CHAPTER 3
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
Introduction
Since 1997,the UNSC reform has been debated in an
«open-ended» committee which media correspondents covering the U.N
reform dubbed «The never-ending committee» [Alvin Leroy 2005:4]. In a
world torn by nuclear threats, terrorism, war crimes and human rights abuses, a
strong UNSC to promote international peace and security and defend
international law has been proposed. The UNSC has played a much more complex
role in the post Cold-War era than in the past because of its increased role in
global politics, and hence its failures are more evident and its reform has
become more urgent than ever. Most states agree the UNSC is a near zilch in
effectiveness but collide on reform measures. There is little clarity, let
alone consensus, about what reform might mean in practice. States agree, that
the UNSC's membership and institutional structures reflect outdated
geopolitical realities and political thinking shaped by the world of 1945. For
more than a decade, nations have been debating the UNSC reform in the
UNGA. However, practically, substantive and substantial reform
has proved virtually impossible. Proposals have come and gone, but no
membership blueprint has yet won the needed support for such institutional
alteration. Currently, a new burst of diplomatic energy has enlivened this
vital debate.
African Union Position
Having deliberated at length on the `Report of the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change' [2004], the AU Executive Council on
the 7th and 8th March 2005 adopted a Common African
Position, known as «The Ezulwini Consensus» in Swaziland [Daneshi
Sarooshi 2005:4]. The AU proposal was formally presented to the UNGA on July
14, 2005. As Daneshi Sarooshi [2005:4] notes, «Under the Ezulwini
Consensus, the 53 AU member states agreed to ask for an increase of UNSC seats
from 15 to 26, with 6 of the 11 new members being permanent ones with veto
rights and the rest five non-permanent ones». Two of the six new
veto-wielding permanent seats should go to African countries while another two
to Asia, one to Latin America and Caribbean and one to Western Europe.
The High-Level panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes report
[2004] suggests that, «The new members of the UNSC should have contributed
`most to the U.N financially, militarily and diplomatically', particularly
through contributions to U.N assessed budgets and participation in mandated
peace operations». However, AU member states demanded the right to select
African representatives to the UNSC and setting up its selection criteria for
African contenders. As Anthony Parsons [2005:5] argues, «According to
`Ezulwini Consensus', the AU criteria will be based on the representative
nature and capacity of those chosen». Nevertheless, these criteria have
still not been explicitly defined. Although countries like Nigeria, South
Africa, Senegal, Egypt and Kenya have shown interest in representing Africa on
coveted seats, the AU is still flummoxed as to which of its member states to
endorse.
The AU Position adopted in Swaziland was reiterated at the AU
Summit in Sirte [Libya] convened on July 4-5, 2005. In Sirte, all 53 states
that make up the AU unanimously reaffirmed the initial position demanding two
permanent seats with veto rights. The text of the declaration, made public on
July 5, 2005 reads, «We reaffirm our commitment to ensure the success,
in unity and solidarity, of our common position with a view to enabling Africa
to choose its representatives in the Security Council to act in its name and on
its behalf,» the Heads of state and Government said in the
declaration on U.N reform [Anthony Parsons [2005:5].
This Sirte declaration was again reaffirmed on August 4, 2005
at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia]. As Robert Massie [2005:4] argues,
«Delegates from the Group of Four [G4], [Brazil, Germany, Japan and India]
aspirants for permanent Council seats also attended the meeting in the hope of
winning crucial African support for their proposal». However, the AU
maintained its position and rejected a compromise deal sold to some African
leaders, including the then AU Chairman Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo
and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, by the G-4 at this extraordinary Summit. As
Sydney Yehuda [2005:2] notes, «The proposal had called for abandoning the
veto right for Africa's bid and abandoning the fifth seat of non-permanent
members in the UNSC». The majority of AU member states, namely, Egypt,
Algeria, Libya, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Congo, Mali, rejected the
proposal. According to Mohammed Bedjaoui [2005], «In Addis Ababa Summit,
46 of the 53 AU states backed the AU's position taken in Sirte [Libya] to push
for the 15-member UNSC to be expanded to 26, including six new permanent seats
with veto-wielding powers». In a bid to sell
AU position, following President Robert G. Mugabe's [Zimbabwe]
request, a committee of ten Heads of state from two countries each of the
continent's regions was set up [The Herald 10 November 2005].
