Memoire Online - International humanitarian food aid in the north-south cooperation: the case of cameroon

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID IN THE NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: THE CASE OF CAMEROON

Corso di laurea in Scienze dello Sviluppo e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Finance for Development)

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved daughter
Marie Anne Yohanna MINFOUMA ESSIMI

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

My heartfelt thanks and appreciation go to my supervisor, Professor Massimo Caneva, for his professional guidance and advices, as well as the generous support, despite his multiple occupations.

I owe special thanks to my lecturers, especially Prof. Roberto Pasca, Prof. Claudia Zaccai, and Prof. Massimo Mamberti, for their brilliant lectures, support and orientations. I am also grateful to the Erasmus Mundus ACP II Programme and the International Relations Office of Sapienza, especially Ms Mattea Capelli for the opportunity and all the support provided during the past two years.

I would warmly thank my classmates and friends Sergio Taibo, Cynthia Sumaili, Leodmila Amone, Abel Mahama, Gérard Aba'a, Sonia Medjo for our tremendous discussions and mutual encouragement. Special thanks to the Diaferio family, Jean Calvin Mbilong, Sylvie Tassi, the «Servizio Universitario Africano» for the reception and guidance in Rome.

I particularly want to acknowledge His Excellency Henri Eyebe Ayissi, Mr and Ms Bela Mengada, and Ms Marie Bernadette Ndjana for their important help.

Special gratitude to my family, my mother Thérèse Biloa, my grandmother Marie Mballa, my uncle Victor Eloundzié; and Sandrine Mballa, Martine Abena, Christelle Nga, Rodrigue Mbolo, Claude Messi, Paul Mballa, Yolande Souga, Gabriel Bothe, Jean Nti for all the love they give me.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Food security is one of the hobbyhorse of the international community, that continuously mobilizes resources when there is a crisis or natural, human or technological disaster. Providing food aid might thus contribute to help needy communities to recover and survive. To better understand how works the food aid on an international scale, we have decided to focus our thesis on the "International Humanitarian Food Aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon."

Food aid is defined as «the international sourcing of concessional resources in the form of, or for the provision of food». Our research try to answer the following fundamental questions: what is the legal structure and framework of international food aid? Who are the actors of the IFA? What are the issues or impacts on these actors? To help us answer these questions, we relied on the "theory of the gift" developed by Marcel Mauss, and which can be summarized as "the obligation to give and the obligation to receive."

Briefly, we can say that the International Food Aid (IFA) is framed by conventions, multilateral and bilateral agreements. The actors in the humanitarian sector share between donors and recipients countries of aid. Agencies and organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP) manage the multilateral food aid. The primary purpose of this aid is in the short term, to distribute food and thus, save lives in the event of major disasters or crises. However and unfortunately, that food aid is sometimes used by some donor countries as a powerful and formidable political and geo-strategic weapon to encroach on the domestic sovereignty of recipient countries.

Cameroon is a laboratory of IFA. In fact, this country has been and continues to be subject to the whims of nature. Volcanic eruptions, toxic gases, floods and other drought caused Cameroon to declare a state of emergency in some of its regions and launch calls for food donations. In addition, it should be noted that the country is home to thousands of refugees whose countries of origin, Central African Republic and Chad in the lead, face permanent political and military troubles. Cameroon therefore appears prominently in the list of IFA recipient countries.

Key words: Cameroon, International Cooperation, (International) Food Aid, Food Aid/Assistance Convention, Donor and Recipient Countries, Food Dependency.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon

UNHAS: United Nations Humanitarian Air Service UNHDR: United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

I- The concept of Food Aid..................................................... 21

III- The coordinating institution of multilateral food aid: the World Food

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Chapter III: The impact of International Food Aid.............................. 90

II- Negative impact of food aid................................................ 97

Chapter IV: The International Humanitarian Food Aid in Cameroon: conditionsof arrival, actors and consequences......................................107

II- Food aid actors in Cameroon..............................................125

III- Consequence of food aid in Cameroon: the political blackmail.. 131 Conclusion..................................................................................139 Bibliographic references.................................................................. 146 Index of figures............................................................................151 Index of tables.............................................................................. 151 Annexature.................................................................................152

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In our era, a state cannot evolve in autarky, it is obliged, in a way where another, to cooperate with other States. The idea of creating an international organization to ensure international cooperation among States has mobilized European minds for centuries. But the first attempts at international cooperation were implemented in during the 19^th century, first with the Rhine River Commission in 1815, the Danube Commission in 1856, then Administrative Unions such as the International Telegraph Union in 1865, the General Union of Post in 1878.

The concept of International Cooperation has started to evolve more positively after the First World War in 1919 with the creation of the League of Nations (LON), thanks to the principles of the Treaty of Versailles (France), under the initiative of the U.S. former president Wilson¹. International Cooperation takes momentum significantly especially after the Second World War, when the United Nations (UN) were created in 1945, replacing the LON. The history of International Cooperation seems more practical: firstly support plans to rebuild the countries of Western Europe under the Marshall Plan and other plans of mutual assistance of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in the context of the solidarity of the proletarians States; and later, the technical assistance to independent States by the former colonial powers or by developing new States.

International cooperation takes many forms. It can be technical, economic, military, political, academic, humanitarian etc. In this thesis, we are interested particularly in the humanitarian cooperation through International Food Aid (IFA) in the context of North-South cooperation. We can locate the beginning of the modern IFA in 1946, when the UN, just one year after its creation, launched the first world campaign against hunger. In Indeed, several underdeveloped countries or developing suffer permanent or temporary food crises that lead them to initiate calls to the international community. Food crises

1 Secretariat of the League of Nations, (1930) Ten Years of International Cooperation, Geneva, pp. 251-252.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

can be caused by natural disasters (drought, floods, earthquakes, etc.) or by the human being (armed conflicts, forced migration, persecution etc.). We therefore have, in one hand, recipient countries that are predominantly developing or poor countries of the South (Africa, Latin America and Asia), and in the other hand, the majority of donor countries which are developed countries of the North (Europe and North America).

Among the human rights, one of the fundamental is the right to food. Food is very important to keep people in good health and give them sufficient energy to work for the development of their locality or their territory. As many countries are facing a decrease in their agricultural production, due to human or natural causes, they are obliged to resort to food aid in order to solve this situation which could have tragic consequences on the population. The food aid can be provide bilaterally that is from a country to another, or multilaterally that is throughout international organizations or non-governmental organizations.

Through this dissertation, we would like to make the current state of International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation, its place and its hidden intentions. The fundamental questions surrounding the following topic are:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- The IFA is based on international laws, conventions and agreements among states and organizations.

- The humanitarian food aid actors are donor countries which have a surplus of agricultural production; recipient countries facing food shortages, and at the middle specialised organisations of UN and international or national NGOs.

- Despite the fact that the first aim of food aid is humanitarian i.e. to preserve life, many critics think that it is more and more a political and economic arm in hand of food aid donors.

- The IFA in Cameroon is coordinated by the WFP Country Office, in collaboration with the Cameroonian Government through the Management Committee of the FAO/WFP Assistance.

Food aid can be described as the transfer of commodities or payments close in nature, to developing countries as a form of development assistance for the provision of food. So, the humanitarian food aid is considered as a gift given by developed countries of the North to the needy countries of the South. This is precisely why in this dissertation; we are using the «Theory of the Gift», developed by the French sociologist Marcel Mauss, and which can be summarized as «the obligation to give and the obligation to receive». In his famous book The gift: the form and reason for the exchange in the archaic societies^2, he states that giving is one of the most familiar operation that does not seem appealing sociological definition states: a good changes contractor by the decision of its owner which manifests to a third a benevolent provision because it requires

2 Mauss Marcel, (1990) The gift: the form and reason for the exchange in Archaic societies, Routledge, London.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

nothing in return. For Maurice Godelier, "the top is to give as much as possible without asking in return."³

However, this liberal and "free" institution that is the gift is, regularly followed by the "counter-gift" perceived by agents or actors as legitimate, in response to the initial benefit, the original gift. Indeed, regarding the donation, "we must return, and return well, according to a precisely established code: neither too much nor too little, not too fast or too late.» The gift is indisputably a primer of a reciprocal relationship, a deferred exchange. The action of giving (a relationship that seems to materialize sympathy) is actually an aggressive dimension. For the gift creates a debt. By obliging his partner, the donor acquires on him the ascending, otherwise power. He forces him to the obligation, possibly expensive, to return and to be taken, perhaps in spite of himself, in an embarrassing climb, in a risky game which are part name, reputation, ranking, function or simply fortune.

In traditional societies, the gift is not always free and disinterested: it is often part of social constraints. The gift undertakes brand alliance, form a network of mutual ties. So, for Mauss, the gift is a

total prestation, imbued with spiritual mechanism engaging the honor of both giver and receiver. E...] The act of giving creates a gift-debt that has to be repaid. Gift exchange therefore leads to a mutual interdependence between giver and receiver. The obligation attached to a gift is not inert. Even when abandoned by the giver, it still forms a part of him. Through it, he has a hold over the recipient, just as he had, while its owner, a hold over anyone who stole it E...] It pursues not only the first recipient of it or the second or the third, but every individual to whom it is transmitted.⁴

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Revisiting The gift, Gregoire Mallard reveals that in fact, the system of gifts allowed «a family, tribe and people to leave the narrow circle of its boundaries, of its rights in order to interact with other nations, which form part of a larger human community.» But, the most important to remember is that «by rituals of gift-giving, by giving, leaders sought to establish the honor of their nations, and even the superiority of their nations over the gift-receiver.»⁵

This theory of the gift would help us to understand what lies behind the international humanitarian food aid; what are the intentions of food aid donor countries and even for the recipient countries.

The literature on food is very important and multidisciplinary. But for this specific topic on Humanitarian Food Aid and International Cooperation, we have focused on WFP and FAO reports and publications because they are the specialized UN agencies on Food Aid, more particularly the WFP. Outside of these reports, and numerous articles and communications released on specialized Reviews, we have consulted some books.

The first one is Food Aid or Food Sovereignty? Ending World Hunger in our time, of Frederic Mousseau. He tries to understand what causes hunger. For him certainly it is not scarcity because agriculture produces 17 per cent more calories per person today than it did 30 years ago, despite a 70 per cent population increase. According to the FAO, this is enough to provide everyone in the world with at least 2,720 kilocalories (kcal) per person per day. Secondly, we cannot blame nature. Food is always available for those who can afford it, even in times of natural disasters such as droughts and floods. Starvation during hard times hits only the poorest. Natural disasters are simply the final push over the edge. So if it is not nature or scarcity, the cause of hunger for Mousseau is the scarcity of democracy and the denial of human rights. Hunger

5 Mallard Grégoire, (2010) «The Gift Revisited: Marcel Mauss on war, Debt and the Politics of Nations», in Buffet Center for International and Comparative Studies, working paper N° 10-004.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

is linked to the denial of a living wage to the working poor and land to the landless, for example. While, right now, the resources exist to end hunger worldwide, those resources continue to be exploited by few. The solution is to implement politics of courage, by converting profits for few into peoples' welfare, by demanding that governments and international institutions serve human interest instead of corporate portfolios, so that our fellow human beings do not starve in the midst of plenty.

Barret Christopher and Maxwell Daniel's book entitled Food aid after fifty years: recasting its role, released in 2005 is a tremendous contribution to the understanding of contemporary food aid.

Jean Ziegler also appears as one of the greatest contributors on the understanding of hunger in the world. From 2000 to 2008, he has been the ever first UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, and from 2008 to 2012 he was member of the Advisory Committee on the UN Human Rights Council. The recent book he released in 2011 (reviewed in July 2012) is Destuction Massive. Géopolitique de la faim⁶. He analyses the progression of malnutrition and hunger in the world by emphasizing the effects they induce in those who suffer. He is especially outrageous that the planet, which experts agree it is now able to feed 12 billion people, accommodates this situation. He then presents the situation of the two specialized UN agencies i.e. the FAO and the WFP. For him, WFP only respond to emergencies and lacks sufficient resources, while FAO has turned into bureaucracy that would be lost on the way. The two barriers that currently stand in the way of the «Right to Food» are the increased production of biofuels competing agricultural land, and land speculation. Millions of hectares of agricultural land are now purchased by Hedge Funds and depriving farmers of their livelihood. The solution is to redirect and consider that food should be seen as a public good and protected from predatory finance.

6 Until now, there is no English translation of the book. So we could translate the title saying «Mass destruction. Geopolitics of hunger.»

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

This work is divided into four chapters. In the first part, we talk about the legal basis of International Food Aid before the presentation of the different types of IFA. The second chapter is dedicated to the actors of the IFA which are the donor countries, the recipient countries and the UN agency which coordinate the multilateral IFA: the World Food Program (WFP). In the third chapter, we try to identify the effects or impacts of IFA both in donor and recipient countries. The fourth and last chapter of this thesis is a practical example of the IFA in a country precisely Cameroon. So, we focus in the conditions of the IFA in Cameroon, i.e. the natural disasters faced by this country (the most recent are the floods in the North Region in September 2012); and the forced migration in the neighbouring countries (especially armed conflicts in the Central African Republic and the Chad). Then we introduce the main actors of IFA in Cameroon, namely the WFP Country Office and the Management Committee of FAO/WFP Assistance. And finally, we analyse the specific consequences of IFA in this country.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The right to food has been recognized as a fundamental human right since the inception of the international human rights regime7. This right is protecting the right for people to feed themselves in dignity, implying that sufficient food is available, that people have the means to access it, and that it adequately meets the individual's dietary needs. The right to food protects the right of all human beings to be free from hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 in its Article 25 recognizes the right to food as part of the right to an adequate standard of living:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

Then, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted in 1966 recognized «the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger». It states in his Article 11.2 that:

The States Parties to the present Covenant... shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.

7 Golay Christophe and Melik Özden (2006) The Right to Food: A fundamental human right affirmed by the United Nations and recognized in regional treaties and numerous national constitutions, CETIM Human Rights Programme Brochure.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

At the 1996 World Food Summit held in Rome, governments reaffirmed the right to food and committed themselves to half the number of hungry and malnourished from 840 to 420 million by 2015. However, the number has increased over the past years, reaching an infamous record in 2009 of more than 1 billion undernourished people worldwide.

In 1999, the right to food was interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in the General Comment 12 establishing that: «The right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has the physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement».

In addition, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food also defined the right to food as:

The right to have regular, permanent and unrestricted access, either directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensure a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear.

In a world prone to natural and human disasters food aid can be lifesaving. However food aid has been challenged as not always being the most appropriate response to food insecurity, whether chronic or emergency. One life affecting consideration is that of timeliness, ensuring the quickest response to emergencies. The efficiency of food aid delivery has also been questioned whereas shipment from donor countries is extremely costly, and the people that are the most food insecure are effectively not reached. Africa has one third of its population suffering from chronic hunger, the highest ratio worldwide. Currently 300 million Africans live on less than USD 1 per day. In Southern Africa 40% of the region's population is said to be suffering from chronic food

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

insecurity8. As a result, food aid has started flowing into countries hit by food shortages in the region, and hence started interacting with local food production and trading systems.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the concept of Food Aid. Food Aid is a multifaceted instrument the diversity of which merits an introduction to the relevant issues and terminology. The concept of Food Aid was created with an almost selfish motive by Americans. The Food Aid was started in the 1950s, primarily as a way to dispose of a surplus production of crops in the US, and this method has since evolved conceptually, politically and institutionally. US farmers suddenly found themselves with a surplus of cotton, wheat, beef, dairy and tobacco, and many of these products could not be absorbed locally. As a solution to the problem, politically conscious farmers' organisations engaged the government to protect their interest: Legislation in the form of public law was passed, creating a food aid facility outside the US. The main focus was to ensure that markets for the surpluses were established outside the US. Food aid made it possible to dispose of surplus stock and create a mechanism of exchange between consumers and disposers of surpluses.

After this brief historical presentation, we will be presenting the definition of food aid, its composition and the different categories. Food Aid is a generic term which encompasses a range of instruments and interventions. The common perception is that Food Aid is the hand-out of food in a situation of food shortage, usually in Asia or Africa. However, as noted by Barrett and Maxwell, «by this standard, Americans would be among the world's most numerous food aid recipients because of the extent of the United States' school feeding, temporary assistance to needy families, food stamps, and other food assistance programs.»⁹

8 NEPAD Secretariat, (2009) Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP): Framework for African Food Security Pillar III. Midrand, South Africa at page 9.

9 Barret Christopher, Maxwell Daniel, (2005) Food aid after fifty years: recasting its role, Routledge, London, p.8.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Though there would be a certain interest for study and comparison, we do not look at food aid interventions in northern countries, such as US domestic food programs, and focuses on International Food Aid, i.e. flows of food (or cash to purchase food) from rich countries to poorer ones, generally developing countries.

A- Definition of Food Aid

Aid can be defined as money, food or anything sent to another country to help it. It is basically the help, support or assistance given to an individual, family, community or nation in need.

In discussing Food Aid, policy experts use a large body of specialized terminology. Unfortunately, in many instances, terms are loosely defined or not defined at all and confusion results. We therefore introduce this discussion of food aid by establishing a common vocabulary to be used throughout. Let us start with a definition of food aid; at first glance this seems an easy task, but as recently as 2003 at a meeting in Berlin even food aid experts struggled to agree on a definition for Food Aid. The definition that resulted from the meeting (but was by no means the result of a consensus) was the following:

The definition of Food Aid should not just be focused on its source of funding, or by specific transactions, such as `items donated from external donors to recipient', but should include consideration of a) all related international and domestic actions and programs, and b) the role of non-food resources brought to bear jointly with food to address key elements of hunger problems. As such, food aid can be understood as all food supported interventions aimed at improving the food security of poor people in the short and long term, whether funded via international, national public and private resources.¹⁰

10 Von Braun J., (2003) «Berlin statement prepared as policies against hunger II: defining the role of food aid» 2-4 September, 2003.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

This definition is more expansive than definitions of food aid that are generally used or implied by the literature. The Berlin definition includes all domestic actions and domestically funded distribution of food as well as nonfood resources used in combination with food for food security purposes. As such, the Berlin definition of food aid is more similar to what is regarded as the generally recognized definition of Food Based Interventions (FBIs). FBIs are food distribution, market intervention, or financial transfers which are funded nationally or internationally and which improve food security. We use the definition of food aid provided by Barrett and Maxwell which is more restrictive and in keeping with that used in the academic literature to date; it is also consistent with the FAO register of the 22 transactions that are considered food aid, 16 of which are subject to CSSD regulation and 6 of which are exempt from the UMR. Barrett and Maxwell define food aid as, «the international sourcing of concessional resources in the form of, or for the provision of food.»

This definition limits food aid to international assistance in the form of food or that results in the procurement of food, but does not qualify food aid as assistance that affects food security. In this sense food aid is distinguishable from food based interventions in that food aid does not necessarily improve the food security of beneficiaries, and it is not nationally funded.

In the broader context food aid is related to the wider concept of «food security». Food security was defined by the 1996 World Food Summit of the FAO, which couched the term as follows in the World Food Summit Plan of Action, at paragraph 1: «Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life».

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

B- Composition of Food Aid

From its inception the majority of food aid has consisted of cereal grains; wheat is the most typical commodity followed by maize, rice and other commodities. During the late 1970s at least 500,000 MT or 5% of global food aid was distributed in the form of non-cereal commodities. Data for the beginning of the 21st century show non-cereal food aid as representing about 1.5 million MT or between 10 and 15% of total global food aid shipments by weight at. FAOSTAT data on non-cereal food aid are not available before 1977 and from 1977 to 1986; data for non-cereal food aid are incomplete as they include only quantities of food aid in four non-cereal commodities: skimmed milk powder, vegetable oil, butter oil and other dairy products. The apparent increase in non-cereal food aid from 1977 to present levels is therefore likely the result of both more complete data and an actual increase in volumes of non-cereal food aid. Pulses and vegetable oils are the most common non-cereal commodity by weight. Included in non-cereal deliveries are dry milk products which have recently been contested due to their large volume relative to production.

The composition of food aid donations has changed significantly over the years: the shares of cereals, non-cereals and pulses have increased along with more donations of micronutrients and iodized salt.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Cereals accounted for 93 per cent of deliveries, and non-cereals for the remaining 7 per cent. Compared with 2010, the share of cereals decreased by 1 per cent; non-cereals increased by the same percentage.

The share of cereals increased by 4 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa and by 5 per cent in the Middle East; there were decreases of 8 per cent in Asia, 1 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a negligible decrease in Eastern Europe and the CIS. The five countries receiving the most cereals were: Ethiopia (19 per cent), Pakistan (10 per cent), Kenya (7 per cent), the Sudan (5 per cent) and Mozambique (4 per cent).

Deliveries of blended and fortified foods - corn-soya blend, Faffa (a formula for infants, commercially produced in Ethiopia) and Nutrimix - amounted to 92,000 mt. The products Plumpy'nut - a peanut-based paste for the treatment of severe/acute malnutrition - and Nutri- Butter - a nutritional supplement in the form of ready-to-use paste - more than doubled their share of the «other non-cereal» category.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Food type		2010		2011
Food type		Mt (000)	%	Mt (000)	%
Cereals		5 539	94	3 798	93
	Wheat and wheat flour	3 254	55	2 117	52
	Rice	682	12	566	14
	Coarse grains	1 409	24	1 024	25
	Blended/Fortified	194	3	92	2

Non- cereals		338	6	270	7
	Dairy products	4	0	5	0
	Meat and fish	2	0	8	0
	Oils and fats	151	3	101	2
	Pulses	145	2	121	3
	Other non-cereals	35	1	34	1

Table 1 shows that food aid deliveries of all categories except meat, fish and dairy products declined from 2010 levels: i) rice fell by 17 per cent, but its share of cereals increased by 2 per cent; ii) coarse grains fell by 27 per cent, but their share of cereals rose by 1 per cent; and iii) pulses fell by 17 per cent, but their share of non-cereals rose by 1 per cent.

