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Les chambres régionales des comptespar Jean-Philippe SOL ENS Cachan - DEA Action Publique et Sociétés Contemporaines 2001 |
[5) The French model of the against-roleThe senators can only propose because they do not have any means of pressure on the regional rooms of the accounts. They can in no way of modifying the lawful framework their actions. As underlines it Bernard Levallois, Public auditor at the Court of Auditors and President of the regional room of the accounts of Alsace, the recent decisions taken by the Council of State leaves of another choice to the authorities only reinforce the legal reliability of the control of legality97(*), in particular in order to protect the small communes against legal possibilities of insecurity, which is one of the great sources of territorial dissatisfaction. This reason for legal insecurity and the significant number of communes in France (more than 36.000) had even led the President of the Trade union of the financial jurisdictions, Mr. Pierre Rocca, to propose a reactivation of departmental agencies98(*) in order to assist the small communes. A contrario, Mr. Rocca is not very favorable to the development of pole of competences commun runs with the prefectoral services, in particular because of the implication of the prefects in the joint projects with the local authorities and because it fears of this fact a diminution of the means allocated with the regional rooms. It is also a way of answering the one of the proposals of the Amoudry-Oudin report/ratio which recommended possibly a technical aid financial magistrates who would have been attached, within poles of competences also including/understanding other territorial magistrates, with the Prefect. This proposal admittedly emanated from a first report/ratio, suggested by the Council of State in 1993. The Houssin report/ratio (« On the simplification of the State in its relationships to the local communities ») also a reinforcement of the legal capacities of the decentralized services of the State recommended. The French system is indeed marked by a strong independence of its system of external control. « In many countries, the external control of the areas is organized and financed by the areas themselves. The persons in charge for the institutions in charge of control, the Presidents [of the German rooms] and of will sindicaturas Spanish or the general inspectors of the provinces of Canada, are all named by the communities which they control. Being the communes, that it is in England and with the country of Galle or in Holland, they often have the choice of the controller, like a company with the choice of its auditor. In England and with the country of Galle, the District to that, which is a public institution, is in competition for the control of the communes with the large private cabinets of Audit »99(*). In a country marked by the centralism and the absence of politico-administrative experiments marked by the polycentrism, the attempts at reforms suggested fall under a logic of jurisdictional independence. The members of the Court of Auditors thus propose solutions in accordance with their functions and their position within the system of action. Alain Sérieyx, President of the regional room of Provence-Alp-coast-to azure, public auditor at the Court of Auditors, in 1996, recalled that the function was new and that the formula adopted by the legislator, «particularly fuzzy, allows all interpretations, extensive or restrictive »100(*) . However, the presence of legislative or institutional, desired aporias or not by the legislator or the political decision maker, can only consolidate the fundamental role of the authorities or institutions involved, in the measurement or the absence of cleavages is likely to reveal the potential logic of the institutions. Without intervention of that which can modify the Tables of the Law, these last naturally tend to open out in their own operating mode. The relations contrasted between the rooms and the elected officials are thus « a question of a perpetual topicality ». The French model is that « against-role101(*) (countered-rotulus, beside ; « rotulus », role, register : to see, and exploit, of information, beside the examined communities) which is exerted by the rooms, take part of the balance of decentralization. It is entrusted to an independent jurisdiction, composed of ruling magistrate collégialement, placed apart from the influences, which they are those the representatives and services of the State, or of those of the checked local organizations ». And especially, the author to reiterate the vocation of this institution, which is that to control the accounts by affirming most strict neutrality in the control of the businesses of which it with the load, while playing the part which is it his in the lighting of certain public choices. The mission of the financial magistrate thus remains loan of this ethos of senior official, of which the vocation serves the Nation as a community and the local communities. This ideological base remains to be brought back, perhaps, with the characteristic of the construction of the ideology Public utility, become a stake and a legitimate resource, with the wire of the development of the official institutions and intervention of the State. What makes, that today, the institutions, actors or authorities of control draw from this ideology in order to justify their interventions. Also, surdéterminées by logics of body and the history of a prestigious institution, the solutions suggested can be only one adjustment of the existing provisions, such as they can be conceived and carried out within an institutional space animated by senior officials conscious of their responsibility and their competences. Gilles Cazenave does not propose particular solutions if it is not a great any more attention given to the exchange, the dialog and publicity. Pierre Fabre102(*), President de Section with the regional room of Provence-Alp-Coasts of Azure, would have a solution plus iconoclast which would consist in amalgamating the administrative courts with the CRC. The solution would have the advantage, according to the author, to simplify the French administrative structures, to facilitate the possible ones resort contentious, to avoid conflicts of competence and to create a single body magistrates, interchangeable in the two specialities, administrative or financial. Bernard Levallois103(*) recommends two suggestions more in connection with what exists « The first would be to make return to the higher Council regional rooms of the accounts of the accredited representatives of the local authorities » so that they can take part in possible proposals for a reorganization of the rooms. « The second would be to create, near this higher Council, for example, a committee charged to define the standards of control to be exerted by the regional rooms of the accounts ». Which question is treated by the Commission of the methods, at the Court of Auditors, which does not have any normative capacity and which is not that a simple authority of coordination. « Even if it is not always easy to say where stops the financial control and where the control of opportunity starts, we must absolutely lean us on the risk of slip towards the control of opportunity, insists Daniel Hoeffel, senator of the Low-Rhine. The local councillors, n the other hand of the transparency of their management, have the right to await the respect of their function ». Also, for lack of a legal base causing a notable consensus, for Philippe Limouzin-Lamothe, « the financial magistrates ensure themselves of the respect of the legal and lawful framework and check that the obligations of transparency are satisfied. The economic criteria of appreciation come as a second, and a second only »104(*). For Roland Laugh, at the time Maire of Strasbourg, « it is necessary to be forwarded to the development of common references, known and accepted of all. Once the practical methods of control well upstream defined, the debate on opportunity will lose of its acuity ». * 97 « Local communities and regional rooms of the accounts : for a partnership », Gazette of the n°1532 Communes of the 10/01/2001, p.10. * 98 « The regional rooms of the accounts cannot be advisers and controllers », The Gazette of the n°1475 communes of the 02/11/1998., p. 31. * 99 Bernard Levallois, President of the regional room of the accounts of Alsace, public auditor at the Court of Auditors, « Local communities and regional rooms of the accounts : for a partnership », The Gazette of the n°1532 Communes of the 10/01/2000, p.10 * 100 « Regulators or gendarmes of decentralization », Right and Decentralization, Local Authorities n°30, p.58-60. * 101 Gilles Cazenave, President of the regional room of the accounts of Haute-Loire, public auditor at the Court of Auditors, « How the relations between the regional rooms and the local councillors evolve/move », Right and Decentralization, Local Authorities, n°30, p.46-54. * 102 The Gazette of the communes, « Proclamation in favor of the fusion of the CRC and MT », * 103 The Gazette of the Communes, « Local communities and regional rooms of the accounts : for a partnership », n°1532 of the 10/01/2001, p.10. * 104 Extracts of the Gazette of the Communes, n°1482 of the 21/12/1998. |
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