IV- Analysis
1) Analysis framework
This analytical section aims to answer the research question:
«To what extent have EU energy diversification policies been implemented
into national strategies in Spain, France, and Germany since aftermath of the
war in Ukraine?» This question is essential to understanding the energy
strategies in terms of diversification of energy sources in the EU and the
three Member States studied in this research.
To answer the research question, the results obtained are
examined as described in the methodology section in order to conduct an
in-depth and critical analysis. Three semi-structured interviews with four
experts form the main basis of the empirical data through narratives. Analysis
using NVivo software enabled thematic coding, which will guide this section and
is structured around key dimensions, including the EU's collective response
(strategy, standards and legislation), the national energy mixes of the three
Member States, the role of nuclear power, prospects for hydrogen,
infrastructure and new energy dependencies. To ensure the robustness of the
analysis, the narratives of the interviews are triangulated with official EU
documents and reports, allowing both the information gathered to be verified
and placed in its institutional context. These sources will be explicitly
included in the critical narratives, in accordance with Chicago style
standards.
Thus, the analysis is initially organised around the study of
EU policies and the collective response to the war, before focusing on case
studies of France, Germany and Spain, then proceeding to a comparative analysis
between cases and finally to a critical evaluation and theoretical
integration.
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2) European Union Policy
a) Historic break: reducing dependence on Russia
The war in Ukraine, the subsequent decision by the United
States to cut energy ties with Russia, and the EU's awareness that it should
not participate in financing the aggression have been called a revolution.
Before 2022, nearly half of the gas imported by the EU came from Russia, as one
DG ENER interviewee pointed out: «We have gone from 45% Russian gas to
less than 20% in two years. This is a historic break.» Indeed, the
share of Russian gas in EU imports via the pipeline fell from over 40% in 2021
to around 11% in 2024, and combined with LNG, imports from Russia accounted for
less than 19% of total EU gas imports in 2024, representing a major decrease in
a very short period of time (European Council, 2025). The EU has also acted on
oil, an important source of energy revenue for Moscow, by imposing progressive
sanctions and rapidly diversifying its supplies. For the EU, the dual
motivation behind this strategy is clear: to reduce the structural
vulnerability of its energy system and to stop financing Russian military
aggression.
Furthermore, the war has also brought the issue of energy
security to the forefront of European debates, described as «the fact
that we need sufficient energy at affordable prices, and of course
decarbonized». The EU's energy policy had previously focused on
decarbonizing production, but the conflict has highlighted the need to
simultaneously ensure security of supply, affordability and environmental
sustainability. Energy affordability became particularly salient with rising
energy prices, and the role of nuclear power was reconsidered as a source of
dispatchable capacity to support the energy transition without compromising
security of supply.
Moreover, the soaring energy costs caused by the energy crisis
have highlighted a new challenge of preserving European industrial
competitiveness. This trend stems directly from the surge in energy prices,
which has put many companies in difficulty, struggling to maintain their
production in Europe. EU policies accordingly aim to focus on competitiveness
and anchoring industries in Europe while enabling them to decarbonize, which
represents a considerable challenge.
b) 24
Sanctions
The sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia have gradually
targeted Russian coal, oil and gas. The embargo on coal was relatively easy to
implement, given its limited share in the European energy mix and therefore
easily substitutable, but the oil and gas embargo proved more complex. As one
interviewee said, oil is a globalized market, «easy to transport by
ship», which facilitated the shift to other suppliers. The difficulty
lies in implementing the EU's gradual embargo on maritime imports, which
account for the essential part of flows to Western Europe. In order to counter
attempts to circumvent the sanctions, the EU had to reinforce its surveillance
of the «ghost fleet», consisting of ships operating in the shadows to
clandestinely transport Russian oil using concealment tactics. In contrast, gas
depended on fixed infrastructure (gas pipelines, LNG terminals), making it a
structural vulnerability much more complex to address.