C- Categories of Food Aid

Food aid is categorized according to the way it is provided by donors and used by recipient countries. According to the WFP, there are 3 forms of Food Aid: Programme Food Aid, Project Food Aid and Relief or Emergency Food Aid. Each has its own set of donor legislation, procedures, sources of financing and methods of operation.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Project Food Aid, is donated to support specific activities and projects, often related to promoting agricultural or economic development, nutrition and food security, such as food for work and school feeding programs. For Sijm, «Project Food Aid is food aid meant to support specific projects. Its particularly

11 Sijm J., (1997) Food Security and policy interventions, Amsterdam, Thesis Publishers, p.473.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

includes food-for-work (FFW) projects and supplementary feeding-nutrition projects for young children and other vulnerable groups.»¹²

Clay and Stokke define Project Food Aid as «the supplying of food as a precondition for sustainable development, for example food-for-work programmes, dairy development and nutrition projects for building capital.»¹³

Project Food Aid is mostly distributed directly to the participants involved, but occasionally it is partly monetised to finance some, or all, local project costs. It is usually aimed at transferring income to the poor or at satisfying their minimum national needs in normal years. This type of Food Aid is often disbursed through NGOs or WFP, and is used to support school feeding programmes or FFW schemes.

3- Relief or Emergency Food Aid

Relief, or Emergency Food Aid constituted only a modest part of overall food aid until the 1990s and it is only in the last decade that it has become the major form of food aid. It is distributed for free in countries facing situations of food insecurity. For Sijm, this form of Food Aid

is used for humanitarian purposes in the aftermath of crises caused by natural disasters or conflicts. It is generally related to immediate actions and relief operations of assistance provided for free to refugees and displaced people E...] This type of food aid has become the most important category of the total food aid to sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁴

Relief Food Aid may be provided under government-to-government agreements or through public and private agencies or inter-governmental organisations such as the World Food Programme (WFP), non-governmental

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

organizations (NGOs) or other multilateral organisations. It is However, a number of countries facing some forms of chronic food insecurity have also become permanent recipients of this form of aid. This last category of Food Aid is the one which interest us in this thesis.

Category Delivery mode		Mt (000)	%
Emergency		2 734	100
	Direct transfer	1 086	40
	Triangular purchase	654	24
	Local purchase	994	36
Project		1 226	100
	Direct transfer	975	80
	Triangular purchase	79	6
	Local purchase	172	14
Programme		108	100
	Direct transfer	104	96
	Triangular purchase	4	4
	Local purchase	-	-

Table 2: 2011 Global Food Aid Deliveries by Category and delivery mode. Source: WFP

The following figures concern the year 2011¹⁵. 67% of food aid delivered was for emergency operations; project food aid accounted for 30% and the remaining 3% was programme food aid. Programme food aid decreased by 59% and project food aid by 4%. The reduction in emergency food aid resulted mainly from a significant decline in direct transfers. 91% of food aid channelled through WFP was delivered for emergencies; the remaining 9% - 224,000 mt - was for project use. In terms of damage caused by natural disasters, 2011 was the costliest year ever; the earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March was the single biggest disaster. The largest responses to natural disasters were made for the Horn of Africa drought and flooding in Pakistan and Cambodia.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Emergency food aid fell by 1.6 million mt in 2011, 37% less than in 2010. Emergency food aid for Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Middle East and North Africa accounted for 96% of deliveries. Latin America and the Caribbean received 4%, and Eastern Europe and CIS received negligible quantities. The main deliveries to countries were as follows, by region:

- Sub-Saharan Africa - Ethiopia 37%, Kenya 14%, the Sudan 13% and Somalia 10%;

- Middle East and North Africa - Occupied Palestinian Territory 43%, Yemen 21% and Libya 17%;

- Latin America and the Caribbean - Haiti 62%, Guatemala 15% and Colombia 15%.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In the quest to foster food security there are some key international regulatory mechanisms that address themselves to the topic of food aid. We try to describe these regulatory mechanisms.

The Food Aid Convention (FAC) is arguably the most significant source of international food aid regulation in the global context. The importance of the FAC is that it is the only instrument under international law whereby donor countries have undertaken firm obligations to provide food aid. The FAC forms part of the International Grains Agreement (IGA) of 1995. The sister convention to the FAC is the Grains Trade Convention (GTC). The relationship is important because the existence of the FAC is tied to the existence of the IGA. The treaties are administered by the secretariat of the International Grains Council (IGC) based in London. The current FAC has its roots back in 1967 and its current incarnation is the 1999 version which has been renewed up to the present date. The GTA has a longer history dating back to the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions and the GATT in the late 1940's.

The International Grains Agreement of 1967 was intimately linked to the trading regime and was concluded in the context of the GATT's Kennedy Round. At that time several international commodity agreements were concluded with a view to managing international commodity trade. In the grain sector there was a tightening of grain market supply and thus with stocks available for use as food aid being low, an incentive for food aid donors to share their aid supply loads with other donor countries emerged. This explains the present day linkage between the IGC and the WTO¹⁶ and the present

16 The 1994 WTO Agreement on Agriculture still makes direct reference to the FAC in its Article 10.4.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

sequencing of negotiations in the Fac to follow in tandem but subsequent to those of the Doha Development Agenda, as elaborated in paragraph 2.2.5. Historically the FAC took its negotiating lead from the GATT, and today this remains the position with the FAC now taking this lead from the WTO.

Related to the FAC, the GTC covers trade in wheat, maize, barley, sorghum and more recently oil seeds and rice. The GTC aims to foster international cooperation in the grain trade; to promote expansion, openness and fairness in the grains sector; to contribute to grain market stability and to enhance world food security. These aims are operationalised through market transparency, information collation, discussion and analysis as regards the international grain markets.

2- Objectives

The objectives of this FAC are essentially two-fold. Firstly to contribute to global food security and secondly to improve the ability of the international community to respond to food emergencies and other food needs of developing countries. In particular these two objectives will be fostered by:

- Making appropriate levels of food aid available on a predictable basis using the FAC.

- Encouragement in ensuring that the food aid is targeted at the alleviation of hunger (and poverty) of the most vulnerable groups.

- Providing food aid consistent with agricultural development in recipient countries.

- Maximising the impact, the effectiveness and quality of food aid granted so as to be a tool in support of food security.

- Providing a platform for coordination and information sharing on food aid matters.

- The pursuit of improved coherence between food aid and other policy instruments.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

3- Commitments

The members of the FAC are Argentina, Australia, Canada, European Community (EC), Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the United States (US). In practice these donors pledge to provide a minimum amount of food aid to developing countries in the form of grains and other eligible products each year. The text of the convention itself defines what these quantities of donated food should be, and determines that all products provided must meet international quality standards, and be consistent with the dietary habits and nutritional needs of recipients. The pledges under the FAC are as follows:

These are minimum tonnages, and these are usually exceeded. The overall aim is to provide double this amount. The FAC's preamble and Article I stipulate that the objective is actually to commit at least 10 million tonnes of food aid annually. This is mainly in the form of grain but also includes other accepted food products suitable for human consumption, like rice, oil or sugar. An increasing proportion of FAC food aid is purchased locally within the recipient country or in neighbouring developing countries, supporting the agricultural sector and local food markets. These triangular transactions help to boost regional agricultural trade, while the rise in local purchases has greatly

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

reduced the food aid component in international trade flows, according to the IGC. Note that countries not listed in the above table can still provide food aid; they simply do not have a treaty obligation to do so. The treaty does not allow for the participation of recipient countries. Given the area of impact of the undertakings under the FAC, African countries are thus glaringly absent in their participation under the Convention.

The advantage of this formalised treaty, participation aside, is that FAC members make food aid available to developing countries with the greatest needs on a predictable basis, and theoretically this is not related to fluctuations in world food prices and supplies.

To achieve greater efficiency in food aid operations there is an emphasis on the monitoring and evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of food aid operations. Rules 9 and 10 of the FAC require each member report of each of its food aid operations which form part of its treaty contributions including those channelled through international organizations or NGO's. The FAC is operationalised through a food aid committee (Fac) which consists of all parties (signatories) to the FAC. It is these donor members, distinct from observers, who operate the tactical side of the business, mainly by exchanging information on food aid needs and operations.

The Fac monitors the performance of its members' undertakings under the Convention on the basis of records maintained by the IGC Secretariat. Information supplied under Rule 9 is detailed in a 12 point reporting list and ranges from information on price to details of third country purchases done using cash donations. It shares information on policy developments affecting food aid and discusses the world food situation and prospects in developing countries. It also considers ways in which donors' aid efforts may best achieve their objectives, with emphasis on the evaluation of world food needs and on

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

the effectiveness and impact of food aid operations on those receiving the food aid. The Fac usually holds two meetings a year in June and December. The Fac sessions may also be attended by invited observers from international organisations concerned with food aid. These include the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Countries party to the IGC can also request observer status at these meetings¹⁷.

Notable in recent times is the participation at Fac meetings of government observers from some new potential members. South Africa has been the only African country to show an interest in this regard, and has been admitted as an observer to the proceedings on several occasions since July 2004. The Secretariat has felt encouraged by this `new' interest.

The Food Aid Committee deals formally with the ongoing business under the Convention but also has informal meetings in order for FAC members to share ideas on the objectives and form of a new Convention on food aid. At these informal discussions, ongoing since 2008, it has been confirmed that the FAC would take its cue from the WTO as to its own renegotiation and that any formal negotiations would have to take into account the outcome of the ongoing WTO agriculture negotiations. It was agreed that there is indeed space to improve the operation of the Fac under the existing FAC, notably as regards information exchange and the coordination of donor activities. In looking to a future incarnation of the FAC, the Fac members agreed to explore how the FAC could be improved by expanding the list of eligible products for donation and reviewing some of the

17 South Africa has participated in the FAC using this method of attendance, being a long standing member of the IGC. The fact that South Africa had itself become a modest donor also played a role.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

procedural rules. The example was cited of donations of fortified products and micronutrients being added as eligible products in addition to the present grains, pulses, oil, root crops, sugar and milk powder.

In deference to the decision to await progress from the WTO negotiations it was agreed that the FAC of 1999 (as extended) should be renewed for yet another term to be decided and made effective from 1 July 2009¹⁸. It is notable that resigning the FAC has been on ice as it were since June 2004 based on the premise that the WTO negotiations need to set the pace and that the FAC can then take its lead from the WTO. This is reminiscent of the birth of the FAC during the Kennedy trade round of the late 1960's. Note also that the linkage between the FAC and the WTO is emphasised by an exchange of letters of understanding as between the FAC and the WTO.

The FAC is not only cross linked to the WTO, but also to the FAO. In this regard note that Article IX of the FAC makes reference to the requirement that food aid transactions are executed so as to be consistent with the FAO's `Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations' (CSSD).

After the FAC expiration in 2007, negotiations were held to continue the mechanism of regulation of food aid world widely. The FAC is indeed the latest in a long series of such multilateral cooperation instruments and it was adopted on 25 April 2012 in London. Following the deposit of instruments of ratification by 6 Parties (EU, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland and the United States), as at 30 November 2012, the Food Assistance Convention entered into force on 1 January 2013.

18 Meeting of the Food Aid Committee, FAC Press Release, 16th December 2008.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The objectives of the Food Assistance Convention are to save lives, reduce hunger, improve food security, and improve the nutritional status of the most vulnerable populations by:

- addressing the food and nutritional needs of the most vulnerable populations through commitments made by the Parties to provide food assistance that improves access to, and consumption of, adequate, safe and nutritious food;

- ensuring that food assistance provided to the most vulnerable populations is appropriate, timely, effective, efficient, and based on needs and shared principles; and

- facilitating information-sharing, cooperation, and coordination, and providing a forum for discussion in order to improve the effective, efficient, and coherent use of the Parties' resources to respond to needs.

The new FAC was open for signature to many other states, in accordance with article 12. To meet the objectives of this Convention, each Party agrees to make an annual commitment of food assistance, set in accordance with its laws and regulations. Each Party's commitment is referred to as its «minimum annual commitment» as follow: Australia A$80m. ; Austria : €1.495m.; Canada: C$250m.; Denmark: DKK185m.; European Union : €300m. ; Finland : €6m. ; Japan : JPY10bn. ; Luxembourg: €4m.; Russia: $15m.; Slovenia: €30,000; Sweden; SEK200m.; Switzerland: CHF34m; United States of America: $1.6bn.

Up to now, 3 sessions of the Fac were organized: the first on 15 February 2013. The same year, the 11th and 12th November, was held the second session. From the 29 to the 30 May 2014, the third session took place. On 17 and 18 November 2014, is scheduled the fourth session.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

B- The FAO Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD)

The origin of the FAO Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) harks back to 1954. Unlike the FAC the CSSD includes both donor and recipient developing country governments among its members, with a number of international organizations and NGOs, notably the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP), being admitted.

The CSSD constructed what are known as the FAO's «Principles of Surplus Disposal»¹⁹ (the Principles). It should be stated upfront that this is a non-binding code of good practice for food aid transactions. According to the FAO these Principles look to ensure that agricultural commodities which are exported on concessionary²⁰ terms result in additional consumption for the recipient country and do not displace normal commercial imports. Likewise domestic production should not be discouraged or otherwise adversely affected. The Principles are not a binding instrument and they do not represent a commitment but only intent by signatory countries. They assist governments to focus on their responsibilities as parties to concessionary transactions and to avoid the potential for disagreements. The interests of food aid recipients are safeguarded by the Principles which emphasize the importance of increasing consumption rather than restricting supplies. The interests of exporting countries are protected by the undertaking that such disposals should be made without harmful interference with normal patterns of production and international trade; by assurances against resale or transhipment of commodities supplied on concessionary terms.

It is notable that the Principles are specifically referred to in Article 10.4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture together with the reference to the FAC. In practice, the CSSD addresses programme food aid where aid is given

19 FAO, (2000) A Guide for Members of the FAO Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal, Rome, p. 7. The description is paraphrased from this source.

20 «Concessional»: Terms relating to price or to other conditions of sale or payment more favourable than those obtainable in the open market.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

through untargeted government to government transfers. In contrast, project and emergency food aid (usually targeted to vulnerable groups, linked to humanitarian or development activities, and carried out by NGOs or the WFP) are generally regarded as additional to commercial exports. Because it operates under the umbrella of the FAO's Committee on Commodity Problems it is able to draw on the FAO's expertise on agricultural trade, food aid, and food security. However, the Principles of Surplus Disposal are non-binding commitments and, like the FAC, the CSSD has no enforcement powers.

A further concept of the FAO's CSSD to consider here are the «Usual Marketing Requirements» (UMR's). The UMR is a commitment by the recipient country of food aid to maintain a normal level of commercial imports of the same commodity and is based on a rolling average of the last five years of commercial imports. Its aim is to ensure that food aid results in additional consumption and that there is no adverse impact on commercial trade. UMRs are thus required to be negotiated between the supplying and recipient countries and included as part of their contractual arrangement in any case in point involving these concessionary transactions. The UMR concept primarily safeguards the interest of donor countries. It is interesting that the FAC, post 1995, ceased to mention the UMRs. The provision addressing the issue simply provides that food aid transactions must be carried out consistently with the FAO «Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations»²¹. Thus the inclusion of UMR provisions in food aid agreements between donor and receiving countries is not a requirement under international law, however it is not prohibited either.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The CSSD is based in Washington D.C. rather than at the FAO Headquarters in Rome. Its location, its name and its focus on surplus proposal clearly reflect the concerns of competing food exporting countries around the use of food aid in an open economy rather than on hunger in recipient countries. Its main function is to avoid the displacement of commercial imports by food aid and it does not

constitute an instrument favouring an adequate use of food aid to fight hunger.²²

C- The World Trade Organisation

The WTO has assumed a primary role in the food aid arena as food aid is closely linked to trade, as was evident in looking at the FAC and FAO structures earlier. In addition we noted that the revision of the primary international food aid instrument, the FAC, is being held on ice pending progress in the Doha Round of trade negotiations. One of the reasons why the WTO has developed a prominence in the food aid arena is because it has a binding and enforceable dispute settlement system which is absent in the FAC and the FAO. In addition to its WTO unique provisions, the WTO's legal text does also make cross reference to both the FAC and the FAO treaties within its texts, thus confirming the authority of the WTO to deal across the three treaties in a manner of speaking. The two places where food aid is notable in the WTO aquis is firstly under the Agreement on Agriculture and secondly in the «Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries». These are now discussed in turn.

22 Mousseau Frederic, (2005) Food Aid or Food Sovereignty? Ending World Hunger in our time, The Oakland Institute, p.6.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

When the WTO Agreement on Agriculture was negotiated food exporting countries were suspicious that International Food Aid might be used by some large subsidy using countries as a ruse to avoid their reduction commitments on export subsidies, which were essentially prohibited save for those scheduled. The essence of the concern is that the distinction between food aid and commercial sales can be unclear and it may happen that a country claims to be providing food aid while it is really exporting food at a subsidized price, on what would be a purely commercial sale absent of the subsidy. It is for this reason that Article 10 on the prevention of circumvention of export subsidy commitments found its way into the agreement. The aim was to ensure that there was no foul play while at the same time recognising that there was a perfectly legitimate role for aid²³. The text of Article 10.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture is directly addressed at food aid donors and lists 3 conditions that they must adhere to. Interestingly the text makes cross reference to the FAC and to the FAO and thus includes their disciplines by way of borrowing and subsuming these disciplines. In short:

- Donors cannot «tie» (that is conditionally connect) international food aid directly or indirectly to commercial exports to the recipient country.

- Food aid transactions, including aid which is monetized, must adhere to the FAO's `Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations' and the system of UMRs.

- The food aid must be provided to the extent possible fully in grant form or on terms `no less concessional' than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986.²⁴

23 This is supported by a reading of the preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture which indicates that «commitments under the reform programme should be made in an equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the environment.»

24 The 1986 FAC today equates to the 1999 FAC as currently renewed to July 2011.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In addition to this Article 10.3 is also informative in assigning the burden of proof in instances where there is suspicion of export subsidy commitments being flaunted. The provision requires that a country claiming that a quantity of a food product exported in excess of its reduction commitment levels is not subsidized (as would be the case for food aid shipments), that exporter has the onus to establish that no export subsidy has been granted in respect of the quantity of exports in question. This is a stringent provision as the onus is squarely on the exporter to justify the claim that he remains within his WTO obligations.

The preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture states that `commitments under the reform programme should be made in an equitable way [..] taking into account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform programme on least- developed and net food-importing developing countries'. This is then addressed in substance in Article 16 where the link is made to the so-called «Decision». The text states that developed countries must take actions provided for in the «Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries» (LDCs & NFIDCs).

Essentially in the Decision it is recognised that while the implementation of the Uruguay Round will generate increasing opportunities for trade expansion, in the scheduled reform programme LDCs and NFIDCs may experience constraints in the availability of adequate supplies of basic foods. It is this concern that the Decision serves to address. The Decision has three main thrusts. It determines that:

- There will be a review the level of food aid established periodically under the FAC and to initiate negotiations' in the appropriate forum to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- Full consideration under donor aid programmes should be given to requests for technical and financial assistance to LDCs and NFIDCs to improve agricultural productivity and related infrastructure.

In looking ahead we see that although the elimination of commercial displacement is the primary objective, all food aid deliveries, both emergency and non- emergency, will be subject to some basic provisions such as the food aid being needs driven, provided in fully grant form, not tied to commercial exports of agricultural or other goods and services and not linked to market development objectives. These disciplines, which are important for many WTO Members, simply underlie the fundamental rationale and purpose of food aid and that food aid should not be used as a means to profit in other areas of international trade; i.e. food aid should not be used as a means to develop market share via increased access to one country's product which gains a foot hold with local consumers who then purchase the good, or tied to the provision of the purchase of other goods and services in the donor country.

Food aid has been one of the more controversial issues in the WTO Doha negotiations on agriculture. To some extent this was based on substantive issues as some WTO Members sought to restrain what they considered to be the circumvention of export subsidy commitments by the US through large quantities of food aid donated in-kind. But, to some extent some countries' positions were political as they were giving up export subsidies and wanted to make sure others made equivalent commitments for any export support provided through food aid, export credits and exporting state trading enterprises. However, nobody wanted to create a situation where new WTO

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

disciplines could restrict future food aid transactions. To ensure that the new disciplines do not create problems for genuine food aid, WTO Members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining adequate levels of food aid and that the food aid disciplines do not unintentionally impede the delivery of food aid provided to deal with emergency situations.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In the IFA field, there are many actors. In one side, we have those who provide food known as food aid donors; and in the other those who benefit of this aid, the recipients. Food aid could be provided bilaterally i.e. directly from one donor government to the recipient government; multilaterally specially through the WFP, and finally through NGOs. Since 2000, donor commitment to multilateral food aid has increased by 75 per cent in response to food security challenges in the poorest countries. The percentage of bilateral food aid reached its lowest reported level in 2011, as it can be seen in the figure below:

Contemporary IFA was initiated by the USA and Canada in the early 1950s. The US immediately became the largest provider of food aid, a predominant position that has been maintained over the past fifty years, with millions of tons of US-produced food transported and dispatched to all continents.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

A- The United States of America25

For almost six decades, the United States has played a leading role in global efforts to alleviate hunger and malnutrition and to enhance world food security through the sale on concessional terms or donation of U.S. agricultural commodities. The objectives for foreign food aid include providing emergency and humanitarian assistance in response to natural or manmade disasters, and promoting agricultural development and food security. In its FY2014 budget submission to Congress, the Administration proposes major changes in the funding and structure of both emergency and development food aid programs.

