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The prospect of international intervention legitimacy: case study of 2011 libyan armed conflict

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par Jean de Dieu ILIMUBUHANGA
Kigali Independent University - Master degree in public international law 2014
  

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3.2.2. The Ideology of Human Rights behind the Libyan Intervention of 2011

The ideology of Human Right is relatively old concern of customary international law. The international politics in the legality of the Libyan intervention is by evaluating the conditions in which the Libyan intervention was legitimized by the approval of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 and its analysis made so far by the voting and sanctioning of the resolution that allowed NATO's intervention.

3.3.2.1. Conditions for the Legitimization of the Libyan Intervention

In the UN debates leading up to Resolution 1973, states wanted to avoid the possibility of the intervention being perceived as an imposition of Western powers (the United States and its European allies), which was precisely what Gaddafi argued the intervention was when faced with its possibility.139(*) Thus, the resolution 1973 to be legally, they needed a rule that allowed them to intervene in this case, a resolution passed by the UNSC on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The states that chose to constrain their actions until the adoption of UNSCR 1973 exposed how international norms are increasingly influential in the consideration of state action. During adaptation of 1973 UNSCR, NATO member states have acted on moral grounds, using justifications such as humanitarian intervention as the sole basis for intervention, they chose instead to garner legal legitimacy to justify their interests.

Concerned on how 1973 UNSCR was voting and sanctioning, it noted that the Resolution 1973 was passed with ten votes in favor and five abstentions and its main contents were140(*):

· Denunciation of the flagrant and systematic violation of human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law, asking for an immediate cease-fire;

· Authorization of the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as to ensure a no-fly zone and protect civilian population;

· Authorization to States to take "all necessary measures" without any set out of rules, condition and limitation to be respect in doing so.

The choice of abstention Countries, rather than an exercise of their right to veto, showed that they were probably more concerned with avoiding a direct confrontation with Libya than with rejecting the measures laid down in the resolution. For instance states voted or abstained according to their political interests in Libya, but once the international community felt the need to intervene, it do.

As General principles, the international interventions were justified in the event of violation of the most basic human laws where categories of individuals or even entire populations, saw their existence threatened in a given country. Therefore, for example, in 1860, France intervenes militarily to Lebanon to protect the Maronite Christians. Similarly in 1964, Belgium had to mount a military operation in Stanleyville (Kisangani-DRC) four years after accession of its former colony, DRC, to independence when that city was threatened by thousands of Congolese rebels. 141(*) In such situations, it was advanced by some and the luck of attention that there exists a right, even a duty to intervene legitimizing the use of force to stop these violations of human rights. However, it is recognized that the recent practice of the United Nations in recent years is moving in this orientation, without may be forecasting all the dangers it implies.142(*)

Subsequently, the Security Council should indeed allow all Member States agreeing to cooperate to use "all necessary means" to ensure humanitarian relief in Bosnia Herzegovina (see Resolution 770 of 13 August 1992) and then to Somalia (see Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992).

These recent developments thus suggest the generalization of the practice of multilateral humanitarian interventions. Leaving aside these marginal and very exceptional human rights protection types, that protection is now organized, probably unevenly, on two levels, universal and regional.143(*) However, the legal basis for humanitarian intervention remains unclear.

In winding up, a researcher can say that whenever States were required to take a decision on the principle of non-use of armed force laid down in article 2 § 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, they argued that this provision prohibits in a general manner the use of force in international relations.

* 139 Joel P. Trachtman, "Economic Analysis of International Law," Yale Journal of International Law, 2012, pp. 65-60.

* 140 United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/Res/1973 (2011) adopted on March 17, 2011. Available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm, accessed on 12/7/2014.

* 141 Richard Falk. "Humanitarian Intervention: Elite and Critical Perspectives." Global Dialogue 2005, pp.45-47.

* 142UN Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 199.

* 143 Anne Orford. Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.122.

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