These measures are part of the broader framework of the
REPowerEU roadmap launched by the Commission in direct response to Russia's
invasion of Ukraine and the energy crisis. This document guides the EU in
eliminating imports of Russian energy by 2027 (European Commission, 2025). EU
Member States must then draw up national plans setting out how they will
gradually ban Russian energy imports by the end of 2025.
The sanctions against Russia have served a dual purpose:
reducing Russia's energy revenues and creating the conditions for a faster
energy transition. But they have also revealed divisions between MS that are
able to diversify their supplies quickly and those that are still heavily
dependent.
c) REPowerEU
The REPowerEU plan form the cornerstone of the EU's energy
strategy. It mobilizes €300 billion with the aim of accelerating energy
diversification and climate transition, in other words, ending dependence on
Russia and pursuing the Green Deal's 2050 carbon neutrality targets (Commission
Européenne, n.d.). To achieve this, the plan provides for the financing
of renewable energy development in the European energy mix, the modernization
and expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure, and increased
support for hydrogen.
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The LNG has quickly become `the linchpin of European energy
security', as one interviewee commented. The EU has become the world's largest
importer of LNG, mainly from the US, which accounted for 46.0% of 2024 share of
LNG arrivals, H1 2024 (Global LNG hub, 2024). In parallel, the EU has
diversified its trading partners to include Qatar and Azerbaijan. Also, unlike
gas which depends on infrastructure for transport, LNG is more flexible but
still requires LNG terminals and interconnections to supply landlocked
countries.
Thus, the REPowerEU plan foresees the accelerated construction
of floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) and the adjustment of
cross-border transport networks to ensure flows are redistributed across
Europe. REPowerEU combines short-term solutions (security of supply via LNG and
international contracts) and long-term solutions (climate transition through
renewables, efficiency and hydrogen), demonstrating the EU's willingness to
avoid substituting one dependency for another, but rather to lay the
foundations for European energy sovereignty.
In addition, the AggregateEU mechanism, introduced as part of
REPowerEU, is a platform designed to aggregate gas demand and facilitate joint
purchases, enabling MS and European companies to strengthen their position in
negotiations with international suppliers. The mechanism helps to rebalance the
power relationship between major global exporters and the European market, with
participation by companies being voluntary. Here, the Commission acts as an
intermediary and provides a framework; in fact, the EU does not impose
directives on MS regarding their energy mix but acts as a facilitator.
One of the most significant changes induced by the energy
crisis is the reorganization of European gas flows. According to one
interviewee, «before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, gas flowed from
east to west, and now it flows from west to east». This reversal of
flows has been made possible by the gradual modernization of interconnections
and the development of LNG capacities, which has led to the structural
reorganization of the European gas market and is undoubtedly one of the EU's
most notable achievements in response to the energy crisis, despite the
persistence of national interests.
d) EU climate framework and the role of nuclear power
As mentioned, the idea behind the EU's energy strategy is to
link energy security to its ecological transition objectives, a dual
«crisis and climate» agenda. The legislative texts
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included in the Fit for 55 package reflect this, in particular
the RED and EED (European Council, n.d.). The Renewable Energy Directive (RED)
promotes the share of clean energy in the European energy mix through the
latest revision of RED III in 2023, which sets a binding target of 42.5%
renewable energy by 2030, with an indicative target of 45% (European
Commission, 2023).
Meanwhile, the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), revised in
2023, sets a legally enforceable target of reducing energy consumption by 11.7%
by 2030, based on projections made in 2020 (EET, n.d.). As one interviewee
highlighted, this approach reflects the principle of «efficiency
first»: the fastest and most cost-effective way to reduce import
dependency is to consume less. These texts are anchored in multi-level
governance, whereby the EU sets the objectives and MS must implement
appropriate national plans, confirming that the EU is acting more as a direct
player in the energy transition and as a facilitator regarding the energy mix.