The President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah [Sierra Leone] chaired High
Level Committee's report was adopted on October 31, 2005. The report expressed
Africa's tenacious adherence to its position as broached in 1997 Harare
Declaration, reinforced in Ezulwini, Swaziland, and at Sirte, Libya, in July
2005 and then restated at AU Extraordinary Summit in Addis Ababa in August 2005
[Robert Massie 2005:7]. Member states unequivocally stated that Africa should
maintain its position and seek to convince the rest of the world, including the
P-5 members of the UNSC to repair the long-standing injustice to the continent.
African Heads of state and government reiterated in the statement on November
1, 2005 that, «Full recognition of Africa in the Security Council
means not less than two permanent seats, including veto» [Robert
Massie, 2005:7]. It is on the 23rd-24th January 2006 in
Khartoum, that AU leaders reaffirmed the AU's position and agreed to delay
tabling its resolution at the Council until it had sold its position to the
powerful UNSC veto-wielding members.
The Group of Four Position
Running contrary to the AU position is the G-4 proposal. As
Thomas Bruha [2005] notes «At an event held on the 25th March
2005 at the Millennium U.N Plaza Hotel, in New York, the G-4 presented the
essentials of their draft framework resolution that they hoped the UNGA was to
adopt during the September 2005 Summit». These countries believe an
expanded UNSC should include, on a permanent basis, countries that have the
will and the capacity to take on major responsibilities with regard to the
maintenance of international peace and security.
According to Martina Metzger [2005],«On July 6, 2005 in
New York, the G-4 formally deposited a draft resolution with the co-sponsorship
of 27 countries, which later became 29». This draft envisages enlargement
of the UNSC to include six new permanent seats [two each for Africa and Asia,
one for the Western states and one for Latin America and the Caribbean] and
four new non-permanent seats [one each for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, as well as Eastern Europe]. Whether the new permanent members will
be granted a power of veto is to be discussed and decided at a review
conference to be held 15 years after
the entry into force of the Charter amendment [Thomas Bruha,
2005]. The G-4 has decided to stand by its draft and canvass support for it.
This group of influential states embarked on a furious lobbying campaign with
particular attention being paid to African states that could make up a powerful
bloc in the world body where a two-thirds majority in the UNGA is needed. The
G-4 states perceive their position as a pragmatic scheme that may succeed in
getting the required backing of two-thirds of the UNGA, as well as being
accepted by the current powerful veto-wielding members.
The South African and Nigerian Position Regarding the
Veto Power
The AU wants veto power for two new permanent seats it hopes
to get on the UNSC in an historic reform of the U.N. As this reform exercise
gathers momentum, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt have been classified as the
front-runners jostling to fly African flag as permanent members in a reformed
UNSC. However, the debate about expansion of permanent membership of UNSC is
unusual with respect to Africa in that unlike other UNSC's members, the
consideration is based on continental representation rather than on the
individual economic or military strength of the countries to be considered.
Although the AU has made its position clear, outside the continent, the G-4
adopted a position which prompted the G-4's allies in Africa led by the
Nigerian President, Oluseguni Obasanjo, to caution against an all-or-nothing
approach.
As Frazer Caron [2005:5] observes «South Africa and
Nigeria, and indeed Africa, hold the view that the UNSC should be expanded in
the permanent and non-permanent categories to make it more representative,
effective and acceptable». This position was reaffirmed when South Africa
President, Thabo Mbeki, at a media briefing in Addis Ababa on August 4, 2005
argued that, «If existing permanent members insisted on keeping their
veto, then the same privilege should be extended to new permanent
members». In an effort to shape and determine the AU position, South
Africa and Nigeria worked with other African states. However, in a marked
departure from the traditional stand of the AU, Nigeria and South Africa
steadily gained support, when they proposed that, like the G-4 states, Africans
should drop the veto idea because too many objections were being raised. This
unanticipated Nigerian position came after the July 25, 2005 meeting in London
by Foreign Ministers, which it chaired, in a search for a compromise deal with
the G-4 states. As Locke Barnaba [2005] argues, «Nigeria agreed to
consider a compromise with the G-4 group, in which new members
would not get veto rights». In addition, the compromise would allow a new
additional seat that Africa had wanted for itself exclusively, to become a seat
that can be rotated among Africa, Asia and Latin America.