U.S. international food aid programs have traditionally been authorized in farm bills. The most recent of such bills, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246), authorized through FY2012 and amended international food aid programs. These programs are administered either by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) or by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Average annual spending on international food aid programs over the decade 2002-2011 was approximately $2.2 billion. In recent years, the volume of emergency food aid has exceeded the amount of nonemergency or development food aid. The 2008 farm bill provides for a «safe box» for funding of non-emergency development assistance projects was set at $400 million for 2013.

The U.S. government has provided food aid primarily through six program authorities:

- Food for Peace Act (historically referred to as P.L. 480); - Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949;

25 The information about US food aid has been collected in Hanrahan E. Charles, (2013) International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program (IFECN); and

The Food for Peace Act (FPA), historically referred to as P.L. 480, is the main legislative vehicle that authorizes foreign food assistance. Over the decade 2002-2011, FPA typically accounted for 50%-90% of total annual international food aid spending. FPA food aid has several stated objectives, including combating world hunger and malnutrition and their causes; promoting sustainable agricultural development; expanding international trade; fostering private sector and market development; and preventing conflicts. FPA is comprised of four primary programs, which are each listed under a different title and have different objectives. The FPA components include:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- Title I, Economic Assistance and Food Security, which makes available long-term, low-interest loans to developing countries and private entities for their purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities to support specific projects;

- Title II, Emergency and Private Assistance, which provides for the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to meet emergency and nonemergency food needs;

- Title III, Food for Development, which makes government-to-government grants available to support long-term growth in the least developed countries; and

- Title V, Farmer-to-Farmer Program, which finances short-term volunteer technical assistance to farmers, farm organizations, and agribusinesses in developing and transitional countries.

Over the past 10 years, Title II has become the largest vehicle for U.S. food aid shipments. In the early years of P.L. 480, Title I funding typically dwarfed that of other programs, but since 1980 it has declined by more than 90%. At the same time, emergency and development food aid under Title II has increased significantly since 1990, when strengthening global food security was made a formal objective of American food aid in the 1990 farm bill. Starting in FY2006, Administrations have not requested funding for any new Title I food aid programs. Title III has been inactive since FY2002. Title I of the Food for Peace Act is administered by USDA, while Titles II, III, and V are administered by USAID. Funding for Food for Peace Act programs is authorized in annual Agriculture appropriations bills. Food aid funding currently is authorized in a full fiscal year continuing resolution which expires on September 30, 2013.

A Food Aid Consultative Group (FACG) advises the USAID Administrator on food aid policy and regulations, especially related to Title II of P.L. 480. The 2008 farm bill, in addition to reauthorizing the FACG, added a

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

representative of the maritime transportation sector to the group. In addition to the maritime sector representative, the FACG membership consists of the USAID Administrator, the Under Secretary of Agriculture for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services, the Inspector General for USAID, a representative of each private voluntary organization (PVO) and cooperative participating in FPA programs, representatives from African, Asian, and Latin American indigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as determined appropriate by the Administrator of USAID, and representatives from agricultural producer groups in the United States.

Title I, Economic Assistance and Food Security, provides for sales on credit terms of U.S. agricultural commodities to developing country governments and to private entities for U.S. dollars or for local currencies. Loan agreements under the Title I credit program may provide for repayment terms of up to 30 years with a grace period of up to five years. Donations of Title I commodities can also be made through Food for Progress grant agreements. No new funding for Title I credit sales and grants has been appropriated since FY2006, although some funding has been provided to administer previously entered into Title I program agreements.

Title II, Emergency and Private Assistance, provides for donations of U.S. agricultural commodities to meet emergency and nonemergency food needs in foreign countries. Food aid provided under Title II is primarily targeted to vulnerable populations in response to malnutrition, famine, natural disaster, civil strife, and other extraordinary relief requirements. Title II food aid is also used to meet nonemergency economic development needs that address food

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

security. Emergency assistance is provided through intergovernmental organizations, particularly the WFP and PVOs, although commodities may be used in government-to-government programs. Nonemergency assistance may be provided through PVOs, cooperatives, and intergovernmental organizations. Commodities requested may be furnished from the inventory of USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), if available, or purchased in the market. The CCC also finances transportation costs, including both ocean freight and overland transport costs when appropriate. The CCC may also pay for storage and distribution costs for commodities, including pre-positioned commodities, made available to meet urgent or extraordinary relief requirements. Depending on the agreement, commodities provided under the program may be sold in the recipient country and the proceeds used to support development projects, a practice known as «monetization.»

The 2008 farm bill set the annual authorization level for Title II at $2.5 billion. This level of funding was $500 million more than the annual authorization for Title II under the 2002 farm bill. As this authorization is discretionary, it is up to annual appropriations bills to set the amount of annual Title II funding, which over the five-year life of the 2008 farm bill has averaged $1.8 billion annually. The 2008 farm bill mandated that Title II commodity donations provide an annual minimum tonnage level of 2.5 million metric tons (mmt), of which 1.875 mmt (75%) is to be channelled as nonemergency (development) assistance through the eligible organizations. This mandate can be waived by the USAID Administrator, who can make the determination that there is a greater emergency need, and/or that the mandated volume of commodities cannot be used effectively in nonemergency situations. In recent years, the volume of Title II emergency food aid has far exceeded the amount of nonemergency or development food aid.

The 2008 farm bill also authorized the use of up to $22 million annually for the monitoring and assessment of nonemergency food aid programs. This

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

provision is a response to criticism that monitoring of such programs by USAID has been inadequate due to such factors as limited staff, competitive priorities, and legal restrictions. This provision authorized the USAID Administrator to employ contractors as nonemergency food aid monitors.

In addition, the 2008 farm bill also increased the amount of Title II funding available annually from $3 million to $8 million for stockpiling and rapid transportation, delivery, and distribution of shelf-stable, prepackaged foods. Shelf-stable foods are developed under a cost-sharing arrangement that gives preference to organizations that provide additional funds for developing these products. The 2008 farm bill also reauthorized pre-positioning of commodities overseas and increased the funding for pre-positioning to $10 million annually from $2 million annually. USAID maintains that pre-positioning (at various sites in the United States and around the world) enables it to respond more rapidly to emergency food needs. Critics say, however, that the cost effectiveness of pre-positioning has not been evaluated.

Title III, Food for Development, provides for government-to-government grants to support long-term economic development in the least developed countries. Under this program, donated commodities can be sold in the recipient countries (i.e., monetized) and the revenue generated is used to support programs that promote economic development and food security, including development of agricultural markets, school feeding programs, nutrition programs, and infrastructure programs. The costs of procurement, processing, and transportation are also paid for by the U.S. government under Title III. No funding request has been made for Title III activities since 2002.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The Farmer-to-Farmer program, first authorized in the 1985 farm bill, has been reauthorized in subsequent farm bills, including the 2008 farm bill.8 The FtF program does not provide commodity food aid, but instead provides technical assistance to farmers, farm organizations, and agribusinesses in developing and transitional countries. The program mobilizes the expertise of volunteers from U.S. farms, land grant universities, cooperatives, private agribusinesses, and non-profit organizations to carry out short-term projects overseas. The 2008 farm bill provides minimum funding for the program of the greater of $10 million or 0.5% of the funds made available to Food for Peace Act programs for each year from 2008 through 2012. Special emphasis is given to activities in the Caribbean Basin and sub-Saharan Africa.

The Section 416(b) program, which is permanently authorized by the Agricultural Act of 1949, provides for the overseas donation of surplus agricultural commodities owned by the CCC. The program is administered by USDA and has been a highly variable component of food aid because it is entirely dependent on the availability of surplus commodities in CCC inventories. Section 416(b) donations may not reduce the amounts of commodities that traditionally are donated to domestic feeding programs or agencies, and may not disrupt normal commercial sales. The commodities are made available for donation through agreements with foreign governments, PVOs, cooperatives, and intergovernmental organizations. Depending on the agreement, the commodities donated under Section 416(b) may be sold in the recipient country and the proceeds used to support agricultural, economic, or infrastructure development programs. The Section 416(b) program has been inactive since FY2007 because of the unavailability of CCC-owned stocks.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The McGovern-Dole program was first authorized in the 2002 farm bill (P.L. 107-171), the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, and is administered by USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service.12 The program uses

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

commodities and financial and technical assistance to carry out school feeding programs and maternal, infant, and child nutrition programs in foreign countries. The 2008 farm bill reauthorized the program through 2012 and established USDA as the permanent home for the program. The commodities used in the program are made available for donation through agreements with PVOs, cooperatives, intergovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. Commodities may be donated for direct feeding or, in limited situations, for local sale to generate proceeds to support school feeding and nutrition projects. Priority countries under the McGovern-Dole program must demonstrate sufficient need for improving domestic nutrition, literacy, and food security.

The 2008 farm bill maintained funding for McGovern-Dole on a discretionary basis. The enacted 2013 appropriation provides $185 million for the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants. It also expanded the McGovern-Dole program by more than doubling the program from the level enacted in FY2009. The additional resources built upon an existing expansion in programming, which was included as a one-time authorization in the 2008 farm bill, of $84 million of CCC funding to the program in FY2009. The enacted appropriation also included an appropriation to the Secretary of $10 million to conduct pilot projects to develop and field-test new and improved micronutrient-fortified products to improve the nutrition of populations served through the McGovern-Dole program.

The Local and Regional Procurement Pilot Project (LRPP) was authorized as a four-year pilot program under the 2008 farm bill. The bill directed the Secretary of Agriculture to implement the pilot in developing countries and provided CCC funding totalling $60 million for 2009 through

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

2012.²⁷ Under the program, grants were provided to PVOs, cooperatives, and the WFP, to undertake the procurement activities. The primary purpose of the LRPP was to expedite the provision of food aid to vulnerable populations affected by food crises and disasters. A secondary purpose was to provide development assistance that will enhance the food consumption security of such populations. The pilot program had four phases:

USDA's evaluation report, conducted by Management Systems International and Coffey International Development, was published in December 2012.²⁸ The evaluation found that total time for LRP purchases averaged 56 days, while total time for comparable in-kind shipments to the same countries in the same time frame took an average of 130 days, that is, 74 days longer for in-kind commodities to arrive. (Evaluators did not have data on pre-positioned in-kind stocks to compare delivery times of LRP with delivery times of prepositioned in-kind commodities.) The evaluation found that for five commodity categories (unprocessed cereals, milled cereals, fortified blended foods, pulses, and vegetable oils), the in-kind commodity costs were lower than LRP commodity costs when counting commodity cost alone. However, total costs (which included ocean, inland, and internal transport, storage, and handling as well as commodity costs) were lower for LRP for every commodity category except for vegetable oils.

27 Funding will be made available as follows: $5 million in FY2009; $25 million in FY2010; $25 million in FY2011; and $5 million in FY2012.

28 USDA Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Pilot Project, Independent Evaluation Report, December 2012,

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) is a reserve of U.S. commodities and cash authorized under the Africa: Seeds of Hope Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-385). The trust is not a food aid program per se, but rather a food reserve that can be used to meet unanticipated humanitarian food aid needs in developing countries. The trust replaced the Food Security Commodity Reserve established in the 1996 farm bill and its predecessor, the Food Security Wheat Reserve, originally authorized by the Agricultural Trade Act of 1980. The 2008 farm bill reauthorized the BEHT through 2012. The program is administered under the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture.

Since 1980, the only commodity held in reserve has been wheat. The 2008 farm bill removed the previous 4 million ton cap on commodities that can be held in the trust, and provides the Secretary with the ability to exchange commodities in the trust for cash, provided the sale does not disrupt markets. It also allows the Secretary to invest the funds from the trust in low-risk, short-term securities or instruments so as to maximize its value. During 2008, USDA sold the remaining wheat in the trust (about 915,000 MT) so that currently the BEHT holds only cash (about $311 million in 2013). The cash can be used to finance activities or purchase commodities to meet emergency food needs when FPA Title II funds are not available. USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) may be reimbursed for the value of U.S. commodities released from the Emerson Trust from either P.L. 480 appropriations or direct appropriations for reimbursement. The CCC may then use that reimbursement to replenish commodities released. Reimbursement to the CCC for ocean freight and related non-commodity costs occurs through the regular USDA appropriations process.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

B- The European Union

The EU (European Commission and Member States) provided over a quarter of WFP's overall contributions in both 2011 and 2012. EU Member States' contributions amounted €829,2 million, while European Commission was €301,2 million. The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), created in 1962, is geared towards increasing agricultural productivity and food self-sufficiency. Through a combination of farm price supports and barriers to food imports, the CAP generated massive surpluses, especially wheat and animal products, which made the EU and its member states majors actors in the international food trade and food aid.

WFP welcomes the European Commission's October 2012 Communication, The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, and acknowledges the EU as the driving force behind two important regional initiatives: SHARE (Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience) and AGIR (Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative - Sahel). These initiatives aim to link short and long-term responses to emergencies, break the cycle of humanitarian crises and help people survive and regain their livelihoods.

Contributions from the EC are channelled through the EC's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection office (ECHO) and through DEVCO - the development assistance arm of the EU.

The Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection directorate, ECHO, and its development and cooperation directorate, EuropeAid, are in agreement with WFP that resilience aims to help individuals, communities and regions avoid hunger. This involves helping populations develop the tools not only for rapid recovery, but also to withstand shocks. In future, communities

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

should be able to focus on dealing with chronic issues rather than having them escalate into acute disasters.

The EC's strong operational support to WFP is accompanied by an equally significant policy component. WFP and the EC meet annually to prioritize joint activities based on WFP's 2008-2013 Strategic Plan. In 2010, both WFP and the EC agreed to prioritize for 2011 the implementation of WFP's innovative hunger solution tools such as cash and voucher programmes. Other priorities will include the nutritional components of food assistance, collaboration in the area of linking relief, rehabilitation and development, and measuring impact and outcomes in humanitarian operations.

ECHO supported WFP operations in more than 30 countries including the response following the earthquake in Haiti, the floods in Pakistan and the Sahel food security emergency. In these crises, WFP food assistance helped meet the basic nutritional needs of the affected population, particularly those of women and children.

In the immediate aftermath of the January 12 earthquake in Haiti, WFP responded with massive food distributions, reaching over 4 million people by mid-April. Following the initial response, WFP, in collaboration with Haitian authorities, supported recovery efforts by targeting the populations most at risk. With financial support from ECHO, nutritional supplements were distributed in earthquake-affected areas to children between 6 months and almost 5 years and to pregnant and nursing mothers. ECHO funding also covered meals for school-age children, nutrition interventions to prevent acute malnutrition, and food- and cash-for-work activities. On the logistics front, ECHO's funding to UNHAS - the UN humanitarian Air Service operated by WFP on behalf of the entire humanitarian community- enabled WFP to charter

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

specialized aircrafts to airlift cargo and personnel to bring assistance to the hard-to-reach areas in Haiti.

Within 24 hours of the devastating floods that hit Pakistan in August, ECHO's financial support helped WFP provide relief food assistance to almost 7 million people. This crucial support helped many households maintain adequate food consumption levels and prevented nutritional deficiencies among infants and young children. WFP also helped affected communities restore their livelihoods and assets through food- and cash-for-work activities. In those areas where markets continued to function but prices were too high for people to afford, WFP piloted a cash project as an alternative to the distribution of food rations. This project enabled beneficiaries to withdraw small amounts of cash at local established bank points. The assistance that ECHO provided to WFP's logistical support activities allowed UNHAS helicopters to be deployed to areas with the greatest emergency needs. It also facilitated WFP - as lead of the Logistics Cluster - to provide the humanitarian community with boats, hovercraft and tractor trailers to reach the most vulnerable.

Across the Sahel belt of West Africa, drought and erratic rains caused meager harvests and severe water shortages forcing the local populations to depend largely on international aid. In Chad, ECHO funding helped WFP provide food for Sudanese refugees, internally displaced persons, and host populations in Eastern Chad as well as for the refugees from the Central African Republic living in Southern Chad. WFP intensified its activities to prevent malnutrition by providing supplementary food assistance to support all children aged between 6-29 months and pregnant and lactating women. In close collaboration with partners and health authorities, WFP used ECHO funding to establish and run nutrition centres. In addition, in Chad and in the rest of the East/West African Region UNHAS played a pivotal role in providing air transportation to the entire humanitarian community.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

ECHO's contribution to WFP Aviation - the third largest donor in 2010 - helped reach millions of vulnerable people who otherwise would have been without vital assistance. In addition, for the first time in 2010, DEVCO through its local delegation, contributed to WFP Aviation. The funding directed to Afghanistan UNHAS provided a safe, efficient and cost effective air transport service to the humanitarian community while, at the same time, contributed to the development and reconstruction of the country.

- building new UN Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD) facilities in Accra, Panama and Sebang, strategic locations that allow WFP to respond immediately to emergency situations and encourage coordination among humanitarian actors;

- setting up the UNHRD network and procurement of emergency equipment to be pre-positioned by WFP;

- providing funding for a humanitarian relief stock of shelter and medicines/medical supplies available for NGOs.

Politicians across the European Union recognise that rapid emergency assistance not only saves lives, but also helps to protect resilience investments and reduce any reversal of development gains. This partially explains why 2012 was a record year for contributions to WFP from the European Commission. In 2011 and 2012, the EU supported many WFP operations, among them: droughts in the Sahel and Horn of Africa; flooding in Pakistan and Benin; conflict in Mali, Yemen and Syria; emergency food aid in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; high food prices. The European Union helped initiate the Food Security Cluster, a coordination and partnership mechanism for emergencies. As WFP Aviation's number one donor in 2011, support from the ECHO enabled the UN

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Humanitarian Air Service to ferry humanitarian cargo and aid workers quickly to isolated communities in the most inaccessible places. ECHO funding for two helicopters in Uganda provided strategic responses to emergencies all across Africa, and even as far away as Pakistan. These helicopters also facilitated WFP's life-saving assistance in border regions of South Sudan, after renewed fighting there in 2012.

The European Commission has also funded WFP assistance to people trapped in `forgotten crises', including the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, the most food insecure and malnourished in Yemen, and households living in extreme poverty in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh.

UE food aid now accounts for more than half of all European food aid contribution, whereas most member states also operate bilateral food aid programmes separately. Through these two bilateral and multilateral channels, the EU remains the second largest food aid donor since the 1970s. Here is some member states contribution to the WFP in 2011:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

DONOR	TOTAL FOOD AID	FOOD AID CATEGORY (mt)
DONOR	TOTAL FOOD AID	Emergency	Project	Programme
Belgium	6,915	5,165	1,751	-
Denmark	32,274	28,303	3,971	-
France	15,936	15,782	153	-
Germany	69,487	53,703	15,784	-
Ireland	13,532	12,716	816	-
Italy	5,435	2,205	2,483	748
Luxembourg	31,554	24,999	2,499	4,055
Netherlands	64,071	60,737	3,334	-
Norway	15,739	14,048	1,691	-
Spain	33,491	30,397	3,094	-
Sweden	54,121	54,121	-	-
Switzerland	19,669	17,809	1,860	-
United Kingdom	45,068	28,761	16,307	-

EU and the US represent around 80% of the total IFA, the rest being shared by a number of smaller donors.

C- The rest of donors

Canada was the second largest food aid donor in absolute terms until the rise of European food aid in the late 1960s. Of the top six donors, Japan provided a significant share of programme food aid; the others (Australia, Saudi Arabia or the Russian Federation) contributed primarily to emergencies and projects.

DONOR	TOTAL FOOD AID	FOOD AID CATEGORY (mt)
DONOR	TOTAL FOOD AID	Emergency	Project	Programme
Australia	118,712	109,611	9,102	-
Canada	174,659	113,918	60,741	-
Japan	262,946	120,162	42,499	100,285
Russian Federation	8,704	8,704	-	-
Saudi Arabia	83,191	76,334	6,857	-
Inter. Gov. Org.	81,534	65,430	16,104	748
NGOs	42,957	29,309	13,648	-
Private	22,171	7,417	14,753	-
United Nations	439,672	423,750	15,922	-

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The human and natural crises faced by many countries are the main reason why food aid is provided. Except of the US and European countries which receive other forms of IFA, the rest of the world benefit of food aid. At the top of the list, there is the African continent, followed by the Asian countries and then Latin American countries.

A- The African continent

More than half of the 97 million people assisted By WFP in 2012 were in Africa. These people included:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

As it is noted in the previous figure, the East and the Central regions of Africa are the great theatre of WFP interventions in this continent. The Great Lakes sub-region and some Central African countries have armed conflict crises, provoking flows of refugees and IDP who need help and assistance.

In 2012, WFP provided assistance for around 97 million people, distributing 3.5 million metric tons of food in 80 countries. Around 1.6 million metric tons of this was shipped to Africa, to 34 ports - that's nearly 75 per cent of the total amount of food WFP transported by sea. During the Sahel crisis, WFP mobilized logistics networks made up of sea ports, locally-contracted transporters, WFP-owned regional fleets, national train networks, airlifts and river barges to reach more than 5 million people spread across eight countries.