The interview with DG ENER experts emphasized this point: «Our role is
to facilitate diversification (...) but diversification is the responsibility
of the Member States».
It is against this backdrop that the debate on nuclear energy
has arisen. Prior to the war, the debate on nuclear energy was already
evolving, particularly with regard to sustainable finance taxonomy. Now,
«many politicians, both at EU and MS level, realize that nuclear will
be essential to achieving energy transition goals while maintaining security of
supply in Europe». However, some argue that nuclear power cannot be
part of the immediate strategy to meet the challenge of decarbonization and
that it is rather «a long-term strategy».
On the financial front, various European funds are available
to support the transition to low-carbon production, but «many of these
European funds are not accessible to nuclear energy». For example,
the Just Transition Fund is mainly intended for renewable energies, and this
type of mechanism remains closed to nuclear power. The length of projects and
the capital costs of nuclear power prevent funding and financing the
construction of new power plants, which poses challenges in terms of return on
investment, as investors need stability. The EU recognizes the advantages of
nuclear power, and this should be reflected in its policies to «send
clear signals that the EU considers nuclear power on an equal footing with
renewables». These funds could send a message to investors:
«they can invest in nuclear power, and the EU supports these
investments». As an experts said, the EU plans to wait until 2028
before including nuclear as a mechanism for producing low-carbon hydrogen,
which creates a competitive advantage for
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renewables and delays investment in hydrogen. From a technical
perspective, nuclear and hydrogen can operate well together thanks to the
stable capacity factors of nuclear power, unlike renewable energy sources,
which are useful for electrolysers and low-carbon heat production for
industry.
The Illustrative Programme for Nuclear (PINC) published by the
European Commission under the Euratom Treaty provides a comprehensive overview
of investment needs across the entire nuclear lifecycle. The 8th edition
estimates that €241 billion will be needed by 2050 to support the
extension of the lifetime of existing reactors and the construction of new
power plants (Enerdata, 2025). The motivation for developing nuclear power is
not solely economic. Extending the operation of existing reactors is as a fact
«the cheapest source of energy», but a «low-carbon
base load capacity» is also needed to build a decarbonized European
electricity system, which includes nuclear and hydrogen, as battery storage
alone would be massive.
3) Case-Studies
a) France
France promotes nuclear energy in its energy strategy, and the
war has provided it with «an opportunity to further defend nuclear
energy». At the European Council level, a growing number of countries
no longer oppose nuclear energy and its decision-making. France is at the
forefront of this movement, leading the Nuclear Alliance of Member States, an
informal alliance of 13 MS that support decisions favorable to nuclear energy
at the European level, such as its inclusion in the taxonomy, in the «net
zero» industry law, or in state aid regulation.
Simultaneously, E. Macron established a national strategy
announced on 10 February 2022, asking EDF, France's leading national energy
company, to build six new EPR2 reactors and commissioning studies for eight
additional EPR2 units. He also instructed authorities to extend the operating
lives of existing reactors beyond 40 years, potentially up to 50 years or more,
if safety permits. The industry documents presented this programme as
potentially delivering roughly 25 GW of new capacity by 2050. The investment is
important: €50 to €67 billion for the first six reactors, plus tens
of billions more for the subsequent ones (World Nuclear News, 2022). The French
President portrays nuclear power as a dual pillar alongside renewables,
ensuring that France preserves its industrial leadership and energy
sovereignty.
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Nevertheless, critics were highlighted by interviewees,
notably the example of the past project «Flamanville EPR», which
experienced years of delays, exponential costs estimated at €23,7 billion
including interest during the construction phase, compared to €3.3 billion
planned (Cour des Comptes, 2025). Additionally, EDF experiences financial
pressures due to policy changes regarding nuclear power plants in recent years.