South Africa was also believed to have reasoned with Nigeria
alongside some other Southern African countries. However, North African
countries, namely, Egypt and Algeria were leading a group of African countries
which wanted to have the veto power or nothing [Frazer Caron, 2005:5].
Concurring with Frazer Caron, John Bhaka [2005] contends that, «South
Africa's Mbeki also hinted that Africa could compromise on its demand for veto
power on the Security Council if the reform has to materialize». This was
illustrated in President Mbeki's speech in Parliament on September 1, 2005 when
he said, «I don't believe our approach would be that we are making a
demand and if the demand is not met, we walk away and go home» Frazer
Caron [2005]. It is during the 4th August 2005 AU Summit in Addis
Ababa, the then AU Chairman President Obasanjo advised his fellow African
leaders to compromise and advance the U.N reforms arguing that,
The main issue before us is to decide either that Africa will
join the rest of the world, or the majority of the rest of the world, in
bringing to a conclusion a demand for U.N reform, or if Africa will stand on a
non-negotiable position that will certainly frustrate the reform efforts.
The Nigerian President's search for a compromise was
unequivocally expressed when he told Heads of state and Government in Addis
Ababa that the continent's quest for two permanent seats with veto on the UNSC
was `unrealistic». He cautiously added that, «Those powers that have
veto won't give it willingly». At the opening of the 4th August
2005 Addis Ababa Summit, President Olusegun Obasanjo argued, «We need to
negotiate with other groups, unless our objective is to prevent any decision.
Let be no under no illusion: Africa stands to lose more than any other
region» [Frazer Caron, 2005]. He urged flexibility when dealing with the
UNSC reform, and compromise with the G-4 to ensure African representation on
the powerful UNSC. In his comment on the 4th August 2005 Addis Ababa
Summit outcome, John Brenda [2005:6] argues that, «President Thabo Mbeki
argued strongly at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in favor of the compromise as
the only realistic way for Africa to get permanent seats. But the Mugabe camp
prevailed». Challenging the African demand for veto power, Femi Fani
Kayode,
Spokesman for Nigerian President, argues that, «Our
position is that it is best for us to be there, rather than insisting on a
veto» [Frazer Caron, 2005]. As the September 2005 UNGA Summit approached,
Nigeria and South Africa had appeared ready to give up the right to veto,
saying compromise might be necessary to get the permanent seats for Africa.
This group's philosophy has been that once Africa becomes established on the
UNSC, the issue of veto power can be pursued later. Therefore, they suggest
that without being a permanent member of the UNSC, Africa cannot start to talk
of veto. Hence, it is advised to first take advantage and get what is
immediately available now.
The Group of Four and African Union Compromise Opponents'
views
The course of action, overtly taken by Nigeria, and covertly
by South Africa at Addis Ababa Summit did not augur well with other African
states. As the AU Summit wrapped up its sessions, the Nigerian proposal on the
need to show more flexibility towards forging a unified African stance on the
expansion of the UNSC membership was rejected. A group of countries led by
Algeria considered that the continent must stick to its first demand and not to
be associated with the G-4 initiative. Several AU states, especially, in North
Africa, vigorously opposed the Nigerian-driven compromise deal. According to
Jibrin Abubakhar [2005] «Egypt accused Nigeria of abandoning African
interests to increase its own chances of clinching a permanent seat on the U.N
Security Council». The oil producing state «tried to subjugate the
African position to narrow interests in a way which does not reflect the
required transparency in dealings between African states», the Egyptian
Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit said. While Nigeria had said the 24
July, 2005 G-4 and a group of African states meeting in London reached a
consensus, the Egyptian delegate, Minister Sameh Shukri, expressed
disappointment arguing that, «If the Nigerian approach continues, it will
lead to a fracture in the African position and the consequences of that would
be grave»[John Mara 2005:6].
It is apparent that if the current state of affairs continues,
it may threaten the pursued reform process goals. Throughout the U.N existence,
the incumbent veto-wielding P-5 have been resisting any expansion in
veto-wielding membership category. Combined with this division within the
continent, these P-5 may exploit such weaknesses and put on hold the reform
process. The division may lead to deeper cracks in the UA position. It is
likely to create more
fragmented groups, and more proponents and opponents of the
Nigerian and South African position, which will definitely create an awful
picture for Africa.
