Memoire Online - The UN security council reforms: myth or reality? an african analysis

«If you think the Monarch is regressive, you do not solve the problem by doubling the size of the Royal family». [Ian Williams, July 26, 2005].

There is possibly nowhere else on the globe that a reformed UNSC is awaited with much anticipation as on the African continent. In all U.N structures, none is a bigger or frustrating target for U.N reformers than the UNSC. For many years, states have been advocating its expansion arguing that adding new members will remedy the democratic and representative deficit it suffers. Nevertheless, schism on whether new members should have veto therein has created a logjam to this project. In a bid to avoid marginalization during this restructuring exercise, for Africa to be heard and recognized as an equal partner in global politics, AU came up with a two-veto seat proposal. While AU was hopeful that the September 2005,UNGA Summit would vote on a proposal, the history's largest gathering of world leaders fell far short of completing the major changes AU sought. The failure of any one proposal to elicit support from the two-thirds of the UNGA members clearly indicated that the Second San Francisco is unlikely. Considering the role of veto in global politics and the P-5 veto-wielding members' vested interests, this chapter answers numerous questions and outlines on how long will the Addis Ababa 53-member AU proposal for two veto status seats, under the current state-centric system will sustain pressure from within and outside Africa. The focus is on the pillars of the U.N Charter such as Charter amendment, especially Article 108. Article 23 and the AU's contenders voting behavior in the UNGA were analyzed.

The effort to create a more effective UNSC that accounts for the changed global security climate has become a geo-political challenge for power and influence. Africa, a home to probably the largest number of crisis-ridden in the world, feels that this opportunity to rectify the imbalance within the main U.N Organ should not be missed. To this end, this largest single bloc at the U.N is exercising its political and numerical clout by refusing to back down on its demand for two veto-wielding seats in the UNSC shake up.

As John Becker [2002:40] argues «In the UNGA, African states account for nearly 30 percent of the votes, simply few states would have to join these states in order to block passage of any proposed reforms». As Diagram 4.1 indicates, in order to change the structure of the UNSC, African position remains vital. The African approach to UNSC reform reflects the continent's aspirations to make it more reflective of today's world landscape of power, as opposed to 1945. Introducing the AU proposal, Nigeria's delegate said it contained a `reaffirmation' of the commitment to strengthening the U.N, including the UNSC, that the Council would be better placed to perform its primary responsibility if it was more inclusive [Mark Migba 2005]. It is believed that the proposed reforms will finally institutionalize Africa's capacity to bring its viewpoint and perspective to global political debate. Although there are insurmountable obstacles to face, notably, Charter amendment, the two-thirds votes by the UNGA members and all veto-wielding P-5, Africa presented an integrated vision of a just UNSC expansion, which considered all geographic regions and guaranteed a balanced representation of all civilizations and cultures.

The AU over the past Summits reaffirmed its position that it will accept nothing short of being offered two permanent seats with veto. The September 14^th-16^th historical UNGA Summit was seen as a unique occasion to take bold decisions in the areas of reforming the UNSC. Paradoxically, when the U.S President appointed John Bolton as the U.S ambassador at the U.N as soon as Congress went into a month-long recess, he sent a warning signal to reformists that

the U.S was not keen on the U.N reform agenda. As Horma Bartese [2005] puts it, «John Bolton released proposals that effectively emasculated reform initiatives by the AU countries». John Bolton sent to his fellow ambassadors to the U.N a list of 750 amendments to a document outlining a blueprint for reform painstakingly compiled by the 59^th UNGA session President, Jean Ping. Lau Breckon [2005:2] who described John Bolton as «Washington's diplomatic demolition expert,» observed that, «his stance could effectively scupper AU ambitions for the continent to be awarded two permanent veto power seats in an expanded UNSC». As the Summit wrapped up the 35-page document, world leaders endorsed on U.N reforms had only one sentence on the need for the 15-member Council to become «more broadly representative, more efficient and transparent» [George Mackman, 2005:4]. At this level, compromise was virtually impossible as UNSC seats meant losers and winners, with each group having drawn enough opposition to prevent a resolution from gaining a two-thirds vote in the 191 UNGA. The 700-plus changes at the very late stage heralded the U.S's résistance in making the UNSC stronger. This state of affairs became a reminder to the AU bloc that, while the 1965 reform was a product of increasing cohesion among the non-aligned states, this harmony fell apart when put to test after the end of the Cold-War.

