L'ONU et la résolution des crises en Afrique centrale: le cas de la crise socio-politique centrafricaine de 2013

ABSTRACT

SOMMAIRE

ABSTRACT

Since march 24th, 2013, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been going through one of the most serious crises in its history. This crisis had negative consequences throughout the country. Thus, the Central African state, being unable to ensure the protection of its civilian population, requested the support of the international community, in this case the UN for an intervention in CAR. But, the current security context in the CAR raises several concerns so that one can wonder about the effectiveness and efficiency of the UN mission. Therefore, what is the UN contribution to the resolution of the Central African crisis of 2013? In reality, the contribution of the UN in Central African Republic is mixed because on the one hand, it has provided significant support for the security and stabilization of the country and on the other hand, its contribution remains ineffective in the face of the interminable Central African crisis. Indeed, the contribution of the UN in the Central African Republic appears from two angles, first, the restoration of the security by the imposition of the sounds voted by the Security Council on the various actors of the crisis and then the restoration of the autority of the state through the creation of MINUSCA. But its multifaceted efforts by the UN can still be improved because of the constraints which are inherent on the one hand to MINUSCA and on the other hand external. To do this, we recommend to UN the need for peace enforcement mandate as a priority and opportunity ; the need for a clear, effective and realistic mandate from MINUSCA ; the respect for the principle of impartiality and the goal of the UN ; the reform of the security sector as a necessary and urgent condition for the stabilization of the CAR and the total lifting of the embargo.

Keys words : UN, Resolution, social and political crisis, Central African Republic.

SOMMAIRE

SOMMAIRE

INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 2

PREMIÈRE PARTIE : LA STABILISATION PROGRESSIVE DE L'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN 2

CHAPITRE I : LA RESTAURATION DE LA SÉCURITÉ DANS L'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN 2

SECTION 1 : L'ADOPTION DES MESURES COERCITIVES VISANT L'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN 2

SECTION 2 : L'ADOPTION DES MESURES COERCITIVES VISANT LES ACTEURS NON-ÉTATIQUES 2

CHAPITRE II : LA RESTAURATION DE L'AUTORITÉ DE L'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN 2

SECTION 1 : LA RESTAURATION DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ TERRITORIALE DEL'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN 2

SECTION 2 : LA RESTAURATION DE L'AUTORITÉ MILITAIRE ET POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE DE L'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN 2

SECONDE PARTIE : LA STABILISATION ENCORE RELATIVE DE L'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN 48

CHAPITRE I : LA RELATIVITÉ LIÉE AUX CONTRAINTES INHÉRENTES À LA MINUSCA 2

SECTION 1 : LES PRINCIPALES CONTRAINTES D'INEFFICACITE DU MANDAT DE LA MINUSCA 2

SECTION 2 : LES AUTRES FACTEURS INTERNES D'INEFFICACITÉ DE L'APPLICATION DU MANDAT DE LA MINUSCA 2

CHAPITRE II : LA RELATIVITÉ LIÉE AUX CONTRAINTES EXTERNES À LA MINUSCA 2

SECTION 1 : LES CONTRAINTES LIÉES À LA FAIBLESSE DE L'ÉTAT CENTRAFRICAIN ET L'INGÉRENCE DES ÉTATS VOISINS 2

SECTION 2 : LES CONTRAINTES RELATIVES AUX ÉTATS MEMBRES DE L'ONU ET AUX GRANDES PUISSANCES 2

CONCLUSION GÉNÉRALE 2