WFP devotes a higher proportion of its resources to Africa than any other United Nations agency. In 2012, WFP dedicated 66 per cent of all its operational expenditure to its work in Africa.

Table 8: WFP direct expenses¹, 2011 - 2012 (US$ thousand). Source: WFP
	2011		2012
Programme	Total	Africa	Total	Africa
Development	315 986	210 458	348 672	229 511
Relief	2 925 212	1 813 415	3 288 536	2 285 862
Emergency	1 367 243	-	-	-
PRRO	1 557 969	-	-	-
Special operations	217 619	159 250	216 068	169 855
Bilaterals, trust funds & others²	310 173	69 860	294 830	51 040
Grand Total	3 768 990	2 252 983	4 148 105	2 736 268
Percentage of all regions	-	60%	-	66%
1 Excludes programme support and administrative costs. 2 Operational Expenses includes General Fund, Special Accounts and Trust Funds that cannot be apportioned by project/operation.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) Network continued to be a vital tool in supporting the humanitarian community's emergency preparedness and response. Through its depot in Accra (City capital of Ghana), UNHRD dispatched medicines, supplementary food to combat malnutrition and shelter items intended for emergency interventions during the Sahel crisis in countries such as Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso. In total last year, 80 shipments were sent from UNHRD Ghana to 17 countries in Africa, representing some 1,300 metric tons of cargo valued at over US$6.4 million. WFP, as the lead agency of the Logistics Cluster, supported the operational activities of over 100 humanitarian organizations in Africa during 2012. Coordination and, where needed, common logistics services were provided in Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Mauritania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Logistics Cluster facilitated storage, provided cargo tracking support, coordinated road, river and air transport, and supported infrastructure assessments, as well as road and airstrip rehabilitation.

WFP supports national governments to design and implement sustainable school meals programmes, aiming to improve not only nutritional and education outcomes of school children, but also to buttress broader safety net systems, and protect and stabilize lives and livelihoods in fragile settings, especially for vulnerable young girls.

Table 9: WFP-supported children in school meals programmes
in Africa, 2006 - 2012. Source: WFP

In 2012, 11.7 million children benefited from take-home rations, which help keep children in school, especially girls in the higher grades.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Table 10: WFP food purchases in Africa, 2011 - 2012. Source: WFP
COUNTRY	2011		2012
COUNTRY	Quantity (mt)	Value (US$)	Quantity (mt)	Value (US$)
Algeria	10 228	3 456 462	8 170	3 767 317
Benin	6 223	2 630 849	15 971	7 250 081
Burkina Faso	6 856	3 347 577	11 673	6 577 309
Cameroon	4 828	1 946 539	3 378	1 510 324
Central Afr. Rep.			396	267 866
Chad	485	196 243
Côte d'Ivoire	1 198	776 632	3 399	1 550 622
Dem.Rep.Congo	4 978	3 530 556	13 902	7 454 921
Egypt	19 493	13 782 524	6 959	5 793 054
Ethiopia	85 293	42 684 636	112 454	46 764 696
Gambia
Ghana	6 710	3 672 513	7 489	4 001 134
Kenya	57 961	22 867 269	37 415	14 012 351
Lesotho	3 738	1 355 622	5 670	2 038 044
Liberia	150	94 500	3 213	1 870 550
Madagascar	3 132	915 549	3 835	1 603 218
Malawi	108 630	40 031 321	35 374	15 001 423
Mali	19 197	10 128 655	17 490	9 090 539
Morocco	2 519	4 251 935	1 757	2 795 871
Mozambique	32 408	11 574 521	12 245	5 068 962
Namibia	711	266 226	869	260 063
Niger	3 526	1 683 963	4 793	3 170 874
Nigeria			28 114	9 052 708
Republic of Congo	190	89 941	10	14 810
Rwanda	9 102	4 540 918	22 938	10 828 731
Senegal	2 719	877 640	2 646	447 689
Sierra Leone	213	216 864	623	432 766
South Africa	109 683	53 360 597	74 419	38 269 388
South Sudan	946	364 960	925	397 250
Sudan	61 264	21 573 616	65 336	21 932 713
Tanzania	64 992	20 030 782	77 119	23 843 372
Togo	5 512	2 493 696	24 477	11 549 993
Tunisia	4 791	3 454 476
Uganda	40 690	18 538 048	34 934	13 776 164
Zambia	31 705	9 056 678	66 208	19 136 044
Zimbabwe	3 583	1 378 248	2 048	1 097 976
GRAND TOTAL	713 654	305 170 553	706 249	290 628 823
Note: Data taken from Food Procurement Annual Reports 2010-2012. This data represents the contracted quantities and values and includes all delivery terms, which should be taken into consideration when doing any analysis on contract values.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

B- Asia

Despite its rapid economic growth, the Asia Pacific region is home to an estimated 642 million hungry people - more than any other continent - and it has more than half of the world's billion undernourished. This plight of the poorest has been compounded by commercial food prices that have not significantly declined since their 2008 record highs and the global financial crisis which has impacted on remittances, the bedrock of many Asian economies. In Asia, WFP assists more than 40 million people in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, DPR Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Timor Leste.

Asia is afflicted by more recurring natural disasters than anywhere else in the world - including volcanoes, floods, earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, and typhoons. In 2009 alone, there were 245 natural disasters across the continent of which 224 were weather-related. The 2010 monsoon floods in Pakistan continued this trend. The future trajectory of climate change has massive implications for Asia. Its natural vulnerability is compounded by the increasing frequency and acuteness of natural disasters, threatening farming communities in low-lying areas and heavily populated agricultural zones, particularly those near coastlines.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- Nepal: 2.3 million; - Pakistan: 19 million ; - Philippines: 2 million; - Sri Lanka: 1.7 million ; - Timor Leste: 430,000

In Asia, WFP is at the cutting edge of developing new ready-to-use supplementary foods designed to prevent malnutrition, particularly in young children. Increasingly, these highly nutritious foods and nutritious additives are being included in regular WFP programmes. WFP Asia also supports the local production of specialised food and micronutrient powders in countries across the region.

RECIPIENT COUNTRY	TOTAL FOOD AID	FOOD AID CATEGORY (mt)
RECIPIENT COUNTRY	TOTAL FOOD AID	Emergency	Project	Programme
Afghanistan	131,444	110,418	3,160	17,866
Bangladesh	98,979	5,559	-	93,421
Bhutan	2,832	-	-	2,832
Cambodia	27,363	18,527	-	8,836
India	17,827	114	-	17,713
Indonesia	1,894	1,894	-	362
Democratic People's Rep. of Korea	46,777	46,546	-	231
Laos	3,295	1,461	-	1,834
Maldives	12,338	-	12,338	-
Mongolia	33	-	-	33
Myanmar	33,312	33,229	-	83
Nepal	13,169	13,169	-	-
Pakistan	401,676	378,555	-	23,121
Philippines	19,414	19,414	-	-
Sri Lanka	35,611	31,695	-	3,916
Thailand	81	81	-	-
Timor-Leste	15,400	-	-	15,400
Viet Nam	10	10
TOTAL	861,454	660,310	15,498	185,646

Table 11: Asian recipient countries of WFP food aid in 2011 by category. Source: WFP

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

To meet the increasing challenges of reaching those in need, WFP works with the private sector, celebrities, and many other partners who are committed to the fight against hunger. In Asia, WFP works with some of the biggest names in the private sector including, Yum Brands, TNT, LG, and Unilever, to respond to disasters and work together on long-term, sustainable solutions through development. Aligning a brand name with WFP not only enhances a corporate image; it also demonstrates a tangible, results-oriented social commitment that resonates with employees, partners, consumers, investors and the public at large. Through Project Laser Beam, WFP is working in a new public private partnership to eradicate malnutrition, with an initial focus on Bangladesh and Indonesia.

C- Latin America and the Caribbean countries

Economic growth in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region has been unstable and unequal with periods of major volatility such as the recent global financial crisis where regional GDP decreased by 3 per cent. The periodic fluctuations, combined with differences among countries and the high and persistent inequalities within them, have contributed to the continuous increase of vulnerability in segments of the population. The latest hunger statistics reveal that more than 52 million people are undernourished and 14 per cent of children under

5 suffer from chronic under nutrition in LAC. Anaemia is the most widespread nutritional problem in the region affecting over 39 per cent of pre-school children, 31 per cent of pregnant women and over 23 per cent of women of reproductive age the total number of affected women comes to 33 million.

The vulnerability of at-risk populations is aggravated by recurrent natural disasters and more recently by the high food price crisis and the global economic downturn that has led to a substantial reduction in the level of remittances. The main objective of WFP in the region is to promote food and

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

nutrition security, and reduce the impact of emerging crises and natural disasters among vulnerable populations. WFP works to address three main issues in the region: i) chronic under nutrition and micronutrient deficiencies; ii) vulnerability to natural disasters; and iii) increasing food insecurity. The programming priorities are organized around the thematic areas of nutrition and social protection, disaster cycle management and livelihood support.

Building on its work in evidence and analysis, WFP's response in LAC can be roughly distinguished into three complementary categories:

governments and counterparts to implement effective hunger solutions, and involves activities such as advocacy, training, technical support, South-South and triangular cooperation, and knowledge management;

- service provision whereby WFP provides specific services to the
governments, mostly through trust funds; and

- food assistance that is provided when necessary through WFP
projects including EMOPs, PRROs and country programmes.

Through its regional capacity-development projects, WFP has systematically been working in partnership with national governments, United Nations agencies, academic and technical institutions, regional intergovernmental bodies and other international cooperation agencies. The LAC region is also highly prone to recurrent natural disasters. Central America and the Caribbean are in the North Atlantic hurricane path and are under permanent threat every season between June and November. Countries on the Pacific Coast are prone to earthquakes, volcanic activity, and the East Pacific hurricane season. They also suffer the effects of El Niño, including droughts and/or excess rainfall. These phenomena generally damage agriculture and infrastructure, create food shortages and further increase inequitable access to

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

food. The effects of recurrent natural disasters on poor livelihoods diminish the impact of national social programmes that aim to combat food insecurity and under nutrition.

The Central America PRRO «Assistance to Vulnerable Groups Affected by Natural Disasters and Other Shocks in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua» aims to strengthen preparedness tools and food assistance in these countries in order to support rapid response. The objective of the PRRO is to save lives; reduce acute malnutrition caused by climatic and economic shocks to below-emergency levels; and protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery.

A three-year regional school meals capacity-development project is being implemented to promote the use of WFP's «Eight Quality Standards» to identify and address quality gaps in the existing national school meals programmes in the 12 WFP-assisted countries. WFP is providing South-South and triangular cooperation, technical support, knowledge management and training and actively integrates traditional partners such as FAO and UNICEF in the coordination of the Essential Package interventions and school gardens. The project also seeks to make vital links with the P4P initiative in order for school meals to provide a market for sustainable local production.

The regional bureau also provides active technical support to governments by promoting South-South and triangular cooperation to pursue hunger solutions in the region. South-South cooperation projects are ongoing with Chile and Mexico offering support to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cuba, Haiti, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and Dominican Republic. Activities include exchange of government personnel to review lessons learned and best practices in nutrition interventions and social safety nets.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

RECIPIENT COUNTRY	TOTAL FOOD AID	FOOD AID CATEGORY (mt)
RECIPIENT COUNTRY	TOTAL FOOD AID	Emergency	Project	Programme
Bolivia	6,745	3,268	-	3,476
Colombia	14,297	14,297	-	-
Cuba	2	-	-	2
Dominican Republic	11,850	-	-	11,850
Ecuador	1,620	1,620	-
El Salvador	31,126	1,126	-	30,000
Guatemala	66,916	14,561	-	52,355
Haiti	92,432	59,306	-	33,126
Honduras	27,869	172	-	27,698
Nicaragua	34,734	842	-	33,892
Peru	76	76	-	-
TOTAL	287,667	95,268	-	192,399

Table 12: Latin America and the Caribbean recipient countries of WFP food aid in 2011 by category. Source: WFP

WFP continues to explore the utilization of cash and vouchers as a mechanism to address underlying causes of under nutrition by improving livelihoods and/or strengthening resilience to recurrent shocks through cash-for-assets activities that support the management of risk at the community level. WFP promotes the strengthened use of cash and vouchers in its own programming as well as in that of governments and partners. Based on the work conducted under «Capacity Building and Technical Assistance in Support of Food-Based Social Protection Programmes» and the results of the social protection study of 2010, the regional bureau has developed a continuation of its «Regional Strategy on HIV and Nutrition» covering the period 2011-2012. Under this strategy, the regional bureau continues to implement advocacy, technical support, knowledge management and operational research to advance in the incorporation of multi-sector approaches including:

- ensuring the integration of food and nutrition components with HIV treatment and care in «National AIDS Strategic Plans» and resource mobilization process;

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- developing and implementing operational norms and protocols pertaining to HIV and nutrition;

- establishing nutrition assessment and counselling as a standard
element of HIV care and treatment programmes and promoting access for vulnerable people with HIV to programmes that alleviate food and nutrition insecurity.

Food insecurity in Central America - particularly in Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala - is closely related to natural disasters and poverty. The four countries are home to 34 million people, with more than half of them living in poverty. These countries also lie on the isthmus between North and South America. Their geographic location exposes them to hurricanes, floods, droughts and earthquakes.

Table 13: Beneficiaries of WFP food aid in 2012 in LAC. Source: WFP
	Female	Male	Total
Total Number of WFP Beneficiaries in 2012	2,096,106	1,915,146	4,011,252
	Female	Male	Total
Number of Beneficiaries Impacted by HIV/AIDS	25,694	37,641	63,335
	Female	Male	Total
Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	137,161	130,593	267,754
Number of Refugees	12,335	13,917	26,252
Number of General Food Distribution Beneficiaries	575,151	535,364	1,110,515
	Female	Male	Total
Number of Beneficiaries of Cash/Voucher Transfers	160,859	144,069	304,928
Number of Participants in Food-for-Training Activities	31,663	30,487	62,150
Number of Participants in Food-for-Asset Activities	79,008	71,552	150,560
	Female	Male	Total
Number of Children Receiving Take-Home	342,106	296,644	638,750
Rations Number of Children receiving School Meals	796,034	752,150	1,548,184
of whom: receiving both Take-Home rations and School Meals	342,106	296,644	638,750
	Female	Children	Total
Number of Pregnant and Lactating Women and Children in Mother-Child-Health (MCH)/Supplementary Feeding	82,690	420,650	503,340

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

III- The coordinating institution of multilateral food aid: the World Food Programme (WFP)

The World Food Programme (WFP) is the food assistance branch of the United Nations, and it is the world's largest humanitarian organization addressing hunger. WFP provides food, on average, to 90 million people per year, 58 million of whom are children. From its headquarters in Rome and more than 80 country offices around the world, WFP works to help people who are unable to produce or obtain enough food for themselves and their families.

A- Brief history and organization of WFP

The WFP was first established in 1961 after the 1960 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Conference, when George McGovern, director of the US Food for Peace Programmes, proposed establishing a multilateral food aid programme. WFP was formally established in 1963 by the FAO and the United Nations General Assembly on a three-year experimental basis. In 1965, the programme was extended to a continuing basis. The WFP is governed by an Executive Board which consists of representatives from 36 member states. WFP has a staff of 11,799 people (2011) with 90% operating in the field. WFP strives to eradicate hunger and malnutrition, with the ultimate goal in mind of eliminating the need for food aid itself. The core strategies behind WFP activities, according to its mission statement, are to provide food aid to:

WFP food aid is also directed to fight micronutrient deficiencies, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat disease, including HIV

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

and AIDS. Food-for-work programmes help promote environmental and economic stability and agricultural production. In 2008, WFP was transformed from a food aid organisation to a food assistance organisation. WFP's five goals in facing up the global hunger challenges are to:

Since its establishment 50 years ago, WFP has shifted from a food aid agency to a food assistance agency, with a more nuanced and robust set of tools to respond to critical hunger needs. Its overarching goal is to reduce dependency on food aid and to support governmental and global efforts to ensure long term solutions to the challenge of hunger.

WFP food aid is also directed to fight micronutrient deficiencies, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat disease, including HIV and AIDS. Food-for-work programmes help promote environmental and economic stability and agricultural production. WFP operations are funded by voluntary donations from world governments, corporations and private donors. The organization's administrative costs are only seven per cent--one of the lowest and best among aid agencies. The Programme also administers the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR), established by the General Assembly with a minimum target of 500,000 tonnes of cereals.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

A daily school meal provides a strong incentive to send children to school and keep them there and allows the children to focus on their studies, rather than their stomachs. Providing school meals has many and varied benefits. The fact that almost all countries in the world - both affluent and developing - provide school meals is proof of this. In many countries, where hunger and poverty is greatest, WFP steps in to provide meals to around 22 million children in 60 countries, often in the hardest-to-reach areas. WFP has been operating school programmes for more than 50 years and is the world's largest provider of school meals. Drawing from this experience, WFP also supports national governments in developing their own quality, sustainable school feeding programmes.

WFP school meals are usually provided at breakfast or lunch, or as a snack, such as high-energy biscuits that are provided and eaten every day in school.

Take-home rations, such as a sack of rice and a can of cooking oil, can act as an incentive to families whose children attend school regularly. WFP also uses fortified food and micronutrient powders to ensure that children get the nourishment they need. School feeding supports the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals on hunger, education and gender parity and offers multiple benefits:

? Education: school feeding increases enrolment and attendance and can help children learn more effectively.

? Nutrition: the school meal is often the only nutritious meal a child gets on a regular basis. It can fight malnutrition and a lack of essential micronutrients that can curb development. Learn more

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

? Health - School meals provides a platform for directly addressing child health for example through deworming schemes. It can also be a platform for other health interventions.

? Social protection: School meals acts as safety for the household, helping families to educate their children and protect their food security in times of crisis.

? Local agricultural production: Using locally sourced food means school feeding programmes benefit not only children, but also farmers, communities and rural economies. Learn about the Purchase for Progress pilot

School meals programmes protect vulnerable children especially during shocks such as the food, fuel and financial crises of 2008. Today, as even affluent countries grapple with painful austerity measures, local governments and organizations are stepping in to provide school meals to children whose families can no longer afford to feed them on a regular basis. Around 368 million children, about 1 out of every 5 children, get a meal at school every day around the world. This includes pre-primary-, primary- and secondary-school children from 169 developing and developed countries.

Global investment in these programmes is huge - around US$ 75 billion per annum. Most of the investment comes from government budgets. Return on investment is substantial - for every $1 spent by governments and donors, WFP estimates at least $3 is gained in economic returns. School feeding provides an array of benefits in education and nutrition and to local agriculture. The number of children receiving school meals is lowest in countries where the need is the greatest. In low-income countries, the proportion of primary school children receiving school meals is just 18%, while in lower-middle-income countries that figure is 49%.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Donor support is crucial for low-income countries. External development assistance accounts for 83% of investment in school feeding in low-income countries. In some low-income countries the cost of feeding a child in school exceeds the overall cost of education. In low- income countries there is great potential for cost efficiencies.

Since the year 2000, 21 countries have started their own school meals programmes that are financed and managed by the government: 17 of these were or are supported by WFP, which works with governments to achieve national ownership of their programmes.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

WFP's Food for Assets projects (also known as Food for Work) pays workers with food to start building a hunger-free future for their communities. For the hungry, every day is about finding enough food to survive: poor farmers cannot afford to risk experimenting with new agricultural methods, when they can barely subsist on a small patch of land. The unemployed don't have a chance to learn new skills if they spend all day scraping a living on the black market. Poverty-stricken communities hit by floods or droughts are too busy looking for food to rebuild infrastructure vital for redevelopment. Providing food in exchange for work makes it possible for the poor and hungry to devote time and energy to taking the first steps out of the hunger trap. This is the goal of WFP's food-for-assets projects. Community members are given food in exchange for work on vital new infrastructure or for time spent learning new skills that will increase the food security of households or communities.

? Irrigation, terracing, soil and water conservation. In countries where drought regularly causes food shortages, irrigation can boost crop yields by 100-400%.

? In war-torn countries, WFP offers food assistance as an incentive for ex-combatants to abandon weapons and learn new skills, which are vital to smooth their path back into society.

? Poverty often forces farmers to overuse soil and grazing land. The result is barren land and accelerating desertification. WFP provides food rations to farmers who practice soil conservation by planting trees.

? To help communities develop, WFP sometimes helps people in villages to build new schools. They receive food, so they can devote time to the building work without worry about losing income.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

? WFP helps people set up home gardening businesses by giving them food assistance as they train. This means later they have a livelihood with which to support themselves.

As the world's largest humanitarian agency, WFP is a major staple food buyer. In 2012, WFP bought US$1.1 billion worth of food - more than 75 per cent of this in developing countries WFP buys locally in developing countries when its criteria of price, quality and quantity can be met. P4P is a logical continuation of this local procurement with the intent to achieve a higher developmental gain with WFP's procurement footprint by buying increasingly in a smallholder-friendly way.

Through P4P, WFP's demand provides smallholder farmers in 20 pilot countries with a greater incentive to invest in their production, as they have the possibility to sell to a reliable buyer and receive a fair price for their crops. It is envisioned that in the wake of WFP purchasing in a more smallholder-friendly way, other buyers of staple commodities including Governments and the private sector will also increasingly be able to buy from smallholders. P4P at the same time invests in capacity building at country level in areas such as postharvest handling or storage, which will yield sustainable results in boosting national food security over the long term. The five year pilot P4P (2009 - 2013) rests on three pillars:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

iii. Learning and Sharing: P4P will gather and share lessons on effective approaches to connect smallholder farmers to markets in a sustainable way and share them widely with stakeholders.