Notwithstanding global consensus on the need to reorient the UNSC, the global South's outlook remains different from those of the developed and industrialized North. This means the success of the AU and U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan's project of reforming the world body; mainly the UNSC remains precariously hinged on the shifting and increasingly divergent interests of the North and the South. While the AU pinned its hope on the September 2005 UNGA Summit, expectations were dashed by the Summit document outcome, which became «historic» to some, and «outrageous» to others. Commenting on Summit outcome, the sharpest criticism came in the closing speech by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who described the document to have been «conceived in darkness and brought forth from the shadows». The Indian ambassador at the U.N, Nirupam Sen, made the astonishing charge explaining that «the most powerful member of the UNSC, the U.S, was opposed to re-introducing resolutions on the expansion of the Council because the aspiring nations [G-4 and AU members] had bitten off more than they could chew» [Horma Bartese, 2005]. These sentiments were echoed by the representative of Nigeria, Sola Ongunbanwo, who said, «President Olusegun Obasanjo and AU

Commission chair Alpha Omar Konare are jointly working on jump starting the process, African states want to return to the table to advance what is diplomatically attainable, where for now the politically desirable is not attainable»[Horma Bartese, 2005]. During the UNGA Summit, internal rifts over rival formulas, the opposition of the U.S and the John Bolton amendments successfully left the original document on UNSC reform in tatters.

African countries erroneously perceive that because African issues dominate more than 60 percent of the UNSC's agenda and that several practices and historical factors deprived the continent of representation in the veto permanent category, therefore, demanding two permanent seats with veto power was non-negotiable. Although this sounds correct, it may not form the linchpin for such demands. African problems may dominate debate in the UNSC but may not threaten global stability and Great Powers' direct interests. This however, is in contrast with the Middle East, where the situation may affect the existing construction of power. According to House Freedom report [2002], African issues dominate the UNSC because «African states are incapable of maintaining collective security over their own continent». The current UNSC reform debates have shown that issues of national interests take precedence over other political imperatives. Thus, the 1965 event, the first ever amendment to the U.N Charter may not repeat itself. This is because as Horma Bartese [2005] observes, «Nationalist China, which had to be extra careful for fear of losing its seat in the U.N, voted in favor of the UNSC reform in order to maintain favor with the non-aligned states who had the power to eject it from the U.N». The country's persistent pursuit for defending national interests was expressed by the then USSR representative Nikolai Fedorenko who opined that his country favored a redistribution of the non-permanent seats because it «would inevitably reduce the share of the Western countries' seats»[Horma Bartese, 2005]. His statement underscores the continuing primacy of the nation-state in the perennial quest for prestige and status in international relations, which is also reflected in the current UNSC debate. In 1965, it is apparent that the USSR made a strategic decision to tie the African and Asian states' desire for UNSC reform to the issue of seating Communist China.

According to Theodore Shabad [2005:4], «The Bush administration expressed its opposition to
all proposals on the table. While the administration has stated that it is open to a modest

expansion of the UNSC, it does not support an expansion of 10 or 11 new members». Instead, the U.S has formally backed Japan's bid for permanent membership on the UNSC and has expressed its willingness to consider `two or so new permanent members' and `two or three additional non-permanent seats', allocated by region to expand the UNSC to 19 or 20[Theodore Shabad, 2005:4]. Japan, which hosts the largest concentration of American troops in Asia, is the main U.S ally in the region, and Washington views Tokyo as a vital geo-political counterweight to Beijing. The U.S position was reaffirmed on July 12, 2005 after the U.S Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, held talks with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura, in Tokyo. In addition, the U.S supports Brazil on the grounds that this Latin American country comes in without veto power [Theodore Shabad, 2005:4].

