42]
argues, «This compels ECOMOG to use force to get the recalcitrant parties
to adhere to what was agreed upon. Sometimes this will involve outright and
large scale military operations against the most belligerent insurgent
group». The ECOMOG mission, at this stage, changes from intervention to
peace enforcement. In West Africa, ECOMOG has been tasked to carry out
disarmament, the formation of interim or transitional Governments, the return
of refugees, military reform, the staging of general elections, ensure security
of U.N personnel and to assist in the process of military reform. At this
stage, its mission changes from peace enforcement to peacekeeping.
Despite problems of command and control, among others, ECOMOG
has achieved more success than expected by its founders and international
community. It is a clear proof of what is possible if African states pool their
resources to address African disputes. There are positive signs that ECOMOG has
created awareness among West African leaders and military experts that the
force is fine-tuning. Within the relatively short period of its existence,
ECOMOG has
gone full circle from peacekeeping and peace enforcement in
Liberia, to restorative intervention in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The
ECOMOG experiment in Liberia has been widely acclaimed as one of the most
successful and unparalleled in the history of peacekeeping.
The Southern Africa Development Community
In Southern Africa, Heads of State and Government have
supported peace support measures that promote collective security in the
sub-region. On political front, these measures include the establishment of
Front Line States [FLS] in 1970, Southern Africa Development Community
Conference [SADCC] in 1980 and SADC in 1992 which superceded the two previously
stated bodies [John Dzimba, 2001:34]. Throughout its existence, SADC has
successfully established a political solidarity that has sustained and deepened
the desire for regional integration. Maxwell Khobe [2003:104] notes
that,«SADC has also created common political values, systems and
institutions in order to build a firm foundation for democratic
governance». On 14 August 2001,in Brantyre, Malawi, Heads of states and
Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. This led to
the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security [OPDS],
which incorporated the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee [ISDSC],
which was established in 1977 as a substructure of the FLS.
The Organ's Protocol Article 2[2] stipulates that, «The
specific objectives shall be, to protect the people and safeguard the
development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law
and order, inter-state conflict, intra-state conflict and aggression». The
OPDS's mandate includes a long list of principles and methods to be employed in
the prevention, management and resolution of conflict by peaceful means. These
include, provisions concerning preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation,
negotiations, conciliation and adjudication by an international tribunal and
the development of various protocols. As Maxwell Khobe [2003:105]
observes,«OPDS is a prerequisite for SADC as an organization, to address
regional peace and security issues. The fact that SADC members have agreed on
its structure signifies an important shift in thinking among member
states». With the establishment of OPDS, any military action must be based
on a collective decision, not taken by individual members or a select of group
of countries. In addition, on 26 August 2003, Heads of State and Government in
Tanzania signed the SADC Mutual Defense Pact. This Pact regulates all forms
of collective security in the region. The main objective is to
operationalize the mechanisms of the SADC Organ for mutual cooperation in
defense and security matters. The philosophy of the SADC framework is based on
the principle that security is a holistic phenomenon not restricted to military
matters, but incorporates political, social, economic and environmental issues.
Its objects are not confined to states, but extend in widening circles to
include peoples, the inhabitants of a geographic region and the global
community [Linus Malu, 1998:34]. As ECOWAS has been conducting sizeable and
robust peacekeeping missions, the SADC member states have undertaken numerous
peacekeeping training and other capacity building projects. The SADC coalition
in the DRC [1998] and Lesotho [1998] distinguished themselves from other
sub-regional initiatives in the degree to which troop contributors were able to
deploy and remain operational without foreign assistance. In the DRC, troop
contributors largely sustained their operations without outside assistance. As
Linus Malu [1998:34] argues, «When the warring parties in the DRC gathered
in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999 to sign a cease-fire pact, they endorsed an
agreement initiated and mediated mainly by SADC». The U.N played only a
facilitating role. In addition, SADC adopted the strategies of disarmament,
peaceful resolution of conflict and institutional development as the
foundations on which peace, human security and conflict prevention should be
built. At the continental level as David Malone [2003:20] notes, «SADC has
been active in the establishment and consolidation of the AU, its institutional
programmes such as the Peace and Security Council and the New Partnership for
Africa's Development [NEPAD]».
In a bid to fulfill the U.N Charter mandate in area of peace
and security, co-operation between regional organizations and the UNSC remains
vital. The U.N faces acute resource constraints. The P-5 of the UNSC are
perceived as being reluctant to become directly involved in conflict in
far-flung areas whose strategic significance has diminished since the end of
the Cold-War. As a result, these factors have compelled successive U.N
Secretary General to call upon regional bodies to complement the world body's
efforts in peacekeeping and peacemaking. To this end, Article 52 and 53 are
vital to the future of regional peace support action. In the post Cold-War
milieu, with under-funded U.N, a broadly based and flexible view of Article 52
and 53 of the U.N Charter have become a necessity. As the following Chapter
analyses, these Charter Articles remain crucial as they form the linchpin for
any country to claim a seat on the UNSC.
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