? Africa: Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia

Beneficiaries: 500,000 smallholder farmers Duration: 5 years (Sept 2008 - Sept 2013)

Total funding: US$168 million for technical capacity, including sub-grants, for 5 years (food not included)

Key donors: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Howard G. Buffett Foundation, European Commission, Governments of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

C- WFP Logistic30

For decades, WFP has been developing its expertise in humanitarian logistics. But it did not begin this way. From the organization's establishment in 1962 up until the 1980s, development projects consumed 80 per cent of WFP's resources. A robust shipping capacity formed the cornerstone of food delivery operations, as vessels carried commodities intended for developing countries around the world. In the mid-1980s, WFP gradually started to build its land transport networks; and, by the early 1990s, these networks thrived in more

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

than 90 countries. Air operations received international recognition when WFP staged the longest-running humanitarian airdrop in history: `Operation Lifeline Sudan' was launched in 1989, and involved airdropping more than 1.5 million metric tons of food.

Two further strategic shifts in the last 20 years changed the way WFP operated, and in turn, moulded Logistics to better support the organization's needs. The early 1990s saw emergency relief becoming the major area of WFP assistance. With each emergency, WFP's expertise in logistics grew and developed. During this period, WFP began to earn its reputation as a provider of logistics services for the humanitarian community.

From around 2010, another historic shift occurred within WFP. In response to a changing global environment and the heightened need for longterm hunger solutions, WFP launched a new strategic plan, aiming at the transition from food aid to food assistance. WFP diversified its food assistance tools to include innovative solutions, such as: issuing cash or vouchers in emergency relief; building community resilience through programmes like Purchase for Progress (P4P); and using new nutritious food items, particularly in relief operations. The shift in WFP's strategy and changes in the humanitarian environment made it imperative for WFP Logistics to change. The Logistics strategy `Driving the Supply Chain', which was launched in early 2012, emphasized four priority areas of focus and innovation: Emergency Preparedness and Response, Controls and Risk Reduction, External Service Provision, and Food Assistance Initiatives.

In 2012, WFP operated 60 fleet workshops, airdropped 4,200 Mt of food, provided 63 humanitarian partners with bilateral logistics services, valued at US$23 million. It coordinated an average of 5.000 trucks, 30 ships and 50 aircraft, managed a network of 650 warehouses around the globe and 700 WFP-owned trucks. In order to ensure timely and efficient delivery of food assistance, WFP developed tools and systems that facilitated supply chain

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

management, one example being a user-friendly dashboard of key operational data and indicators. Other logistics priorities in 2012 were emergency response efforts in South Sudan, Syria and Yemen, along with large relief and recovery operations undertaken in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Through UNHAS, UNHRD, the Logistics Cluster and our bilateral services, we continued to act as a logistics service provider to the wider humanitarian community.

In 2012, over half of WFP's food -- about 2.2 million metric tons -- travelled by sea. Nearly 75% was shipped to Africa last year, serving emergencies in eight countries across the Sahel region, and many others all over the continent. On any given day, WFP has 30 ships at sea, carrying humanitarian assistance for distribution in more than 70 countries. WFP works with a specialized and reliable network of shipbrokers and freight forwarders, moving cargoes from 60 load ports to 75 discharge ports across five continents. WFP's shipping team makes every effort to ensure that ocean transport saves time and money. In 2012, WFP directly contracted the ocean freight instead of accepting the best offer of food suppliers, reducing costs by a total of US$12.5 million. In order to contract the right vessel at the right price, WFP ensures advance planning -- thanks to both its inhouse shipping expertise and a new finance mechanism, the Forward Purchase Facility (FPF).

Many vessels were chartered last year in response to urgent needs during the Sahel crisis. In April 2012, an urgent request came for a unique type of vessel that could immediately ship 24,000 metric tonnes of FPF cargo to various ports across West Africa. However, there was one catch: the precise discharge ports had not yet been decided, as regional priority needs were still evolving. This shipping operation was further complicated by the fact that every port had different restrictions. Despite the challenges of this charter, WFP was able to deliver the cargo by July 2012. By opting for one large vessel instead

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

of four separate smaller ones, WFP saved US$30/per metric ton on this critical delivery. In addition to cost savings, lead times were reduced thanks to the FPF mechanism and WFP's shipping expertise. WFP's container bookings are increasing WFP ships its commodities in two ways: in bulk or by containers. In shipping terms, `charter' vessels carry bulk commodities, which are loaded unbagged and in large quantities into ships' holds, then bagged upon arrival at their destinations. WFP uses `liner' services when transporting food by containers. When commodities need extra care, such as refrigeration or humidity-control to prevent damage during transportation, containers can provide it.

When faced with blocked roadways, poor infrastructure, or communities affected by conflict or natural disaster, WFP turns to the skies. Last year WFP used its aviation expertise in several emergency responses. In South Sudan and the Central African Republic, WFP organized a combination of airlifts and airdrops to reach cut-off communities. To ensure that food distributions could continue uninterrupted to the refugees who had fled fighting in Sudan's Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, WFP airdropped a total of 3,144 mt into refugee settlements at Yida and Maban in South Sudan.

WFP's aviation experts continued to manage worldwide passenger air services through UNHAS, as well as a range of crucial services around the world providing vital access to affected populations. The aviation team also offers a variety of air services available to humanitarian partners, such as third-party services, air freight and executive passenger services. To make all of this work possible, WFP relies on a well-established operating structure:

- An independent and dedicated Aviation Safety Unit (ASU) performs continuous safety assurance, regulatory interactions, investigations,

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

safety promotion, and registration of air operators. In 2012, 172 evaluations of air operators were performed.

- WFP Aviation's Quality Assurance Unit (QAU) has continued to review field operations using the Quality Management System (QMS). In 2012, four reviews were conducted, which resulted in 19 recommendations and has achieved a better level of services. By the end of the year most of the recommendations had been implemented.

- Building capacity among key stakeholders is a major element of WFP Aviation's footprint at the local level. Last year, ASU trainings were attended by a total of 274 staff from WFP and other UN agencies, NGOs, national governments, civil aviation authorities and others directly involved in WFP Aviation air services. The trainings ensure a high level of overall quality in the operations. Looking forward, they also form part of the WFP exit strategy: participants are empowered with new skills, fostering career opportunities and helping to develop local aviation industries.

In recent large-scale emergencies, such as the Haiti earthquake of 2010 and the Pakistan floods of 2010, WFP helicopter assets were crucial in the delivery of relief items to affected populations who could not be reached by road. However, helicopters are not always available where and when they are needed. Deploying helicopter assets around the globe is always costly -- even more so in times of emergency. Valuable days are lost dismantling, freighting, reassembling and testing helicopters before they can be put into use. Furthermore, market competition tends to increase during emergencies, drastically increasing the price of air assets.

Thanks to a strategic fleet of two stand-by helicopters based in Entebbe, Uganda, WFP is able to respond quickly and efficiently. These helicopters can be deployed at 24 hours' notice, and, from this geographically central location,

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

are poised to reach all of continental Africa, and as far as Pakistan and Madagascar. They can carry essential food assistance and cargo, are well-equipped to transfer humanitarian workers to the most hard-to-reach places, and can perform medical evacuations. The stand-by fleet is mainly funded by ECHO. When not on emergency deployment the helicopters are made available to the humanitarian community on a cost-recovery basis.

During 2012, the stand-by fleet proved to be a strong asset on the frontlines of humanitarian response in Africa. It provided support to emergency interventions in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan through the transportation of humanitarian personnel, food and relief cargo. It also performed medical and security evacuations for UN and NGO staff, most notably in DRC following rebel advances and growing insecurity in the east. Last year, the stand-by fleet transported over 3,000 passengers and 186 mt of cargo, and conducted 281 evacuations.

The last leg of WFP's supply chain usually consists of surface transport. Surface transport is not confined to trucking food to its final destination by road -- often it also involves river barges, trains and even animals to accomplish this sometimes Herculean task. WFP relies on the expertise and local knowledge of more than 2,500 logisticians, managing the last leg of delivery in over 70 countries. The ability to go that final mile has earned WFP its reputation as the world's leading humanitarian logistics organization. As 96 per cent of this `final mile' is by road, WFP requires an extensive land transport network. We operate approximately 5,000 trucks on any given day. Where possible, local transports are contracted, but in situations where security or lack of sufficient trucking capacity prevents this, WFP uses its own fleet. In 2012, WFP's fleet of around 700 trucks were assigned to more than 20 country operations worldwide. In

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

many of these countries road infrastructure is poor. In such places, it takes a certain kind of all-terrain vehicle to navigate the cratered tracks and dense jungle roads.

Heavy-duty trucks allow WFP to bring food along humanitarian corridors all over the world, making roads the lifelines for millions of beneficiaries. In emergency situations, already poor roads often deteriorate; sometimes WFP's own trucks are the only ones that can reach isolated populations. In the past, finding suitable trucks for difficult conditions has been a challenge, especially when they are not available from local transporters. On stand-by and ready for deployment, a total of 65, fully operational trucks can be sent to any of the countries in the West and East African regions within five days of receiving a request.

In 2012, WFP operated a logistics budget of US$ 986 million to transport food to over 70 countries, which includes not only land, air and sea transport, but also warehouse rentals, storage and handling. All of this accounts for around 20% of WFP's entire budget. Nearly 80% of WFP's transport expenditures are for movement by road, followed by ocean transport and a fraction by air.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In 2012, the average rate to transport one metric ton of food assistance -- or 20 bags weighing 50kg each -- overland was US$180. Transport costs include the journey that a bag of food must make from the moment it arrives at the nearest port or point of procurement, all the way to its final destination. In some countries, food has to travel particularly long distances, and this drives up transport costs. For example, food destined for South Sudan normally arrives as ocean freight at the port in Mombasa, Kenya. From there, it must cross Kenya, and sometimes Uganda, before it reaches South Sudan. Once there, the lack of infrastructure often requires special all-terrain trucks to be available to bring the food further in-country.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

International Humanitarian Food aid, initiated in 1954, is the most known and publicised instrument put forward to fight hunger, especially in the southern countries, where millions of tons of food are shipped each year. This food aid is used both for humanitarian concerns and economic and political interests.

Food aid covers a wide range of activities, ranging from the distribution of large quantities various systems to popular cooking food, through programs recharge under medical supervision. His first goal is of course to save life. But it also a preventive role in mitigating the economic impact of the crisis: to enable people to remain home, not having to sell or abandon their livestock and means of production, provide seed stock. It allows people to get over it, or limit prevents bursting process families and capitalization of farms³¹.

A- The benefits in recipient countries: saving life and providing relief

Emergency Food Aid is essential in situations of acute food insecurity to prevent malnutrition and to protect livelihoods. Food aid not only saves lives in crisis situations but also prevents the use of coping strategies that can be damaging for economic recovery such as the consumption of seeds, the

31 Grunewald François, (1996) « Pour ou contre l'aide alimentaire », in Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge n° 822, pp. 633-654.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

slaughtering or the sale of livestock, depletion of capital goods, migration to cities or deforestation. As a result, it not only prevents malnutrition in disaster situations but can also prevent people facing temporary crisis situations from falling into chronic poverty and food insecurity. The benefits of food aid can be similar at the national level, as it may save substantial national resources and foreign exchange reserves, which can be then spent on essential services and investments instead of being used for food imports. Food aid can be particularly critical for countries such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that are heavily reliant on food imports and that lack financial resources and foreign exchange for food imports.

Relief Food Aid has, without a doubt, saved millions of lives in crisis situations since it was created. However, as mentioned previously, until recently, it was marginal compared to Program Food Aid. The second section of this report examines Relief Food Aid and the consequences of this recent change in more detail. However, before we examine Relief Food Aid, the role played by food aid, and primarily Program Food Aid, as a foreign policy and trade instrument deserves specific attention because of its indirect but critical impact on world hunger. Program Food Aid has been considered an instrument of development in two ways. First, it constitutes a direct economic support to net food importing countries, allowing savings in financial resources and foreign exchange. These savings on food imports can be allocated for other expenditures. In addition to providing direct financial assistance, revenues generated by the sales of commodities may cover additional government expenditures, some of which may facilitate nationwide development. However, over the past decades, Program Food Aid has rarely been development oriented, as for instance this budgetary support could mean increased military expenditures. This occurred in the case of US food aid to Vietnam and Indonesia in the 1960s and 1970s. Further, this form of aid, like cash assistance, has often been tied to policy or trade deals, which are not necessarily advantageous for recipient countries.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

A second function of Program Food Aid has been to support the structural shift from subsistence agriculture to industrialization and cash crops. Development has generally been the official goal announced for such interventions, and may have been a genuine concern in certain cases, especially for friendly countries during the Cold War. Without a doubt, many food aid recipients, starting with those of the Marshall Plan in Europe after World War II, have managed to use this assistance wisely, integrating it into broader development policies aimed at industrialization and food self-sufficiency, which ultimately boosted living standards and human development.

Ragnar Nurske³² believes that food aid is important. He argues that food aid could provide an important stimulus to industrial development. He explains that in the presence of an inelastic supply of domestic food, it could prevent the domestic terms of trade from turning against the emerging industrial sector. Nurske adds that if food aid were used to help underemployed labour build infrastructure, for instance, it could contribute to one fourth of investment cost and ease the foreign exchange gap resulting from the responsiveness of domestic supply to rising demand during the initial stages of development.

Lavy says «food aid has a significant positive effect on food production and any disincentive induced by the additional supply of food is offset by the positive effects»³³. Food aid may increase net household incomes and release resources for investment in agricultural inputs. Food aid may be used indirectly to provide support or act as an incentive for initiatives in community and economic development. Food aid improves food security by providing a means of protection and a way to raise the dietary status, nutrition and consumption of the poor. In addition, food aid can contribute to several other development objectives such as raising labour productivity, improving natural infrastructure

32 Cited by Ruttan, V.W., (1993) Why food aid? Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.

33 Lavy V., (1990) Does food aid depress food production? The disincentive dilemma in the African context, Washington D.C, World Bank.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

through food aid-sponsored projects, offsetting inflationary pressures and providing support to the balance of payments or the government's budget through the generation of so-called counterpart funds.

Shocks such as war or natural disasters and the resulting destruction and displacement damage people's livelihood in different ways: loss of belongings and assets, disruption of productive activities and markets, and elimination of state and community support mechanisms. Such conditions require the immediate creation of a comprehensive relief assistance package. Food, water, sanitation and health care are the first needs that must be addressed but aid may also include basic items such as cooking utensils, fuel, mattresses, blankets, and hygiene products. The requirement for this relief aid is enshrined in the right to food and the right to assistance, specified by various international legal documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Geneva Conventions.

Under extreme circumstances, the provision of food aid prevents malnutrition and can aid economically and as such, it constitutes a legal obligation. The need for food aid in extreme circumstances varies:

- In the case of displaced people or refugee populations, the need for food assistance can last for years. This is due to legal restrictions around the employment of refugees, the limitations to agriculture due to the lack of arable land, and limited income opportunities in displaced camps.

- After natural disasters, the need for food aid is generally limited to shorter periods of time--a matter of few months or even a few weeks, e.g. until business is restored in a flooded area--given that food aid can be replaced by cash assistance as soon as local markets and the local economy are reactivated.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- In war situations, food assistance can be essential for both displaced populations and residents as, apart from displacement, access to food is limited by the loss of crops and productive activities and the disruption of commercial activity and markets. Food aid often remains essential as long as fighting continues, which can be for years.

When people do not have alternative sources of food or income, which is the case for most displaced populations and refugees, WHO international standards recognize that every affected individual should receive a balanced ration providing a minimum nutritional intake of 2.100 Kcal per day, without limitation in terms of duration of the assistance. Supported by international legal documents and standards and driven by a lifesaving imperative, the rationale and the modalities for Relief Food Aid are therefore relatively clear and do not call for debate.

B- The benefits in donor countries: promoting domestic interests

Though their interests were similar to those of the North American countries, European governments have never openly admitted any economic or political interest behind their food assistance. However, the US has always been very open about the multiple objectives assigned to its food assistance, listed as follows by USAID:

- Promote broad-based, equitable and sustainable development, including agricultural development;

- Develop and expand export markets for US agricultural commodities; - Foster and encourage the development of private enterprise and democratic participation in developing countries.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

International food aid was initiated at a time when the policy of price support generated large surpluses of cereals in donor countries. State agencies purchased agricultural commodities from farmers in times of low prices and growing surpluses. This was part of a policy geared towards the enhancement of the whole agricultural sector in donor countries. But because surpluses shrunk in the 1980s, food aid is now driven more by the individual interests of a few groups and businesses rather than political objectives that favor an entire economic sector. Food aid in the US constitutes only $1-2 billion annually in a domestic market exceeding $900 billion. With such a modest share, food aid is no longer the policy instrument it was initially when it resulted from the government's price support policy. It now represents the interests of the «privileged few with preferential access to procurement process.» Major forces driving food aid today are specific crop lobbies, U.S. shipping companies and NGOs and relief organizations.

The shipping industry is another major interest behind food aid in the US; it is supported by the 1985 Farm Bill which requires that at least 75 per cent of US food aid be shipped by US vessels. As in the case of agribusiness, the cargo preference benefits some interests rather than the industry as a whole, for which food aid constitutes only a tiny portion. The same study by Barrett and Maxwell shows that just four freight forwarders handle 84 per cent of the shipments of food aid from the US and that a few shippers rely extensively on US food aid for their existence. They «depend heavily on food aid business and might not be financially viable without the massive subsidies they draw from food shipments the American electorate thinks are donations not to shipping lines but to poor people abroad.»³⁴

Preference given to in-kind food produced in the US and to the US shipping industry makes US food aid the most expensive in the world. The premiums paid to suppliers and shippers combined with the increased cost of

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

food aid due to lengthy international transport raise the cost of food aid by over 100 per cent compared to local purchases. The last major force driving food aid in donor countries relates to the vested interest of a number of relief and development organizations active in food aid projects. Interestingly, the only international NGOs specialized in food aid are US based, and rely on food aid for either direct food interventions or for funding of other activities through the monetization, or sale, of the food they receive in the recipient country. On average, the main US based relief and development NGOs rely on food aid for 30 per cent of their resources and more than half of the food they receive is sold on the market in recipient countries to generate funding for other programs. In certain countries, Chad in the 1990s for example, food aid constitutes the main or the only resource available to NGOs. As a result of their heavy dependence on food aid as a resource, they are poorly inclined to question the current food aid system.

A- Increasing of dependency

Dependency exits when one party relies on another without the reliance being reciprocal. Baldwin defined dependence in terms of reliance on others, lack of self-sustenance and self-sufficiency³⁵. He also defined it in terms of the benefits that would be costly for one to forego. Thus, most developing countries found themselves in this tragic situation. McKinlay³⁶ further elaborated that in such a relationship, one party may choose to terminate the relationship with little or no costs while the other can do so only at considerable costs. Given the above suppositions, the reliant state, therefore, operates in a subordinate or

35 Baldwin D. A., (1980) «Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis», in International Organization n° 34, pp. 471-506.

36 Mckinlay D. R, Little R., (1977) «A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation» in World Politics n° 30, pp. 58-86.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

dependent position. More so as Moon³⁷ puts it, the dominant party establishes a dependent relationship because it generates a degree of control or influence, and the main use of aid is the potential to control. Caporaso³⁸ alluded to the fact that this control can be used for a variety of reasons dictated by the dominant state.

Given the above definition of dependence, one can argue that the provision of aid creates a relationship of unreciprocated reliance. McKinlay elaborated that the donor can terminate the provision of aid with little or no costs. The recipient on the other hand incurs considerable costs when aid is terminated. Aid provides the donor with a potential of control over the recipient. This potential to control is derived from three factors:

- Firstly, the excess demand for aid places the donor in an advantageous bargaining position. The donors can, therefore, dictate to some extent a number of conditionalities under which aid is to be supplied.

- Secondly, the nature of aid provides the donor with the means for intervention in the recipient country for instance with programme aid, it entails some intervention in the recipient's fiscal, monetary and development policies while project aid entails future reliance of the recipient on the donor for the servicing and maintenance of the particular project.

- Thirdly, repayment can create another situation where the donor is in an advantageous bargaining position.

Given these three factors one discovers that many developing countries are experiencing difficulty in repaying their debts, and the problem is becoming more acute. This article, therefore, argues that economic growth as advocated

37 Moon B. C., (1983) «The Foreign Policy of Dependent State» in International Studies Quarterly n° 279, pp. 315-340.

38 Caporaso J. A. (1978) «Dependency and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioural Analysis», in International Organisation n° 32, pp. 13-43.

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by the modernisation theorists entails more than capital injection, as aid reduces the capacity of developing countries to service their debts. Food aid dependence has reached a point where it is counterproductive and is doing nothing to generate processes that would obviate the need for it. The aid recipient relationship has developed into one that neither generates mutual respect nor harnesses the capacities of all those involved. Instead, it has generated the dependency syndrome, cynicism, and aid fatigue.

Many developing countries and most LDCs depend on the export of a small number of agricultural products for their foreign exchange earnings. However, the real prices of these commodities are volatile and decline over time. The direct consequence is declining and erratic incomes for LCDs and their small producers. This specialization in a few commodities also results in an increased dependence on food imports from developed countries. Developing countries have increasingly specialized in non-food products such as coffee or cocoa, while the subsidized exports from developed countries make imported food cheaper than local products. The LDCs now spend between 50 and 80 per cent of their foreign exchange on food imports. The specialization of LDCs in exportable cash crops and the liberalization of agriculture have been strongly encouraged by western countries and international financial institutions. Encouragement of these policies is based on the theory that trade will lead to development. However, reforms have actually driven the poorest countries into a downward spiral: while their export earnings are declining and volatile, they have to finance growing amounts of imports of food and manufactured goods from developed countries. This situation directly threatens the food security and economic sustainability of many LDCs, and increases their debt burden.