The Group of Four Proposal's Impact on the African Union
Position
The UNSC reform involves too many political considerations,
geopolitical interests, and the settling of many old scores. The G-4 position
regarding the UNSC reforms has led to political skullduggery within the AU
bloc, a situation which may put the entire process into disarray. The fact that
there is now a multitude of different positions on the UNSC reform means that
there is little or no chance that the required two-thirds majority will be
attained in the UNGA. Although there have been disagreements in a number of AU
deliberations, it is imperative to note that African votes carry heavy weight
in deciding the fate of the U.N reform, especially the UNSC. In order
to be adopted, the draft resolution needs to have support from two-thirds of
the 191 UNGA members including 53 African countries. Thus, their 53 votes
either way could make or break the resolution. Nevertheless, the way the U.N
Charter is presently crafted, any of the UNSC veto-wielding members can put the
reform on hold.
Although it has been perceived that obstacles to the
large-scale reform of the U.N may reside above all in the split between the
rich North and the poor South, the ` haves' and `have-nots'. A division within
the AU and the G-4 regarding this reform exercise is likely to stall the whole
project. The bone of contention is whether the African countries should
negotiate with the G-4 on the issue of veto which the African countries have
demanded in their own proposed resolution, but the G-4 group carefully set
aside for later discussions. Currently both resolutions have been tabled at the
UNGA, after African states under the AU banner failed to reach a truce with the
G-4 countries. It is vital to note that the G-4 and AU joint formula is so
crucial because it is about the best way for any resolution on the expansion of
the UNSC can obtain the much-needed two-thirds in the UNGA. However on the one
hand, most African states have strongly insisted that Africa must have two
veto-wielding members in an expanded UNSC. On the other hand, a group led by
Nigeria and South Africa wants the demand for veto power dropped. According to
Ayala Maya [2005], «The G-4 soft pedaled on the issue of veto power after
the current permanent members warned that if they insist on veto, the whole
idea of reform of the Council would be scuttled». This veto freeze has
been seen as a strategic shift designed to win
the incumbent veto-wielding members' support. It has been also
seen as realistic after realizing that the P-5 will not give up or dilute their
treasured veto. These were reaffirmed by the Japanese Prime Minister, Jenichiro
Koizumi, who argued that, «The freeze on demanding veto rights was
unavoidable, the current permanent members will resist any attempt to infringe
on their vested interests.» [Ayala Maya, 2005].
The calls for the AU-G-4 joint formula have been steadily
louder. This results from the fact that a coalition between Africa and the G-4
bloc is seen as a sure winner and the best strategy to grab the necessary
votes. However, AU under this joint formula will have first to forswear veto
power in hopes of persuading the incumbent veto-wielding P-5. As Sydney Dawson
[2005] argues, «The effort to expand the UNSC suffered a serious blow when
negotiations between the G-4 and AU to submit a joint proposal fell apart in
Addis Ababa Summit». Although neither proposal individually has currently
the support of two-thirds of the UNGA, it can be argued that a joint proposal
would be more likely to meet such threshold.
The gap between the G-4 draft resolutions and the AU proposal
is not all that wide. These groups agree that the number of permanent members
should be increased. The differences are that the AU draft gives full veto
rights to the new permanent members and proposes that the number of the
non-permanent members should be increased by a total of five countries, with
two of them from Africa [compared with one nonpermanent seat in the G-4 draft].
Proposing on how this gap can be filled, Jarrod Weiner [2005:4] argues that,
The United States, a permanent member with veto power is
against new countries getting the veto. If the G-4 and the AU both submit draft
resolutions for voting, there is a strong possibility that both sides will
fall. In order to gain the 128 votes necessary for adoption, the opposition
must be kept to under 63 votes. The number of countries that can be expected to
definitely oppose the G-4 draft is said to be around 30. So if it fails to
attract many African votes, the G-4 draft is not going to be able to see the
light of day. And most attention must be devoted to integrating the G-4 draft
and the AU proposal.
There is widespread support for enlarging the UNSC to reflect
the global realities of the 21st century. Nonetheless, as the
current state of affairs has shown, there are still serious barriers, which
must be understood and navigated. Considering the P-5 veto power and their
vested interests, the following Chapter analyzes the possibilities of amending
the pillars of the U.N charter, especially Article 108 and the prospects and
challenges the AU proposal faces.
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