It is evident that the U.S reached its `reasonable' conclusion from more traditionally sordid premises. If the U.S could not convince a mere 15-strong UNSC into backing the invasion of Iraq, then it would be harder for it to twist the arms of 26 members. Thomas Hamilton [2005:5] argues that, «The more revealing is that the U.S made it clear that it would not support permanent seats for any country that snubbed the Bush regime build up to the invasion». Just as Germany qualifies, AU, with all of its 52 members also condemned the war. While France and Britain back the G-4 proposal, no Great Power ever came out in support of the AU formula. This was illustrated in August 2005, when AU Summit delegates adopted the report by the High Level Committee of 10 [in charge of selling AU's position], chaired by the Sierra Leone's President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. During the Summit, delegates said in future the committee should make contacts at the highest levels and not through officials. The general feeling was that officials like Ms Jendayi Frazer [The U.S Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs] were too low and of no «political substance» to represent official thinking in the Bush regime [Herald 10 November 2005].

This was reiterated during the Khartoum AU Summit [23rd -24^th January 2006] when concerns were that the committee had not done enough and had not approached the P-5 members to sell Africa's position. In Sudan, President Mugabe charged that,

Assuming that the outcome of taking our campaign to the five permanent members is to realize that they do not support Africa's position, this summit must ask itself one question: Does the US, Britain or any of the five permanent members have the right to block Africa's position to permanent members of the UN? [The Herald, 27 January 2005]

The failure of AU proposal to draw much support from Great Powers led Eddy Maloka [2005] to argue that the AU's «intransigent demand for veto» could cost the world progress regarding the enlargement of the UNSC. He adds, «We believe that the AU position was a strategic error ... the `all or nothing' approach is not in the best interest of Africa». His views were echoed by Adekaye Adebajo [2005] who feels that, «The Council reform is unlikely to happen, but if the AU had accepted the G-4 proposal, the UNSC reform would have been more likely». One may observe that Africa is demanding more than it would appear that the U.N members or the U.N system is capable of giving. Supporting this view, Jerome Cartillier [2005], concurs that, «Many observers believe that by choosing to insist on having the right to veto, Africa has failed a test of time and squandered an opportunity». He adds that, «The AU position was also seen as `tragic' because its non-compromise position on UNSC reform will in all likelihood keep the continent outside an important political forum». Although during the last Summit in Khartoum [Sudan] AU members went into the trenches and said its position for full veto-seats was nonnegotiable, this new power game paradigm places Africa in an awful situation. However, although P-5's national interests have become a stumbling bloc, Africa, being the largest bloc in the UNGA, and by the fact that the global South is not represented in the UNSC, Africa richly deserves a seat in the UNSC with all privileges.

Taking into account the December 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes and the Kofi Annan's In larger Freedom [2005] reports, neither model involves any expansion of the veto. The 2004 report suggests that, «We recognize that the veto had an important function in reassuring the U.N most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the existing members' veto powers». The panel only urged the use of veto to be limited to matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake and refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. The 2004 report concludes that, «We recommend that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto» [Michael Brenham, 2005:6]. The two alternative models proposed by the Panel and the U.N Secretary General for achieving greater representativeness, attention almost wholly focused on Model A, envisioning six new permanent seats, but without any change to veto powers, and Model B, which would have added no new permanent seats but

created a number of renewable four-year positions that would be potentially available to enable the presence on the UNSC of all the most important regional players. The G-4 proposed a plan similar to Model A. It is apparent that if only the AU could have agreed with the final position of the powerful G-4, and realized that an extension of the veto was unattainable, the six-permanent seats model had every chance of winning the necessary UNGA two-thirds support.

In their pursuit of raisons d'être, states use whatever institutions available to serve their interests. In a world where the U.S has no challenger, its global presence, as great as, of that of any empire in history, trying to control its actions through the UNSC begins to resemble the Roman Senate's efforts to control the emperor. The P-5 members that wield the veto in the UNSC are unlikely to view with favor any encroachment into their privileged realm, unless they believe the contenders' entry serves their particular interests as it was in 1965. In addition, one may observe that the idea that Great Powers will continue to participate, politically or financially, in an institution whose purpose has become to limit their powers has no precedent. If the UNSC continues to materially disagree with U.S foreign policy on critical issues, the U.N could come to resemble its defunct predecessor, the League of Nations. In spite of public declarations, the P-5 are content with the present arrangements and oppose any changes that might dilute or take away their veto power or expand their club in veto category. The U.N Charter Article 109 reserved the possibility of a General Conference for the purposes of reviewing the U.N Charter [Thomas Hamilton, 2005:4]. Nevertheless, it is patently clear that the P-5 preferred setting the bar high for any changes. They not only resisted efforts to convene such a conference but also tacitly communicated their intention to safeguard their veto rights. Considering the U.S build up to Iraq war, it can be deduced from its attitude that no U.S leader will permit the UNSC to stand in the way of pursuing the U.S's projected interests in national security.