Given the dire economic situation of LDCs, it has become increasingly difficult for them to import food and ensure adequate food availability at the national level. Some form of assistance for these food imports is therefore

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

necessary to allow LDCs to allocate a portion of their scarce resources for nonfood purchases. In order to improve food security and economic stability in the long run, they must also allocate resources for education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, and other basic programs. IFA is the only solution they have to feed their population. The problem is that food aid, and particularly food aid in-kind, is not politically neutral and it may ultimately create more dependency on food imports. Therefore, if the need for assistance to meet food deficits is undeniable, it must be integrated into broader national responses that protect and restore the livelihoods of small farmers and increase national food availability.

To summarize, a household or community exhibits dependency when it cannot meet its immediate basic needs without external assistance.2 Dependency is not necessarily an undesirable outcome: for households that cannot support themselves, such as those without able-bodied adults, dependence on external assistance enhances welfare; the alternative is destitution. To distinguish it from the more common, pejorative use of the term «dependency», this welfare-enhancing type is referred to as «positive dependency.» Helping individuals, communities and organizations to meet basic needs when they otherwise could not - fostering positive dependency - is indisputably desirable. The undesirable aspect, «negative dependency», arises when meeting current needs is achieved at the cost of reducing recipients' capacity to meet their own basic needs in the future without external assistance. For many countries, food aid is integrated into policies leading to structural food deficits and increased dependency on food imports. For the poorest countries, such dependency combined with scarce resources to finance imports has resulted in increased poverty and hunger.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

B- Food aid as a foreign policy tool

While the volume of food aid has always correlated to the fluctuations of international cereal markets, the allocations of food by country have been determined by a combination of foreign policy interests and humanitarian concerns. As claimed by US Senator Hubert Humphrey in July 1953, food aid was a weapon against communism during the Cold War: «wise statesmanship and real leadership can convert these [food] surpluses into a great asset for checking communist aggression. Communism has no greater ally than hunger; democracy and freedom no greater ally than an abundance of food.» The Cold War saw large amounts of food aid sent to countries that were strategically important to the US such as India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Similarly, large shipments of food aid went to East Asia at the time of the Korean and Vietnam wars. In the 1970s the bulk of US food aid shifted to the Middle East, including Israel and Egypt, as these countries gained strategic importance to the US. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, more food aid went to former socialist countries in Eastern Europe, until recently when it joined the arsenal of the so-called War on Terror. As discussed earlier, foreign policy goals also often overlap with commercial and economic interests. Massive food assistance provided to Asian countries such as South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, initially corresponded to foreign policy goals but has resulted in the development of market opportunities for US exports.

North Korea (DPRK) is one of the largest recipients of food aid, but it is considered as a «Rogue State». The country received nearly 10 million tons of food between 1994 and 2004, far more than any other. But this food aid has been always used strategically by its donors. Food aid shipments to North Korea sometimes resemble a diplomatic arm wrestling match more than an attempt to help the hungry. Each of the donors uses food aid to extract concessions from the DPRK regime. Japan uses aid as a bargaining chip with North Korea as it

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

tries to resolve kidnappings, hijackings and missile tests. China and South Korea use their own rice surpluses to try inducing cooperation with the North over refugees. The US meanwhile has grave concerns over North Korea's nuclear and long-range missile capabilities and its suspected support of terrorist organizations and has manipulated food aid shipments to the country explicitly so as to bring the North Koreans to the negotiating table. The Clinton administration had no qualms about interrupting American (and, derivatively, South Korean) shipments at the height of the North Korean famine. Revealingly, this act elicited no international uproar. Then, only a year after declaring North Korea part of an «axis of evil» in early 2002 and as rice stocks began being replenished in the DPRK, the Bush administration announced the resumption of US food aid shipments to North Korea.

The clear motivation behind food aid resumption was its utility as a bargaining chip in ongoing diplomatic confrontations over the US unwillingness to sign a non-aggression treaty and North Korea's production of nuclear weapons. Of course, those bearing the risk in these repeated games of chicken against the United States are the food insecure peoples of North Korea. Kim Jong Il's regime is unpredictable. But from the donor's perspective, the US benefits no matter how negotiations over food aid end. If the regime agrees to their conditions for aid, then the United States succeeds in engaging the regime in talks, scores a diplomatic victory, gains access to the North Korean population, and can argue that it has achieved important humanitarian impacts. If the regime rejects the offer of food under the prescribed conditions, then the health of the country's economy and its citizens falters, thus creating an environment in which the population could revolt. US and other donor countries continue to offer food shipments despite doubts that the food will reach the neediest groups and with scant solid evidence of any sustainable impact. Commitment to aid and actual shipments do not appear to respond to changing food availability. Rather, aid has responded primarily to diplomatic exigencies, pulled by one or another donor in protest over an act by the North

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Korean government or begun or resumed by a donor in an effort to engage the North Koreans in dialogue and thereby be able to stop undesired behaviours.

In 2002, several African countries rejected Genetically Modified (GM) food aid from the US. Some of them ultimately accepted the food under the condition that it would be milled before distribution, but Zambia refused any GM import. WFP operational principles and SPHERE standards both recognize the need for food aid to conform to recipients' own regulations and standards. Yet, WFP was not initially willing to provide non-GM food to the country and instead, with the US government, pressured Zambia to accept GM food in two ways:

- At a critical time of food shortage for the country, WFP held back its financial resources for non-GM food and cut off the provision of food to Zambia for several months. As a result, Zambia had only received 51 per cent of its food aid requirement by March 2003. Apart from US in-kind food aid, WFP had cash available from other donors and enough resources to purchase GM free food in the region. Yet, WFP's Executive Director, James Morris, claimed, «there is no way that WFP can provide the resources to save these starving people without using food that has some biotech content.»³⁹

- US government officials and institutions also tried to use international and domestic political pressure to force Zambia to accept GM food. This included holding the Zambian Government responsible for starving its own people to death: «This famine is very dangerous and it's going to kill a lot of people if decisions are not made quickly,» said Mr. Winter from USAID. At the same time A. Natsios, USAID Director, accused environmental groups of

39 « Zambia must accept some GM food, warms WFP Executive Director », WFP website (August 30, 2002).

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endangering the lives of millions of people in southern Africa by encouraging local governments to reject GM food aid. Natsios said, «They can play these games with Europeans, who have full stomachs, but it is revolting and despicable to see them do so when the lives of Africans are at stake.» He added, «The Bush administration is not going to sit there and let these groups kill millions of poor people in southern Africa through their ideological campaign.» FEWSNET, the USAID early warning system, also published several reports backing the US position and holding the Zambian government liable for the delays in food deliveries.⁴⁰

Obviously, USAID's primary concern was not Zambian lives. Despite alarming statements by USAID officials, there was no famine in Zambia. All malnutrition surveys conducted in the country in 2002 indicated very low malnutrition levels, below the 5 per cent threshold which indicates a normal, non-life-threatening situation. But another percentage may explain the US position in this matter: 34 per cent of the corn planted in the U.S is genetically modified.⁴¹ US insistence that African countries accept GM food aid originated from the pressure of US agribusiness interests rather than humanitarian concern. As a matter of fact, the US Grains Council and the National Corn Growers Association delivered a joint letter to President Bush in January 2003, asking him not only to begin dispute settlement action in the WTO, but also to encourage acceptance of GM corn in food aid shipments.

In 2002 and 2003, Zimbabwe faced serious food shortages triggered by the negative impact of the land reform on production, poor rainfall, economic difficulties and a lack of international support. At that point, foreign aid was concentrated in emergency relief, largely food aid, with more than 700,000 tons

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

of food distributed in two years by WFP and NGOs. When similar food shortages occurred after the drought that hit the country in 1992 and 1993, positive relations between Zimbabwe and western countries fostered direct funding to the Zimbabwean government. This funding allowed the government to proceed to emergency imports and subsidized sales of food, while NGOs ran complementary food distributions to vulnerable groups. The situation in 2002 and 2003 was different because the Zimbabwean government lacked support from donor countries. In May 2002, Clare Short, British Foreign Minister, stated,

Mugabe's policies have resulted in growing hunger and food shortage. The Government of Zimbabwe is now unable to feed its own people E...]. Our help to the poor in Zimbabwe cannot be through the government. DFID [the British department of foreign aid] has provided £3.5 million to the World Food Programme and $4 million to charities in Zimbabwe to help feed children and vulnerable adults. And still there is no plan from the government of Zimbabwe to tackle the problems. It is morally right that we help those who are hungry. People must not die of hunger when there is so much food in our world. People must not be punished because their government is corrupt.»

Britain, the EU and the US decided to channel their support only through relief organizations. They also excluded the beneficiaries of the land reform from the assistance, and gave priority to emergency food aid, with limited support to agricultural recovery. The provision of food to millions of Zimbabweans was critical in the prevention of malnutrition and the protection of livelihoods but the way assistance was designed and distributed suggests that this was not the sole objective. By highlighting the need for a massive food relief operation led by foreign relief organizations, donors intended to demonstrate the failure of land reform programs and the unwillingness of the Zimbabwean government to assume responsibility for feeding its own people. The fact that the severity of the situation was overstated by many western media outlets and government representatives tends to confirm the political motives behind the aid. Contrary to what was often reported, Zimbabwe was

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

not on the edge of famine82 and the Zimbabwean government did actually meet a major part of the food deficit through its own means.

In Afghanistan, the volume of food aid doubled in the immediate aftermath of the US victory over the Taliban regime. Deliveries increased from 277,000 tons in 2001, to 552,000 tons in 2002. Emergency food assistance was needed in a country affected by more than 20 years of war and several years of drought. Aid was still needed in 2003, when the volume of assistance was cut by half, down to 230,000 tons, much below the volume of aid provided in 2001. The agriculture and farming situation had not improved significantly but donor countries placed less priority on Afghanistan because it was no longer the centre of world's attention. The priority had shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq: food aid deliveries to Iraq increased from 2,100 tons in 2002 to more than 1 million tons in 2003. Like what occurred in Afghanistan after the US invasion, food aid was reduced again to approximately 10,000 tons in 2004. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and primarily food aid, has been used by the invasion forces as a public relations measure to win domestic and international public opinion and the hearts of the people living in the war zones.

In October and November 2001, TVs worldwide showed the airdrop of food rations by US aircrafts on Afghanistan. A few tons of food were dropped, which was insignificant compared to the monthly national requirement of more than 50,000 tons needed by the Afghan population at that time. In March 2003, Coalition Forces extensively used the argument that Iraq required humanitarian aid to seize and secure ports. And the first food distributions were army rations handed out by coalition soldiers in front of the international media. Yet, in Iraq, the Oil for Food Program had been in place until the invasion, and the government had distributed a food ration that would provide food for several months. There was therefore no need to rush into immediate emergency food

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distributions. Food aid to support friendly countries during the Cold War was generally a part of a larger package of assistance including direct financial assistance and other forms of aid, notably military aid, aimed at strengthening friendly governments. Since the elimination of the Eastern Block, the use of food aid in US foreign policy has evolved. It is now more geared towards shorter-term objectives, e.g. as a bargaining tool in negotiations as in the case of North Korea, or as a temporary support of political or military objectives in the «war against terror.» The political use of food aid has thus shifted in an interesting way. Formerly, food aid was provided as direct economic support to the governments of friendly states. It is now provided with new objectives to «unfriendly» countries or «Rogue States», under the control of WFP and NGOs.

The International Humanitarian Food Aid in
Cameroon: conditions of arrival, actors and
consequences

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Cameroon is a country in the west Central Africa region. It is bordered by Nigeria to the west; Chad to the north-east; the Central African Republic to the east; and Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo to the south. Cameroon's coastline lies on the Bight of Bonny, part of the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. The country is often referred to as "Africa in miniature" for its geological and cultural diversity. Natural features include beaches, deserts, mountains, rainforests, and savannas. Cameroon is divided into five major geographic zones distinguished by dominant physical, climatic, and vegetative features. «The coastal plain» extends 15 to 150 kilometres inland from the Gulf of Guinea and has an average elevation of 90 metres. Exceedingly hot and humid with a short dry season, this belt is densely forested and includes some of the wettest places on earth. The «South Cameroon Plateau» rises from the coastal plain to an average elevation of 650 metres. Equatorial rainforest dominates this region, although its alternation between wet and dry seasons makes it is less humid than the coast. This area is part of the Atlantic Equatorial coastal forests ecoregion. An irregular chain of mountains, hills, and plateaus known as the Cameroon range extends from Mount Cameroon on the coast--Cameroon's highest point at 4,095 metres--almost to Lake Chad at Cameroon's northern border at 13°05'N. This region has a mild climate, particularly on the Western High Plateau, although rainfall is high. Volcanism here has created crater lakes. This area has been delineated by the World Wildlife Fund as the Cameroonian Highlands forests ecoregion.

The southern plateau rises northward to the grassy, rugged Adamawa Plateau. This feature stretches from the western mountain area and forms a barrier between the country's north and south. Its average elevation is 1,100 metres and its average temperature ranges from 22 °C (71.6 °F) to 25 °C (77 °F) with high rainfall between April and October peaking in July and August. Its characteristic vegetation is savanna scrub and grass. This is an arid region with sparse rainfall and high median temperatures. Cameroon has four patterns of drainage. In the south, the principal rivers are the Ntem, Nyong, Sanaga, and

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Wouri. These flow southwestward or westward directly into the Gulf of Guinea. The Dja and Kadéï drain southeastward into the Congo River. In northern Cameroon, the Bénoué River runs north and west and empties into the Niger. The Logone flows northward into Lake Chad, which Cameroon shares with three neighbouring countries.

The country is divided into 10 region: Adamawa, Centre, East, Far North, Littoral, North, North-West, South, South-West and West. The total population in Cameroon was 20.030.362 in 2011.

Compared with other African countries, Cameroon enjoys relatively high political and social stability. This has permitted the development of agriculture, roads, railways, and large petroleum and timber industries. Cameroon's per-capita GDP (Purchasing power parity) was estimated at US$ 2,300 in 2011, one of the ten highest in sub-Saharan Africa. The lack of food has as direct consequence on food security. Different authors point out that there are many causes of food insecurity in different parts of the world which largely hinder food availability, accessibility and food utilisation. These causes may be political, economic and social conditions that include natural disasters, high population growth, low food production and falling prices for agricultural commodities; political instability, unequal distribution of food, lack of access to major distributors of food and shortage of means to purchase the food. In this section, we try to identify the conditions that lead Cameroon to resort or seek food aid to its partners.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

I- Conditions of arrival of international food aid in Cameroon A- Natural disasters

Natural disasters are events of sudden origin are related to climatic events. The idea is prevalent that we certainly cannot predict, but their occurrence may lead to conduct studies and research to be it in mitigation. The result both in human and financial terms is often very heavy especially for underdeveloped or developing countries as is the case of Cameroon.

Among the natural disasters that Cameroon had to manage these last decades, are found epidemics, drought, landslides, shipwrecks⁴², insect infestations that kill crops particularly in the area of the Far North, already handicapped by nature⁴³. We therefore mention here only the most recurrent natural disasters, especially those which call for food aid. In tis case, Cameroon has experienced flooding and toxic fumes and eruptions and earthquakes.

Cameroon has recorded several cases of flooding and this in various parts of the country whether in urban or rural areas. However floods are seasonal but their arrival causes sometimes irreversible consequences. Indeed the position of Cameroon promotes the occurrence of floods, the northern regions⁴⁴ are particularly known for their strong destructive storms.

Several additional factors contribute to the occurrence of floods including torrential rain, deforestation, erosion depleting soils become unable to retain large amounts of water. Similarly, uncontrolled installation of populations increases these risks. People are actually quite uninformed about urbanization plans where they exist, and the buildings are made in swampy

42 For example, on July 7, 2008, a boat traveling from Nigeria to Gabon fails on the coasts of Cameroon because of cracks on the boat. The balance is about fifty dead.

43 With the North and Adamawa, the Far North regions are very difficult to access in addition to the very favourable crop weather not.

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areas as is the case in areas such as Bépanda, a populous district of the city of Douala. Moreover, the proximity of the rivers in the northern part of the country with the housing could lead to flooding due to the collapse of such rivers. In this northern area, the climate is quite special. It is in fact that there is some imbalance, a long dry season from November to June, is followed by a short rainy season that it is from June to October. It even happens that there are years of drought and other heavy rainfall. In addition, the same problem may occur if one of the 51 dams that account Cameroon had to break.

The latest and most deadly floods experienced by the country took place in August 2012. Approximately 60,200 people in total have been affected by these floods in the North and Far North Cameroon and among these victims, 11% were found in relocation sites, according to the United Nations in countries. This serious disaster poses the threat of a humanitarian crisis, given its magnitude accompanied by difficulties in accessing certain areas of flooding. Of the 60,200 victims identified, 40,200 were in the North and 20,000 in the Far North, according to the UN. 52% of the population was made up of more than 18,000 women and children were counted. In addition to responding to the urgent needs of all victims for shelter, food, health and hygiene and sanitation, "Any pregnant woman in the relocation sites was supported free" explained the UN official, who mentioned the provision of 20,000 insecticide-treated nets. In its response to the disaster, the Cameroonian government announced the release of emergency assistance to 1.5 billion OEA francs ($ 3 million), supplemented by a budget of 300 million francs ($ 600,000) granted by the presidential couple not to mention a stock of food and other materials. On the sidelines of international solidarity, many supporters have also appeared, including support of 5 million OEA francs ($ 10,000) of the Chinese Embassy in Yaoundé, 200 tons of food from Saudi Arabia, and plural donation amounted to USD one million offered by the United States were recorded.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In fact, the impacts on both the financial and human and material are heavier. Cameroon is in this regard is to disburse millions of FOEA on the occurrence of floods. This money is to evacuate the wounded, provide their first aid, evacuate the affected areas and resettle the population in question. After most of the flooding, there have been cases of cholera that increase the rate of casualties.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Cameroon has also known toxic gas fumes mainly with Lake Monoun in 1984 and Lake Nyos in 1986. Lake Monoun is located in the North-West with a small size but the emanation of gas managed to cause the death of about 40 people. Lake Nyos is a crater lake in the same Northwest Region of Cameroon, located about 315 km (196 mi) northwest of Yaoundé, Cameroon city capital. Nyos is a deep lake high on the flank of an inactive volcano in the Oku volcanic plain along the Cameroon line of volcanic activity. A volcanic dam impounds the lake waters. A pocket of magma lies beneath the lake and leaks carbon dioxide (CO2) into the water, changing it into carbonic acid. Nyos is one of only three known exploding lakes to be saturated with carbon dioxide in this way, the others being Lake Monoun, aforementioned, and Lake Kivu in Democratic Republic of Congo.

Although a sudden outgassing of CO2 had occurred at Lake Monoun in 1984, a similar threat from Lake Nyos was not anticipated. However, on August 21, 1986, a limnic eruption occurred at Lake Nyos which triggered the sudden release of about 100,000 - 300,000 tonnes (some other sources state as much as 1.6 million tons) of CO2; this cloud rose at nearly 100 kilometres per hour. Carbon dioxide, being about 1.5 times as dense as air, caused the cloud to "hug" the ground and descend down the valleys, where various villages were located. The mass was about 50 metres thick and it travelled downward at a rate of 20- 50 kilometres per hour. For roughly 23 kilometres the cloud remained condensed and dangerous, suffocating many of the people sleeping in Nyos, Kam, Cha, and Subum. About 4,000 inhabitants fled the area, and many of these developed respiratory problems, lesions, and paralysis as a result of the gases. This air killed some 1,700 people as well as 3,500 livestock. Scientists concluded from evidence that a 100 m fountain of water and foam formed at the surface of the lake. The huge amount of water rising suddenly caused much turbulence in

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

the water, spawning a wave of at least 25 metres that would scour the shore of one side⁴⁵.

It is not known what triggered the catastrophic outgassing. Most geologists suspect a landslide, but some believe that a small volcanic eruption may have occurred on the bed of the lake. A third possibility is that cool rainwater falling on one side of the lake triggered the overturn. Others still believe there was a small earthquake, but as witnesses did not report feeling any tremors on the morning of the disaster, this hypothesis is unlikely. Whatever the cause, the event resulted in the rapid mixing of the supersaturated deep water with the upper layers of the lake, where the reduced pressure allowed the stored CO2 to effervesce out of solution. It is believed that about 1.2 cubic kilometres of gas was released. The normally blue waters of the lake turned a deep red after the outgassing, due to iron-rich water from the deep rising to the surface and being oxidised by the air. The level of the lake dropped by about a metre and trees near the lake were knocked down.

Following the eruption, many survivors were treated at the main hospital in Yaoundé, the country's capital. It was believed that many of the victims had been poisoned by a mixture of gases including hydrogen and sulfur gases. Poisoning by these gases would lead to burning pains in the eyes and nose, coughing and signs of asphyxiation similar to being strangled. Following the disaster, the lake was dubbed the "Deadliest lake" by Guinness World Records in 2008.