Finally, the issue of social acceptability remains sensitive as France, marked
by the `Gilets jaunes' movement, continues to view the question of electricity
prices as eminently political. This is where the French paradox lies, because
its electricity mix is already decarbonized by nuclear power, yet it is lagging
behind in the deployment of renewable energies. In the words of one
interviewee: «When you look at a map of the carbon intensity of
electricity production in Europe, France is one of the greenest countries on
the map», yet «France risks being fined for failing to meet
its 2030 renewable energy targets, and is regularly called to order by the
European Commission for noncompliance with RED targets». This is a
major challenge for France, as highlighted by an expert from DG ENER:
«Wind and solar energy are underperforming in France: authorizations
are too slow and local opposition is strong». The problem is that the
EU sometimes favors certain technologies over others instead of focusing on
decarbonization. This debate fuels France's defense of a technologically
neutral approach, which would prioritize CO2 reduction targets over renewable
energy quotas.
Concerning hydrogen, France is ambitious with the national H2
strategy, aiming to create a complete system, from production to industrial
uses, but production remains low and costly. Besides, France remains cautious
about imports from Morocco or Spain, as it prefers to maintain an approach of
industrial sovereignty and security of supply. This trend is reflected in the
fact that today, «three-quarters of the hydrogen consumed in the EU is
carbon-based», meaning that most of the hydrogen consumed in France,
as in the EU, remains fossil-based. The priority is therefore to decarbonize
the existing hydrogen used in heavy industrial sectors (chemicals, fertilizers,
ammonia) before considering expanding its uses. The challenge for France is
therefore to «ensure that these hydrogen-intensive industries have
access to clean and affordable hydrogen». Future needs are
significant, and it is not certain that France will be able to produce enough
green hydrogen, so the main focus remains on securing sufficient domestic
decarbonized production for industry.
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France's energy strategy is rooted in a logic of strategic
autonomy, which is based on the assumption that nuclear power is the main
pillar, supplemented by a gradual increase in hydrogen and renewable energies.
However, this vision remains fragile due to the technological and financial
uncertainty surrounding nuclear power, and the social acceptability of energy
choices in a context of high price sensitivity.
b) Germany
Germany illustrates in a paradigmatic way Europe's energy
vulnerability prior to the war in Ukraine. In 2021, Germany was a major
importer of Russian Gaz representing 53% of its exports to the EU via Yamal,
Nord Stream 1 and 2 (Ziomecki, 2025). Its energy model was based on a
structural dependence on Russian gas, which directly fueled the country's
industrial pillars, notably the chemical, steel and automotive industries. The
invasion in February 2022 put an end to this equation, forcing Berlin to
urgently rethink its energy system. While the sanctions regime still allowed
Russian oil to be imported, these flows quickly dwindled, and Germany
compensated by accelerating diversification. In 2021, the country had no
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, but in less than three years, six
floating storage and FSRUs were commissioned in the north of the country at
Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel and Lubmin, accompanied by increased imports of
US and Qatari LNG and a strengthening of pipeline supplies from Norway, and
occasionally from Nigeria and Libya. This strategy, described as a
«puzzle, mosaic» by one interviewee, has transformed Germany, which
«not only imports for its own consumption, but now also exports, for
example to Austria», reversing the flows that previously only ran
from east to west.
Simultaneously, the coalition government (SPD, Greens, FDP)
has accelerated the deployment of renewables, aligning the RED III objectives
with the national law. Solar, wind and hydrogen became the pillars of the
transition, with the latter being crucial for decarbonizing heavy industry. As
one interviewee from DG ENR points out: «In the case of Germany, they
have been extremely ambitious» and «extremely quick in
accelerating the deployment of renewables in recent years, in parallel with the
construction of its LNG terminals». At the European level, Berlin is
positioning itself as a driving force for renewables but remains uncertain
about nuclear power. Indeed, despite the energy crisis, Germany has maintained
its schedule, with the permanent closure of its last three power plants in
April 2023, after a temporary extension of a few months for energy security
reasons. This is a paradox because it has led Germany to import
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massive amounts of French nuclear electricity. It should be
noted, however, that the carbon intensity of the German electricity mix (363
gCO2eq/kWh) remained around fifteen times higher than that of France (21.7
gCO2eq/kWh) in 2024 (UBA, 2025; RTE, n.d.).