The veto, the P-5 wield elevates them to the ranks of the five most powerful countries in the world body, giving them the ultimate authority to declare war and peace, and also decide on who should or not be subjected to international sanctions. As Michael Brenham [2005:6] argues, «Although arguably the UK and France as well as Russia are no longer considered Great Powers, their permanent status with veto power gives them a substantial voice in

international politics». As the debate over Iraq shows, enhancing the UNSC's role is a principal objective of French and Russian foreign policies. This is because these countries will be given a say about where, when and how the U.S unparalleled military power will be projected so long as Washington works through such framework. These P-5 with veto power are in essence, guarding themselves, they will neither relinquish nor dilute their veto power by allowing more veto-wielding members in their privileged club. It may be observed that by insisting on veto, Africa may have pulled the plug on its proposal since it is unlikely that the P-5 will amend Article 108 of the U.N Charter, the most difficult step for any UNSC reform endeavors.

The U.S Department of State identifies votes of fundamental national interest in the UNGA annually. As the U.S Department report [2005] indicates, voting records of key African contenders may dent AU's hopes of getting two proposed permanent seats with veto. The report indicates that support for the U.S voting position on key issues over the past five years among the key UNSC contenders has been low. Evidently, this report remains vital to the U.S in considering the current reform agenda. According to the report, the analysis of actual votes [not including consensus votes] in the UNGA over a six-year period [1999-2004] reveals that five of the leading candidates voted against the U.S more than 70 percent of the time.

According to the report [2005], the records of the three leading African contenders are poor. Nigeria and South Africa voted with the U.S just 25 percent of the time, while Egypt, a huge beneficiary of U.S aid, sided with it in only 18 percent of the votes. In addition, as the report indicates, of the 190 [excluding the U.S] members of the UNGA, Nigeria and South Africa rank 104^th and 106^th respectively. Egypt ranks very near the bottom at 168^th , behind Sudan and just ahead of the so called `rogue regimes' [Iran, Libya, Burma, and Syria]. The report indicates that support for U.S voting positions in the UNGA fell since 1999 for all African countries competing for the UNSC seats. In 2004, as the report indicates, Nigeria voted with the U.S just 15 percent of the time, and South Africa only 11 percent of the time. In 1999, these two countries voted with the U.S 35 percent, and 40 percent of the time, respectively. Egypt's record was pitifully low [8.5 percent] in 2004 [down from 29 percent in 1999]. Voting exercise on key issues, African contenders are a cause of concern to the U.S. The report [2005] suggests that South Africa and Nigeria voted against the U.S position on key votes on average of 80

percent of the time between 2000 and 2004. Egypt voted with the U.S just 16 percent. The U.S did n

ot receive a single vote of support from Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt on any key vote in 2001. The report continues that worse than their actual voting records is the fact that these countries' opposition to U.S priorities is increasing. The report suggests that South Africa and Nigeria have sharply reduced their level of support for the U.S on key votes since 1999. In addition, in 2004, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt voted with the U.S on just two key votes.

The UNSC Contenders: Average Voting Coincidence with the U.S. in the UNGA [1999-04].

Source: The U.S Department of State: Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2004

[August 10, 2005], Average Calculated by the Heritage Foundation. * Does not include Consensus Resolutions.

Considering the level of support on key issues by African contenders, with doubled veto as proposed by the AU proposal, if adopted it will make it far more difficult for the U.S to work through the expanded UNSC. Hence, the U.S is unlikely to accept the AU reform roadmap. This incongruity in UNGA voting by African countries jostling The

U.S is likely to perceive these countries being less supportive of its policy priority once they are granted two veto seats in the UNSC. Apart from the UNGA, African countries have been als

o less supportive of U.S policy priorities in UNSC. This can be illustrated by the 2003 voting -

in UNSC, when African non permanent members were among the «Uncommitted Six»
[Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, Chile, Mexico, Pakistan], which stood defiant and refused to

endorse the U.S's war in Iraq [Lau Breckon, 2005:5]. The U.S will view the expanded UNSC undermining its effort to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It may perceive military action in its interests being less likely to receive U.N support. Hence, this AU reform route is likely to be abandoned.