Cameroon was not actually prepared for this type of disaster; he had to call for international assistance. This support has enabled the construction of resettlement areas, minimum infrastructure for population needs. However, these measures were not enough, as local residents of Lake Nyos lived mainly on agriculture and livestock. Most people displaced still live on the resettlement

45 Tchindjang Mesmin and Njilah Isaac Konfor, (2009) «Flood Danger from Lake Nyos» in African Journal of Science and Technology (AJST) Science and Engineering Series Vol. 2, n°. 2, pp. 5062.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

sites while their presence was supposed to be temporary in these places. Unfortunately, there is still a large quantity of CO2 in these lakes and the risk of emergence of new lake fumes is not excluded. This is why, with the support of the international community have been undertaken degassing operations of these two lakes. Several researchers proposed the installation of degassing columns from rafts in the lake. The principle is simple: a pump lifts water from the bottom of the lake, heavily saturated with CO2, until the loss of pressure begins releasing the gas from the diphasic fluid and thus makes the process self-powered. In 1992 at Monoun, and in 1995 at Nyos, a French team directed by Michael Halbwachs demonstrated the feasibility of this approach. In 2001, the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance funded a permanent installation at Nyos. In 2011, two additional pipes were installed by Michael Halbwachs and his French-Cameroonian team to assure the complete degassing of Lake Nyos⁴⁶.

Cameroon is located on a volcanic fault line and thus naturally more exposed to shocks. We mention the presence of several volcanoes in this area especially in the plains of Mbo or in the savannas of Bamenda. Mount Cameroon is located precisely in this area where the presence of recurring tremors in the area of South-West. Indeed, it remains a very active volcano over volcanoes located in the same area. The mountain is part of the area of volcanic activity known as the Cameroon Volcanic Line, which also includes Lake Nyos, the site of a disaster in 1986 presented in the preceding part. The most recent eruption occurred on February 3, 2012. Mount Cameroon is one of Africa's largest volcanoes, rising to 4,040 metres above the coast of West Cameroon. It rises from the coast through tropical rainforest to a bare summit which is cold, windy, and occasionally brushed with snow. The massive steep-sided volcano

46 Brown David, (2000) "Scientists hope to quiet Cameroon's killer lakes", in The Washington Post.

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of dominantly basaltic-to-trachybasaltic composition forms a volcanic horst constructed above a basement of Precambrian metamorphic rocks covered with Cretaceous to Quaternary sediments. More than 100 small cinder cones, often fissure-controlled parallel to the long axis of the massive 1,400 cubic kilometres volcano, occur on the flanks and surrounding lowlands. A large satellitic peak, Etinde (also known as Little Mount Cameroon), is located on the southern flank near the coast. Mount Cameroon has the most frequent eruptions of any West African volcano. The first written account of volcanic activity could be the one from the Carthaginian Hanno the Navigator, who might have observed the mountain in the 5th century BC. Moderate explosive and effusive eruptions have occurred throughout history from both summit and flank vents. A 1922 eruption on the southwestern flank produced a lava flow that reached the Atlantic coast, and a lava flow from a 1999 south-flank eruption stopped only 200 m from the sea, cutting the coastal highway⁴⁷.

The eruptions of Mount Cameroon usually begin with an explosion of ash emissions and follows projections rocks. From 28 May to 10 June 2000, took place a long eruption. It was the seventh time in the 20th century that the "Chariot of the Gods" was angry. At the beginning of the disaster, according to experts, a crack on the southeast flank of Mount Cameroon. The emission of lava that lasted during this period has hampered much of the Bakingili road going to Limbe. Luckily it has not resulted in loss of life. Towns around the volcano are populated, we find in this area beaches, moreover Buea, which is a university city and attracts tourists in quite large numbers. In addition, the soil in volcanic regions is very fertile. It contains enormous potential for development of small industries making in agriculture. Then it attracts populations, with all the possible consequences in case of eruption.

47 DeLancey, M. W. and M. D. DeLancey, (2000) Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon (3rd ed.), The Scarecrow Press, Lanham-Maryland

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B- Instability and forced migration in the neighbouring countries

As previously said, in the Central African sub-region, Cameroon is surrounded by countries which are facing political and military troubles. Particularly, refugees in Cameroon who benefit of international assistance especially food aid come from Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad.

The political situation in CAR has been unstable since its independence from France in 1960, marked by five coups d'état and many more failed attempts. The most recent coup occurred in March 2013 when Michel Djotodia seized power from Francois Bozizé. In the recent past, Patassé had won multiparty presidential elections in 1993. His presidency, however, was marked by a series of military coup attempts prompting the involvement of a small UN force. In 1999, Patassé was reelected but failed to unite the various armed groups and political factions, opening the path for a new wave of violence. In 2001, former President Kolingba⁴⁸ tried to seize power, prompting Patassé to seek assistance from Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Ugandan-backed rebel group, the «Mouvement de Liberation du Congo» (MLC). The MLC had been active in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, occupying most of the northern part of the country bordering CAR. Ultimately, the coup failed. In the aftermath, Patassé accused his chief of staff Bozizé of disloyalty. Bozizé then fled to Chad but returned a year later to oust Patassé. Bozizé's troops quickly reached the capital Bangui resulting in heavy fighting. In order to contain the invading forces, Patassé again requested help from Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba's Banyamulenge troops pushed the rebel back to the north, but in the process committed mass atrocities against civilians. Ultimately, however, Bozizé was successful and seized power in 2003. Bozizé held power in a transitional

48 Kolingba was president of CAR between 1981 and 1993. He seized power from Dacko through a coup and lost it to Patassé in the 1993 presidential elections.

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government and was then elected president through general elections in 2005 in a contentious political process.

Soon after the 2005 elections, violence broke out again in the northwest of the country, causing the displacement of more than 100,000 civilians.⁴⁹ Among the armed groups involved, the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) was the most prominent, with members of Patassé's former presidential guard and local self-defense groups seeking security for their communities. CAR's presidential guard responded by carrying out a dirty war against the rebels, which have resulted in attacks on the civilian population, burning thousands of civilian homes, and summary executions.

In 2006, violence in the northeast of the country broke out as a second rebellion was led by another former associate of Patassé, Damane Zakaria, now chief of The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity's (UFDR). The UFDR seized several towns, as the government of CAR accused Sudan of being behind these attacks. The violence made hundreds of civilian deaths and led to widespread house burning, looting, summary executions and the widespread use of child soldiers. After years of continuous fighting, the country saw signs of progress toward ending the conflict in June 2008 when UFDR and APRD signed a peace agreement with the government to disarm and demobilize their soldiers. Parliament approved amnesty legislation later that year, which covers violence from 15 March 2003.

But in 2012, another crisis erupted, precisely the 10th of December 2012, between the Government of the CAR and Seleka, a coalition of rebel groups, many of whom were previously involved in the Central African Republic Bush War. The rebels accused the government of president François Bozizé of failing

49 Peter Bouckaert, Olivier Bercault and Human Rights Watch, (2007) State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses Against Civilians, New York, Human Rights Watch. UN OCHA Central African Republic Fact Sheet, June 2007.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

to abide by peace agreements signed in 2007 and 2011. Rebel forces known as Seleka (Séléka means "union" in the Sango language) captured many major towns in the central and eastern regions of the country. Seleka comprises two major groups based in north-eastern CAR: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), but also includes the lesser known Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). Two other groups, the FDPC as well as the Chadian group FPR, both of which are based in northern CAR, also announced their allegiance to the Seleka coalition.

According to the Human Rights Watch, hundreds of civilians were killed, more than 10,000 houses burned, and approximately 212,000 persons fled their homes to live in desperate conditions deep in the bush in northern parts of the Central African Republic. Additionally, rebel groups say that Bozizé has not followed the terms of the 2007 agreement, and that there continue to be political abuses, especially in the northern part of the country, such as "torture and illegal executions». On 15 December, rebel forces took Bamingui, a town approximately 120 km (75 mi) from N'Délé in a direct line towards Bangui. Three days later they advanced to Bria, an important diamond mining town lying 200 km South-East of Ouadda. The Seleka claim they are fighting because of a lack of progress after a peace deal ended the 2004-2007 Central African Republic Bush War. Following an appeal for help from Central African President François Bozizé, the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, pledged to send 2,000 troops to help quell the rebellion. The first Chadian troops arrived on 18 December 2012 to reinforce the CAR contingent in Kaga Bandoro, in preparation for a counter-attack on N'Délé.

On 26 December 2012, hundreds of protesters angered by the rebel advance surrounded the French embassy in Bangui, hurling stones, burning tires and tearing down the French flag. The demonstrators accused the former colonial power of failing to help the army fight off rebel forces. At least 50

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

people, including women and children, were sheltering inside the building, protected by a large contingent of around 250 French troops that surrounded the area.

On 11 January 2013, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Libreville, Gabon. On 23 January 2013, the ceasefire was broken, with the government blaming Seleka and Seleka blaming the government for allegedly failing to honor the terms of the power-sharing agreement. On 25 March 2013 Séléka leader Michel Djotodia, who served after the January agreement as First Deputy Prime Minister for National Defense, declared himself President. Djotodia said that there would be a three-year transitional period. He promptly suspended the constitution and dissolved the government, as well as the National Assembly. Following Michel Djotodia's resignation on 10 January 2014, Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet served as acting president until the National Transition Council (CNT) elected Catherine Samba-Panza as interim president with the aim to lead the country to the 2015 elections.

This politico-military crisis had not only led to massive displacement to neighboring countries, mainly Cameroon. Even UN personnel stationed in Bangui had to be evacuated to Cameroon for their safety. So, the crisis in CAR was managed in one way or another from Yaoundé.

Chad has been marked by permanent conflict since its independence from French colonial power in 1960. A whole host of authoritarian regimes have followed one another, with power changes usually coming about through military coups. Each regime is characterized by a concentration of power in the person of the president and a small, usually ethnically homogenous leadership clique which seeks to defend its privileges by any and all means. Composed of

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

approximately 200 ethnic groups, Chad's diverse population is broadly divided into predominantly Muslim Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups located in the north and east, and indigenous groups practicing Christian and various traditional beliefs located in the south. The result: not only does the country lack any nationally oriented social and economic policy - it is also ruled by a repressive state apparatus which crushes any form of opposition. Resistance initially coalesced at the regional level and was primarily aimed at fending off government decisions which were perceived as negatively impacting on local living conditions; with the protests escalating into open civil war at the beginning of the1980s.

As a result, leadership and presidency in Chad drifted back and forth between the Christian southerners and Muslim northerners. When one side was in power, the other side usually started a revolutionary war to counter it. In 1998 an armed rebellion began in the north, led by President Déby's former defense chief, Youssouf Togoimi. In 2003, conflict in the neighboring Darfur region in Sudan leaked across the border into Chad. Refugees from Sudan were joined by Chadian civilians who were trying to escape rebel violence and eventually filled the camps. It was clear that Chad's rebels received weapons and assistance from the government of Sudan. At the same time, Sudan's rebels got help from Chad's government.

Some opponents of President Déby have used his perceived lack of democratic legitimacy to foment armed efforts to oust the long-serving Chadian leader. Déby has faced several coup attempts, and diverse armed political and regional factions have been active since the 1990s. Shifting rebel alliances, which include defectors from the government, gained strength in the east in 2005-2006 and launched a series of raids on strategic government positions. Intercommunal violence not directly related to the rebellion also increased. Rebels

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

attacked the capital, N'Djamena, in April 2006, and Déby declared a state of emergency in November of that year. Critics charge that he used the state of emergency, which prohibited public rallies and campaigning and allowed the government to censor the press, to silence opposition.

In early February 2008, rebel forces advanced on the capital in an unsuccessful attempt to force Déby from power. Hundreds of civilians were reportedly killed in the fighting, and an estimated 30,000 Chadians fled across the Cameroon border, 10 miles from N'Djamena. Rebel groups later attacked and briefly held several towns in eastern Chad in June 2008. Chad's main armed groups, who have been divided by ethnic and personal rivalries, agreed in November 2008 to unify their efforts to overthrow Déby.⁵⁰

Cameroon is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the 1969 OAU⁵¹ Convention. At the national level, the Government adopted the Law Defining the Legal Framework for Refugee Protection in July 2005. A decree to bring the 2005 law into application was signed in November 2011, and this was followed by the creation of the Eligibility and Appeals Commissions in July 2012. So, Cameroon hosts some 104,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, mainly from the Central African Republic and Chad.

50 Lauren Ploch, (2010) «Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad», Congressional Research Servive, Washington DC.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Type of population	Origin		Total in country assisted by UNHCR

Refugees		CAR	96. 250

		Chad	1.480

		Nigeria	3.410

		Various	2.030

Table 14: Figures of refugees and asylum-seekers in Cameroon in 2013. Source: UNHCR Cameroon Country Office

As it has been said previously, IFA in Cameroon is provided bilaterally and multilaterally. But the multilateral part is predominant at 98% and managed by the WFP. The rest of 2% is provided by «friendly» countries like The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or Morocco which, spontaneously, help Cameroon in case of disasters, such as floods or drought. Then, we focus this part on the main actors of the IFA in Cameroon, i.e. WFP Country Office and the governmental organism in charge of working in collaboration with the UN agency: the FAO/WFP Assistance Management Committee.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

A- The WFP country Office

Cameroonian government signed the agreement with the WFP on April 3, 1968. The office is located behind the Town Hall in Yaoundé. It has an antenna in Bertoua in the East Region, and a sub-office in Garoua in the North Region.

WFP works by five years plans. WFP's activities in Cameroon have three main components: supporting the basic education and enrolment of girls in school; promoting food security and rural development, mainly in the northern regions of the country; improving the nutritional status of the moderately acute malnourished children and pregnant and nursing women in the North region.

During the previous program (2008-2012), in 2012, WFP aimed to reach 612,000 people through the following activities: the emergency operation for drought-affected households and acute malnourished group in the Far North region, protracted relief and recovery operation for refugees and host population in the East and Adamaoua regions, and school meals.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In December 2011 the Government of Cameroon declared an emergency situation in the Far North region of the country due to a major drop in cereal production following poor rainfall, aggravating the already severe situation in the region which suffers from chronic food insecurity and structural poverty. In the Logone-and-Chari division, over 400,000 people are affected by the decrease in food production. In response to a request for relief assistance by the government of Cameroon, WFP initiated an emergency operation aiming to: firstly, improve the food consumption of people affected by drought through general food distributions; secondly, reduce the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children 6-59 months of age and malnourished pregnant and lactating women through targeted supplementary feeding; thirdly, prevent acute malnutrition among chronic malnourished children 6-23 months of age and pregnant and nursing women through blanket supplementary feeding. The emergency operation aimed to reach 258,000 people.

The protracted relief and recovery operation aims to save lives and protect livelihoods of food-insecure Central African and Chadian refugees and restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods of Central African refugees and host populations. It targets more than 186,000 people through activities that aim to improve resilience of food-insecure refugees and local households, with an emphasis on environmental protection and rehabilitation activities to enhance sustainability. In the area of nutrition, the protracted relief and recovery operation aims to stabilize global acute malnutrition rate below 10%.

In this context, the strategy will continue addressing the immediate needs while also building the human and physical assets of host communities and refugees for long-term recovery. Monthly general food distributions are planned for 2,600 Chadian refugees in the North region and 40,700 Central African refugees in the East and Adamaoua regions. A supplementary feeding program is currently addressing the nutritional needs of children below five,

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

pregnant and nursing mothers amongst Central African Refugees and host population.

During the 2011/2012 school year, WFP provided food assistance to over 25,000 students from 109 government primary schools in rural areas in Adamaoua, North and Far North regions. The students received daily hot meals for 165 school days, with a total of 914,438 metric tons of food. The food basket included rice, pulses, oil, iodized salt and maize. In addition, about 4,000 girls from these schools received family take-home rations in order to motivate their parents to keep sending their daughters to school.

The current 2013-2017 country office programme (CP)⁵² is based on the DSCE and the national sectoral strategies for education, rural development and nutrition, and is aligned with United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Its objectives are to:

- promote primary education, with particular emphasis on girls; reduce micronutrient deficiencies in school-age children; and strengthen the capacity of government and other cooperating partners in school feeding (design, management and sustainability of the school feeding programme);

- increase the food security of households and mitigate the effects of climate shocks by improving access to food through the implementation of social protection safety nets and sustainable management of community grain stocks;

- reduce the prevalence of moderate acute malnutrition among children between the ages of 6 and 59 months, and in pregnant and lactating women; and

52 This country programme has been submitted and approved on a no-objection basis by the WFP Executive Board during it Second Regular Session held at Rome from 12 to 16 November 2012.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- strengthen national capacities for the prevention and management of malnutrition through a hand-over strategy.

The programme will contribute to achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7⁵³and Strategic Objectives 2, 4 and 5⁵⁴and is organized around the following three components:

This component is done in collaboration with the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB). The objective of this component is to increase enrolment and retention rates through the end of primary school, particularly for girls, and to reduce micronutrient deficiencies in school-age children. The component focuses on the districts within the North and Far-North regions that have the worst food insecurity and have gross enrolment rates, primary school completion rates and girl/boy ratios below the regional average. The school feeding programme also has a nutritional objective, since the prevalence of anaemia in children under 5 is 68.2 percent in the North and 63.5 percent in the Far-North. On average, 55,000 students per year in 250 rural schools will be targeted in these two regions. The schools will be selected according to the criteria established in the school feeding programme guidelines.⁵⁵

To encourage girls' enrolment through the end of the primary school, 6,500 girls in intermediate grades 1 and 2, selected on the basis of their attendance rate, will receive 25 kg of maize per quarter. In collaboration with

53 MDGs: 1-Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2-Achieve universal primary education; 3- Promote gender equality and empower women; 4-Reduce child mortality; 5-Improve maternal health; 7-Ensure environmental sustainability.

54 Strategic Objectives: 2-Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures; 4-Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition; 5-Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase.

55 Schools are targeted according to the following criteria: i) enrolment rate less than 40 percent; ii) public schools in rural areas; iii) schools providing the full educational curriculum with fewer than 40 percent girls; iv) a maximum of 325 students; v) food-insecure areas where communities are involved; and vi) presence of basic infrastructure.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Population Fund, the World Bank, the Institute of Agricultural Research for Development and partner NGOs such as Plan International and Counterpart International, WFP will make efforts to improve the school environment, through access to clean water and sanitation, deworming, nutrition education, environmental conservation, and community ownership of school activities. Starting in school year 2017/18, WFP will supply only technical assistance, while the Government ensures full provisioning of the school feeding programme.

? Component 2: Improve household food security by enhancing resilience to recurrent climatic shocks

The component is coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) as the technical partner, while the implementation is carried out with the assistance from experienced NGOs. Component 2 is designed to reduce communities' food insecurity and enhance their resilience to climate shocks and the effects of market speculation, by implementing community grain storage facilities. These village grain stocks are one element in the rapid response system for dealing with food crises - part of the national early warning system and the Grain Department's emergency reserves. The grain storage facilities will make it possible to: i) establish community grain reserves to improve access to food; ii) slow the rise in grain prices during the lean season; iii) improve rural people's incomes from agricultural production; and iv) enhance women's participation in community activities and their ability to manage and conserve assets.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

In partnership with the Ministry of Public Health (MINSANTE), Component 3 is designed to support the Government's efforts to address moderate acute malnutrition by providing a supplementary food targeted to children aged 6-59 months and pregnant and lactating women. Initially the component will cover the Far-North, which suffers from acute and chronic malnutrition rates above critical thresholds, although if resources permit it will expand its coverage to the North. In parallel, UNICEF will support the Government in tackling severe acute malnutrition. In addition to training stakeholders, WFP and UNICEF support will include nutritional inputs and equipment. Collaboration between the two agencies will include a review of food and nutrition sector strategies and management protocols, and assistance in planning activities for the nutrition programme.

The programme will target the North and Far-North regions of the country, where food insecurity rates are high and school enrolment rates are low, particularly for girls in rural areas and where acute and chronic malnutrition rates exceed critical thresholds. WFP will continue to provide food assistance, since it has not yet established partnerships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and financial institutions to carry out cash transfers. However, this decision may be reviewed once a planned feasibility study on cash transfers has been carried out.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Table 15: WFP beneficiaries by component and year in Cameroon⁵⁶
Component	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total%	% Women /girl
Component 1: Promote primary education, particularly for girls
School feeding	55 000	55 000	55 000	55 000	55 000	91 660	50
Dry rations	32 500	32 500	32 500	32 500	32 500	54 160	60

Component 2: Improve household food security by enhancing resilience to recurrent climatic shocks
Community grain storage facilities	107 500	107 500	107 500	107 500	107 500	537 500	80

Component 3: Provide nutritional support for vulnerable groups
Management of moderate acute malnutrition-- children 6 to 23 months of age (targeted)	6 450	5 775	5 100	4 275	3 450	25 050	50
Management of moderate acute malnutrition-- children 24 to 59 months of age (targeted)	14 025	12 525	10 950	9 300	7 500	54 300	50
Management of moderate acute malnutrition-- pregnant and lactating women (targeted)	6 300	6 150	6 000	5 850	5 700	30 000	100

TOTAL	215 275	212 950	210 550	207 925	205 150	781 850	76

Through the three components, employing a hand-over strategy, WFP will work to develop the Government's capacity to fight hunger and malnutrition. As part of government efforts to increase agricultural production, WFP will increase local purchases, mainly through producers' groups and programmes designed to boost production.