Therefore, as one expert stresses, «Germany realizes
that opposing nuclear power solely for ideological reasons leads
nowhere», even if no recovery plan is envisaged in the short term
apart from a distant opening towards SMRs or fusion. Nuclear policy remains
marked by internal tensions: «the Chancellor is not opposed to nuclear
power and often takes positions in this direction», but «the
Ministry of Ecology says the opposite and responds to public consultations on
low-carbon hydrogen by stating that it should not include nuclear
power». Germany is clearly trying to clarify its internal dynamics
with the new government, and has even started attending, without participating,
the informal nuclear alliance meetings at the European Council.
Nonetheless, the energy crisis has revealed social divisions,
notably the protests against the `Heizungsgesetz' heating law. According to one
interviewee, «people felt that the pace was too fast and
unfair». This episode reflects the struggle to balance climate
urgency, energy security and social acceptability. The case of Germany
highlights the dilemmas that MS face with regard to the energy transition.
c) Spain
Spain is a unique case, given its excellent solar and wind
resources, with a highly concentrated population of 50 millions inhabitants
along the coast and in Madrid. This makes it relatively easy to build wind or
solar farms, as the interior is sparsely populated. However, the challenge for
renewables lies in market saturation, leading to very low capture rates for
solar plants, limited to 5% of the average electricity price in April 2025,
reducing investor attractiveness. This vulnerability pushed Spain to change the
electricity market at EU level, led by Teresa Rivera. In May 2022, Spain and
Portugal obtained regulatory approval from the European Council and the
Commission for what is known as the Iberian exception, which consists of
capping the electricity prices at which gas-fired power plants can sell
electricity on the market. This was authorised on the grounds that Spain is
isolated from the rest of the EU, forming a so-called «electricity
island».
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Spain has often advanced this argument: «We want more
interconnections; if you don't provide them, we need exceptions because we are
not on an equal footing with the rest of the MS and we suffer from
isolation», which, in energy terms, translates into higher prices
since isolated systems are more expensive than integrated systems.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of Spain having the
potential to supply renewable energy to its European neighbors was confirmed by
the experts, thereby contributing significantly to European energy sovereignty.
However, social, economic and political variables involved in exporting
renewables to the rest of the EU complicate this vision. Firstly, Spain
prioritizes decarbonization by 2050. Secondly, social acceptance by the Spanish
population would be a major obstacle. According to an interviewee:
«This idea that we will install a lot of renewables in Spain to export
them to the rest of the EU starts to circulate in Spain (...) there is this
narrative that we don't want to become an «energy colony».
Spanish wind and solar farms have a limited impact on employment because these
projects require a significant workforce during construction, but the staffing
requirements for maintenance are extremely low, depriving local populations of
direct economic benefits. Finally, the Spanish energy landscape is marked by
the strong presence of private players, with Iberdrola, the leader in renewable
energies, pushing for an acceleration of the transition, while Repsol together
with the oil industry are restraining progress, particularly in the transport
sector, claiming that industrial employments must be preserved.
Despite the great potential for renewable energy, its
interconnections are limited. In 2022, its electricity connection rate with
France was only 3%, well below the European target of 15% by 2030. As one
interviewee explained, Spain and Portugal are only connected to Europe by two
interconnections: one in Catalonia and one in the Basque Country:
«That's very little, which is why we talk about the «Iberian
energy island»».
For instance, the Bay of Biscay extension project, involving a
370 km submarine cable with a capacity of 2 GW, making the total FR-ES exchange
capacity increase from around 2.8 GW to 5 GW once the project is completed
(target commissioning date 2028), got considerably delayed (MITECO, 2024). As
one interviewee noted: «France was not very enthusiastic about opening
up its network further to Iberian renewables» but the blackout in
April 2025 made Spain push for more interconnexions with France (Abnett, 2025).