Country	Share of Global Gross National income [%]	Share of World Population [%]	Contributions to regular U.N. Budget 2004-06[%]
USA	32.7	4.6	22.00
Japan	12.6	2.0	19.49
German	6.2	1.3	8.66
Britain	4.9	0.9	6.13
France	4.5	1.0	6.03
China	4.0	20.4	2.03
India	1.6	16.7	1.88
Brazil	1.4	2.9	1.52
Russia	1.1	2.3	1.10
South Africa	0.3	0.7	0.29
Egypt	0.3	1.2	0.12
Nigeria	0.1	2.1	0.04
P-5 members	47.2	29.2	35.26
G-4 Group	21.8	22.9	31.53
AU contenders	0.7	4.0	0.45

Source: James D. Fearon, Comments on the Report of the High-level Panel, in: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 89, 100. For the UN contributions: Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations, Res. of the UN General Assembly A/RES/58/1 B 3rd March 2004.

In area of cheque-book diplomacy, African contenders still lag behind. The G-4 contenders, namely, Japan and Germany are pillars of the global economy, both are bigger than UK and France, and both are more economically powerful than any member of the UNSC except for the U.S [Lau Breckon, 2005:4]. As Table 4.1 indicates, Germany contributes 8.6 percent of the U.N. budget, surpassed only by Japan [19.4%] and the U.S [22.0%]. Four permanent members of the UNSC pay less, Britain [6.1%], France [6.0%], China [2.0%] and Russia [1.1%][U.N report 2005]. Even in UNGA voting, Germany and Japan [members of the G-4], their record is excellent [though it is thought to be not reliable by the U.S report [2005]]. Surprisingly, they realized that in global politics, power is not shared voluntarily and decided to give up their quest for veto seats in an expanded UNSC. These countries realized that global powers with

veto power, financial and military control over the U.N are only likely to allow that kind of reform, which reinforces and favors their respective national interests.

Japan's contribution to the annual U.N budget and peacekeeping operations, and its unsuccessful bid for a permanent seat, sends an indicative signal to the AU, showing where one could draw a line when reform involves veto power. Despite its high-powered lobbying and the tremendous influence it wields as the world's biggest aid donor, Japan has failed to convince the majority of the remaining member states that it richly deserves the title of a «veto-wielding big power»[Michael Brenham 2005:6].

Although the amount of membership dues is assessed according to a country's ability to pay. As table 4.1 indicates, AU contenders' contributions remain contentious. Commenting on African countries contribution to the U.N Wafula Okumu [2005:5] argues, «Payments are often still not made on time. African countries are notorious for late payments and delinquencies only matched by the U.S, which intentionally withholds payments as a way of exerting pressure on the U.N or to make political points». However, as indicated by the U.N Financial Regulations Rule 5.4, South Africa and Egypt had already paid their dues, $5,196,166 and $2,135,411 respectively, for 2005 by the end of January. Since 1996, South Africa has consistently paid its U.N dues on time. Between 1991 and 2004, Egypt paid its dues in time six times. As of 16 December 2004, South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria had paid their full dues to the U.N regular budget. However, as Wafula Okumu [2005:5] argues, «While Nigeria has always paid late, Kenya has been chronically delinquent». Although financial capability is not listed amongst the U.N selection criteria, it cannot be ignored, and may end up as de facto criteria unless adequate provision is made to cater for poor countries. In addition, the UNSC contenders must have sufficient financial resources to enable them to staff their New York and Geneva U.N Missions with adequate and highly qualified personnel. Furthermore, the UNSC must adopt resolutions it has the financial capacity to implement.