56 Source: WFP Executive Board, Country programme Cameroon 200330 (2013-2017), p.10.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Table 16: WFP PC's Budget Summary⁵⁷
	Component 1		Component 2		Component 3		Total
Food (mt)		9 881		5 000		3 302		18	183
Food cost	6	275 474	1	749 357	2	675 276	10	700	750
Total	6	275 474	1	749 357	2	675 276	10	700	750

External transport								499	523
Land transport, storage and handling (total)							1	979	727
Landside transport, storage and handling (per mt)									109
Other direct operational costs							1	706	130
Total direct operational costs							19	355	557

Direct support costs							4	469	428
Indirect support costs (7.0 percent)							1	354	889
Total WFP cost							20	710	446
Government's contribution							5	944	874

Government's contribution represents the cost of 7,500 mt of food donated by the Government (74%) and the cost of secondary transport of foods (26%). In principle, the contribution will be distributed as follows: 500 mt per year for Component 1 and 1,000 mt per year for Component 2. This distribution may, however, be adjusted based on need. Cameroonian government also created a committee which could be seen as the governmental interlocutor with the UN agencies dealing with IFA.

57 Source: WFP Executive Board, Country programme Cameroon 200330 (2013-2017), p.18.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

B- The Management Committee of FAO/WFP Assistance58

On November 24, 1986, the Cameroonian government established a committee for the management of FAO and WFP assistance under the Ministry of Agriculture. This committee is responsible for the management, monitoring and coordination of all assistance provided or developed in Cameroon under the auspices of two UN institutions.

- Identifies, formulates, executes and monitors the implementation in relation to the relevant departments and agencies, projects and concrete action programs in which this assistance is provided;

- Coordinates and monitors the activities of the two institutions and those of their special programs undertaken in Cameroon in the field of food and agriculture in particular in the areas of plant and animal production, fisheries, forestry, training and research;

- Ensures, in relation to the representatives of FAO and WFP evaluation of projects and assistance programmes;

- Seeks to promote cooperation between the Government, FAO and WFP for mobilizing technical and financial assistance for the implementation of the national food security programme in the action plan of the FAO global food security;

- Provides permanent links between the different ministries and agencies interested in the activities of FAO and WFP;

- Centralizes contributions, grants, donations from all sources to support in the one hand, the implementation of its action programme, and in the other hand, monitor under the authority of the Minister responsible all operations related to the management of emergency food assistance in case of disaster;

58 Presidential Decree N° 86/1411 of November 24, 1986, creating a FAO/WFP assistance Management Committee.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

- Organizes and performs in connection with the WFP representative in Cameroon any transaction of purchase and distribution of local food in the context of policy triangular transactions defined by the WFP in order to boost domestic food production and technical cooperation among developing countries.

To fulfil its mission, the committee has a Secretariat headed by a Permanent Secretary, assisted by a Deputy, both appointed by decree of the President of the Republic. The secretariat includes: Division of WFP interventions, Division of FAO interventions, Administrative and Financial Department and the Accounting Department. Heads of divisions and services are also appointed by the President of the Republic.

III- Consequence of food aid in Cameroon: the political blackmail

We have already mentioned the consequences of the IFA both in donor and receiving countries. The food dependency is the first risk faced by poor receiving countries. The IFA is also used as a political tool which helped donor countries to interfere in the already weak domestic sovereignty of receiving countries. In addition of all these elements evident in Cameroon, there is another phenomenon particular to the country: the «political blackmail».

In fact, food security is for FAO "a major factor in political stability within states". So, all those involved in the fight against hunger and food insecurity can guide their actions for political purposes. According to Janin and Suremain⁵⁹, the food crisis that the world has gone through in 2008

59 Janin P. and Suremain ch. De, (2008) «La question alimentaire en Afrique: risques de politisation«, in Tiers-Monde, vol. 12.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Provided some rulers a political scene promising aid and rescue to their people, praising their "food diplomacy, encouraging to produce more and eat local, denouncing speculator traders. Some withdrew gains popularity beyond undoubtedly some efficiency measures.

Speaking precisely the measures taken, some rulers, after leaving the situation of food insecurity without rotting arrange that could anticipate or reduce this phenomenon, set themselves up as "fire-fighters" to appear in the eyes of their populations as "saviours". These measures were or are incommensurate with the crisis, but the political fallout, they are much more noticeable. Because the prevailing rule in the present context is the "politics of the belly", distribution of food aid is sometimes preceded by large demonstrations or political meetings in which those who provide this benefit to help the situation for political positions.

The voices of the people were solicited with the argument that they have never been abandoned in times of crisis and they would do well not to give those who have not abandoned. In addition, if these voices were granted to those concerned, this "generosity" was not going to stop. The highest authority of the State, namely the President of the Republic, every food crisis, such as during the December 2012 floods, has not failed to take emergency measures to relieve his "fellow compatriots." One of these measures is sending emergency food aid. He does not bring it himself, but he delegates this task to a third party. Although the Head of State does not explicitly request a lift back to the people, some of those who are responsible for conveying said support were quick to convince (although it is very difficult to verify) the population that is with their interpersonal skills and their personal relationship with the President that this help came, garnering rewards, congratulations, respect and recognition of populations.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Antoine Socpa described very well this situation when he talks about the «electoral gift». He condenses his reflection by arguing that: "In certain situations, food aid is even used as devices for mobilization and political manipulation. In many African countries, politicians give food to people in exchange for their votes"⁶⁰.

In fact, election campaigns during the democratic transition in Africa to the south of the Sahara are characterized by the abundance of politicians' captivating speeches and promises. Voters are pulled back and forth between the party in power and opposition parties as calls are made to vote for one side or the other; and as the pressure heightens, voters tend to try to "cash in" on their vote. Instead of being a time for ideological debate, political campaigns tend to occur in a "mess hall" atmosphere. The practice of making "electoral gifts" especially food gift, in Cameroon is described. The impact of these practices on voters and on the forming of alliances between majority and opposition parties is assessed. By attracting many people, these "festivities" serve to measure the popularity of parties and, later on, cover up the fact that election results are falsified.

Apart promises staffing infrastructure development, food and clothing, gadgets and trinkets of all kinds are offered to people during election periods. These are, essentially, meat (beef, egg, sheep and goat), smoked fish, rice, red wine, beer, spirits, loincloths, tee-shirts bearing the image of the party, caps, scarves, key chains, etc.. Moreover, with the clear intention of getting people to give them their votes, politicians make a firm commitment to find immediate solutions to the grievances of the people. Caught between the gifts that fall as manna from heaven on people experiencing the problems of immediate survival, and unable to offer as does the ruling party, the main opposition parties have taken turns attitudes following: instructions to refuse donations,

60 Socpa Antoine, (2000) «Gifts in Cameroonian Election Campaigns», in Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, n°157.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

instructions to accept donations, instructions to use them. These delays in the public and political opposition parties are as follows: "They want to buy your consciences. Do not accept gifts. "

In this phase of the refusal of gifts, the people themselves were divided. Part would accept donations while another did not want. This ambivalence had created a situation of mistrust and insecurity. Thus, any person who received or refused a gift was labeled. Some people have even been abused to have received a gift or for refusing. While the reluctance of people between the acceptance of the gift and its use are prescribed by the political parties of the opposition, the fact remains that their success depends on the actual impact of these political or their leaders. These people are afraid for their own safety and that of their families and their children. Compliance or non-instructions and against voting instructions prescribed by political parties therefore follows different paths and seems to be dependent on the ethnic population trends of both cities.

Proportionally, the "electoral gift" is one of the anti-democratic recipes beloved by some African politicians. Unpopular political parties are indeed those gifts to bring or maintain social groups within their sphere of influence. When the phenomenon of "electoral gift" grows, we must fear its negative impact on the democratic process in Africa. Face kept and maintained under conditions of precarious survival populations, food recipe is a trap to tame them and turn them into electoral cattle.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The work above has allowed us to get around the issue of international humanitarian food aid. We have in fact, after having defined the legal context of the IFA, presented the different actors in the sector. On the one hand, there are the rich donor countries of the North, the head of which include the U.S. and the EU, and on the other poor recipient countries of the South, led the platoon Sub-Saharan Africa, followed closely by Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. In the middle, is the largest humanitarian organization in the world, WFP, which is responsible for managing the multilateral food aid. Subsequently, we identified the possible consequences of the IFA. In the last chapter, we have illustrated the practical case of Cameroon, how does IFA work. Concretely, after the country has faced numerous natural disaster such as floods, toxic fumes or volcanic eruption; due also to the political and social instability in some neighbouring countries, especially Central African Republic, Chad and nowadays Nigeria because of the Boko Haram terrorist/Islamic group, the IFA is regularly used for refugees and some internal displaced victims. At the country level, it is managed by the WFP Country Office and the governmental Management Committee of FAO/WFP Assistance. Beyond the fact that the main objective is and remains saving lives when communities are facing crises or disasters, whether natural, technological or human, food aid has been used by donors as a political weapon in international relations between states. IFA serves as lobby, pressure medium. It is an instrument to reward its "friends", or otherwise to punish his "enemies." Humanitarian issues have long been misled to make room for purely economic and political interests of the various actors involved.

However, it is possible to trim the IFA, and some propositions are made by scholars and food aid experts, such as Frederic Mousseau or Ed Clay. For them, it is widely acknowledged today that food aid must be refocused so that it is more effective in the fight against hunger. But opinions diverge on how the

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

refocusing should be accomplished. It is therefore important to rethink and widen the debate over the future of food aid. There is growing international pressure for the WTO to become involved in food aid. Two aspects of US food aid have produced conflict in recent international negotiations around the liberalization of agriculture: the practice of monetization, which consists of the sale of food aid to generate cash in recipient countries, and the export credits used for concessional sales. Cereal exporting countries, namely the EU and the Cairns Group, would like to hand over responsibilities for the governance of food aid to the WTO to oppose the hidden subsidies and the distortion to free trade caused by this form of US food aid. Currently, the FAC and the CSSD both lack a binding enforcement mechanism whereby donors not meeting their commitments and/or not following agreed upon guidelines could face possible penalties under a WTO-like dispute settlement/resolution mechanism. The evolution of the aid system is therefore once again triggered by trade interests and competition rather than genuine humanitarian and development concerns.

Yet, Oxfam and other relief organizations have recently echoed the sentiments of European negotiators, and asked for the enforcement of food aid practices by the WTO to avoid food dumping and the displacement of commercial imports by food aid. Though the relief organization seems to be motivated by the hope that a `fairer free trade' will benefit developing countries, this position overlooks three fundamental elements:

- Specialized in exportable cash crops, LDCs are not food exporters, and actually spend a large share of their funds to import food;

- The food trade is dominated by developed countries and a few large developing countries such as South Africa and Brazil; they are the ones affected by the displacement of commercial imports;

- In both developing and developed countries, food trade is controlled by large international agribusinesses and large-scale farmers. More food

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

trade between developing countries may therefore benefit these corporations rather than small- scale farmers.

Because of these factors, it seems unlikely that the world's poorest countries would benefit from WTO regulation of food aid, which would most likely serve business interests at the expense of development objectives. The displacement of commercial imports may actually benefit net food importing developing countries, which spend a high share of their budget on food imports, because of the conservation of scarce resources this practice represents. Furthermore, from a development point of view, it is highly questionable to put in place an enforcement mechanism only for food aid, while the rest of international development assistance remains largely uncontrolled and very poorly monitored. In practice, an enforcement mechanism for food aid regulation would only create a new instrument to promote trade. What the hungry really need is an enforcement mechanism that ensures the human right to food and development assistance.

The existing institutions that govern food aid are not designed for the alleviation of hunger but rather serve the interests of exporting countries. The CSSD, intended to deal with surplus disposal, is outdated and ineffective. The FAC is hosted by a trade body, the International Grain Council, and only represents food exporting countries. Given their design, focus and functioning, it is clear that these two institutions should be eliminated to better serve the needs of the world's hungry population. Their replacement by an FAO body that would integrate food aid into a broader food and agriculture program seems to be the only way to start working productively towards the reduction of hunger through international assistance. The FAC sets annual food aid commitments by donor countries. This constitutes an interesting model that can be used in broader applications where food aid would be an instrument along with others. Similar to FAC operations, donors should make multiyear

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

commitments to the FAO in financial terms, for plans to be carried out in the food and agriculture sector of every targeted country. This would reprioritize agriculture and allow an increase in resources going to this sector. If these changes were adopted, the role of FAO could also be to coordinate and monitor international assistance geared towards the eradication of hunger. UN agencies would work at the national level to help governments and NGOs develop and implement strategies that support agriculture and small-scale farmers. This should be undertaken independently of donor countries' foreign policy and trade interests and driven solely by the food security concerns of the developing countries and their farmers. Given what we know about fighting world hunger, food sovereignty is paramount, and must be at the heart of future policies to support and protect small-scale farmers and subsistence agriculture.

As suggested by Ed Clay, an expert on development and food aid, WFP could become the lead UN agency for all emergency responses, rather than existing simply as a food aid agency. WFP is already the leading agency in emergencies, providing logistical support for transportation and telecommunications to the entire UN system. Relief interventions are generally run vertically by specialized UN organizations: the WFP provides food, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) takes care of nutrition, water and sanitation, WHO deals with health issues, FAO supports agriculture and fisheries. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the assistance under the UN Development Program (UNDP) and UNHCR follows its specific mandate on refugees. Though it is more and more recognized as an appropriate alternative to food relief, cash interventions do not fall under the responsibility of any of these agencies. There is a similar gap for non-food relief items such as cooking pots, cooking fuel, blankets, jerricans or soap, often as necessary and urgent as food in emergencies for the preparation of food, and to

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

prevent epidemics and diseases. The UNHCR is in charge of the provision of shelters and camp mapping in the case of refugees who have left their country, but no equivalent organization is in charge of internally displaced people, though they are in greater numbers than refugees in the world today.

Transforming WFP into a World Relief Program would eliminate the bias toward the use of food aid from contemporary relief responses and strengthen the capacity of the international community to meet emergency needs by designing more appropriate and integrated responses. Food aid would then become only one element of relief response, developed along with others, and used only when required.

The distinctions between the three different forms of food aid--Relief, Program and Project Aid--are not consistent with the reality of the food problems in developing countries. As seen in the cases of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Haiti, Zimbabwe and Niger, when a country is expecting a food shortage and lacks the financial resources or foreign currency to import food, the best response is financial assistance to allow the country to support domestic food production or proceed to food imports. Even in a year of food deficit, governments can often play a decisive role in increasing food production through direct intervention in markets. In other instances, support for winter crop-cycles and for alternative crops such as tubers, has been successfully provided by NGOs and governments in the form of seeds, seedlings, tools and fertilizers to optimize winter crops after the failure of a main harvest. Providing financial assistance to purchase food or agricultural support as soon as a shortage is predicted would prevent having to resort to Relief Food Aid months later, when a country runs out of food. In an ideal world, Relief Food Aid would only be required in situations of wars and sudden natural disasters, characterized by the unpredictability and the urgency of food needs and often by limited capacity at the community and government levels.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Food aid should be kept separate from trade concerns and other political interests and should only be allocated according to the needs of recipient countries. With a consistent aid budget, the replacement of in-kind food aid with local and triangular purchases would double the amount of food available. To put it differently, current US food aid budgets could be cut in half without a decrease in the overall volume delivered if the food was procured locally. The high cost of in-kind food aid combined with the adverse effects of this form of aid on agriculture in recipient countries makes a strong case for the elimination of US in-kind food aid. This could have a positive impact on the hungry in two ways: by reducing the side effects of food aid and freeing resources which could then be redirected towards supporting agriculture.

The donor countries must not only review their procurement system and dissociate food aid from their national interests but also dramatically increase the amount of resources for agriculture and rural development in the recipient countries. This is the only way to reduce hunger and the need for food aid.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

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Food Aid», Conference Paper, published by the Society of International Economic Law.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Confirming their continued commitment to the still valid objectives of the Food Aid Convention, 1999, to contribute to world food security, and to improve the ability of the international community to respond to emergency food situations and other food needs of developing countries;

Seeking to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of food assistance in preserving the lives and alleviating the suffering of the most vulnerable populations, especially in emergency situations, by strengthening international cooperation and coordination, in particular among the Parties and stakeholders;

Recognising that vulnerable populations have particular food and nutritional needs;

Affirming that States have the primary responsibility for their own national food security, and therefore for the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food as set out in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Voluntary Guidelines to support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security adopted by the FAO Council in November 2004;

Encouraging governments of food insecure countries to develop and implement country- owned strategies that address the root causes of food insecurity through long-term measures, and that ensure proper linkages between relief, recovery and development activities;

Referring to international humanitarian law and the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence;

Referring to the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, endorsed in Stockholm on 17 June 2003;

Recognising that the Parties have their own policies related to providing food assistance in emergency and non-emergency situations;

Considering the World Food Summit Plan of Action adopted in Rome in 1996, as well as the Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security identified in the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security of 2009, in particular the commitment

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

to achieve food security in all countries and the ongoing effort to reduce poverty and eradicate hunger that was reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in the United Nations Millennium Declaration;

Considering the commitments made by donor and recipient countries to improve development aid effectiveness by applying the principles of the Organisation for Economic Cooperationand Development's (OECD) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted in 2005;

The objectives of this Convention are to save lives, reduce hunger, improve food security, and improve the nutritional status of the most vulnerable populations by:

The Parties, in providing and delivering food assistance to the most vulnerable populations, should always adhere to the following principles:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Nothing in this Convention shall derogate from any existing or future WTO obligations applicable between Parties. In case of conflict between such obligations and this Convention, the former shall prevail. Nothing in this Convention will prejudice the positions that a Party may adopt in any negotiations in the WTO.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Eligible Country, Eligible Vulnerable Populations, Eligible Products, Eligible
Activities, and Associated Costs

Assistance Committee (DAC) list of Official Development Assistance Recipients, or any other country identified in the Rules of Procedure and Implementation.

with relevant national policies and legislation of the country of operation, including, as appropriate, applicable international food safety and quality standards as well as products that contribute to meeting food needs and protecting livelihoods in emergency and early recovery situations. The list of Eligible Products is provided in the Rules of Procedure and Implementation.

commitment in accordance with Article 5 shall be consistent with Article 1, and shall include at least the following activities:

These Eligible Activities are further elaborated in the Rules of Procedure and Implementation.

commitment according to Article 5 shall be consistent with Article 1, and shall be limited to costs directly linked to the provision of Eligible Activities, as further elaborated in the Rules of Procedure and Implementation.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

quantity can be expressed in tonnes of grain equivalent or other units of measure provided under the Rules of Procedure and Implementation.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Party formally opposes the proposed decision of the Committee on a matter under discussion at a formal session. Formal opposition may occur either at the formal session or within thirty days after the circulation of the minutes of a formal session recording the proposed decisions concerned.

informal meeting, or is temporarily unable to fill the office of Chairperson, the Vice-Chairperson shall act as Chairperson. In the absence of the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson, the Committee shall appoint a temporary Chairperson.

office of Chairperson, the Vice-Chairperson shall become Chairperson until the end of the year.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The Committee shall seek to resolve any dispute among the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Convention or the Rules of Procedure and Implementation, including any claim of failure to perform the obligations set out in this Convention.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

This Convention shall be open for signature by Argentina, Australia, the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the European Union, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Ireland, the Italian Republic, Japan, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Swiss Confederation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 11 June 2012 until 31 December 2012. This Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each Signatory. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Any State referred to in Article 12, or the European Union, that intends to ratify, accept, or approve this Convention or accede thereto, or any State or Separate Customs Territory deemed eligible under Article 13(2) for accession by a decision of the Committee but has not yet deposited its instrument, may at any time deposit a notification of provisional application of this Convention with the Depositary. The Convention shall apply provisionally for that State, Separate Customs Territory, or the European Union from the date of deposit of its notification.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The originals of this Convention, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised, have signed this Convention.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Eligible Activities for the fulfilment of a Party's minimum annual commitment are any of the following:

Associated Costs, as provided in Article 4(5) of the Convention, are the following:

comply with relevant national policies and legislation of the country of operation, including, as appropriate, applicable international food safety and quality standards. They are the following, until the

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

needs and protecting livelihoods in emergency and early recovery situations. They are the following, until the Committee modifies this list of products:

RULE 4: Grain Equivalence of Contributions to Quantity Commitments For Parties with quantity commitments:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

commitment, under Article 5(10) and 5(14) of the Convention, its cash contributions may be converted into grain equivalent for the portion not used to fulfil any value commitment the Party has made. The grain equivalence is calculated as follows:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Thai white rice, 100% second grade, fob Bangkok, Thai white rice, 5% broken, fob Bangkok

facilitate information sharing with stakeholders. The following is to be posted on this website:

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

of the Convention is to list contributions provided in a given year that count towards the minimum annual commitment of that same year. A standard reporting template is to be developed by the Committee and is to be used by all Parties. The list of contributions should contain the following elements, to the extent possible:

(viii) any other information relevant to the principles and objectives of the Convention, which could include information on Eligible Vulnerable Populations assisted.

The Secretariat may provide assistance in calculating the grain equivalence where applicable.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Committee to be adopted at the first formal session of the following year. This report is to reflect information provided in the Parties' annual reports as discussed in Rule 9 and is to contain:

its adoption by the Committee, on the website maintained by the Secretariat, in accordance with Rule 8.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

Chairperson after informal consultations with the Parties. Possible agenda items for discussion at formal sessions (or informal

Every fifth year after the Convention enters into force, the Committee is to undertake an assessment of its relevance.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014

The Secretariat is to make any arrangements for interpretation that may be necessary.

In considering an application for accession to the Convention under Article 13 (1) of the Convention, the Committee is to take into account all relevant factors, in particular the minimum annual commitment that the applicant is prepared to make in accordance with Article 5 (1) of the Convention.

International humanitarian food aid in the North-South cooperation: the case of Cameroon 2014