In terms of gas, Spain plays a strategic stabilizing role thanks to its network
of gas pipelines and, above all, its LNG infrastructure.
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With seven regasification terminals, it accounts for nearly a
third of European capacity. As the interviewee notes: «Spain has the
largest regasification capacity in Europe, but it remains underutilized due to
insufficient connections with the rest of the continent». This
imbalance was partially corrected in 2022, when France agreed to increase its
gas import capacity from Spain by around 20% through technical adjustments.
Then, in December 2022, Spain, France, and Portugal announced
the creation of the H2Med corridor, including the BarMar subsea pipeline
connecting Barcelona to Marseille. The goal is to transport 2 million tons of
green hydrogen per year by 2030, representing around 10% of the EU's estimated
consumption. The expert points out that «the initial idea was to use
BarMar in a hybrid way, first to transport gas and then hydrogen, but the
European authorities have decided that it will be used exclusively for
hydrogen». H2Med is recognized as a Project of Common Interest (PCI)
by the European Commission and is included in the REPowerEU strategy.
Another important factor is the Mediterranean dimension,
illustrating the vulnerability of Spain's energy security. First, the 1,400 km
Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (MEG), which transported Algerian gas to Spain and
Portugal via Morocco, was closed in October 2021. This is a direct consequence
of tensions between Algeria and Morocco, placing Spanish diplomacy in a
delicate situation. A few months after the closure, Spain indicated in a letter
to King Mohammed VI that it recognized de facto Moroccan sovereignty over
Western Sahara, which led Algeria to freeze `all trade relations with Spain,
with the exception of natural gas'. Second, regarding hydroelectricity, Spain
is a mountainous country and hence has significant potential to easily generate
hydroelectricity, despite its Mediterranean climate and irregular rainfall. As
an interviewee points out: «There are many droughts in Spain, and we
expect this trend to increase with climate change». Pumped-storage
projects face long environmental permitting procedures, which slows the
deployment of large-scale storage capacity. These projects are usually located
in the mountains, which requires many permits that are difficult to obtain.
By contrast, Spain currently operates seven nuclear reactors
that supply around 20% of its electricity production (World Nuclear
Association, 2024). In 2019, the government approved a plan with the private
companies owning these plants, setting a phased closure between 2027 and 2035.
However, the energy crisis and the major power outage on the Iberian Peninsula
in April 2025 have reignited the debate (ENTSO-E, 2025). While the current
government is
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maintaining its phase-out target, some industrialists and the
Christian Democratic Party are open to extending the life of nuclear power
plants by 10 years. This view is also supported by an expert from
NuclearEurope: «In Spain, we are seeing the closure of reactors that
could still be maintained and produce energy for years to come (...) this has
major consequences for jobs, competitiveness and energy security. The challenge
of decarbonization is immense, we must invest in all capacities: nuclear,
renewables and hydrogen». In Spain, the war in Ukraine and the energy
crisis have reshuffled the deck: to have a stable electricity system,
diversification is preferable.
4) Within-Case Analysis
In order to pursue the analysis, each case is compared in this
section, highlighting similarities, differences and structural divisions. As a
reminder, in the current environment, France has nuclear sovereignty but
remains vulnerable in terms of renewable energies, Germany made significant
efforts in renewable energies, focuses on LNG and its position on nuclear
energy is uncertain, while Spain concentrates on renewable energies and
hydrogen but remains predominantly opposed to nuclear energy.
It is noteworthy that these countries have converged on a
strategy of accelerating the diversification of energy sources since 2022,
resulting in a radical decline in Russian energy imports, but this `success'
masks a substitution by other dependencies (US, Norway, Algeria). The EU has
been the conductor of the energy crisis, but without a single score. All three
countries have mobilized REPowerEU as a specific emergency framework, and the
EU has been a facilitator through the objectives to be achieved, the financing
and the mechanisms implemented, but remains non-prescriptive on the energy mix,
which is left to the discretion of the Member States. The three countries seek
to strike a balance between energy security (availability), decarbonization
(combating climate change), and affordability (price) at their own level.