The U.N Charter Article 23[1] does not mention any qualifications, to which permanent members of the UNSC should conform. However, the function of the UNSC suggests that the permanent members would be the member-states most capable of performing this function. In area of promoting international peace and security, all African contenders played crucial role

and their efforts have been commendable. As Wafula Akumu [2005:5] argues, «In areas of troop contributions for peacekeeping efforts, Nigeria is ranked 7th, South Africa is 10th, Kenya 13th and Egypt 49^th». In this area of peacekeeping, Kenya claims the distinction of being the second top African nation troop contributor to all U.N missions. All AU contenders believe to have contributed positively to emerging African values and practices in peace, justice and governance. While this effort is commendable under Article 23, lack of financial clout hampers African efforts to be heard in the UNSC corridors of power.

It is imperative that the principle of sovereign equality as enshrined in the U.N Charter Article 2[1], finds expression in the UNSC composition with all privileges currently enjoyed by the P5. It is undisputable that the UNSC is outdated and its reform is needed to mirror the current political realities. However, national interests, balancing representation and efficiency have become major hindrance to the current reform debate. Most importantly, the UNSC must be expanded to a reasonable number of states which can reach decisions with dispatch in crisis, and membership should include a reasonable cross-section of states that, relative to their region, can bring economic, military, and political assets to implement collective decisions. Although the African response has been cast as one of high principle, considering the P-5 vested interests, turning on two vetoes seats, in reality was seen as having been driven by familiar political imperatives. Five vetoes already impaired the good performance of the UNSC, with their own national interests, adding more may lead to gridlock, the UNSC will fall victim to political impasse, conflicting interests, inflexibility and inability to accommodate future change. In addition, consultations with capitals, time zone differences, and multiple languages add to the burden. An overextended and underfunded UNSC will be weaker than ever. This led Peter Walsum [2005:2] to argue that, «No one can seriously believe a Council with 26 members can be more effective than one with 15, but it has become politically incorrect to point this out».

It is vital to focus on how to limit the use of veto, not on how to proliferate it. As far as the right of veto, that numerous states would want abolished is concerned, the elitist principle of power will undoubtedly keep it, because its abolition is, as Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett [2000: 23] note, «a splendid idea, but a fully unrealistic one». This was also ruled out on 9

August 2005, by the U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan, who described it as »utopian» attempts to either abolish the existing vetoes or create new permanent seats with veto powers. He said that, «It is utopian to think we can do it. Many member states would want to do that, but it is not possible». He added that P-5 are not willing to create additional vetoes. The most important as Annan argues, is to have «effective representation on the UNSC, and make it more democratic, to ensure that voices of other regions are heard» [Wafula Akumu, 2005:5]. In any reform exercise, there is bound to be much résistance from the beneficiaries of the status quo. The G-4-AU compromise may help break the current logjam by blending their proposals and requesting for veto power after they have been granted permanent seats in the UNSC.

The AU must recognize that under the current state-centric system, driven by national interests, proposing two veto-wielding seats must be in tandem with perceived potential support abroad. Historically, the Charter has only been amended once in 1963. Nevertheless, the P-5 vote on the 1963 amendment did not reflect their true preferences with respect to the reform proposal, but were part of the larger Cold War strategic interaction. In the event that the ongoing discusion fails to produce a new UNSC that will be responsive to the needs of all stakeholders, capable of responding to current global challenges, many countries will loose faith in the system. The worldview will therefore continue to be «might makes right». This may not only result in the dissatisfied countries looking for alternative mechanisms, outside the U.N system for dealing with international peace and security, but also in the elite states losing a very important tool for pursuing their national interests under the guise of international security. There is also the option, at least in theory, of discarding this system and transferring its functions to the UNGA. The future UNSC reform requires that the small states reassert their power in numbers, and vote together as they did in 1963. Although African states maintain their demand for two veto-wielding seats, but due to the fact that none has the military capabilities and influence to justify such a position, the end of the U.N Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the 59^th UNGA President, Jean Ping's tenure of office may slow the tempo of this reform project.

The UN security council reforms: myth or reality? an african analysis

CHAPTER 4
THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING AFRICAN UNION PROPOSAL OR OTHERWISE

Introduction

The UN security council reforms: myth or reality? an african analysis

CHAPTER 4THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING AFRICAN UNION PROPOSAL OR OTHERWISE

Introduction

CHAPTER 4
THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING AFRICAN UNION PROPOSAL OR OTHERWISE