However, the hierarchy differs, with Germany favoring industry
and accessibility, France favoring strategic sovereignty, and Spain favoring
climate opportunities. In addition, there is a growing trend in each case
towards LNG, especially in Germany with the rapid construction of new terminals
and the development of renewable energy and hydrogen. This responsiveness
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from MS contrasts with the EU's historical slowness on energy
issues and demonstrates the effectiveness and relevance of the EU's response to
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Beyond the differences, there are structural fractures in the
energy mix of the three cases analyzed. France has a real asset in terms of
sovereignty, but the reality is that it imports uranium to produce nuclear
power, particularly from Africa and Central Asia, which hides an invisible
external dependency (WITS 1, n.d.). This illustrates the logic of `energy
security and new dependencies': apparent sovereignty is in fact based on
external supply chains, shifting vulnerability without eliminating it. Germany,
which opted for a post-Fukushima approach, i.e. phasing out nuclear power, is
exposing itself to direct economic (higher energy prices) and industrial (loss
of competitiveness) vulnerabilities by relying mainly on imports of US LNG
(WITS 2, n.d.). This illustrates how a national policy can reinforce
extra-European dependence. We find here the dynamic of `alternative
dependencies' from Russian gas, Germany is now exposed to a new vulnerability
linked to LNG imports, revealing the limits of the transition as an energy
security measure.
Comparing these two cases also shows that the dependencies are
different in nature: France's dependency on imported uranium remains largely
«invisible» in public debate, while Germany's dependency on LNG is
«visible» and highly politicized, as it involves costly
infrastructure and direct exposure to geopolitical tensions. This asymmetry of
dependencies complicates European unification, as it produces different
perceptions of energy vulnerability and therefore divergent priorities within
the EU.
Spain, positioned as a «model student» in the
transition and with the EU's renewable energy ambitions, faces geographical
isolation and a lack of interconnections with the rest of the continent,
placing it in a geopolitical and infrastructural vulnerability. Spain's
renewable energy potential remains under-exploited, highlighting the
limitations of the «multi-level governance» approach: the EU sets
ambitious targets (Fit for 55, RED III), but Member States remain the dominant
actors in implementation, and structural asymmetries such as interconnections
are not offset by sufficient European coordination. This limits the EU's
ability to transform its energy diversity into a real strategic advantage and
raises the criticism that the limits of European integration are not related to
resources but to governance and solidarity between MS. The EU's vulnerability
is fragmented, which hinders the implementation of a unified strategy and
increases the EU's dependence on short-term solutions. The EU must ensure
energy security
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through pragmatic management of national asymmetries rather
than internal convergence. This struggle to harmonize trajectories also
undermines EU's credibility as a Normative Power Europe, as defined by Ian
Manners (2002). Although the EU has strong climate ambitions with the Green
Deal and carbon neutrality, national differences (nuclear, LNG,
interconnections) weaken the projection of a consistent normative power.
This divergence also applies to nuclear, preventing the
emergence of a unified model. Even though the debates have evolved, especially
with Germany's informal participation in the nuclear alliance meetings at the
Council, the EU's international credibility is enfeebled, as it cannot speak
with one voice in global energy and climate negotiations. The hydrogen issue is
also causing new tensions as plans for massive imports from North Africa and
sub-Saharan Africa raise fears of «green extractivism», where the
European transition would be at the expense of producer countries, and
reproducing both asymmetries of dependency and post-colonialism dynamics
(Sadik-Zada et al., 2025).
Thus, through these three cases, the EU appears to operate on
a logic of coordination rather than real integration. Different national
trajectories and multi-level governance can become a real asset if they are
managed as structured complementarity.
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